**Codebook MIA-AUTHORITY
Measure of International Authority (MIA v. 2)
version May 31, 2021**

***Citation for the dataset***

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. **2017.** *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance.* Oxford: OUP, 888pp.

The Measure of International Authority (MIA) contains estimates of the Delegation and Pooling of authority (1950-2019) and policy portfolio for 76 international organizations (1950-2017). We are currently extending the measures through 2020.

**This is the codebook for MIA-Authority that accompanies the dataset DP\_Oct 2019.dta.**

Data available on: <https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/international-authority/>

Contents

[Table 1: MIA datasets 2](#_Toc73386183)

[Unit of analysis 3](#_Toc73386184)

[Types of IOs: task-specific vs. general purpose 3](#_Toc73386185)

[Authority: delegation and pooling 4](#_Toc73386186)

[***Delegation*** 4](#_Toc73386187)

[***Pooling*** 5](#_Toc73386188)

[***Calculation*** 6](#_Toc73386189)

[Sources 6](#_Toc73386190)

[Table 2: Explanation of entries in excel/stata file 7](#_Toc73386191)

[Table 3: IO acronym, COW ID, year-rows in dataset 10](#_Toc73386192)

# **Table 1:** **MIA datasets**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **MIA-Authority** | Annual scores on Delegation and Pooling for each international governmental organization from 1950-2019. Each row breaks an IO–year down into delegation, pooling, and their components. |
| MIA-Master data | Annual scores for each scoring indicator, which presents the data at the most disaggregated level. The unit of analysis is IO-year-body-decision area-decision stage. Please use this dataset if you would like to compose your own authority indicators. |
| MIA IO excel | IO-specific excel that reports a matrix where the unit of observation is the IO body at a decision stage in a decision area in a year of reform. This is the most complete record of our coding for a particular IO. These IO excel files contain some scoring that is not reflected in the MIA-Master data. |
| MIA IO profile  | The narrative of each IO contains a brief history of the IO as well as the justification (and sourcing) of each coding decision that is recorded in MIA IO excel. |
| MIA-Policy | Annual scores for each international governmental organization from 1950-2017. Each row breaks an IO–year down by 25 policy areas, policy scope, core policy, and flanking policy. |

A codebook accompanies each dataset. **This is the codebook for MIA-Authority.**

# **Unit of analysis**

The unit of analysis is the individual international governmental organization (henceforth international organization or IO) which we define as a formal organization for collective decision making among at least three member states. An IO is international in that it is constituted among national governments. It is an organization in that it is structured by rules for a continuous purpose.

How many IOs do we identify? We code 76 international organizations over the course of 1950-2019, varying over the years between 31 and 80.

What do we measure? International authority, that is political authority in the international domain. Political authority is the power to make collective decisions based on a recognized obligation to obey. We conceptualize international authority as delegation, the conditional grant of authority by member states to an independent body, and pooling, the joint exercise of authority by member states.

Which years do we code? The dataset covers the period 1950 (or the founding year of an IO, if later) to 2019 (or the final year of IO existence, if earlier). We code an institutional reform from the year that it comes into effect.

How do we keep track of change? We synthesize all observations used in scoring in an excel file for each IO. We begin with the structure and decision rules in 1950 or the first year of an IO’s existence. For each year in which we detect change, we start a new row in the excel file.

How do we justify a coding decision? Our judgments relate to rules laid down in treaties, conventions, protocols, rules of procedures, statutes, or other documents. We reference the documentary basis, and we seek to triangulate our judgements with secondary sources. Profiles for each IO detail documentary bases, secondary sources, and explain our observations. These profiles are available on the website.

# **Types of IOs: task-specific vs. general purpose**

We distinguish between general-purpose and task-specific IOs. This is expressed in their contractual speciﬁcity, the scale of their membership, and the breadth of their policy portfolios. However, at its most basic level the distinction is about the range of public goods that such IO could be asked to exercise authority over by or on behalf of its member states. Hence the thinnest definition is as follows:

* A **general purpose IO** bundles the provision of public goods for a transnational community of member states.
* A **task-speciﬁc IO** contracts cooperation narrowly around a clearly specified, and bounded, particular cooperation problem.

