Community, Scale, and Regional Governance
Transformations in Governance

*Transformations in Governance* is a major new academic book series from Oxford University Press. It is designed to accommodate the impressive growth of research in comparative politics, international relations, public policy, federalism, and environmental and urban studies concerned with the dispersion of authority from central states up to supranational institutions, down to subnational governments, and sideways to public–private networks. It brings together work that significantly advances our understanding of the organization, causes, and consequences of multilevel and complex governance. The series is selective, containing annually a small number of books of exceptionally high quality by leading and emerging scholars.

The series targets mainly single-authored or co-authored work, but it is pluralistic in terms of disciplinary specialization, research design, method, and geographical scope. Case studies as well as comparative studies, historical as well as contemporary studies, and studies with a national, regional, or international focus are all central to its aims. Authors use qualitative, quantitative, formal modeling, or mixed methods. A trademark of the books is that they combine scholarly rigor with readable prose and an attractive production style.

The series is edited by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and Walter Mattli of the University of Oxford.

*Organizational Progeny: Why Governments are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance*
Tana Johnson

*Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity within Democratic Countries*
Agustina Giraudy

*Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume I*
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman Osterkatz, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield

*Community, Scale, and Regional Governance: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume II*
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks (with Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman Osterkatz, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield)

*Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III*
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, and Svet Derderyan

*Community, Scale, and the Design of International Organization: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume IV*
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Tobias Lenz

*Community and Scale: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume V*
Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume II

Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks
(with Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman Osterkatz, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield)
Acknowledgements

The questions that motivate this book took form in Val d’Aran in the Pyrenees some ten years ago. We had driven several hours to traverse just a few linear miles, and we had arrived in a place with distinctive flora and fauna, habits and norms. What, we began to ask, was the effect of geographical isolation? How could political difference be sustained in its absence?

In seeking answers we have been helped by many people. Max Boiten collected data on distinctive regions. Luigi Mendez, Nick Neuteufel and Rick Scholten checked references and formatted text. Sandra Chapman compiled the index. Special thanks to Dawn Brancati, Kent Eaton, Jean-Paul Faguet, Agustina Giraudy, and Michaël Tatham for their extensive feedback on drafts we sent their way.

We owe a large debt of gratitude to many friends and colleagues who helped us along the way. At our two home universities, UNC Chapel Hill and VU Amsterdam, we have been fortunate to have been surrounded by terrific colleagues. In particular, Tom Carsey, Virginia Gray, Jonathan Hartlyn, Hans Keman, and Georg Vanberg have provided helpful comments. Conversations with graduate students at both universities in and out of the classroom have sustained the project in countless ways. Emanuel Coman, Hanna Kleider, Jonathan Kropko, Benjamin Neudorfer, Jan Rovny, and Florian Stoeckel have helped us in matters large and small. Our home universities gave us unqualified support while we were on research assignment.

Extended stays at the Kollegforschungsbereich “Transformative Europe” at the Free University of Berlin, provided us with valuable feedback. Tanja Börlzel, Detlef Jahn, David Levi Faur, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Wolfram Kaiser, Juan Díez Medrano, Kiran Patel, and Thomas Risse have been wonderfully generous with comments, advice, and friendship. Nuffield College welcomed us for a Trinity term which allowed us to push the draft into a manuscript. We are also grateful to the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg in Delmenhorst for financial and intellectual sustenance. On various occasions we received comments from Ian Bache, Michael Bauer, Jenna Bednar, Arthur Benz, Nicholas Charron, Maria Escobar-Lemmon, Tulia Falleti, Imke Harbers, Charlie Jeffery, Christian Joerges, Ken Kollman, Brigid Laffan, Iván Llamazares, Edina Szöcsik, Pep Vallbé, and Christina Zuber. We owe a special debt to two whose influence
Acknowledgements

is felt on every page—Stein Rokkan and Elinor Ostrom. We would have loved to send them copies.

We are most fortunate to have had the help of talented co-authors. Sandi Chapman Osterkatz, Sari Niedzwiecki, Arjan Schakel, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield are equally responsible for producing the regional authority index that provides a foundation for this book and they have been influential in shaping our thinking and suggesting incisive examples.

The project has been financed by Gary Marks’ Advanced ERC grant # 249543, “Causes and Consequences of Multilevel Governance” and a grant to Liesbet Hooghe from the European Commission.

We dedicate this book to our parents, Eileen and Bobby, and Cécile and Raf, who showed us how two people can share work as well as love.

Chapel Hill

April 2016
Contents

List of Tables xi
List of Figures xiii
List of Maps xv

Prologue 1
1. Scale and Community 5
2. Measuring Regional Authority 24
3. Trends in Regional Authority 44
4. Designing Jurisdictions 65
5. Community and Differentiated Governance 100
6. Community and the Structure of Governance 122
7. Five Theses on Regional Governance 151

References 163
Index 189
Detailed Contents

List of Tables xi
List of Figures xiii
List of Maps xv

Prologue 1

1. Scale and Community
   Scale Diversity 5
   The Ladder of Governance 8
   The Nature of Authority 11
   Community 15
   Patterns of Peripheral Survival 19

2. Measuring Regional Authority 24
   I. The Background Concept: Political Authority 29
   II. The Specified Concept: Validity and Minimalism 31
   III. Dimensions of Self-rule and Shared Rule 34
   IV. Indicators for Dimensions of Self-rule and Shared Rule 38
   V. Scoring Cases 38
   VI. Adjudicating Scores 39
   Conclusion 42

3. Trends in Regional Authority 44
   The Big Picture 44
   Convergence? 46
   A Multilevel Perspective 48
   Differentiated Governance 52
   The Incidence of Reform 55
   Democracy 57
   Conclusion 61
   Appendix 62

4. Designing Jurisdictions 65
   Where to Start 67
   Jurisdictional Design in History 69
   Community and Geo-history 73
## Detailed Contents

| Conceptualizing Jurisdictional Design | 75 |
| Comparing Jurisdictional Designs      | 77 |
| The Effect of Regime Change          | 81 |
| Napoleonic Design                    | 83 |
| Optimized Design                     | 88 |
| Rokkanian and Irregular Design       | 90 |
| “An Average is But a Solitary Fact”  | 96 |
| Appendix                              | 98 |

### 5. Community and Differentiated Governance

| Types of Differentiation               | 100 |
| Autonomy                              | 101 |
| Asymmetry                             | 105 |
| Dependency                            | 110 |
| Conclusion                            | 116 |

### 6. Community and the Structure of Governance

| Expectations                           | 122 |
| Variables                              | 126 |
| Regional Authority                     | 128 |
| Community                              | 128 |
| Democracy                              | 132 |
| Population, Area, Affluence            | 133 |
| Ethnic Diversity                       | 133 |
| Supranational Governance               | 133 |
| Tiers                                  | 134 |
| The Effect of Prior Statehood and Language on Governance | 134 |
| Community’s Effect over Time           | 138 |
| Conclusion                             | 145 |
| Appendix                               | 148 |

### 7. Five Theses on Regional Governance

| Regional Governance Has Undergone a Quiet Revolution | 151 |
| Regional Governance Has Become Differentiated       | 152 |
| Regional Governance Grows with Affluence            | 154 |
| Regional Governance is Social                       | 155 |
| Regional Governance is Democratic                   | 157 |

References                                                                                           163
Index                                                                                                  189
List of Tables

2.1 Measures of regional authority 25
2.2 Self-rule 40
2.3 Shared rule 41
2.4 Polychoric factor analysis 43
3.1 Trends in regional authority 47
3.2 Regional tiers 49
3.3 Establishment and disestablishment of regional tiers in 81 countries (1950–2010) 50
3.4 Reforms in federal countries 56
3.1.1 Country coverage 62
4.1 Types of jurisdictional design 66
4.2 Operationalizing jurisdictional design 78
4.3 Jurisdictional design in 42 reforms 79
4.4 Logit model for the effect of regime change on jurisdictional design 82
4.1.1 Jurisdictional tiers and key correlates 98
4.2.1 Operationalization: the effect of regime change on jurisdictional design 99
4.3.1 Descriptives: the effect of regime change on jurisdictional design 99
5.1 Types of differentiation 103
5.2 Autonomy (1950–2010) 106
5.3 Indigenous jurisdictions (1950–2010) 107
5.4 Asymmetry (1950–2010) 115
5.5 Dependency (1950–2010) 117
6.1 Rokkan regions in 2010 132
6.3 Time-series cross-section estimation for 81 countries 140
6.4 Democracy, community, and regional reform 141
6.1.1 Time-series cross-section estimation for non-federal countries 148
6.2.1 Operationalization of independent variables 149
6.3.1 Descriptives of independent variables 150
List of Figures

1.1 Policy cost curves
1.2 The ladder of governance

1.3(a) Jurisdictional axes: Mendoza, Argentina
1.3(b) Jurisdictional axes: Echternach, Luxembourg
1.3(c) Jurisdictional axes: Chapel Hill, United States

2.1 Measurement model

3.1 Distribution of regional authority scores
3.2 Reforms at the country level
3.3 From uniform to differentiated governance
3.4 Reforms at the regional level
3.5 Democracy and regional authority
3.6 The evolution of representation

4.1 An analytical frame for jurisdictional design
4.2 Jurisdictional designs
4.3 Rokkan regions

4.4(a) Napoleonic designs: Départements in Napoleonic France (1790)
4.4(b) Napoleonic designs: Provincias in Napoleonic Spain (1833)
4.4(c) Napoleonic designs: Vojvodships in Poland (1999)
4.4(d) Napoleonic designs: Planski ryegioni in Macedonia (2008)
4.4(e) Napoleonic designs: Regiuni de dezvoltare in Romania (1998)

4.5(a) Optimized designs: Regiones in Chile (1976)
4.5(b) Optimized designs: Federalnyye okruga in Russia (2000)

4.6(a) Rokkanian and irregular designs: Negeri-negeri in Malaysia (1957–63)
4.6(b) Rokkanian and irregular designs: Comunidades in Spain (1979–83)
4.6(c) Rokkanian and irregular designs: Perifereies in Greece (2011)
4.6(d) Rokkanian and irregular designs: Regioni in Italy (1971)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.6(e)</td>
<td>Rokkanian and irregular designs: Provinsi-provinsi in Indonesia (1950)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6(f)</td>
<td>Rokkanian and irregular designs: Provinsi-provinsi in Indonesia (2010)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Modes of differentiated regional governance</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Paths of differentiation (1950–2010)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Shared rule in asymmetric and autonomous regions</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1(a)</td>
<td>Annual regional authority</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1(b)</td>
<td>Annual change in regional authority</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Language and prior statehood in democracies and autocracies</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Maps

4.1 A geometric design for France (1780) 71
4.2 Départements in France (2015) 72
Prologue

The postfunctionalist premise of this book is that governance is not one thing. It is at least two things: it is a means to realize ends and it is an end in itself. The first conception conceives governance, binding collective decision making in the public sphere, as a functional adaptation to the provision of public goods. The second conceives governance as an expression of human sociality. It stresses that humans are social beings who value self-rule for what it is as well as for what it does. Collective self-rule has intrinsic value for people who consider themselves part of a community.

In order to make progress in explaining the territorial structure of governance, it is necessary to theorize both its functional and social logics. The functional logic of governance is a logic of scale diversity in the provision of public goods. It conceives jurisdictional design as a utilitarian response to the dilemma of providing public goods to egocentric individuals. This approach has some elegant implications. Multilevel governance is what *homo economicus* would create if he wished to provide individuals living in different locations with public goods having diverse externalities and economies of scale.

However, we need to extend the analysis beyond the pressures for functionally efficient governance if we wish to understand demands for self-rule on the part of ethnic minorities or, more generally, communities that are normatively distinctive. When such communities demand self-rule, they are claiming a collective right to exercise authority. The demand is not derivative from a preference over policy. It expresses a polity preference rather than policy preference. It asserts the right of a community to govern itself. This is the *Who Question*—does this group or does that group have the right to make collectively binding decisions? This is one of the most difficult questions in the field of human behavior, and it is the source of much political conflict. It is the point of departure for postfunctionalism because it requires one to think beyond the functionalist analysis of economic efficiency. It implies that to
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

explain governance one must analyze how individuals think and act in relation to the communities to which they conceive themselves belonging.

In our prior work we have theorized that the implications of community for governance are constructed in political debate. The conceptual distinction between exclusive versus inclusive national identity appears to be highly influential in predicting attitudes over European integration. So it is not the strength of national identity that is decisive for jurisdictional reform, but the way in which national identity is constructed in debate among political parties, social movements, elites, and the media. This approach is bearing fruit in the analysis of peripheral nationalism. However, if we wish to generalize about the structure of governance across a wide range of countries over an extended period of time, it makes sense to go further back in the causal chain. Regionalist political parties are banned in many countries, and surveys that would allow us to infer contestation over polity preferences are lacking. So we identify systemic indicators of peripheral community which we use to predict the structure of governance.

Economic costs and benefits can be expected to affect the willingness of individuals to make a sacrifice for self-rule. However, the existence of a budget constraint does not alter the premise that the demand for self-rule cannot be reduced to preferences over policy. There are at least two reasons for believing so. The first is that there is convincing evidence that the diffuse reciprocity exhibited by humans in communities cannot be explained by theories that assume humans to be self-regarding economizers.

The second reason—and the central argument of this book—is that the effects of community for governance are different from the effects of functional efficiency. Normatively distinct communities produce ripples in the structure of governance because they attract rule. They produce local concentrations of authority that break the coherence of jurisdictional design across a country. The outcome then reflects not just heterogeneity of policy preferences, but something more fundamental and difficult to accommodate, heterogeneity of polity preferences. The literature on heterogeneity of policy preferences helps one explain uniform multilevel governance in which every jurisdiction in a country has the same authority. We theorize the heterogeneity of polity preferences to explain something more varied and more puzzling: differentiated multilevel governance.

Minority communities generate differentiation in ways that have little to do with functional efficiency and a lot to do with the strategic location of a regional community in relation to the central state and to other regions in the country. Minority communities come in distinct forms that allow one to generalize about their authority, their relations with other subnational groups, and their systemic effects. Whereas some regional communities can be accommodated as anomalies that have merely local effects, others
precipitate intense conflict with systemic effects for governance in the country as a whole.

The influence of community appears to reach into the physical design of jurisdictions. One might expect that any sensible economist or public goods scholar would design jurisdictions so that they have roughly the same territory and population. However, the jurisdictions we observe are built around communities as well as functionalist models, and this leads them to have widely varying territories and populations. Some communities survive national assimilation with small populations in small territories at the geographical margin of a society, while others nearer the center have large populations in large territories. So the existence of community makes its presence felt by producing a positive association between the size of a region's population and the size of its territory.

A community is not just a collection of individuals having distinct preferences over policy. A community is a group of densely interacting individuals sharing norms of diffuse reciprocity. This makes a decisive difference because sociality is the key to overcoming the dilemma of collective action, the free rider problem. Territorial proximity is by no means necessary for sociality, but it certainly helps. Territorial community is perhaps the strongest form of solidarity there is. National states are the foremost example, but territorial communities within national states can also have a formidable capacity for collective action.

Several expectations flow from this. One is that the efforts of a minority community to gain self-rule can affect the society as a whole. There are several ways in which this can happen. Those in other regions may resist the empowerment of a single region, or they may compete by demanding similar rights. When confronted by a minority that considers itself a nation, people in other regions may begin to reconsider their own identity. Central rulers may accommodate a minority by reforming the country as a whole, or they may resist and seek to suppress the movement.

Opposition rooted in a minority community may outlast intense state repression. Territorially concentrated minority communities can be a thorn in the side of a dictator, and are a common source of revolt in authoritarian regimes. Pressures for self-rule can burst into the open when a regime democratizes, with dramatic consequences for the formation of new states. Democratization and minority nationalism go hand in hand, yet consolidated democracies rarely break apart. On the one hand, democracy creates space for the mobilization of minority community; on the other it allows an amazingly flexible repertoire of accommodation.

Both functional and community pressures have played out in the rise of regional authority over the six decades we examine in this book. However, they have done so in different ways with different results. One would expect to see country-wide reform as a functional response to change in the
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

technology of public goods provision or change in a government’s policy portfolio. We find ample evidence for such effects both cross-sectionally and over time. Governments have become more engaged with the daily lives of citizens as they have taken on responsibility for education, health, welfare, and the environment. These policies require contextual information that is difficult to centralize, and governments have adapted by providing these policies at multiple levels.