# **Authority: delegation and pooling**

We break down authority into two dimensions – delegation and pooling.

## ***Delegation***

**Delegation** is an annual estimate of the authoritative role of non-state bodies in an IO’s decision-making process. We distinguish between political delegation in agenda setting, political delegation in final decision making, and judicial delegation. *Delegation* is a straightforward average of these three.

*Political delegation* is assessed by evaluating decision making in a) IO assemblies, executives, general secretariats, and consultative bodies, b) that are partially or fully composed of non-member state actors, and c) that exercise or co-exercise authority over agenda setting and/or the final decision d) in one or more of six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and (up to five streams of) policy making. We evaluate the authority to set the agenda (agenda setting) and the authority to take the final decision (final decision) separately.

*Judicial delegation* is assessed with seven dichotomous or trichotomous items that tap how obligatory legal dispute settlement is; whether parties have direct access to thirdparty review; how binding rulings are; whether there is a standing tribunal; who has access; whether there is a remedy for non compliance; whether it can make compulsory preliminary rulings. The score for judicial delegation is the average of these seven components scaled from 0 to 1; if an IO has more than one dispute settlement mechanism, we use the aggregate score of the most supranational mechanism (DS\_sum\_st).

The aggregation for delegation works as follows:

1. Each IO body receives a **composition score** for the degree to which it is non-state.[[1]](#footnote-1) All scores range from 0 to 1.
2. Calculating **delegation in** **agenda setting (del\_agenda)**. We average composition scores for all bodies that participate in agenda setting in each decision area. With respect to the decision area of policy making, an adjustment is made when an IO has more than one policy stream or when the general secretariat is the sole gatekeeper. This produces an agenda setting score for each decision area, and delegation in agenda setting is the average of these six scores.
3. Calculating **delegation in** **final decision (del\_final)**. Rather than averaging, here we identify the body with the *highest* composition score in each decision area. This produces a decision score for each decision area, and delegation in final decision is the average of these six scores.
4. We use DS\_sum\_st, an average of seven components, for **judicial delegation**.
5. **Delegation** for an IO-year is the average of delegation in agenda setting (del\_agenda), delegation in final decision (del\_final), and judicial delegation (DS\_sum\_st).[[2]](#footnote-2)

## ***Pooling***

**Pooling** is an annual estimate of the extent to which member states share authority through collective decision making in the IO. Pooling is higher to the extent that national sovereignty is constrained by a) majority voting, b) IO decisions that are not or only partially subject to ratification, and c) IO decisions that are binding or conditionally binding.

Pooling is assessed in a) one or more state controlled IO bodies (assemblies, executives) b) in which member states collectively set the agenda and/or make final decisions, c) by pooling their authority under some decision rule with some degree of bindingness and/or requiring some form of ratification, d) in one or more of six decision areas (poolaccess, poolsuspens, poolconstit, poolbudget, poolcompliance, poolpolicy).

The scoring for pooling works as follows:

1. We determine which IO bodies are state controlled.[[3]](#footnote-3)
2. Each of these state controlled bodies receives a **voting score** which reflects the voting rule in each decision area. A score scales from 0 (individual decision by each member state) to 1 (members decide collectively by simple or absolute majority).
3. Decisions in each decision area are assessed on whether they require ratiﬁcation and whether they are binding, which combined produce a weight factor for each decision area. These **weights** range from 0.063 (ratification required by all member states & not binding) to 1 (no ratification & binding).
4. Calculating **pooling in agenda setting (pool\_agenda)**. We average voting scores for all state controlled bodies that participate in agenda setting for each decision area (with an adjustment when an IO has more than one policy stream). This score is multiplied by the weight for bindingness and ratiﬁcation for that decision area. This produces an agenda setting score for each decision area, and pooling in agenda setting is the average of these six scores.
5. **Calculating pooling in final decision (pool\_final)**. Rather than averaging, we identify the IO body that has the lowest (i.e least majoritarian) voting score in final decision in each decision area (with an adjustment when an IO has more than one policy stream). This voting score is multiplied by the weight for bindingness and ratiﬁcation in that decision area, and pooling in final decision is the average of these six scores.
6. **Pooling** for an IO-year is the average of pooling in agenda setting (pool\_agenda) and pooling in final decision (pool\_decision).[[4]](#footnote-4)

## ***Calculation***

Please apply the do file **combined DelPool\_Oct 2019.do** to MIA-Master.dta to produce the delegation and pooling estimates, and their components.