Functional and community pressures have operated in much the same direction in recent decades to deepen multilevel governance. However, there is nothing inevitable about this. Community is double-edged, and it can centralize as well as decentralize authority. The demand for national self-rule can impede governance among states. Within states, minority communities can claim exclusive competences that throttle multilevel governance within their territories. Efforts to stretch functional analysis to encompass such effects appear to go in precisely the wrong direction. In order to account for the variation that we observe across time and space, we need to redirect the study of governance to questions that are prior to preferences over policy. We need, in short, to engage the Who Question—who gets the right to make collectively binding decisions?
1

Scale and Community

What principles underpin governance? One must begin by asking which group of persons should form a jurisdiction. This is the Who Question: who should have the right to make collectively binding decisions? Only after persons are conceived as members of a group does it make sense to ask how that group should make decisions. Democracy does not provide an answer. The principles that underpin democracy say nothing about who the people are. Majority rule, yes, but a majority of which people? Minority rights, but in relation to which majority? Principles of democracy, justice, or individual rights do not tell one which groups of persons should exercise governance to achieve these goods. The fundamental question of governance—the Who Question—is logically and ontologically prior to questions relating to how a group makes decisions or what those decisions are. A theory of governance should, at a minimum, seek to explain the territorial structure of authority: which groups at which scales have authority to make what kinds of decisions?\(^1\)

The Who Question is one of the most contested and intrinsically difficult issues in politics. Strangely, it could be set aside for a few decades following World War II. The structure of governance was frozen in place by fear of Völkisch conflict. The puzzles that shaped the study of politics concerned regime type and distributional conflict within jurisdictions that were assumed to be fixed. These topics are deeply important, but they must be prefaced by inquiring into the structure of governance. Which groups get to exercise self-rule?

One approach is to think through the functional implications of providing public goods. Governance in the tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls begins with individuals who contract a government to provide themselves with security and the good things in life while seeking rules that

\(^1\) We define governance as authoritative decision making in the public sphere. This may take place within or among states. The questions we are asking engage both comparative politics and international relations.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

protect individual liberty. Every person has the same need to provide herself with government. The social contract theorists disagree on how decisions should be made, but they share the assumption that it doesn’t really matter who consents to contract government. What matters is that the threat of moral hazard impels any rational person to do so.

Hobbes regards society as an outcome, not an ingredient, of government. Group solidarity plays no role in creating jurisdictions. What spurs individuals to form a government is that they share a condition—the state of nature—for which binding coordination is a rational response. The political community—the commonwealth—is the product of government, “For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the Commonwealth” (Hobbes 1651/2001: ch. XXIX). Humans have motives and desires that are pursued without reference to ethnicity or culture. Each individual is, in short, a “disconnected singular” (Wolin 1960: 246).

Rawls (1971: 13) invites us to consider the principles of government that “free and equal persons would assent to under conditions which are fair,” that is, the principles that we would choose to impose on ourselves as “unencumbered individuals.” Such persons may conceive the principles of a just society before knowing what sort of people they are, what their personal capacities are, or what groups they consider themselves members of. Rawls is asking us to peel away every layer of social being to recognize procedural principles of political justice that are prior to the loyalties and convictions expressed in political communities.

This is precisely how contemporary public goods theory conceives governance. Individuals are prior to society, and the structure of governance reflects individual preferences and the need to overcome moral hazard in providing public goods (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Musgrave 1959; Oates 2005; Stigler 1957). What matters is the territorial heterogeneity of preferences which pulls government down to the local level, and economies of scale and externalities which pull government up to the national level. The trade-offs vary across the public goods that government provides. Hobbes regards security as the master public good, but governments have come to provide many other goods and they vary widely in scale. Some, like security from invasion, are best handled at the national level, whereas others, such as home care for the elderly, are best provided locally.

This approach has some elegant implications. The structure of governance is a functional adaptation to scale diversity in the efficient provision of public goods. Because the costs and benefits of centralization vary from policy to policy, governance should be multilevel. A functionally efficient design consists

---

2 Faguet (2012); Geys and Konrad (2010); Oates (2006); Shah and Shah (2006); and Treisman (2007) summarize this literature.
of exponentially spaced tiers in a ladder of governance reaching down from the entire globe to local jurisdictions encompassing tens of thousands of people.

However, functional pressures are one thing, jurisdictional outcomes are another. To explain the allocation of authority across tiers, the shape of jurisdictions, and the differentiation of authority within states, one must engage how people conceive themselves in relation to their society. Cooperation to produce public goods is an expression of human sociality. Humans form communities to survive and reproduce. Communities are settings in which preferences are formed as well as settings in which preferences are realized. These include a propensity to internalize reciprocity as a norm, to distinguish between insiders and outsiders, and to consider the rule of “foreigners” as illegitimate.

The notion that government is rooted in community is as old as the study of politics. Plato and Aristotle regard human life “as bound up with the good of the communities out of which our identity has been constituted” (Bell 2013; MacIntyre 1984). Plato conceives government as an expression of social solidarity so complete that the community resembles a single organism. Despite being employed by an expansionist non-city state, Aristotle (in his Politics) considers the polis as the natural context for government and the expression of the fully realized “political man” (Aristotle 4th century BC; Lipset 1960): “A man who by his nature is without a polis is not fully human.”

Aristotle begins his Politics by saying that “every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good.” In contrast to contemporary usage, Aristotle employs the term community “to characterize all social groups rather than to characterize one especially close and highly integrated form of social life” (Yack 1993: 26). The greater the capacity of a group to provide itself with public goods, the more that group takes on the character of an Aristotelian community.

These themes are developed in contemporary communitarian thinking. Michael Walzer (1983) argues that governance involves the interpretation of shared understandings bearing on the political life of particular communities. He counterposes this to the notion that one can specify individuals abstractly or that their preferences are motivated by optimality. Michael Sandel claims that liberalism misunderstands the nature of the self because it deracines persons from their communities. Obligation is inseparable from communal bonds: “What marks such a community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain ‘shared final ends’ alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings within which the opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved” (Sandel 1998: 172).

In this view, governance is an expression of sociability, of the ties and bonds that transform a group of disconnected singulars into a society (Pocock 2011: 343).
Governance for Aristotle is not merely a means to produce public goods; it is itself a public good expressing partnership among citizens: “Our natural disposition to act in a friendly way toward people with whom we share ends and actions leads us to single out community members as objects of special sympathy and concern” (Yack 1993: 43). In order to probe the Who Question one must go beyond the utilitarian benefits of governance to consider how individuals perceive themselves in relation to others. Beyond providing public goods, governance is the means by which a body of persons creates a collective capacity to make their laws.

Liberal individualism and communitarianism are normative visions of government, and the debate between them has framed the history of political philosophy. However, as we seek to show in this book, these visions provide a basis not just for prescribing what should happen, but for explaining what does happen.

Scale Diversity

Expectations about the functional effects of public goods provision are grounded in a literature that conceives the efficient scale of decision making as a trade-off between the costs and benefits of centralization (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Hobbes 1651/2001; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972, 2005).

A larger jurisdiction has several benefits. Chief among these is that it reduces the per capita cost of non-rival public goods. If my consumption does not diminish your consumption, then the more people contribute to producing the good, the cheaper it is for each of us. Such public goods are intangible and ubiquitous. Governance itself is a non-rival public good, as is economic exchange, security, and the rule of law. Further, a larger jurisdiction is better able to internalize the effects of its decisions. If two groups consume a public good, then the amount produced should reflect the collective benefit—not the benefit for any one group. On the same logic, if one group produces pollution that affects the other, the amount produced should reflect the costs for both groups. In addition, larger jurisdictions provide insurance against disasters. If a polity is large enough, it can assist those suffering from a flood, earthquake, or economic shock by mobilizing the resources of people living in areas not affected. Finally, larger jurisdictions are better placed to exercise economic and political power in competition with others. This may be true even if larger jurisdictions are more inefficient than small jurisdictions because power depends on the absolute level of one’s assets, not just their average cost.

The benefits of smaller jurisdictions are conjectured to include responsiveness (smaller governments are better placed to understand the concerns of local residents); flexibility (smaller governments can change policy more
easily in response to changing conditions or preferences); heterogeneity of preferences (smaller governments are better able to tailor policy to individuals in different parts of the country); innovation (smaller governments may innovate by competing with each other); voice (smaller governments provide more opportunities for citizen input); robustness (smaller governments reduce the scope of policy failure); and exit (smaller governments may allow residents to vote with their feet). 3

Informational asymmetries between local and central decision makers underpin these benefits. The informational approach to decision making was put on the table by organizational economists who conceive decision making for an organization as a process of repeated messages or dialogue (Arrow 1991: 5; Kochen and Deutsch 1969: 735). The foundation for this is observed by Arrow (1961: 11): “[I]t [is] close to an impossibility for individuals in close contact with the productive processes to transmit their information in all its details to another office. This proposition, long recognized in practice, is the basis of the management literature on the questions of centralization and decentralization.”

Arrow is taking issue with the Fordist notion that the job of front-line personnel is to convey standardized information to their superiors, who make decisions on their behalf. Fordism is built on the assumption that information from the shop floor can be extracted perfectly from workers or collected independently by the board room. However, decision making in firms engages persons as well as things, and such information may be soft—difficult to standardize, resistant to batching, and correspondingly expensive to pass up an organizational hierarchy. A local bank manager, for example, is better placed to decide on a small-business loan by talking directly with the borrowers to assess their honesty and acumen than is a banker in the head office who has access to a report written by the bank manager (Stein 2002: 1892–3).

Government itself can be conceived as a process of repeated dialogue with citizens, and the information that is required for the provision of public goods is no less soft than that for small-business loans. This motivates Elinor Ostrom’s (2010: 8) summary of her decades-long contribution to the study of metropolitan governance:

3 It is worth noting that these benefits are contested (March and Olsen 1998: 949). For example, an oft-cited virtue of decentralization is that competition among local governments allows citizens to vote with their feet and thereby reproduces some benefits of market competition (Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956; Weingast 1995). However, this assumes that citizens have sufficient information about the quality of public services, that they know which level of government provides what, that governments do not overfish the common tax pool, and that the expertise of local officials is not inferior to that of national officials. Whether these assumptions hold, and how robust the argument is when they do not, is a matter of debate (Dowding, John, and Briggs 1994; Dowding and Mergoupis 2003; Lowery et al. 1995; Lyons, Lowery, and Hoogland DeHoog 1992; Panizza 1999; Treisman 2007; Wibbels 2006).
Advocates of the metropolitan reform approach assumed that size of governmental units would always be positive for all types of goods and services. Scholars using a political economy approach [by contrast] assumed that size of governmental units would be positive or negative depending on the type of public good or service. Those involving face-to-face delivery, such as education, policing, and social welfare, would show a negative effect of governmental unit size; those involving economies of scale, such as highways and utility systems, would show a positive effect.

A decentralized government is better placed to respond to soft information on the preferences of those living in a region. This is the case even if there is no heterogeneity of preferences across localities. The contexts of human interaction may vary even if preferences do not. Smaller jurisdictions are better able to respond to local conditions—the ecology of a region, its geographical particularities, the distinctive character of its resources, its economic and social structure, its ways of life. “Street-level” case studies of policy making, beginning with the classic example of the Tennessee Valley Authority, generated a vocabulary to describe this—“task environment,” “local interaction,” and “local stimuli” (Keeble, Lawson, Moore, and Wilkinson 1999; Pritchett 1943; Scholz, Twolmby, and Headrick 1991).

Whether a particular structure of government is optimal or suboptimal requires knowledge that we are not close to achieving (Crouch et al. 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2009a; Shah and Shah 2006; Treisman 2007). Moreover, what is efficient in one country may be suboptimal in another. However, it is not necessary to point-predict the trade-off between the costs and benefits of decentralization to conclude that the trade-off varies widely across the public goods provided by governments (Breuss and Eller 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2012; Schakel 2009, 2010). The implication is spelled out by Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte in their book, Size and Democracy (1973: 129, 133–4):

Let us make clear what we mean by boundaries that are too small. If, because of its boundaries, a political system lacks authority to secure compliance from certain actors whose behavior results in significant costs (or loss of potential benefits) to members of the system, then the boundaries of the political system are smaller than the boundaries of the political problem.... Let us make clear what we mean by [boundaries that are] too large. If the application of uniform rules throughout a political system with given boundaries imposes costs (or loss of benefits) on some actors that could be avoided (with no significant costs to others) by non-uniform rules, then the boundaries of the political system are larger than the boundaries of the political problem.

This logic underpins Oates’ (1972: 55) decentralization theorem: “[E]ach public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would internalize the benefits and costs of
such provision.” This is the golden rule of multilevel governance: **centralize where necessary; decentralize where possible.**

Figure 1.1 displays hypothetical per capita cost curves for policies with diverse scale economies. The scale for population on the horizontal axis increases exponentially from that of a small town on the left to the entire population of the planet on the right. The curve labeled A represents a local public good such as nursery schooling or home care for the elderly. The curve at B represents a regional public good such as hospitals or the protection of a common pool resource such as a lake or natural reserve. The curve at C depicts a national public good, while that at D is a global public good such as finding a cure for ebola.

The idea that efficiency implies multilevel governance rests on the claim that it makes sense to provide public goods at appropriate population scales. If the costs and benefits of centralization vary across policies, policy provision should be scale diverse. One might expect to find jurisdictions nested in what Herbert Simon (1962, 1974) calls a nearly decomposable system in which there is tight coupling within jurisdictions, but loose coupling among them. The idea is to break a complex system into less complex, and correspondingly more autonomous, subsystems that can adapt to their local environments, persist or evolve independently, develop novel solutions, and sustain themselves even if other subsystems break down (Aldrich 1979/2008: 77, 83; Thompson 1967: 59).

### The Ladder of Governance

One way of dealing with scale diversity would be to have a separate jurisdiction for each policy (Casella and Frey 1992; Frey and Eichenberger 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2003). Task-specific governance for each policy would form a crazy quilt pattern of overlapping jurisdictions. School boards and
local governments in the United States often intersect, as do the jurisdictions of many task-specific international organizations (Foster 1997; Keohane and Victor 2011; Skelcher 2007). In the European Union this is described as variable geometry (Schmitter 1996; Stubb 1996; Wallace 1985). It is particularly appropriate for policies that are decomposable, i.e. where decisions in one jurisdiction do not have a short-term effect on decisions in other jurisdictions.

The alternative, and the focus of this book, is general-purpose governance in which jurisdictions bundle policies to gain economies of scope. Such jurisdictions make it possible for political parties to aggregate preferences in popularly elected assemblies. Whereas task-specific governance is good at insulating experts from popular contestation so that they can seek Pareto optimal solutions, general-purpose governance is suited to distributional bargaining across policies. Whereas task-specific governance is oriented to output legitimacy, general-purpose governance is oriented to input legitimacy (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 2004; see Scharpf 1999).

Bundling policies limits the number of jurisdictional tiers. At which scales will those tiers be placed? In order to limit the number of tiers while capturing the efficiency benefits of scale diversity, one can expect jurisdictional tiers to be arrayed at roughly equal intervals on an exponential population scale. The design will take the form of a Russian doll arrangement. The result is an elegant functional design which limits the number of jurisdictional levels, adjusts policy provision to scale diversity, and simplifies coordination by nesting each lower-level jurisdiction within a single jurisdiction at a higher level (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

![Figure 1.2. The ladder of governance](image)

---

4 There are some curious exceptions. These include Texarkana, a municipality in both Texas and Arkansas with a Federal Court house straddling state boundaries. The Belgian village of Baarle-Hertog is a patchwork of twenty-four non-contiguous parcels of territory nestled within the Dutch municipality of Baarle-Nassau.
Figure 1.2 models this by plotting six tiers of governance from a local tier at \( a \) to a global tier, the United Nations, at \( f \). The position of the state in this arrangement can be assumed to vary exogenously as a result of geopolitics. The difference between a state at \( e \) with a large population and a state at \( b \) with a small population is that the former has four levels of governance within it and one beyond, while the latter has one level of governance within it and four beyond. In this model, domestic and international politics are two paths to the single goal of achieving scale diversity in the provision of public goods.

The model assumes that jurisdictional levels are spaced evenly along an exponential population scale. Figures 1.3 (a), (b), and (c) provide some plausibility for this conjecture by mapping governance for individuals living in Mendoza, Echternach, and Chapel Hill. Each point locates a general-purpose jurisdiction. The regression line in each graph reveals that the population increases from tier to tier at an exponential rate.

Hence, the number of jurisdictional levels within a country is a function of the log of its population. The effect is long term, and is best picked up in cross-sectional comparison. The bivariate association for eighty countries in 2010 is 0.72. There is a simple and powerful generalization: the larger the population of a country, the greater the authority exercised by regional governments as measured by the Regional Authority Index (\( r = 0.68 \)).

Both small and large states need international jurisdictions to supply global public goods, but large states are less dependent on international organizations below the global level. The most populous countries—China, India, the
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

Figure 1.3. Jurisdictional axes (continued)
United States—belong to relatively weak general-purpose international organizations. The strongest such organizations—the European Union, the Andean Community, the System for Central-American Integration (SICA), and Caricom—encompass countries with small or medium populations (Marks et al. 2014). As Figure 1.3(b) illustrates, Luxembourg is a member of two general-purpose international organizations short of the globe: Benelux, with a population of 28 million, and the European Union with a population of 505 million. Correspondingly, Luxembourg has just one level of general-purpose regional governance, whereas the United States has several. As we shall see in Chapter Three, no country with a population of less than 2.5 million in 2010 has an intermediate tier of government, whereas no country with a population greater than 4.9 million is without one.

A functionalist approach appears to explain some basic regularities in the structure of governance. It accounts for the nested character of jurisdictional design and the exponentially increasing population scale of general-purpose tiers. It connects the population of a country to the authority exercised by its regions. Beyond this, the ladder of governance explains how states at different population scales produce demands for different mixes of subnational and supranational governance. A functional approach also suggests that the structure of governance depends on a government’s policy portfolio. A portfolio that is limited to public goods with extensive economies of scale will produce less decentralization than a portfolio that includes public goods with diverse economies of scale and which are sensitive to local context. Hence a state that provides welfare, education, and health will be more decentralized than one that is limited to defense and taxation (Osterkamp and Eller 2003; Peterson 1995).

The Nature of Authority

What matters from a functionalist perspective is what governance does, not what it is. The premise of functionalism is that a phenomenon can be explained by the role it plays in the system of which it is part (Levin 2013).5 Functionalism directs our attention to the effects of an institution, not its meaning for those affected.

5 A functionalist approach which “characterizes the mental in terms of structures that are tacked down to reality only at the inputs and outputs” is the predominant approach to the mind/body problem in cognitive science (Block 1980: 272). In this conception, a mental state can be explained by the function it performs irrespective of its bio-physical context in the same way that a kidney can be explained by its function in filtering blood (Block 1980: 268; Sober 1996: 226).
Governance, from a functionalist perspective, consists of institutions that produce public goods. This raises a fundamental question: why would a person demand self-rule if he or she is supplied with the policies she prefers?

Public goods theory assumes that individuals have heterogeneous preferences over policy, but are otherwise indistinguishable. It models an individual's utility as a function of the policies that are delivered to her and the taxes that she must pay (Alesina and Spolaore 2003: 18; Treisman 2007). Hence, a central state that tailors public goods to the preferences of citizens in different parts of a country is in equilibrium without ever having to decentralize authority. The state could set up outposts throughout the country to gather the necessary information and report back to the center, which would then make all policy decisions.

One cannot simply rule this out as infeasible. Central states can and do tailor policy to different parts of the country. Treisman (2007: 60) concludes his perceptive study of decentralization by observing that, “it is perfectly possible as a technical matter for central governments to provide different educational, cultural, religious, or other policies to fit the desires of local populations.” He points out that Stalin, who ruled one of the most centralized states ever to have existed, allowed schools in the non-Russian republics to teach in local languages. The United Kingdom, long regarded as a centralized unitary state, provided Scotland with its own legal system and separate educational and religious institutions, even while, until 1999, ultimate authority remained in Whitehall.

As we write this in the build-up to the Brexit referendum, many Conservative MPs have joined a campaign demanding that “parliament should have sovereignty over its own territory” (Barker 2015). Prime Minister David Cameron has bargained a looser relationship with the European Union, but a rump in his own party is campaigning for something more—complete self-rule. This follows a UK general election in which the Scottish National Party gained all but three seats in Scotland on a manifesto stating that “decisions about Scotland’s future—about our economy and society—are best taken by the people of Scotland” (SNP 2015: 35).

Providing individuals with the policies they want is not the same as giving them the authority to collectively determine those policies. Self-rule is the independent exercise of authority. So, individuals may demand self-rule even if the central government tailors public goods to their preferences. The reason for this takes one to the core of governance, the exercise of legitimate power.

Power is a capacity unlike any other because it is the present means to obtain some future good (Hobbes 1651/2001). It is the potential to realize...
Scale and Community

one’s will in the face of resistance. Unlike money, it is not depleted when it is spent. With what might a people exchange the power to make its laws? This is precisely why conflict over the allocation of authority can be so difficult to resolve. Power, and its legitimate expression, authority, are master goods that relieve the bearer from trusting in the promises of others.

A theory of governance should explain the institutional frame—the structure of authority—in which policies for this community, rather than that community, are decided. Knowledge about policy preferences, no matter how precise, cannot explain preferences over which groups should have the right to exercise collective authority. Preferences over governance are shaped by group attachments as well as by policy preferences.

Community

Communities are settings for self-rule both for what they offer and for what they reject. Communities facilitate the provision of public goods because they nurture social networks, repeated interaction, and long time-horizons that diminish free riding. Aristotle was referring to this characteristic when he used the word *koinônia* to refer to a group—any group—with the normative resources to cooperate and to identify and punish free riders. To what extent does the population in a jurisdiction form a network of densely interacting individuals who have consentient understandings and expectations that can underpin a commitment to the commonweal? Do those individuals conceive themselves as sharing a past and do they expect to share a future (Ostrom 1990: 88)?

These questions have implications for governance that are neither functional nor dysfunctional. Our premise is that the structure of governance expresses the bonds of human sociality as well as the functional pressures of scale. Citizens care—passionately—about who exercises authority over them. A postfunctionalist theory stresses that governance cannot be explained by its utility or purpose, but must engage the feelings that people have about the communities in which they live.

Territorial community has profound implications for multilevel governance. It has broken the notion that states exert homogenous authority in their territories. Maps in which countries are distinguished as color-coded blocks reify the state as having a monopoly of authority within its borders. Uniform governance within countries has become the exception rather than

---

7 As King Lear learns when he exchanges self-rule for a promise of gratitude, only to be told, “You should be rul’d, and led by some discretion that discerns your state better than you yourself.”
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

the rule. The mobilization of territorial communities has created a patchwork of differentiated governance within the state that is the new normal.8

Territorial communities within states are front lines in the clash of ethnic nationalisms. Demands for self-rule on the part of distinct communities affect not just their own homelands, but shape the structure of government in the states of which they are part. To understand this, we need to probe how communities facilitate and constrain governance and the conditions under which minority communities can survive assimilation.

Communities are Janus-faced. The social solidarity that facilitates government within communities constrains government among them. On the one hand, communities diminish free-riding, which is the bane of public good provision, on account of their “shared understandings, . . . dense social networks, and connective structures” (Tarrow 2011: 16). On the other hand, communities constrain the provision of public goods when they divide the social world into “us” and “them,” into “insiders” and “outsiders.” Hence, communities can be described as settings of parochial altruism (Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr 2006).

Communities rest on a combination of objective and subjective factors, something shared and something felt, which is profoundly shaped by where one grows up. Yack observes (2012: 23) that “nationalism’s students have devoted a lot of time and energy to debunking myths that exaggerate the special virtues and antiquity of nations. But in debunking one set of myths, they have inadvertently breathed life into another: myths that exaggerate our independence from the contingencies of birth and cultural heritage.” Where one grows up is an imposed fact of life that affects how one thinks and feels about one’s identity. Territorially concentrated groups with distinctive ways of life not only prefer particular packages of public goods, but may demand the power to determine their own laws.

Unrestricted power—complete independence—is a chimera to the extent that a community is connected to others. The world has never been divided into non-overlapping, mutually exclusive, communities. Territorial communities exist at different scales, and often their edges are blurred (Mann 1986). Patterns of social, economic, and political interaction almost never coincide, and most persons consider themselves members of more than one territorial community (Curtis 2014; Marks 1999; Moreno, Arriba, and Serrano 1998). So the link between community and the demand for self-rule is politically constructed (Risse 2010). What then matters for self-rule is the extent to which

8 Political geographers have been at the forefront in seeking to explain how territory and spatial difference shape social and political interaction at diverse scales (Agnew 2009, 2013; Bevir 2010; Brenner 2004; Brenner et al. 2008; Elden 2013). This is also a point of departure for multilevel governance theorists (Bache and Flinders 2004; Enderlein, Wälti, and Zürn 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Piattoni 2009).
members of a community have an exclusive attachment, so that they regard an overarching jurisdiction as “rule by foreigners.”

Most countries have within their borders territorially concentrated groups with distinct ways of life, institutions, and modes of speech. In one of the first efforts to map ethnic diversity, Walker Connor (1972: 320) observed a “remarkable lack of coincidence...between ethnic and political borders.” Just twelve of 132 states were ethnically homogenous. The vast majority of minority territorial communities have been assimilated in the process of state building, but the vast majority of states have within them such a community.

Territorial communities provide a key to the structure of governance. Their continued existence is a vital source of differentiation within states. And how they have survived the pressures of state building tells us a lot about the structure of governance in a country.

Patterns of Peripheral Survival

How does a minority community sustain its distinctiveness in the face of sustained interaction within a state? This is the question that motivated Stein Rokkan’s life-long project (1974: 30) to “study the dynamics of boundary-building and boundary-differentiation” in order to “problematize the division of territories into units.” Rokkan produced meticulous historical maps of regions and states across Europe which are heavily biased to validity and eschew parsimony. His prime motivation, however, lay close to his roots in the far north of Norway and the conditions under which peripheral regions sustain their distinctive cultural and political institutions in the face of a centralizing state. A peripheral region, he wrote, is not simply a remote region, a region distant from a state-center, a region at the geographical limit of a state, but is expressed in the daily life of its inhabitants, in their interactions with power brokers in the center (Flora et al. 1999: 113–15; Rokkan and Urwin 1983; Tarrow 1977). To what extent is a community part of a state, yet marginal to it?

The answer to this question depends on the capacity of a community to fend off the homogenizing effects of state building. How will it respond to the cross-pressures arising from the nationalization of education, national labor markets, a national army, a national civil service, national transportation networks, a national culture, a national party-political system, and the construction of a national identity? The population of the periphery is likely to be

9 Stein Rokkan grew up off the Norwegian coast in the municipality of Vågan, which consists of a group of islets and remote areas perched between the craggy Lofoten mountains and the rough waters of the Vesterfjord—a 1,500 km journey from Oslo.
ambivalent and divided. Under what circumstances will it sustain its distinctiveness?

We theorize two scenarios in which this could, and sometimes did, happen. The first is well described by the conventional notion of a peripheral region, a region that is geographically, culturally, linguistically, socially, economically, and politically peripheral to the center. Few regions will have every one of these characteristics, but they tend to go together in mutual causation. The one exogenous factor is, of course, geography. “While geography alone does not make up a community, it certainly helps” (Spinner-Halev 1991: 404). The intuition here is that the greater the time and effort required for communication between a core and a periphery, the weaker the pressure of homogenization. Geographical barriers often delineate states and provide some insulation for a region that is both part of a state, yet distinct from it.10

Peripheral regions within states exist in the zone between full independence and assimilation. They are too small, too weak, too thinly populated, or too resource poor to command independence. Yet their geographical isolation, lack of resources, or harsh climate protects them from mass immigration and subsumption in the dominant culture. Many are small islands—the Åland Islands, the Azores, Corsica, the Faroes, the Galapagos Islands, Jeju, Madeira, the archipelago of Mindanao, or the archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina. Some are defended by difficult terrain. Dense forests and dangerous waters cut off Sabah and Sarawak from mainland Malaysia. The diverse dialects of the Basque language survived in the isolated valleys of the Spanish and French Pyrenees. Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon in Canada are vast stretches of taiga and tundra which are inaccessible in winter. Greenland, the world’s largest island, has an inhospitable climate and Nuuk, its capital, is four time zones removed from Copenhagen. Papua, Indonesia’s largest province, is located in New Guinea’s impenetrable rainforest with the highest mountains in Oceania. Valle d’Aosta, in the mountainous region of northwest Italy, is sparsely populated and, until modern times, was liable to be cut off by snow. Panama’s five indigenous comarcas are located on the Atlantic coast among river deltas and inland swamps. Nicaragua’s two indigenous regions are on its Atlantic coast, which is separated by a mountain range from its populous Pacific region.

These regions stick out because they do not obey the functional logic of scale diversity. Their population and territory are carved out by the happenstance of geography, not central planning. Many combine small population and small territory, and spoil the designs of those who wish to divide the country into equivalent jurisdictions with uniform competences. Such

10 “Mountains, along with rivers, are the two most popular means of delineating borders; that has been a fundament of political geography literally through the eons” (Smethurst 2000: 39).
regions are unique within their countries, in their distinctive norms, ways of life, and modes of speech. But their peripherality reduces their threat. Central governments and other regions in the same tier can regard them as special cases that do not breach the unity of the country as a whole or the principle of equal treatment.

However, resisting assimilation requires both normative distinctiveness and group cohesion. Lacking these, many island peoples have been assimilated into the mainland state. The peripheral islands of Lesbos, Samos, and the Dodecanese are populated by Greeks who came to identify with the mainland under Ottoman and Italian occupation. Gotland, an outward-looking trading island, was amalgamated with the rest of Sweden in the fourteenth century. The Philippine island of Palawan contains some eighty-seven ethnic groups. Many indigenous communities were similarly too fragmented or politically vulnerable to engage in effective resistance. Latin America’s creole states suppressed the surviving indigenous peoples at the center, while those in the periphery were left largely alone in “brown areas, . . . places with low or nil state presence” (O’Donnell 1993: 1357). As Deborah Yashar (1999: 84) observes, “Where the state incompletely penetrated local communities (nowhere more evident than in the Amazon), Indians sustained a certain degree of political autonomy by retaining and/or creating authority systems and customs.” These local communities retained the capacity to mobilize for self-rule when the state extended its reach into their domains. Several were jolted into resistance in the 1980s and 1990s when modernizers imposed neoliberal reforms in previously sheltered areas of society (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005, 2015).

There is another scenario that can produce a distinctive region, and it is completely different. It involves power, not geography. What happens when a core region fails in its quest to become a state, but succumbs to another? Unlike a peripheral region, this region does not exist in the outer reaches of the state. It cannot hide in obscurity or insignificance. It is neither barren nor isolated. It is an integral part of the state. Will it be able to sustain its distinctiveness against assimilation?

This depends on the embeddedness of its institutions and, in particular, on whether it can maintain a distinctive language. Language, as Laitin (2000: 144) emphasizes, “is not only a means of communication, but it is also a marker of identity.” Deutsch (1966: 95) suggests that a litmus test for the existence of a community is the breadth and density of communication within a group relative to that among groups: “Membership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders.” Is the dialect or language of the minority officially recognized as a standard? This is decisive
because maintaining a distinctive language is “a question of public recognition, of the legitimisation of standards: the use of a language is a collective act in which everyone in a territory must share, and it becomes politicised when a set of elite groups establishes a standard of written communication and lodges claims for its recognition in public life” (Rokkan in Flora et al. 1999: 66, 171–2).

Quebec, Catalonia, and Flanders are failed cores that have sustained distinctive languages that underpin distinctive cultural, educational, and religious institutions. Quebec and Catalonia were considered separate polities at the time they joined the Canadian and Spanish states, and they had a long-standing, although contested, right to sustain distinct institutions. In the early twentieth century Dutch was recognized as one of Belgium’s official languages, in step with the expansion of the franchise which tilted political power to the Flemish demographic majority. Each of these regions weathered attempts to impose a common administrative language to promote rationalization and economic modernization (Gellner 1964, 1983).

The Spanish term fuero—the concession of the center to traditional group rights—can be applied to several regions that had considerable bargaining power when they were encompassed in larger units. Bavaria negotiated special rights when it joined the Second Reich in 1870, and has sustained a distinct vernacular. Johor, once the most powerful of the Malay sultanates, was brought to heel by the British in the late nineteenth century, but sustained a distinct political system in the British Empire. In the 1940s it extracted federalism as the price of its inclusion in Malaysia (Harper 1999). Scotland retained legal, religious, and educational institutions in dynastic union with England. Despite linguistic assimilation, Scottish institutions have persisted under the benign neglect of the center (Flora, Kuhnle, and Urwin 1999: 198).

In contrast to geographically peripheral regions, these regions tend to be large in territory and population. Indeed, their relative size is a key to their distinctiveness, for it increases interaction within the region as a proportion of all interaction. If individual choices about whether to learn and speak a language depend on its utility outside the home, then a region with a relatively large population is better placed to incentivize a non-titular language.

The population of a distinctive territorial community is generally small in relation to the population of the country in which it is located. The average population share is 13.9 percent in the eighty countries we observe in 2010. But territorial minorities can have large effects.