# **Sources**

For conceptualizing international authority and its operationalization, please see:

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. **2017.** *Measuring International Authority.* Chapter One: Measuring International Authority. OUP: 34-106.

For conceptualizing general purpose vs. task-specific international organization, and implications for contract, policy scope, and membership, please see:

Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks. 2019. *A Theory of International Organization.* Chapter Four: The Basic Set-up: How International Organizations Vary. OUP, 44-59.

For a step-by-step guide on how to aggregate scores for delegation and pooling into MIA, please see:

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. **2017.** *Measuring International Authority.* [Chapter Three: From Scoring to Aggregation](https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13018/2021/03/Hooghe_Marks_Schakel_Niedzwiecki_Osterkatz_Shairrosenfield_Measuring-regional-authority_2016.pdf)—The MIA Dataset. OUP: 107-132.

For a detailed discussion of the coding schema and its application, please consult:

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, Svet Derderyan. **2017.** *Measuring International Authority.* [Chapter Two: How We Apply the Coding Scheme](https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13018/2021/03/Hooghe_Marks_Schakel_Niedzwiecki_Osterkatz_Shairrosenfield_Measuring-regional-authority_2016.pdf). OUP: 34-106.

# **Table 2: Explanation of entries in excel/stata file**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **VARIABLE NAME** | **RANGE** | **VALUES AND LABELS** |
| Ioname |  | Short name of international organization (acronym) |
| Acronym |  | Full acronym of IO |
| Ionumber | 270-5550 | COW code (http://www.correlatesofwar.org) |
| Year | 1950-2019 | Year of evaluation |
| inception | 1831-2002 | Year in which IO was created |
| initial | 0-1 | First year in dataset  |
| End | 0-1 | Last year in dataset |
| typeI | 0-1 | 0=Task-specific1=General purpose |
| Contract | 0-1 | 0=relatively complete1=highly incomplete |
| DIMENSIONS |  |  |
| delegation | 0-1 | Delegation aggregated in one of two equivalent ways: (del\_agenda + del\_final + DS\_sum\_st)/3 OR (delaccess + delsuspens + delconstit + delbudget + delfincompl + delpolicy)/6 |
| pooling | 0-1 | Pooling aggregated in one of two equivalent ways: (poolagenda + poolfinal)/2 OR (poolaccess + poolsuspens + poolconstit + poolbudget + poolcompliance + poolpolicy)/6 |
| DS\_sum\_st | 0-1 | Delegation to dispute settlement, calculated as (rowmax(DS\_sum1 DS\_sum2 DS\_sum3)) |
| COMPONENTS |  |  |
| delaccess | 0-1 | Delegation on membership accession (agenda+ final + DS)/3 |
| delsuspens | 0-1 | Delegation on suspension of a member (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| delconstit | 0-1 | Delegation on constitutional reform (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| delbudget | 0-1 | Delegation on budgetary allocation (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| delcompliance | 0-1 | Delegation on financial non-compliance (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| delpolicy | 0-1 | Delegation on policy making (highest of five streams) (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| del\_agenda | 0-1 | Delegation on agenda setting (sum of agenda setting in 6 areas)/6  |
| del\_final | 0-1 | Delegation on final decision (sum of final decision in 6 areas)?6 |
| poolaccess | 0-1 | Pooling on membership accession (agenda+ final + DS)/3 |