11 Laitin (2000: 151) points out that rationalization, “the authoritative imposition of a single language for educational and administrative communications, is a concept derived from Max Weber (1968), who used the term to refer to modern state practices of standardization and bureaucratization. A common currency, a common legal system, and a unified tax code are all examples of rationalization, as would be a common administrative language.”
Distinctive communities shape the physical design of a country’s jurisdictions. In Chapter Four we examine how the two paths to distinctiveness have contrasting effects on the size and population of jurisdictions. Some territorial communities produce jurisdictions that are exceptionally small in both population and area. Others encompass relatively large populations in large territories. There is no functional logic to this. Uniformity goes out the window in the presence of distinctive community. Instead of trading off population and territory, so that jurisdictions encompass dense populations in smaller territories and sparse populations in larger territories, distinctive communities produce jurisdictional designs in which there is a positive association between population and territory.

Distinctive communities produce differentiated governance within states. The demands of minority communities for self-rule can set them apart from other territories within the state, and central governments may accommodate them with ad hoc reforms. Differentiated regions break the idea that the rights and duties of citizens are the same across the territory of the state. Chapter Five theorizes the effects of three forms of differentiation—autonomy, asymmetry, and dependence—for the depth and character of regional authority.

Finally, distinctive communities have a marked effect on the overall level of regional authority of the countries of which they are part. Such communities form only a part of a society, but, as Chapter Six reveals, a demand for self-rule on the part of a single region can trigger emulation, competitive mobilization, identity construction, and efforts on the part of the central government to quench separatism by upgrading the authority of regions across the country as a whole.
2

Measuring Regional Authority

This chapter introduces our measure of regional governance, the regional authority index (RAI). We seek to estimate the authority exercised by regional governments in eighty-one countries on an annual basis from 1950, or from the time a country becomes independent, to 2010.1 The sample consists of all EU member states, all member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), all Latin-American countries, ten countries in Europe beyond the European Union, and eleven in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.2

Table 2.1 lists four prior measures of regional authority by year of publication. Measurement has become more comprehensive over time, providing more information for more years.

The RAI continues this development and has some unique features. Most importantly, the unit of analysis is the individual region, which we define as a jurisdiction between national government and local government. We draw the boundary between local and regional government at an average population level of 150,000. This excludes the lowest tier of government in all eighty-one countries, but allows us to capture intermediate governments, often arrayed at two nested jurisdictional levels between the local and national. We relax the population criteria for individual jurisdictions that stick out from a tier of government that meets the regional threshold, such as Greenland or the Galapagos Islands.

A focus on regional or intermediate government has theoretical and practical virtues. It encompasses virtually all subnational governments that exert self-rule within distinct homelands. Such governments tend to form part of a regional tier of government with an average population greater than 150,000 or they have special authoritative competences alongside a regional tier.

---

1 On average a country in the dataset is coded for forty-seven years. Forty-eight countries are coded for the entire 1950–2010 period.

2 The case selection reflects a trade-off between an effort to cover the largest possible number of countries and the team’s resources—chiefly their time—and the availability of country expertise, along with primary and/or secondary sources.
Where subnational governments play an important role in co-governing a country, these are almost always intermediate governments. To the extent that subnational governments play a formally recognized role in shaping constitutional reform, one needs, again, to look to the intermediate level. Yet many countries lack any form of intermediate governance or have deconcentrated regional governments that have little authority. Regional jurisdictions are the most variable elements of territorial governance within the state and are generally the most contested.

Postfunctionalist theory emphasizes the role of communities in shaping governance. This directs our attention to variation within as well as among societies. Distinctive communities that press for self-rule within states are almost always minorities, but their effect can be systemic. In order to test postfunctionalist predictions about the role of such communities for jurisdictional design and authority, one needs to disaggregate governance to the level of the individual region.

The decision to conceptualize the individual region as the unit of analysis has several consequences. It means that we must take on the possibility that regions may be nested within each other at different scales. Altogether, there are 103 levels of regional government in the sixty-five countries that have at least one tier of regional government. So researchers can begin to compare regional tiers within countries as well as compare regional authority across countries. The measure also picks up reform that is limited to a single region

---

3 Regional governments in a tier can often be evaluated in tandem because they are generally bound by the same legal provisions.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

in a country. A reform in a single region may not sound important, but if it undermines the norm that all be treated equally, it may be hotly contested by other regions as well as by the central government. Moreover, such a reform may threaten to dismember the state.

The measure comprises ten dimensions that tap the diverse ways in which regions may exert authority. These dimensions are quite strongly associated with each other and can be thought of as indicators of a latent variable. However, differences across these dimensions are substantively interesting and provide a more precise mapping of reform.

Combining a regional approach with fine-grained attention to the ways in which a region can exert authority produces a measure that is vastly more sensitive to change than any previous one. Twenty-one percent of the variation occurs over time. The territorial structure of governance is much less fixed than one would assume when reading the classics of comparative politics, such as Arend Lijphart’s Patterns of Government (1999) or Daniel Elazar’s Exploring Federalism (1987).

The RAI is limited in several respects. Three stand out. First, we do not encompass tiers of subnational government containing jurisdictions with an average population of less than 150,000. And we omit local government entirely. This is a topic that calls out for systematic measurement, perhaps adapting the measure proposed here to variation in the policy responsibilities of local authorities and estimating the role of local authorities in the confederal arrangements they form at the regional or inter-regional level (Campbell 2003; Loughlin, Hendriks, and Lidström 2011; Nickson 2011; Norton 1994; Page and Goldsmith 1987, 2010; Sellers et al. 2016). Second, the RAI is concerned with authority, which we define as formal power expressed in legal rules. It excludes the effects of contextual factors, such as leadership, political parties, or corruption. These—and many other factors that we do not measure here—can be influential for government performance. However, if one wishes to examine their effects, it makes sense to measure them separately. Finally, the country coverage of the present measure is incomplete. In particular, it does not cover China or India, two continental-sized countries with correspondingly complex and differentiated systems of regional government.

Estimating a concept requires a series of theoretical, conceptual, operational, and coding decisions. Each step is a move from the general to the particular in which an abstract concept is translated into the language of

---

4 We include metropolitan regions with an institutional arrangement that differs from that of non-metropolitan regions.

5 A team led by Andreas Ladner and Nicholas Keuffe is adapting the RAI to estimate local decentralization in thirty-eight countries (personal communication, March 2015).
numbers. Measurement, no less than theory, is “the art of discerning what we may with advantage omit” (Popper 1982: 44).

The process can be broken down into six steps:

- **Defining the background concept.** How have social scientists understood the concept?
- **Specifying the measurement concept.** Which of those meanings do we wish to include? Which are excluded?
- **Unfolding the concept into dimensions.** How does one break down the measurement concept into discrete pieces that can be independently assessed and aggregated to capture its meaning?
- **Operationalizing the dimensions.** How does one conceptualize and specify intervals on the dimensions? What rules allow one to reliably detect variation across intervals?
- **Scoring cases.** What information does one use to score cases? Where is that information, and how can others gain access to it?
- **Adjudicating scores.** How does one interpret gray cases, i.e. cases for which scoring involves interpretation of a rule?

Figure 2.1 is an expanded version of Adcock and Collier’s (2001) schema. We make two additions. The first is a level of measurement in which the abstract concept is broken down into dimensions prior to developing indicators. Virtually all concepts of major theoretical interest in the social sciences are complex in that they comprise more than a single dimension of variation. So an important step in operationalizing abstract concepts such as regional authority, democracy, or gross national product (GNP) is to conceive a limited set of dimensions that are amenable to operationalization and that together summarize the meaning of the overarching concept. The second addition is a final important step, adjudicating scores, which lays out rules for exceptional or difficult cases that arise in any coding scheme. Social science measurement is replete with gray cases, and one telling indication of the transparency of a measure is whether these are explicitly communicated.⁶

The arrows in Figure 2.1 are verbs that describe the steps down from background concept to individual scores, or up from scores to concept. The boxes contain nouns describing the concept, its dimensions, indicators, and scores at each stage in the measurement process. The figure makes the point that these steps are interdependent. How one specifies the scope of a concept has

---

⁶ This is the commitment to production transparency which entails “a full account of the procedures used to collect or generate the data” (APSA 2012: 10). Transparency is the primary aim of the companion volume to this book which provides a full account of the dimensions, indicators, and scores used in the RAI (Hooghe et al. 2016).
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

I. Background concept
The broad constellation of meanings and understandings associated with a given concept.

Conceptualization
Specifying the concept precisely in light of the research goals.

Revisiting the background concept
Exploring broader issues concerning the background concept in light of measuring it.

II. Specified concept
A specified, clearly defined, formulation of a concept.

Unfolding
Pressing a specified concept into distinct dimensions that encompass the meaning of the concept.

Modifying a specified concept
Fine-tuning or revising a specified concept in light of efforts to dimensionalize, operationalize, and score.

III. Dimensions
The variables that indicate the systematized concept and which, together, summarize its meaning.

Operationalization
Conceiving one or more indicators for each dimension.

Modifying dimensions
Fine-tuning or revising dimensions in light of operationalization, scoring, and adjudication.

IV. Indicators
Operational rules for scoring cases along dimensions.

Scoring cases
Applying rules to produce scores for each case along each dimension.

Modifying indicators
Revising the rules for scoring in light of ambiguities and error.

V. Scores for cases
The scores for cases under rules for coding dimensions.

Engaging difficult cases
Applying rules for scoring in the face of complexity.

Evaluating scoring
Revising scores in light of ambiguous cases.

VI. Adjudicating scores
Rules for ambiguous cases and border cases.

Figure 2.1. Measurement model
Note: Adapted from Adcock and Collier (2001).
consequences for breaking it into dimensions. How one operationalizes dimensions frames the choice of indicators. Even minor differences in the indicators can have serious consequences for scoring.

I. The Background Concept: Political Authority

Political authority is a core concern of political science, some would argue the core concern (Eckstein 1973; Lake 2010; Parsons 1963; Weber 1968). Political authority—the capacity to make legitimate and binding decisions for a collectivity—underpins human cooperation among large groups of individuals.

Two conceptions have predominated in our understanding of the structure of authority. The first conceives a polity as grounded in human sociality. Families, villages, towns, provinces, and other small- or medium-scale communities are the ingredients of larger political formations. This idea is as close to a universal principle in the study of politics as one is likely to find. Ancient states and tribes were composed of demes, wards, or villages. Aristotle conceived the polis as a double composite: households within villages; villages within the polis. Each had a collective purpose and a sphere of autonomy. The Romans built a composite empire by attaching a vanquished tribe or polis by a foedus—a treaty providing self-rule and protection and demanding payment of a tax, usually in the form of manpower. The Qin dynasty, which united China in 221BC, had a multi-tiered structure extending from the family through wards and provinces to the empire (Chang 2007: 64). The Incas conceived of five hierarchically nested tiers reaching from the family to an empire (Rowe 1982). Medieval scholars conceived the state as a composite (consociandi) of men already combined in social groups (symbiotes). Johannes Althusius (1603/1997) conceived the state as a contract among such associations, a consociatio consisting of families within collegia within local communities within provinces.

The modern variant of this idea is federalism, which describes a polity “compounded of equal confederates who come together freely and retain their respective integrities even as they are bound in a common whole” (Elazar 1987: 4). Federalism highlights the basic constitutional choice between a unitary and federal system. A unitary system has a central sovereign that exercises authority, whereas a federal system disperses authority between “regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (Dahl 1968, 1986: 114; Riker 1987: 101). Most importantly, regions or their representatives can veto constitutional reform. The unitary/federal distinction informs a literature on the consequences of basic constitutional decisions for
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

ethnic conflict (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004) or democracy (Lijphart 1999). Federalist scholars have told us a lot about why independent units would wish to merge and how some polities arrive at federalism in order to avoid falling apart (Rector 2009; Roeder 2007; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). And there is a rich literature comparing federal polities (Watts 1998, 1999a, 2008).7

The federal/unitary distinction draws attention to the tension between self-rule and shared rule that is inherent in a composite polity. The constituent communities wish to retain their independence, their distinct way of life, language, religion, dress, customs, their norms of social interaction. Yet they wish also to gain the benefits of scale in security, trade, and governance by forming a state in which they share rule with the center. As we discuss later, the concepts of self-rule and shared rule motivate our measurement scheme, and they are taken directly from the federalism literature.

However, the unitary/federal distinction has some fundamental limitations for the measure we propose. It is a blunt instrument for assessing incremental institutional change. Shifting from a unitary to a federal regime (or the reverse) is a high hurdle that few countries meet. The number of federal countries in our dataset has hardly changed over the past sixty years, yet there is ample evidence that this has been a period of profound reform.8 Not surprisingly, the federalism literature tells one far less about variation among unitary countries than among federal countries (Hooghe and Marks 2012; Rodden 2004; Schakel 2008). Variation among unitary countries has grown a lot over the past six decades, whereas the contrast between unitary and federal countries has diminished. Finally, federalism is concerned with the topmost level of subnational governance, whereas several countries have two or three levels of government between the national and the local.

A second conception, the idea that governance can be more or less decentralized, has also been hugely influential. Centralization and decentralization are poles of a continuous variable describing the extent to which authority is handled by the central government versus any government below. This way of conceiving governance is elegant and thin. Both its virtues and vices arise from its very high level of abstraction. It travels well. It allows one to compare governance around the world and over time on a single scale.


8 As Gary Goertz (2006: 34) observes, dichotomous concepts tend “to downplay, if not ignore, the problems— theoretical and empirical— of the gray zone. Often, to dichotomize is to introduce measurement error . . . [because it] implies that all countries with value 1 are basically equivalent.”
We seek to develop a measure that is similarly robust across time and place. If the RAI is aggregated to the country level it can be interpreted as a measure of decentralization. We follow decentralization scholars by distinguishing forms of decentralization: over policy making; over fiscal policy; over the appointment of subnational decision makers; and over the constitution. Each can be considered an independent variable that can register change in the absence of sweeping constitutional reform.

However, abstractness has a price if it comes “at the expense of connotation” (Sartori 1970: 1051). Decentralization, but to which level of governance? Knowing whether a state is more or less centralized tells one nothing about which tier does what. Decentralization measures focus on the central state, lumping together all levels of subnational governance as “the other,” the non-central state. This can be a useful simplification in cross-national comparison, but it severely restricts the study of governance within the state. It has nothing to say to cases where one level is empowered at the expense of another. “How does one compare two three-tier systems, A and B, when in A one-third of the issues are assigned to each of the tiers, while in B 90 percent of the issues are assigned to the middle tier and 5 percent each to the top and bottom tiers?” (Oates 1972: 196; Treisman 2007: 27). One needs to map individual regions and tiers to probe variation in multilevel governance.

The measure we propose builds on the concepts of federalism and decentralization (Enderlein, Wälti, and Zürn 2010; Oates 1972, 2005, 2006; Stein and Burkowitz 2010). Both ways of thinking about authority have been influential in our work, as in the discipline of political science a whole. From federalism, our measure takes the idea that regional authority consists of distinct forms of rule: self-rule within the region and shared rule within the country as a whole. This provides us with the conceptual frame for our measure. From decentralization, the measure takes the idea that the structure of government can be measured along continuous variables that together summarize regional authority.

II. The Specified Concept: Validity and Minimalism

Our focus in this book is on legal authority which is:

- institutionalized, i.e. codified in recognized rules;
- circumscribed, i.e. specifying who has authority over whom for what;
- impersonal, i.e. designating roles, not persons;
- territorial, i.e. exercised in territorially defined jurisdictions.

These characteristics distinguish legal authority from its traditional, charismatic, and religious variants (Weber 1958). Weber (1968: 215–16) observes
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

that “In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office.” The exercise of legal authority over a large population involves a minimum level of voluntary compliance with codified rules that have a specific sphere of competence, and which are exercised through formal institutions, including a differentiated administration.

A focus on legal authority has two benefits. The first is that it distinguishes the structure of government from causally related but conceptually distinct phenomena such as the organization of political parties, the ideological beliefs of those in office, or the incidence of corruption. The second is that legal authority can be evaluated using public records: constitutions, laws, executive orders, statutes, or other written documents which are publicly available to researchers who can confirm, revise, or refute our coding decisions.

Our approach is minimalist. Minimalism is a concept used in design to expose the essence of a form by eliminating all non-essential features. In measurement this is the effort to specify the essential properties of a concept by eliminating its superfluous connotations. This avoids entangling phenomena that one wishes to explore empirically. If a measure of subnational authority were to include an indicator for party centralization it would not help one to investigate how party organization shapes the structure of government.

Minimalism and validity often exist in tension. Public spending might be considered a minimalist indicator of decentralization, but the proportion of public expenditure that passes through a subnational government does not tell us whether that government can determine spending priorities.

The measure we propose taps authority codified in law, but we do not interpret this mechanistically. Some written rules never make it into practice. If the constitution states that subnational governments may tax their own populations, yet enabling legislation is not enacted (as in departamentos and provincias in Peru), then we do not consider the regions to have fiscal authority. Similarly, we code the date when a reform takes place, not when it is prescribed in legislation.

We estimate reforms that are not enacted in law if they are codified in executive orders, decrees, or edicts that are considered legally binding. For example, we take into account the capacity of a central state to sack regional governors, as in Argentina under military rule, even though it had a flimsy legal basis. Article six of the Argentine constitution allows federal intervention only in a handful of circumstances such as civil war and violation of the constitution, but when a military junta came to power in 1966, it drafted a military decree, the Acta de la Revolución, which sanctioned centralization and the abrogation of civilian rule (Potash 1980: 195–6).
Where the rule of law is weak, informal practices may interfere with provisions codified in law. Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke (2010: 24) point out that “complete institutional analysis must consider informal social norms that govern individual behavior and structure interaction between social actors.” This is true, but no measure should try to cover the entire field. To what extent should one include informal social norms in a measure of regional authority? This depends on the purpose of the measure, and we wish to make it possible for researchers to investigate the causal links between the structure of government and its causes and consequences. If we included indicators for regime type, corruption, or clientelism in a measure of regional authority, this would complicate causal inference.

For the same reason we leave partisanship and party politics aside. Regional governments may be more assertive if they have a different partisan complexion from that of the central government, but our focus is on the rules of the game rather than how they affect behavior. In Malaysia, for example, we code the capacity of Sabah and Sarawak to levy an additional sales tax without prior central state approval, even though this authority was used only from 2008 when opponents of the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition won regional elections. If one is interested in finding out how political parties affect the exercise of authority, it makes sense to estimate political parties independently from the structure of government (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Harbers 2010; Hopkin and Van Houten 2009; Riker 1964).

Regime variation poses a particular challenge, given the expectation that dictatorship and centralization are related (Bird and Vaillancourt 1998; Elazar 1995; IADB 1997; Leff 1999). We want to pick up the effect of a regime in constraining or facilitating regional authority, but we do not want to build regime type into a measure of regional authority. One can expect authoritarianism to bias subnational relations towards centralization, but this is not a black-and-white phenomenon (Eaton 2006; Eaton et al. 2010; Gibson 2004; Montero and Samuels 2004; O’Neill 2005; Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999). Authoritarian regimes typically suspend or abolish subnational legislatures or executives, but the extent, form, and timing varies considerably.

Some examples suggest the need for a nuanced approach. Whereas the Revolución Argentina (1966–72) replaced all elected governors and put provincial legislatures under military control, the coups in 1955 and 1964 left subnational institutions more or less intact (Eaton 2004a; Falleti 2010). The military regime in Brazil (1964–82) maintained direct elections for governorships for three years before requiring regional assemblies to select governors from a central list (Samuels and Abrucio 2000). Regional assembly elections were never canceled. Cuba’s Castro regime sidelined provincial and municipal institutions in favor of sectoral juntas, but reintroduced them in 1966 (Malinowitz 2006; Mendez Delgado and Lloret Feijoo 2007; Roman 2003).
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

In Indonesia, centralization under authoritarian rule was incremental. Provincial and municipal legislatures continued to be elected even under Suharto, and subnational executives were gradually brought under central control. In 1959, regional governors became dual appointees; in 1974, they were centrally appointed; and from 1979 the central government appointed mayors and district heads as well.

We also see some exceptional cases in which authoritarian rulers create a new regional level. In Chile, Pinochet created an upper level of fifteen deconcentrated regiones to empower his rural constituencies. He also shifted authority over schools and hospitals to municipal governments to weaken public sector unions. Both regiones and municipalities became focal points for subsequent decentralization (Eaton 2004c).

Regime change can have different effects for regional governance in different parts of a country. Democratization in Spain produced a cascade of regional bargains, beginning with the historic regions of the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia. The 1978 constitution laid out two routes to regional autonomy, but competitive mobilization spurred a variety of institutional arrangements (Agranoff and Gallarín 1997).

A democratic opening is often followed by the accommodation of a previously suppressed ethnic minority. One result of this is that a country that had a homogenous structure of government becomes territorially differentiated. Aceh and Papua became autonomous Indonesian regions after Suharto’s resignation (Bertrand 2007; Reid 2010a). Mindanao became an autonomous Philippine region following the People Power Revolution (Bertrand 2010: 178). Democratization in Russia after 1989 saw a series of bilateral arrangements with the central government empowering ethnic regions (Svendsen 2002: 68–70).

A valid measure of regional authority should be sensitive to these phenomena. Theory in this rapidly growing field engages the timing and character of regional authority, and it often has implications for individual regions as well as countries. If one wishes to test a theory relating democratization to multi-level governance, it is necessary to have measures in which these phenomena do not contaminate each other.

III. Dimensions of Self-rule and Shared Rule

One of the most important tasks in measuring an abstract concept is to decompose it into dimensions which (a) can be re-aggregated to cover the meaning of the specified concept; (b) are concrete in the sense that they are a step closer to observed reality; and (c) are simple in that they are unidimensional and substantively interpretable (De Leeuw 2005). This can take more
than one step. Measurement of the nominal gross domestic product of the United States begins by decomposing the concept into five categories—consumption, services, investment, exports, and imports—each of which is further disaggregated. Consumption, for example, consists of rental income, profits and proprietors’ income, taxes on production and imports less subsidies, interest, miscellaneous payments, and depreciation. The purpose is to break down an abstract concept, in this case nominal GDP, into pieces that capture its content and can be empirically estimated (Landefeld, Seskin, and Fraumeni 2008). Similarly, measures of democracy disaggregate the concept into domains that can be broken down into dimensions (Coppedge et al. 2008, 2011).

Our first move is to distinguish two domains that encompass the concept of regional authority. **Self-rule** is the authority that a subnational government exercises in its own territory. **Shared rule** is the authority that a subnational government co-exercises in the country as a whole. The domains of self-rule and shared rule provide an elegant frame for our measure and they are familiar in the study of federalism (Elazar 1987; Keating 1998, 2001; Lane and Errson 1999; Riker 1964). The distinction appears to have empirical as well as theoretical bite. Research using our prior measure for OECD countries finds that self-rule and shared rule have distinct effects on corruption (Neudorfer and Neudorfer 2015), spatial disparities (Ezcurra and Rodriguez-Pose 2013), regional representation (Donas and Beyers 2013; Tatham and Thau 2013), regional party vote share in national elections (Kyriacou and Morral-Palacin 2015), subnational coalition formation (Bäck et al. 2013), protest (Quaranta 2013), and voting (Niedzwiecki and Stoyan 2015).9

Self-rule and shared rule are distinct domains of regional governance, but we need to decompose them into dimensions to estimate variation.

The tripartite distinction between fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization is a useful point of departure. Fiscal decentralization is control over subnational revenue generation and spending; administrative decentralization is the authority of subnational governments to set goals and implement policies; and political decentralization refers to direct elections for subnational offices (Falleti 2005; Montero and Samuels 2004).10 The four types of political decentralization identified by Treisman (2007: 23–7) overlap with this three-fold schema, with the important addition of a dimension for constitutional decentralization (“subnational governments or their representative have an explicit right to participate in central policy making”).

9 An incipient literature examines the diverse causes of self-rule and shared rule (see e.g. Amat and Falcó-Gimeno 2014). Joan-Josep Vallbé (2014) extends the self-rule/shared rule distinction to judicial regional authority.

10 Falleti (2010: 329) takes a step towards a more specific conceptualization of administrative decentralization as “the set of policies that transfer the administration and delivery of social services such as education, health, social welfare, or housing to subnational governments.”
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

The revenue-generating side of fiscal decentralization can be broken down into the authority of a regional government to control the base and rate of major and minor taxes and its latitude to borrow on financial markets without central government approval. On administrative decentralization it would be useful to know the extent to which the central government can veto sub-national government and the kinds of policies over which subnational governments exert authority. And on political decentralization, one might distinguish between indirect and direct election of offices, and further, between the election of regional assemblies and regional executives.

Fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization are concerned with the authority of a regional government in its own jurisdiction. However, a regional government may also co-determine national policies. Is the regional government represented in a national legislature (normally the second chamber), and if so, to what effect? Can the regional government co-determine the proportion of national tax revenue that goes into its pocket? Does it have routinized access to extra-legislative channels to influence the national government? And, most importantly, does the regional government have authority over the rules of the game?

These distinctions provide a basis for further specification. Each responds to a basic question that one can ask about regional authority. In the domain of self-rule we formulate five questions:

- **Institutional depth** tracks the extent to which a regional government can make autonomous policy decisions. A deconcentrated regional administration has the apparatus of government—a physical address, a bureaucracy, an executive, a budget—but is subordinate to the center. A decentralized regional government, by contrast, can make independent policy decisions, which, at the upper end of this scale, are not subject to central government veto.

- **Policy scope** taps the breadth of regional self-rule over policing, over its own institutional set-up, over local governments within its jurisdiction, whether a regional government has residual powers, and whether its competences extend to economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare policy, immigration, or citizenship.

- **Fiscal autonomy** is evaluated in terms of a regional government’s authority to set the base and rate of minor and major taxes in its jurisdiction. This dimension is concerned with the authority of a government to set the rules for taxation rather than the level of regional spending.
Measuring Regional Authority

- Does a regional government have authority to borrow on financial markets? **Borrowing autonomy** evaluates the centrally imposed restrictions on the capacity of a regional government to contract loans independently on domestic or international financial markets.\(^ {11} \)

- Is a regional government endowed with representative institutions? **Representation** assesses whether a regional government has a regionally elected legislature; whether that legislature is directly or indirectly elected; and whether the region’s executive is appointed by the central government, dual (i.e. co-appointed by the central government), or autonomously elected (either by the citizens or by the regional assembly).

In the domain of **shared rule** we pose the following questions:

- To what extent can a regional government co-determine national policy making? **Law making** assesses the role of regions in structuring representation at the national level (i.e. in a second legislative chamber); whether regions have majority or minority representation there; and the legislative scope of the second chamber.

- Can a regional government co-determine national executive policy in intergovernmental fora? **Executive control** taps whether regional governments have routine meetings with the central government and whether these are advisory or have veto power.

- Can a regional government co-determine how national tax revenues are distributed? **Fiscal control** taps the role of regions in negotiating or exerting a veto over the territorial allocation of national tax revenues.

- Can a regional government co-determine the restrictions placed on borrowing? **Borrowing control** distinguishes whether regional governments have no role, an advisory role, or a veto over the rules that permit borrowing.

- Can a regional government initiate or constrain constitutional reform? **Constitutional reform** assesses the authority of a regional government to propose, postpone, or block changes in the rules of the game. Does constitutional reform have to gain the assent of regional governments or their constituencies? Does it require majority support in a regionally dominated second chamber?

A region may exercise shared rule multilaterally with other regions or it may exercise shared rule bilaterally with the center. Multilateral shared rule is

\(^ {11} \) Our prior measure overlooked borrowing (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2008, 2010). Extending the sample to Latin America and Southeast Asia brings regional borrowing into focus both in self-rule and shared rule. Subnational borrowing became particularly salient from the 1980s and 1990s, when several Latin American countries were hit by debt crises. The financial crisis in the Eurozone has also put the spotlight on regional borrowing.
contingent on coordination with other regions in the same tier; bilateral shared rule can be exercised by a region acting alone.

IV. Indicators for Dimensions of Self-rule and Shared Rule

An indicator consists of rules for inferring variation along a dimension (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 75; Tal 2013: 1162). Chang (2004: 216) asks, “In the process of operationalizing the abstract concept, what exactly do we aim for, and what exactly do we get? The hoped-for outcome is an agreement between the concrete image of the abstract concept and the actual operations that we adopt for an empirical engagement with the concept (including its measurement).”

Tables 2.2 and 2.3 detail indicators for self-rule and shared rule. The indicators specify institutional outcomes for an individual region or regional tier that can be reliably assessed against information in constitutions, laws, executive orders, and government documents. In addition, the intervals are designed to have the following desiderata (Gerring and Skaanig 2013):

- Each interval comprises a set of necessary and sufficient institutional conditions for a particular score.
- The attributes for each interval encompass the prior interval with some additional unique attribute.
- The attributes are binary in order to minimize the gray zone between existence and non-existence.
- Collectively, the intervals seek to capture the relevant variation in the population that is assessed.
- The spacing of the intervals is conceived as equidistant so that a unit shift along any dimension is equivalent.

V. Scoring Cases

Scoring cases consists of obtaining and processing information in order to place numerical values on objects (Bollen and Paxton 2000). Our scoring strategy involves “interpretation through dialogue.”

Interpretation is the act of explaining meaning among contexts or persons. When measuring regional authority, we are interpreting the concept of regional authority in the context of particular regions at particular points in time. As one moves down the ladder of measurement in Figure 2.1, the concept of regional authority becomes less abstract, but even concrete concepts, such as a dual executive, a routine meeting, or a formal veto, are not directly observable. “The bridge we build through acts of measurement between
concepts and observations may be longer or shorter, more or less solid. Yet a bridge it remains” (Schedler 2012: 22).

The principal challenge in estimating an abstract concept such as regional authority is validity rather than reliability. Validity concerns whether a score measures what it is intended to measure. Do the dimensions really capture the meaning of the concept? Do the indicators meaningfully pick up the variation on each dimension? Do the scores accurately translate the characteristics of individual cases into numbers that express the underlying concept? Reliability concerns the random error that arises in any measurement. How consistent are scores across repeated measurements? Would a second, third, or nth expert produce the same scores? If the error one is most worried about is systematic rather than random, then it may be more effective to structure dialogue among coders to reach consensus on a score than to combine the scores of independent coders.

The practical steps involved in interpretation through dialogue are as follows:

- gathering and interpreting public documents, including constitutions, laws, executive decrees, budgets, government reports, and websites;
- engaging the secondary literature to check interpretations and probe the contextual appropriateness of indicators;
- subjecting interpretations to expert commentary on the validity of scoring judgments;
- discussing/debating contending interpretations among the measurement team;
- explicating judgments in extended profiles so that others may revise or reject our decisions.

The profiles in the companion volume are intended to make the link between indicators and scores both plausible and transparent (Hooghe, Marks, Schakel, Niedzwiecki, Chapman Osterkatz, and Shair-Rosenfield 2016).

VI. Adjudicating Scores

Gray cases are endemic in measurement. They come into play at every step in a measure and arise in the fundamental tension, noted by Weber, between an idea and an empirical phenomenon. Gray cases are not indicators of scientific failure. Rather they are calls for re-assessing a measurement, for ascending the arrows on the right side of Figure 2.1. One can seek to resolve a gray case by refining observation, by revising an indicator, dimension or, in extremis, by redefining the specified concept. Is this case gray because we lack good information or does it raise conceptual issues? Is the case an isolated instance of
### Table 2.2. Self-rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-rule</th>
<th>The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional depth</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–3</td>
<td>0 No functioning general purpose administration at regional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Deconcentrated, general purpose administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Non-deconcentrated, general purpose administration subject to central government veto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Non-deconcentrated, general purpose administration not subject to central government veto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy scope</strong></td>
<td>The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–4</td>
<td>0 Very weak authoritative competencies in (a), (b), (c), or (d), whereby (a) economic policy; (b) cultural-educational policy; (c) welfare policy; (d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set-up, local government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Authoritative competencies in one of (a), (b), (c), or (d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Authoritative competencies in at least two of (a), (b), (c), or (d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Authoritative competencies in (d) and at least two of (a), (b), or (c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Criteria for 3 plus authority over immigration, citizenship, or right of domicile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal autonomy</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–4</td>
<td>0 Central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Regional government sets the rate of minor taxes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Regional government sets the base and rate of minor taxes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Regional government sets the base and rate of at least one major tax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borrowing autonomy</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which a regional government can borrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–3</td>
<td>0 The regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 The regional government may borrow under prior authorization <em>ex ante</em> by the central government and with one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions: a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits); b. foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank; c. no borrowing above a ceiling; d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 The regional government may borrow without prior authorization and under one or more of (a), (b), (c), or (d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 The regional government may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–4</td>
<td>0 No regional assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Indirectly elected regional assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Directly elected assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly:</td>
<td>0 Regional executive appointed by central government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Dual executive appointed by central government and regional assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive:</td>
<td>0 Regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or directly elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared rule</td>
<td>The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Law making      | The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation. | 0–2
|                 | Regions are the unit of representation in a national legislature.                               | 0.5
|                 | Regional governments designate representatives in a national legislature.                    | 0.5
|                 | Regions have majority representation in a national legislature based on regional representation. | 0.5
|                 | The legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority.           | 0.5
| Executive control | The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings. | 0–2
|                 | No routine meetings between central and regional governments to negotiate policy.             | 0
|                 | Routine meetings between central and regional governments without legally binding authority. | 1
|                 | Routine meetings between central and regional governments with legally binding authority. | 2
| Fiscal control  | The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues. | 0–2
|                 | Neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues. | 0
|                 | Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto. | 1
|                 | Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues. | 2
| Borrowing control | The extent to which a regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing constraints. | 0–2
|                 | Regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints.                  | 0
|                 | Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto. | 1
|                 | Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints and have a veto.         | 2
| Constitutional reform | The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change. | 0–4
|                 | The central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution.        | 0
|                 | A national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum. | 1
|                 | Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum. | 2
|                 | A legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation. | 3
|                 | Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change. | 4
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

ambiguity or does it suggest a more general problem? If the latter, can one rejig
the indicator for that dimension? Or does the problem go back to the speci-
fication of the concept?