| poolsuspens | 0-1 | Pooling on suspension of a member (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| poolconstit | 0-1 | Pooling on constitutional reform (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| poolbudget | 0-1 | Pooling on budgetary allocation (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| poolcompliance | 0-1 | Pooling on financial non-compliance (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| poolpolicy | 0-1 | Pooling on policy making (highest of five streams) (agenda+final+DS)/3 |
| pool\_agenda | 0-1 | Pooling on agenda setting (sum of agenda setting in 6 areas)/6 |
| pool\_final | 0-1 | Pooling on final decision (sum of final decision in 6 areas)/6 |
| coverage1 | 0-1 | Is the dispute settlement obligatory to all? (0,1,2)0: no dispute settlement1: not obligatory – Members can opt out2: obligatory – Members cannot opt out |
| thirdparty1 | 0-1 | Is there an explict right to third party review? (0,1,2)0:no right to third-party review1: access is controlled by a political body2: automatic right to third-party review |
| tribunal1 | 0-1 | How is the tribunal composed? (0,1,2)0: no tribunal1: tribunal is composed of ad hoc arbitrators2: standing body of justices who rule collectively during extended terms of service |
| binding1 | 0-1 | Is adjudication binding? (0,1,2)0: not binding1: binding if there is ex ante agreement among disputing parties2: directly binding |
| nonstate1 | 0-1 | Do non-state actors have legal standing? (0,1,2)0: on member states can initiate dispute resolution1: the international secretariat can initiate dispute resolution2: non-state actors as well as state actors can initiate |
| remedy1 | 0-1 | Is there remedy for non-compliance to the ruling? (0,1,2)0: no remedy for non-compliance1: remedy is retaliatory sanctions2: court rulings have direct effect |
| preliminary1 | 0-1 | Is there a preliminary ruling system of national court referrals? (0,1,2)0: no preliminary ruling system1: optional for national courts to ask for ruling2: some national courts are required to ask for a ruling |
| DS\_sum1 | 0-1 | Dispute settlement 1 (7 components)/7 |
| coverage2 | 0-1 | Is the dispute settlement obligatory to all? (0,1,2)0: no dispute settlement1: not obligatory – Members can opt out2: obligatory – Members cannot opt out |
| thirdparty2 | 0-1 | Is there an explict right to third party review? (0,1,2) |
| tribunal2 | 0-1 | How is the tribunal composed? (0,1,2) |
| binding2 | 0-1 | Is adjudication binding? (0,1,2) |
| nonstate2 | 0-1 | Do non-state actors have legal standing? (0,1,2) |
| remedy2 | 0-1 | Is there remedy for non-compliance to the ruling? (0,1,2) |
| preliminary2 | 0-1 | Is there a preliminary ruling system of national court referrals? (0,1,2) |
| DS\_sum2 | 0-1 | Dispute settlement 1 (7 components)/7 |
| coverage3 | 0-1 | Is the dispute settlement obligatory to all? (0,1,2)0: no dispute settlement1: not obligatory – Members can opt out2: obligatory – Members cannot opt out |
| thirdparty3 | 0-1 | Is there an explict right to third party review? (0,1,2) |
| tribunal3 | 0-1 | How is the tribunal composed? (0,1,2) |
| binding3 | 0-1 | Is adjudication binding? (0,1,2) |
| nonstate3 | 0-1 | Do non-state actors have legal standing? (0,1,2) |
| remedy3 | 0-1 | Is there remedy for non-compliance to the ruling? (0,1,2) |
| preliminary3 | 0-1 | Is there a preliminary ruling system of national court referrals? (0,1,2) |
| DS\_sum3 | 0-1 | Dispute settlement 1 (7 components)/7 |