Gray cases contain valuable information that can be useful for users and for
those who might improve a measure. They should be highlighted rather than
hidden. We notate three common sources of “grayness” in the country profiles:

- Insufficient or ambiguous information. Outside the laboratory, observation
can be plagued by poor light or deficient information.

- Observations that fall in between intervals. No matter how sharp a distinc-
tion, some observations sit between intervals.

- Disagreement among sources, coders, experts. Applying a concept to an
empirical phenomenon is an inferential process that is subject to error
and hence to disagreement. Even simple concepts that refer to physical
objects have fuzzy boundaries (Quine 1960: 114ff).

Conclusion

Measuring the authority of individual regions in a wide range of countries
over several decades is always going to be a theoretical as well as a practical
challenge. Our approach, in short, is to (a) disaggregate the concept into
coherent dimensions that encompass its meaning; (b) operationalize these
dimensions as institutional alternatives that are abstract enough to travel
across cases but specific enough to be reliably evaluated; (c) assess the widest
possible range of documentary information in light of the secondary literature
and expert feedback; and (d) discuss coding decisions and ambiguities in
comprehensive country profiles.

The measure can be used to estimate regional authority at the level of the
individual region, regional tier, or country by combining the dimensions.
Alternatively, researchers may wish to re-aggregate these to their needs. The
intervals on the dimensions are conceptualized along equal increments, so
one can add up dimension scores to produce a scale ranging between 1 and 30
for each region or regional tier. Country scores are zero for countries that have
no regional government, but there is no a priori maximum because countries
may have more than one tier. We use the additive scale in the maps, tables,
and figures in this book.

An alternative approach is to interpret the dimensions as indicators of a
latent variable. The Cronbach’s alpha across the ten dimensions for 2010 is
0.94, which suggests that the dimensions can be interpreted as indicators of a
single latent concept. Table 2.4 presents a factor analysis for country scores in
2010. We use polychoric correlations on the conservative assumption that the
indicators are ordinal. A single-factor solution accounts for 82 percent of the variance. When we impose a two-factor solution, each indicator loads strongly on one latent factor and weakly on the other factor. The solution confirms the theoretical distinction between self-rule and shared rule.12

The decision to estimate authority at the level of individual regions rather than countries is the single most important measurement decision we make because it affects how one thinks about the structure of government. Governance exhibits great variation within as well as among countries, and one cannot begin to fathom the reasons for this or understand its consequences if one conceives the state as the unit of analysis. Some regional governments have wide-ranging policy competences, others deal with a single problem. Some can block constitutional reform. Some have extensive taxing powers. Some exert wide-ranging authority within their own territories; others play a decisive role in the governance of the country as a whole. Some regions have a bilateral relationship with the central government, while others negotiate alongside other regions in uniform tiers. Variation within countries is as theoretically interesting as variation among them. Postfunctionalism theorizes that the former can help to explain the latter. The RAI is useful in this regard because it is designed to estimate territorial governance within, as among, countries.

12 The correlation between the two dimensions is reasonably strong (r=0.61). It does not make much difference which method one uses to aggregate the data: the scores derived from additive scaling are very similar. The correlation is 0.98 for 2010 for the single dimension. Moreover, the index is robust across alternative weights for self-rule and shared rule. The RAI weighs shared rule to self-rule in the ratio of 2:3. When we reverse these weights, the rank order among countries in 2010 yields a Spearman’s rho of 0.99 (Pearson’s r=0.97).
3

Trends in Regional Authority

Our purpose in this chapter is to survey the broad outlines of regional governance and its development over the past six decades. Along the way we encounter some intriguing puzzles and query some established expectations. Why do federal regimes, which we expect to be institutionally stable, reform so much? Why has the distinction between federal and non-federal regimes come to tell us less about the structure of governance? Why do new regional tiers sometimes end up centralizing authority? And why has there been an almost irresistible move towards representative institutions?

The regional authority index (RAI) estimates 3,465 regional governments in eighty-one countries—in total around 1,724,040 region/year observations on ten dimensions of regional authority. Each region has distinctive features that shape its governance, but, as we show in this chapter, variation over time and space is patterned in ways that allow succinct summary.

The Big Picture

When viewed from a great height, one can see that the pattern of human settlement is constrained by its physical context, by the lay of the land, and its ecology. So it is with the structure of governance. It is constrained, though not determined, by the number of people to be governed and their dispersion over space. The larger a country, the greater is the need to have one or more tiers of governance below the national and above the local. So a first cut at describing regional governance should pay attention to the scale of a country’s population. The single most powerful influence on a country’s regional governance in cross-sectional comparison is its population. The association between a country’s population and the RAI in 1950 for the forty-eight countries we track continuously was 0.55 in
1950 and 0.60 in 2010. For all eighty countries for which we have data in 2010 it is 0.68.¹

Population size also affects the conditions under which regionalization takes place. The average RAI for the forty-eight countries we survey from 1950 to 2010 was 8.09 at the beginning of the period and 12.62 at the end.² The RAI of the median country increased from 5.25 in 1950 to 11.12 in 2010. The increase for the median country is 30 percent more than the average increase because countries with very small populations do not budge from zero and federal countries at the upper end of the scale do not increase much. So change is most marked between these extremes—i.e. in the range of the median country.

Across the entire dataset, we detect an increase in regional authority in fifty-two of eighty-one countries. Nine countries have seen a decline: Cuba, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Sweden, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Malaysia, Russia, and Serbia-Montenegro. The last four are federal countries that become slightly more centralized over the period as a whole, but retain higher than average RAIs.³ Cuba’s provinces were weakened in the wake of the Castro revolution. Costa Rica replaced its deconcentrated general-purpose tier with special-purpose regional associations. Ecuador and Sweden centralized when they abolished second chambers representing regions. Bosnia-Herzegovina was placed under a UN protectorate in 1997 that could veto legislation and appoint or dismiss judges, ministers, civil servants, and members of parliament.

That leaves twenty countries with the same level of regionalization in 2010 as when they entered the dataset. Sixteen have a population of less than three million and so have little need of an intermediate tier of government between the local and the national. The remaining four countries are El Salvador, Singapore, Israel, and Honduras. Putting aside federal countries, every country that we observe with a population of at least fifteen million in 2010 saw some measure of regionalization.

The average increase in the RAI for the fifty-two countries that regionalized is 5.6. This is equivalent to one of following scenarios.

- The creation of an entirely new tier of regional governance with centrally appointed executives and directly elected regional assemblies. Subject to

¹ We use the logarithm of population to capture the intuition that the effect of an additional individual decreases as the overall population increases.
² The RAI covers nineteen European, twenty Latin-American, two North-American, and seven Southeast Asian or Pacific countries that were independent from 1950 to 2010 and which make up 76.5 percent of the country-year observations in the dataset. These countries are starred in the Appendix to this chapter. Unless otherwise stated, all trends in this book are calculated for these countries only.
³ Serbia-Montenegro partitioned in 2006, and the two constituent republics of Montenegro and Serbia enter our dataset as independent observations in 2007.
post hoc central veto, regional executives set property tax rates and have responsibilities in one policy area such as primary and secondary education.

- Or, if a regional tier like the one described above already exists, a five-and-a-half point increase in the RAI would make regional executives co-responsible to elected regional assemblies and no longer subject to post hoc central veto. The responsibilities of regional executives would be extended to a second policy area, such as economic planning, with control over the base as well as the rate of a major tax (e.g. sales taxes) in addition to property taxes. Regional executives would have routine consultative meetings with the central government on fiscal policy.

There are many examples of such reforms. In the early 2000s, Slovakia’s RAI increased from 1 to 7 when it set up self-governing regions with directly elected councils and a directly elected chairperson. The councils gained primary responsibility for regional economic development and could borrow subject to prior approval by the minister of finance. Peru’s RAI increased by seven points in 2003 when its departments were upgraded from deconcentrated to decentralized regions with extensive policy responsibilities and a directly elected assembly and executive. Poland’s five-point increase in 1999 amounted to the replacement of centrally appointed regional prefects with dual executives responsible to directly elected regional councils. In addition, regional executives gained competences in higher education, health care, spatial planning, and EU structural funding.

Convergence?

Before we proceed, we need to engage a thorny question: has regionalization led to convergence? We think the most plausible answer is no, but there are two sides to the question.

Figure 3.1 summarizes the distribution of the RAI for forty-eight countries in 1950 and for the same countries in 2010. There are three things to notice. First, the distribution shifts markedly to the right. The mean and median increase by 4.53 and 5.87 points, respectively. Second, the distribution becomes noticeably flatter over time. The coefficient of skewness of the distribution falls from 1.08 to 0.74 (Cox 2010: 483–4). Third, the difference between the mean and median narrows from 2.84 in 1950 to 1.50 in 2010. In 1950, the distribution was heavily biased to highly centralized countries with a smattering of moderately decentralized countries and a long tail of

---

4 The distribution drawn from our sample is smoothed using Epanechnikov kernel estimation.
federal countries. In 2010, the bias to centralized countries is less marked and the tail of the distribution is fatter and longer.

Our eyeballs do not perceive in this graph an increase in convergence over time. Rather the reverse. The spread of the scores among countries appears flatter in 2010 than in 1950. The third row of Table 3.1 confirms that the standard deviation of country RAI scores is greater in the 2000s than it was in the 1950s. And the standard deviation in the 2000s at 9.67 is not much smaller than the mean (12.36) or median (11.00).

However, convergence is a tricky concept. What would you make of the following example? In 1950, the scores for three hypothetical countries are 1, 2, and 3. In 2010 they increase to 10, 12, and 14. Has there been convergence? In absolute terms, the answer is no. The standard deviation has doubled from one to two. But the proportional distances among these scores has decreased.

### Table 3.1. Trends in regional authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>9.61</td>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>12.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of variation (CV)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n=48 countries. Observations are decade averages.

CV (coefficient of variation) $i = \frac{\sigma}{\mu}$ where $\sigma$ is the sample standard deviation and $\mu$ the sample mean for decade $i$. 

Figure 3.1. Distribution of regional authority scores

*Note: n=48 countries.*
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

This is what the coefficient of variation, which divides the standard deviation by the population mean, would tell us. The final row of Table 3.1 shows that relative to the mean at each time point, the variation in the RAI among countries has in fact fallen.5

There is a substantive reality to this. In 1950, territorial governance within states was predominantly centralized, and just a small number of countries were decentralized, with a distinct category of federal countries at the tail. In 2010, there are fewer highly centralized countries, and there are more countries in the middle and towards the decentralized side. If one were to compare the distributions in 1950 and 2010 around a standardized mean, there has indeed been convergence. If, on the other hand, one compares the absolute variance in 1950 to that in 2010, divergence has increased.

A Multilevel Perspective

Subnational governance has become more multilevel over the past sixty years. Table 3.2 reveals that the number of tiers between the local and the national has grown from fifty to sixty-two in countries we observe from 1950 to 2010. By 2010, the number of countries with a second tier had risen from five to fifteen, and this accounts for the bulk of change. In that year, only Costa Rica and the two least populous countries in the sample, Iceland and Luxembourg, have no regional tiers. At the opposite extreme, Germany has three regional levels consisting of Regierungsbezirke and Kreise (or Kreisfreie Städte) nested within Länder.6

Altogether, thirty-four new levels of subnational governance were created and seven eliminated across the sample as a whole (Table 3.3). All but one of the countries that set up their first regional tier had a population of less than ten million at the time of the reform. The exception is South Korea, which abolished subnational government during the Korean War and reintroduced it in 1952 when its population was 21 million. All but four countries that set up a second tier had a population greater than ten million at the time. Finland, Portugal, and Serbia already had a tier of regional governance when they created a second one, but only one of these tiers has an RAI greater than one. Belgium, ever the exception, added an authoritative tier of regions and communities to its strong provinces.

---

5 The decline in variation is robust across dispersion measures that treat the data as ordinal or non-normal, such as the coefficient of median absolute dispersion (CMAD) and the coefficient of interquartile variation (CIQR) (Bonett 2006; Stuart and Ord 1994).

6 Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin have neither Kreisfreie Städte nor Kreise.
In most cases, competences handled by these new tiers were reallocated from the center, but there are exceptions. Regionalization may also reallocate competences among subnational tiers. In France, régions were established in 1964 as deconcentrated units to implement national economic plans and, once in place, were used to scale up as well as scale down, partly at the expense of the lower regional tier, the départements (Keating 1998: 63; OECD 2006: 135). In June 2014, the French government released plans to halve the number of régions, and empower them with additional policy competences and tax powers while reducing départements to deconcentrated administrations. Similar trade-offs have taken place among Belgian provinces and regions, Hungarian megyék and regiók, Chilean municipalities and regions, and Indonesian kabupaten-kabupaten and provinsi-provinsi.7

An important conceptual point lurks here. The dimension running from centralization to decentralization is useful if one’s gaze is focused on what the central government does or does not do, but it is a blunt instrument for conceptualizing variation along the ladder of governance. An increase in the authority of a regional tier may, or may not, be a move in the direction of decentralization.

The overall direction of reform in most countries has been to decentralize authority, but there are several counter-examples. Upscaling governance has gained traction in recent years, particularly in Europe. Denmark has seen

---

Table 3.2. Regional tiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No tier</th>
<th>One tier</th>
<th>Two tiers</th>
<th>Three tiers</th>
<th>Total no. of tiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5a</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5b</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3c</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4d</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3e</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2h</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3f</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3f</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n = 48 countries. A tier is included if it encompasses at least one-third of the population of a country.

* Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, South Korea.
* Cuba, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg.
* Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg.
* El Salvador, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg.
* El Salvador, Iceland, Luxembourg.
* Costa Rica, Iceland, Luxembourg.
* Germany.
* Germany, Peru.

---

7 Case studies probe multilevel interaction, e.g. for Argentina (Giraudy 2015), Belgium (S. De Rynck 2002; F. De Rynck and Wayenberg 2010), Brazil (Niedzwiecki 2016), Chile (Eaton 2004a), France (Loughlin 2007a), Greece (Hlepas 2010), Hungary (Soós and Kákai 2011), Indonesia (Aspinall 2011), Italy (Brunazzo and Roux 2007; Piattoni and Brunazzo 2011), and Spain (Chapman Osterkatz 2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>(do/gwangyeoksi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>(provincias)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>(régions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>(communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>(regioni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Connecticut-US</td>
<td>(planning regions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>(regions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>(regiones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>(comissões regionais)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>(comunidades)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>(périphéries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>(development regions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Catalina-Spain</td>
<td>(comarcas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>(županije)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>(departamentos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>(maakuntien)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>(regions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>(apskritys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>(kraj)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>(regiunidrezvoltare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>(régirók)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>(regionalne agencije)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>(provincias)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>(qarku)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>(kraj)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>(okrug)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Quebec-Canada</td>
<td>(conférences régionales)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>(provincias)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>(regioner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>(planski regioni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>(kalkunna ajanslan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>(plamožans regioni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>(regionalni razvojni saveti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>(duehallintovirastot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>(apskritys)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.3. Establishment and disestablishment of regional tiers in 81 countries (1950–2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>(provincias)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>(régions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>(comunidades)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>(comunidades)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>(departamentos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>(regiones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>(provincias)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>(amtskommune)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>(apskritys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>(ääni)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Establish** 1 2 6 5 9 11

**Disestablish** 1 0 0 1 2 3
considerable centralization in an effort to bring jurisdictional scale in line with policy function (Blom-Hansen and Heeager 2011: 224). In 1970, more than a thousand municipalities, rural counties, urban districts, and state-run specialized agencies were replaced by 275 municipalities responsible for primary education, elderly care, child care, and employment. At the regional level, twenty-five counties and a large number of districts were merged to form fourteen counties responsible for health care, secondary education, and regional infrastructure (Blom-Hansen 2012). Subsequent bottlenecks in the health sector led to another comprehensive redesign in 2007 which cut the number of municipalities and counties by two-thirds, with the aim of increasing “the efficiency of the public sector by harnessing benefits of scale and by providing a better infrastructure for competition and incentive-based governance measures” (Vrangbæk 2010: 212). Two regions were exempt: Greenland and the Faroe Islands retained their autonomous status as full service jurisdictions.