# **Table 3: IO acronym, COW ID, year-rows in dataset**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ALADI | 3430 | 1961—2019 |
| AMU | 470 | 1989—2019 |
| APEC | 650 | 1991—2019 |
| ASEAN | 750 | 1967—2019 |
| AU | 3760 | 1963—2019 |
| BIS | 810 | 1950—2019 |
| Benelux | 840 | 1950—2019 |
| CABI | 871 | 1987—2019 |
| CAN | 330 | 1969—2019 |
| CCNR | 1050 | 1950—2019 |
| CEMAC | 1260 | 1966—2019 |
| CERN | 1720 | 1954—2019 |
| CIS | 1230 | 1992—2019 |
| COE | 1390 | 1950—2019 |
| COMECON | 1370 | 1959—1991 |
| COMESA | 1170 | 1982—2019 |
| Caricom | 880 | 1968—2019 |
| ComSec | 1240 | 1965—2019 |
| EAC1 | 1750 | 1967—1976 |
| EAC2 | 1751 | 1993—2019 |
| ECCAS | 1500 | 1985—2019 |
| ECOWAS | 1520 | 1975—2019 |
| EEA | 1831 | 1994—2019 |
| EFTA | 1670 | 1960—2019 |
| ESA | 1790 | 1980—2019 |
| EU | 1830 | 1952—2019 |
| FAO | 1840 | 1950—2019 |
| GCC | 1990 | 1981—2019 |
| GEF | 1900 | 1994—2019 |
| IAEA | 2370 | 1957—2019 |
| IBRD | 2400 | 1950—2019 |
| ICAO | 2500 | 1950—2019 |
| ICC | 2702 | 2002—2019 |
| IGAD | 2230 | 1986—2019 |
| ILO | 2830 | 1950—2019 |
| IMF | 2880 | 1950—2019 |
| IMO | 2860 | 1960—2019 |
| IOM | 2250 | 1955—2019 |
| ISA | 3100 | 1994—2019 |
| ITU | 3160 | 1950—2019 |
| IWhale | 3250 | 1950—2019 |
| Interpol | 2700 | 1950—2019 |
| LOAS | 3450 | 1950—2019 |
| Mercosur | 4260 | 1991—2019 |
| NAFO | 2572 | 1979—2019 |
| NAFTA | 3670 | 1994—2019 |
| NATO | 3700 | 1950—2019 |
| NordC | 3590 | 1952—2019 |
| OAPEC | 3800 | 1968—2019 |
| OAS | 3900 | 1951—2019 |
| OECD | 3750 | 1950—2019 |
| OECS | 3830 | 1968—2019 |
| OIC | 3850 | 1970—2019 |
| OIF | 270 | 1970—2019 |
| OPEC | 3840 | 1960—2019 |
| OSCE | 3770 | 1973—2019 |
| OTIF | 1090 | 1950—2019 |
| PCA | 3940 | 1950—2019 |
| PIF | 4200 | 1973—2019 |
| SAARC | 4170 | 1986—2019 |
| SACU | 4240 | 1969—2019 |
| SADC | 4250 | 1982—2019 |
| SCO | 5550 | 2002—2019 |
| SELA | 3390 | 1976—2019 |
| SICA | 990 | 1952—2019 |
| SPC | 4190 | 1950—2019 |
| UN | 4400 | 1950—2019 |
| UNESCO | 4410 | 1950—2019 |
| UNIDO | 4420 | 1985—2019 |
| UNWTO | 4570 | 1975—2019 |
| UPU | 4430 | 1950—2019 |
| WCO | 1650 | 1952—2019 |
| WHO | 4550 | 1950—2019 |
| WIPO | 4560 | 1970—2019 |
| WMO | 4530 | 1950—2019 |
| WTO | 4580 | 1995—2019 |

1. An IO body may be partially or fully independent of member states in one of three ways. It may be composed of representatives of bodies outside the executive organs of the member state, for example, representatives of national or regional parliaments, courts, interest groups, professional associations, or international organizations. It may be composed of members who operate under an oath of independence. Or it may be an external non-state body. In each case, the participant must have full voting rights to qualify as non-state (Hooghe et al. 2016: 109ff). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Step 5 can be reconfigured by, first, averaging agenda setting, final decision, and dispute settlement for each of the six decision areas to produce delaccess, delsuspens, delconstit, delbudget, delfincompl, delpolicy, and second, averaging these six scores to produce delegation. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. We consider an assembly as state-dominated when all or a majority of its members are selected by member states; we consider an executive as state-dominated when all or a majority of its members represent member states and receive voting instructions from their government. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Step 6 can be reconfigured by, first, averaging the pooling score for agenda setting and final decision for each of the six decision areas to produce poolaccess, poolsuspens, poolconstit, poolbudget, poolcompliance, poolpolicy, and second, averaging these six scores to produce pooling. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)