Centralization was not an explicit goal of these reforms. Rather it was the by-product of an attempt to increase efficiency. In several countries, lower-level regional units have been weakened or merged “where a critical mass is needed to increase effectiveness, such as [in] health care or regional policy” (Vammalle and Charbit 2010: 222). In 2012 the Italian government announced that it would reorganize and eventually abolish provinces, a third level of subnational government between regioni and municipalities. In January 2015 many provinces were swallowed into metropolitan cities “to encourage better coordination on urban problems that don’t stop at city borders” (d’Antonio 2014). Unlike old-style provinces, which were directly elected, each metropolitan city has a governing council of indirectly elected officials and a president, who is typically the mayor of the core city.

The wave of regionalization over the past six decades has been a response to excessive centralization resulting from nationalism, from authoritarianism, and from international war. Each of these can lead to a highly centralized regime which stifles regional particularism, neutralizes political opposition, and imposes national unity. The most sustained and sharpest increases in regional authority have taken place in countries that were previously the most centralized: Spain in the post-Franco era; Indonesia in the post-Suharto era; Italy and France in the post-World War II decades; the Czech Republic and Slovakia following communism; Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Peru, and South Korea following military rule. But what can one expect if nationalism, authoritarianism, and international war do not return to re-impose centralization?

---

Clearly, the increase in the number of regional tiers, and of regional authority in general, that has taken place over the past several decades cannot continue unabated. Figure 3.2, which shows the total number of reforms in eighty-one countries for each year from 1950 to 2010, suggests that the incidence of regionalization has declined from its peak in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1995 there were thirty-one reforms, dropping to thirteen from 2005 to 2010. As regions become empowered and as the number of levels of governance increases, the scope for further regionalization across the board will diminish. This is consistent with the fact that regional governance has increased less in federal countries than in non-federal countries of similar population size. This is nothing less than saying that regional governance is becoming the norm in all but very small countries.

Differentiated Governance

Many reforms are targeted at individual regions that are differentiated from other regions in the same country. The concept was used by Rod Rhodes and

---

9 The threshold for a reform is an increase or decrease of 0.1 in the RAI for a country as a whole.
his collaborators to challenge the conventional assumption that the United Kingdom is a unitary state in which “the institutions of the centre can direct all levels of governance” and to make the point that “civil service differentiation has been and remains a feature of the operation of UK government,” creating “the potential for a disUnited Kingdom” (Rhodes et al. 2003: 8–9, 99; see Rhodes 1988: chs 1 and 5). Scotland has long had a distinctive legal status within the United Kingdom, and the “one-size-fits-all” approach is in retreat in England also. From 2015, local governments can form a combined authority with an elected mayor and negotiate with the central government to gain control of certain services (Lowndes et al. 2015). Manchester has acquired authority over transport and skill training, and will have joint control over health and social welfare. Cambridge has been offered control of certain business taxes. The reform has been described as “a classic messy British answer of ad hoc progress made one step at a time.” Yet the concept of differentiation travels well beyond Britain. Many countries that we observe in this book have some form of differentiated governance, and the incidence has been growing.

We define a differentiated region as a region with authoritative competences that distinguish it from other regions in the same country, and we operationalize such a region as one that differs from other regions in its tier on one or more dimensions of the RAI. In 1950, nineteen of the forty-eight countries we track from 1950 to 2010 had one or more regions that meet this criterion. By 2010, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, this had increased to thirty countries. No country with differentiated regional governance has become uniform; eleven countries have become differentiated, chiefly in response to the demand for self-rule on the part of those claiming to represent distinct ethnic communities. Flanders gained special authority in Belgium, Corsica in France, the indigenous territories in Bolivia, five indigenous comarcas in Panama, Jeju in Korea, the Azores and Madeira in Portugal, Yogyakarta and later Aceh and Papua in Indonesia, and Mindanao in the Philippines.

In most cases, differentiated regions have more regional authority than other regions in the same tier, as do each of the regions listed above. A declining number of regions are differentiated in that they exercise less, rather than more, authority. Some of these are capital regions, such as Kuala Lumpur and Caracas, which are centrally controlled for fear of revolt. The remaining differentiated regions with lower RAI scores are dependencies.

11 The concept has been applied to the European Union, where it refers to “the differential validity of formal EU rules across countries” (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012; Kölliker 2006; Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014: 356; Schmitter 1996; Stubb 1996; for an early critical discussion of institutional differentiation in response to national diversity in the context of European integration, see Wallace 1985).
former colonies, or regions that are deemed to have insufficient resources for self-rule.

Differentiated regions are targets of reform. Figure 3.4 distinguishes reforms of entire regional tiers and reforms of differentiated regions. The latter constitute the majority: 56 percent prior to 1980, rising to 61 percent from 1980 to 2010.

Figure 3.4 reveals a bias of deep significance. Differentiated regions are far more likely to be empowered than disempowered. For every reform that weakens the authority of a differentiated region, we detect nine reforms that strengthen a differentiated region. The ratio for regional tiers is just 3:1. Whereas reform of regional tiers is particularly sensitive to scale efficiency, reform of differentiated regions is particularly sensitive to community. If the efficient scale of, say, building hospitals or schools increases, then it may make economic sense to shift this competence higher on the ladder of governance. Efficiency is blind to the demand of a community to rule itself. But tell a community that it will lose authority over some of its laws, and one may expect identity as well as efficiency to come into play. Differentiated regions

---

**Figure 3.3.** From uniform to differentiated governance

*Note: n=48 countries.*

---
generate a ratchet effect. Proposing a reform that disempowers a territorial community which feels entitled to self-rule may be asking for trouble.

The Incidence of Reform

On average, a country experiences a regional reform every thirteen years. The incidence of reform is slightly skewed. We detect no fewer than fifteen reforms in Argentina between 1950 and 2010, more than in any other country, while five countries have had no reforms.12 On the whole, though, we see many more reforms than one would expect if one consulted prior measures. The territorial architecture of most states is not fixed in stone. Larger countries are particularly prone to reform. Those with a population greater than ten million see reform every 10.8 years on average. So the overall picture is one of flux rather than stability. A phenomenon that appeared institutionally rigid becomes more variable—and more puzzling—when viewed through the lens of a more sensitive measurement instrument.

12 Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, and Luxembourg.
Reforms are most likely in countries experiencing regime change. The likelihood of reform in a given year in a stable country is 6.6 percent. This more than triples to 22.4 percent if the country’s Polity score changes compared to the previous year. Around one-quarter of all reforms take place in a year when a country experiences a shift of one or more on this measure. There are several mechanisms. A regime that is in transition to or from democracy may sweep with a new broom. It may reform subnational institutions to reward friends or disempower enemies. The regime may decentralize to allow richer regions to retain a greater share of the taxes they collect or it may centralize to redistribute moneys to poorer regions. A democratizing regime may decentralize to accommodate previously suppressed demands for self-rule, whereas one captured by authoritarian rulers may centralize to stamp out opposition.

The effect of regime change is particularly noticeable in federal countries which, on average, see a country-year reform every nine years, compared to fifteen years in non-federal countries. This is intriguing because regional authority is built into the constitutional fabric of a federal polity. Reform in a federal polity must negotiate an obstacle course of veto points, and this might be expected to make reform more difficult.

Table 3.4 provides information on reform in the eleven federal countries that we observe. Reform is frequent and substantial in five countries—Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Malaysia—each of which has seen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of reforms</th>
<th>Average RAI change per reform</th>
<th>Regime instability</th>
<th>Authoritarianism (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia (from 1957)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (from 1955)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>139</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.28</strong></td>
<td><strong>148</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.21</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number of reforms: first tier reforms where ΔRAI > 0.1; average change per reform: absolute ΔRAI averaged across reforms; regime instability: coefficient of variation of Polity IV scores for observation years; authoritarianism: number of years with a Polity IV score < 5 on −10 to +10 scale.

13 The Polity2 index varies between −10 (authoritarian) and +10 (democratic).
14 Fifty-four of 223 reforms (24.2 percent) take place in a year of regime change.
the alternation of military and democratic regimes (Falleti 2010; Llamazares 2005; Montero and Samuels 2004). Total reform in these countries, i.e. the number of reforms multiplied by the average change in the RAI per reform, ranges from 10.5 to 65. Reform is less frequent and of smaller average magnitude in the remaining countries, none of which has experienced regime change since 1950. Total reform in these countries ranges from zero to 3.9. In the absence of regime instability, federal countries experience relatively few reforms. And when they do engage in reforms, these tend to fluctuate around the status quo. In democratic federations the allocation of territorial authority resembles a structure-induced equilibrium in which the status quo is “invulnerable in the sense that no other alternative, allowed by the rules of procedure, is preferred by all the individuals, structural units, and coalitions that possess distinctive veto or voting power” (Shepsle 1989: 137). Authoritarian rule, by contrast, centralizes authority, bypasses federal rules of procedure, and abolishes the veto power of subnational units.

When we look at the entire sample, we find that the average change per regional reform is significantly smaller in stable democratic federal countries than in democratic non-federal countries: 0.85 compared to 1.93, a difference that is significant at the 0.001 level. Whereas there is limited to-and-fro in federations, in non-federal countries a regional reform often produces a new status quo.

**Democracy**

One of our baseline expectations is that territorial governance is affected by the character of the regime. Decentralization is dangerous for a dictator if it empowers local arenas in which challengers can build support. Whereas a dictator may consider acquiescence to regional self-rule as a sign of weakness, a democratic leader may be less insecure. Democratic leaders sustain their rule by winning elections rather than by denying authority to others. At the same time, democracy makes it easier for proponents of regional authority to mobilize.

These are plausible priors, but systematic evidence has been lacking. In our earlier work (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2012), the effect of regime type was difficult to detect because we observed chiefly European and OECD democracies. Of the thirty-one countries we now

---

15 Veto player theory posits that the number of veto players alone does not determine blocking capacity; one needs to take into account their congruence in policy positions and their cohesion (Hallerberg 2011; Tsebelis 1995, 2002). As Fritz Scharpf (1988, 2005) argues, such congruence is least likely for institutional reform because it directly affects the institutional self-interest of the constituent units to preserve their autonomy.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

examine in mainland Latin America and in the Asia and Pacific region, only Costa Rica, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia have not experienced authoritarianism over the past six decades.

Evidence at the level of individual countries is mixed because there are instances in which authoritarian rulers empower their regional allies or in which democratic rulers centralize to cut out the old authoritarian elites. In Chile in 1976, Pinochet extended the responsibilities of municipalities and created a new regional tier to consolidate his support in rural areas (Eaton 2004b). Cuba instituted directly elected regional assemblies during authoritarian rule and Haiti restored a regional senate. Following their democratic transitions, the Czech Republic and Slovakia initially abolished their intermediate tier to purge communist influence. Bulgaria, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Portugal democratized with no increase in authority for their standard regions, and several authoritarian regimes, including those in Brazil, Indonesia, Spain, and Turkey, tolerated elected municipal or regional governments. In these cases, short-term partisan advantage appears more influential than the character of the regime.

However, these partisan effects tend to cancel each other out in aggregation. Figure 3.5 plots four measures of democracy alongside the average regional authority index for the forty-eight countries for which we have continuous data. The simple associations between the RAI lagged one year, and these measures of democracy range from 0.28 to 0.43. The level of democracy in a country implementing a decentralizing reform is on average significantly higher than in a centralizing country: 6.3 as against 1.2 on the Polity IV measure.16

Representation—the right of a region to select its legislature and executive—has been the most dynamic element in the rise of regional authority.17 In 1950, just twelve of forty-eight countries had a directly elected regional assembly and a fully accountable regional executive. By 2010 that number had increased to twenty-nine (Figure 3.6). Regional representation is firmly rooted in the nineteen established democracies with regional tiers. But two-thirds of all decentralizing reforms took place outside this select group. The principal engine has been democratic transition, which has beefed up representative institutions. Seven countries had a regional tier without representation in 2010, all but one in Central America and the Caribbean.18 When one looks

16 Significant at the 0.005 level. The positive association between democracy and regional authority withstands controls (Ch. 6).
17 Regional representation is the extent to which regional actors can select regional office holders. For regional legislators this is by direct election in the region or indirect election by subnational office holders. For the regional executive this is by direct election in the region or responsibility to a regional assembly. A dual executive is an intermediate category combining regional representation with central selection.
18 The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Israel.
at differentiated regions, regions that are distinct from their tier, the change is particularly sharp. In 1950 ten differentiated regions had directly elected assemblies and fully accountable executives (16 percent). In 2010 there were sixty (or 77 percent).

Regional representation is a democratic norm. Unless interrupted by authoritarianism, regional representation rarely decreases. The ratio of decentralizing to centralizing reforms in democracies is around 18:1. There are just five exceptions and they reinforce, rather than weaken, the argument.\(^{19}\) The directly elected council of the US District of Columbia was suspended from 1995 to 2000 when Congress created an oversight board following financial mismanagement. The directly elected Stormont parliament in Northern Ireland was suspended from 1972 to 1999, and again from 2003 to 2006, following a sharp rise in communal violence. The directly elected assembly of

\(^{19}\) Two lower-level tiers also saw centralization: in 1965, assembly and executive elections for bandarayan/perbandaran were suspended on mainland Malaysia; and in 1972, directly elected councils in Connecticut were replaced with councils composed of local representatives.
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol was replaced by an indirectly elected chamber when the constituent units, Südtirol and Trentino, were empowered (Alcock 1970, 2001). In the twilight of Russia’s brief democratic experiment, direct election of regional governors was replaced by presidential vetting of candidates and indirect election (Goode 2007, 2010).

Authoritarianism tends to reduce regional representation. Eighty percent of all centralizing reforms take place under an authoritarian regime’s watch.

---

20 From January 2015 direct elections for Italian provinces were replaced by indirect representation of municipal mayors. Similar plans are afoot in France for the départements. In both cases, this is balanced by strengthening upper-tier regions.

21 Polity IV categorizes Russia as predominantly democratic in 2005 with a score of 6 on its −10 to +10 scale, while Freedom House registers authoritarianism with a score of 3 on its 0–12 scale (where 12 is fully democratic).

22 We categorize a country as authoritarian for each year that it scores five or lower on the Polity IV scale.
However, authoritarian regimes do not always shut down representative institutions. In Indonesia, directly elected regional assemblies persisted under Suharto. Thai changwat gained directly elected assemblies in 1955 under authoritarian rule. While the military junta in Brazil replaced elected with appointed governors, it allowed direct elections for the state legislatures. In Colombia, directly elected departmental assemblies pre-date the resumption of competitive national elections in 1974 (O’Neill 2005; Penfold-Becerra 1999).

Altogether, we detect twenty-one decentralizing reforms and twenty-seven centralizing reforms in authoritarian regimes. Some centralize only to later decentralize. Cuban president Batista intensified control of provincial elections after the 1952 coup, and Castro dismantled provincial institutions altogether when he took power. When they were revived in 1966, provinces had no representative institutions, but indirectly elected provincial assemblies were established ten years later, and in 1992 these became directly elected. Authoritarian rulers sometimes create new regional institutions to divide and rule, as did president Marcos in 1979, when he set up directly elected assemblies in Mindanao while abolishing direct provincial elections in the rest of the country.

Conclusion

This chapter surveys regional authority across time and space and reveals five trends. First, while regional authority has increased over the past sixty years and governance within the state has become more multilevel, there are few signs of convergence. There appears to be as much variation in regional authority among countries in 2010 as in 1950.

Second, the gap between federal and unitary countries has narrowed as many unitary countries have gained considerable levels of self-rule. All non-federal countries with a population of at least fifteen million increased their RAI over the past six decades with the result that all medium-sized or larger countries tend to have strong intermediate governance between the local and the national. Today, the size of a country’s population is as powerful a predictor of its overall RAI as knowing whether that country has a federal or unitary constitution.

Third, governance is increasingly differentiated. Most reforms identified by our measure are targeted at regions that have special provisions distinguishing them from standard regions. These regions tend to be more dynamic than regions in standard tiers and their reforms are more consistently biased towards empowerment. We hypothesize that the mobilization of community
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

chiefly lies behind this, a development we explore in greater depth in Chapters Five and Six.

Fourth, we see signs of recentralization to rationalize the ladder of governance. Some reforms seek to economize on the number of tiers, and create larger territorial units to reap scale benefits, especially in health provision and economic development. These reforms shift competences among subnational tiers without changing the overall level of decentralization.

Finally, we find that the character of the regime matters. Democracy opens the door to regional governance because it lowers the cost of political claims and because it does not induce rulers to monopolize authority. Because authoritarian regimes are biased towards centralization, the transition to democracy is very often accompanied by decentralizing reform.

Our survey suggests that regional governance is shaped both by the efficient provision of public goods at diverse scales and by the existence of distinct territorial communities. Scale pressures can be identified chiefly by looking at tiers in the ladder of governance. Community pressures are most visible when an individual region gains special provision for self-rule. As we explain in Chapter Four, both principles of governance shape the territorial design of jurisdictions, but in contrasting ways.

Appendix

The sample consists of eighty-one countries across five continents. For forty-eight countries the time series is complete; these countries enter the dataset in 1950 and have continuous coverage until 2010 (starred). Two countries enter in the 1950s, seven in the 1960s, two each in the 1970s and 1980s, sixteen in the 1990s, and four in the 2000s. The most recent entry is Kosovo. The country ID refers to codes in the master datasets, which are available online.

Table 3.A.1. Country coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country name</th>
<th>Country ID</th>
<th>Country abbreviation</th>
<th>Observation years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>1992–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>1955–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>BHS</td>
<td>1973–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>BRB</td>
<td>1966–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize*</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>BLZ</td>
<td>1981–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia*</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>BOL</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>1995–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil*</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>BRU</td>
<td>1984–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1991–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada*</td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile*</td>
<td>CHL</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia*</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica*</td>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>1991–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba*</td>
<td>CUB</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>CYP</td>
<td>1960–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>1993–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark*</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic*</td>
<td>DOM</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>TIMOR</td>
<td>2002–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador*</td>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador*</td>
<td>SLV</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EST</td>
<td>1992–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland*</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece*</td>
<td>GR</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala*</td>
<td>GTM</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>GUY</td>
<td>1966–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti*</td>
<td>HTI</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras*</td>
<td>HND</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>1990–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland*</td>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia*</td>
<td>INO</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland*</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel*</td>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy*</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>1962–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan*</td>
<td>JAP</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>KOS</td>
<td>2008–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LV</td>
<td>1990–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LT</td>
<td>1992–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg*</td>
<td>LUX</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>1991–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>MLY</td>
<td>1957–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>MT</td>
<td>1964–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico*</td>
<td>MEX</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>MTN</td>
<td>2007–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands*</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand*</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua*</td>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway*</td>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama*</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay*</td>
<td>PRY</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru*</td>
<td>PER</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines*</td>
<td>PHL</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1990–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal*</td>
<td>POR</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>ROM</td>
<td>1991–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>1993–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>SERB</td>
<td>2007–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>SIN</td>
<td>1965–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SK</td>
<td>1993–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SLE</td>
<td>1990–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea*</td>
<td>KOR</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country name</th>
<th>Country ID</th>
<th>Country abbreviation</th>
<th>Observation years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain*</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>SUR</td>
<td>1975–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden*</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>SV</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand*</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>THA</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>TTO</td>
<td>1962–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey*</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>TURK</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom*</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States*</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay*</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>URY</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela*</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>VEN</td>
<td>1950–2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4

Designing Jurisdictions

The design of general-purpose jurisdictions—their territorial size and their population—is a basic feature of government. Yet we do not know much about the character or incidence of alternative designs. What are the design choices on offer? What variation do we find on the ground, and why would rulers choose one design over another?

Before we can generalize about jurisdictional design, we need to conceptualize the choices that confront rulers. In Chapter One we set out two ways of thinking about governance: one that conceives governance as an instrument for the efficient provision of public goods, and one that conceives government as an expression of community. In this chapter we explain jurisdictional design as a choice between these two conceptions (Table 4.1).

The instrumentalist approach conceives governance as responding to externalities and economies of scale. This approach to government is utilitarian, premised on the idea that a central planner can frame jurisdictions in a rational manner to achieve administrative efficiency taking into account a country’s heterogeneity. Its purpose is to provide public goods at the lowest cost to every individual across the country. The result is a ladder of governance reaching from the local to the national level and beyond. It is then the job of the central government to determine the appropriate size and competences of jurisdictions at each level. Scale design avoids ad hoc adjustments. Population and area are optimized to minimize deviation from the median jurisdiction in the tier. If concentrations of population make homogenous units infeasible, jurisdictions with dense populations are made small in area, and those with sparse populations are made large.

The alternative is a bottom-up approach, which responds to local conditions and expresses the desire of those living in different parts of the country to exercise self-rule in their homelands. Jurisdictional design pays less attention to efficiency and more attention to territorial community. Instead of optimizing population and area according to abstract criteria, this approach responds to incremental pressures of geo-history. Instead of conceiving jurisdictions...
within a standard frame, this approach conceives jurisdictions as intrinsically diverse. The outcome is a differentiated set-up with jurisdictions that vary widely in population and area. Large, populous regions can exist alongside small, less populated regions.

This distinction helps to make sense of the designs that we track over the past sixty years. Some regional tiers closely approximate a scale design. Départements in France and voivodeships in Poland have populations and areas almost as homogenous as the squares on a chess board. By contrast, some regional tiers bear no sign of top-down design. They encompass large, populous regions alongside much smaller, less populated regions. The variation can be prodigious. Andalusia has seventeen times the area of the smallest mainland comunidad in Spain, La Rioja, and twenty-six times the population.

When will jurisdictional reform exhibit scale and when community? Our expectation is that regime change is a setting for scale design. A regime that breaks from the past may wish to stamp a new order on territorial governance. Imposing a consistent national frame of governance may be a step in overcoming parochial interests and centralizing authority. By redrawing boundaries, the reform may disempower established groups that support the old order. By applying the same principle to all parts of a country, the new rulers may cast themselves as national unifiers. Or, less grandiosely, regime change may provide an opportunity to sweep away accumulated anomalies and impose a more efficient, standardized system for the provision of public goods.

In order to compare jurisdictional designs we need to examine newly created tiers that have not been subject to population shifts over time. We observe forty such cases in our dataset. Along with two historical cases—Napoleonic France and Spain—these provide the empirical basis for our analysis. But to make this journey we need a map. How can one comprehend the variation that lies before us? On what dimensions might one summarize jurisdictional design? We begin by taking stock of the sparse literature on the topic and then we survey some ancient and modern examples of jurisdictional design. We next propose a scheme to systematically estimate variation. We conclude by testing a theory of jurisdictional design.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1. Types of jurisdictional design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scale</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down Design implements a central plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental Jurisdictions are designed to provide public goods at a particular scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardized Jurisdictions are standardized in size and authority.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community, Scale, and Regional Governance
Where to Start

This is a field in which there are country studies, but little comparison. Theory has been drawn from the size of states and the intuition that ethnicity produces smaller jurisdictions (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Friedman 1977). However, it is not at all clear that ethnicity works in the same way within countries as it does among them. There is good reason to believe that ethnicity produces diverse, rather than small, jurisdictions.

The key argument in this literature is that of Alesina and his colleagues, who conceive a trade-off between economies of scale and ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby 2004; Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). In their influential model, economies of scale impose costs on small jurisdictions, and ethnic heterogeneity imposes costs on large jurisdictions. People avoid heterogeneity both because they want to avoid interaction with other ethnic groups and because different people prefer different public goods. Since economies of scale and heterogeneity are hypothesized to have opposite effects on jurisdictional size, their relative causal weight can be estimated by counting the number of jurisdictions. More jurisdictions indicate the influence of ethnic heterogeneity; fewer jurisdictions indicate the influence of scale. At the national level Alesina and Spolaore (2003) find that heterogeneity reduces the size of countries, and at the local level they find less consolidation of US school districts in counties that are more diverse (Alesina et al. 2004).

We conceive a tension between economic and communal pressures on jurisdictional design, but our starting point differs in two ways (Hooghe and Marks 2009b; Marks 2012; Marks and Hooghe 2000). First, we relax the assumption that larger units are always more cost-effective. The economic factors that bear on jurisdictional design encompass, minimally, the quality of information used in policy making and the costs imposed by spatial decay. Diseconomies of scale may arise if the information necessary for providing good government to people living in a region is difficult to standardize, resistant to batching, and correspondingly expensive to pass up an organizational hierarchy (Hooghe and Marks 2012; Ostrom 2010: 8; Stein 2002). Larger

---

1 There are literatures on the size of states (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Friedman 1977; for empirical tests see Greem 2012; Lake and O’Mahony 2004), the location and size distribution of cities (Gabaix and Ioannides 2004; Krugman 1993), local government amalgamation (Freitas Tavares and Camões 2011), the number of subnational jurisdictions (Auffhammer and Carson 2009), and the effects of jurisdictional borders (Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski 2011; Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002). OECD Territorial Reviews provide informative country overviews of jurisdictional design.

2 We define ethnicity broadly as a “category in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership” (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008: 517).
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

jurisdictions may also impose additional costs on access to some public goods, such as elderly care. Informational and spatial costs may produce smaller, not larger, jurisdictions, depending on the public good. Efficient jurisdictional design produces a ladder of governance, ranging from the local to the global.

Second, we wish to revisit the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on jurisdictional design. Does ethnic heterogeneity lead to smaller jurisdictions? Looking at the world of nations, this is a plausible claim. Many states have broken up in ethnic conflict. The resulting states are, of course, smaller than the states from which they emerged. But the situation within states is different. On the one hand, small, culturally distinct groups distant from the center tend to have small jurisdictions. The Faroes, Jeju, and Malacca are, for example, much smaller in population and area than the average jurisdiction in Denmark, South Korea, or Malaysia. On the other hand, jurisdictions claimed by ethnic groups that are less isolated—such as Catalonia, Sarawak, or Scotland—can be considerably larger than the average jurisdiction in their respective state. Perhaps it is only where the living spaces of ethnicities are highly intermixed, as in the United States, that ethnic heterogeneity produces smaller jurisdictions. The generalization that ethnicity produces smaller jurisdictions appears to break down when ethnic minorities are less intermixed. Ethnic minorities that inhabit distinct parts of a country may produce both smaller than average and larger than average jurisdictions.

The idea that ethnic heterogeneity may lead to large jurisdictions comes out of models in which individuals are shaped by those with whom they interact. Axelrod (1997) simulates jurisdictional design among individuals whose chance of interaction is proportional to their cultural similarity. He finds that iterated interaction produces an equilibrium where a small number of large, culturally distinct regions co-habit the same territory but are unlikely to assimilate. The basic idea is that groups which are similar are likely to interact and then become even more similar, and eventually meld into a larger region. Assimilation may produce a single homogenous jurisdiction, but it may also generate more than one cultural region. Over time, the boundaries that differentiate these distinct regions will harden, and the process will settle down to equilibrium.

Karl Deutsch and Stein Rokkan, two giants of political sociology, arrive at exactly the same conclusion by analyzing historical patterns of communication. Deutsch (1953) argues that the capacity of a group to sustain its distinctive norms depends on the ratio of communication among its members relative to communication between its members and those outside. Rokkan and Urwin (1983) argue along parallel lines that a peripheral community must have the resources to resist being swallowed in a national state. These resources include a recognized language and literature, an urban center, and robust economic and political institutions that can survive assimilation.
The core intuition is physical: the larger an object, the smaller its surface in relation to its volume. Individuals in larger groups are more likely to interact with each other than with those outside. Geographical isolation can have the same effect. A group that is isolated on an island or mountain, or in a desert may be able to sustain its culture even if it is small. But a group that is not isolated may have to be large to resist assimilation.

Ethnicity—or more broadly, community—can be expected to produce diverse jurisdictions, depending on the resources of the groups resisting assimilation. A bottom-up design biased towards community can be expected to produce jurisdictions that vary in area and population, whereas one biased towards scale will optimize area and population so that a jurisdiction that is large in one is small in the other.

Jurisdictional Design in History

Carving population in equivalent jurisdictional units according to some abstract design has a long history. Ancient states devised elaborate systems of rule to collect taxes and enforce compliance. The internal structure of the state was organized in tiers reaching down to every individual. A multilevel system emerged as early as 221 BC under the Qin dynasty. It consisted of a series of nested tiers for 27 million subjects dispersed over five million km² (Chang 2007: 64). Thirty-six commanderies (chün) containing around three-quarters of a million people were divided into prefectures (hsien) responsible for 10,000 to 20,000 families, which in turn were subdivided in a nested hierarchy of counties (hsiang) of 5,000 families, wards (li) of 100 families, shih of ten families, and wu with five families (Chang 2007: 44). The family was the final unit of control. If any of its members committed a crime, the entire family suffered the penalty.

The Qin dynasty anticipated modern efforts to flatten a pre-existing order by standardizing jurisdictions. Feudal aristocratic ranks were abolished. Noble families were dispossessed and forced to move to the capital (Bodde 1986: 142; Chang 2007: 58). More than one million people were resettled and two million soldiers conscripted. Successor regimes added or subtracted units and tiers as the empire grew or contracted.

The Inca empire had a comparably elaborate structure (Rowe 1982). The first tier divided an empire encompassing much of contemporary Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Northern Chile into quarters. The scheme divided each quarter into ten provinces, each province into ten districts until, three further tiers down, an official oversaw ten peasants.

Mapmaking and the census make it possible to imagine rational governance with spatial rather than communal units (Anderson 1991; Biggs 1999; Sahlins 1989). Philosophers and revolutionaries imposed mathematical thinking on
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

territorial governance with no concession to custom. Inherited muddles of feud, Escher-like jurisdictions were imagined away by dividing a country into homogenous territorial units. David Hume, usually regarded as an empiricist and a pragmatist, begins his essay, *The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth* (1742/1987: XVI.7), with a blueprint of logarithmic precision:

Let Great Britain and Ireland, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 100 counties, and each county into 100 parishes, making in all 10,000. If the country, proposed to be erected into a commonwealth be of more narrow extent, we may diminish the number of counties; but never bring them below thirty. If it be of greater extent, it were better to enlarge the parishes, or throw more parishes into a county, than increase the number of counties.

Late eighteenth-century France was a hothouse for such plans, the most influential of which was a map by Robert de Hesseln dividing France into eighty-one districts of 18 by 18 leagues, each of which was subdivided into nine cantons (Map 4.1).\(^3\) The result is a striking geometric design paying no regard to history or geography. It conceives France as a homogenous space composed of equally homogenous units. The *Comité de constitution* of the French Assembly, charged in July 1789 with reshaping French territorial governance, took the map as its point of departure (Biggs 1999; Branch 2013). The committee, stacked with luminaries of the revolution—Talleyrand, Siéyès, Le Chapelier, Rabaut Saint-Etienne, Mirabeau, Condorcet—intended to build a just administration “with perfect equality between all components of the nation.” It would end privilege, particularism, and parochialism entrenched in what the *Comité* described as “bizarre and unequal” jurisdictions, “which only habit could render tolerable” (quoted in Biggs 1999: 389). Condorcet (1804: 231) noted that the plan exemplified the egalitarian ideal because it would allow any citizen to travel to his local district, conduct business, and return home in a single day. Siéyès saw the plan as an antidote to local community:

[I]t would be essential to make a new territorial division based on equal spaces, everywhere, except at the borders of the kingdom…It is only by erasing the borders of the provinces that one could destroy all local privileges, effectively reclaimed while we were without constitution, and which will continue to be defended by the provinces, even while they won’t present anything more than obstacles to the creation of social unity… I know of no means that is more powerful and more prompt to forge, without problems, all parts of France into one body and all the Peoples that divide it, into one Nation.\(^4\)

---

\(^3\) A league (*lieu*) was the distance (around 4 km) that could be covered by foot in an hour.

Mirabeau famously remarked that the plan failed “to reconcile administration with men and things.” Edmund Burke (1790/2003 Vol. III: 231–2) objected that it imposed “equality in geometry,” whereas “the goodness of the soil, the number of the people, their wealth, and the largeness of their contribution, made . . . infinite variations between square and square. I cannot conceive how any man can have brought himself to that pitch of presumption, to consider his country as nothing but carte blanche, upon which he may scribble whatever he pleases.”

As implemented, the reform of 1790 created eighty-three départements of roughly equal area on the model of de Hesseln’s map with minimal concession to the landscape. Each département was large enough to support a local court and small enough for a civil servant on horseback to reach any corner within a day’s ride. The revolutionaries coolly applied the same Cartesian logic to subdivide each département into four or five arrondissements, each of which contained seven to ten cantons. Thirty-six thousand towns, burgs, parishes, and villages with diverse statutes and rights were replaced by the uniform institutions and competences of the commune (Masson 1984; Ozouf-Marignier 1986). Most départements were named after rivers or geographical landmarks rather than local villages or towns in a deliberate effort to override regional loyalties (Piattoni 2009). The system was consolidated under Napoleon and imposed across his empire. Henceforth, it would be known as the Napoleonic model (Martí-Henneberg 2005a: 793; see also Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski 2011; Flora et al. 2016). The spirit of the original plan is evident in the contemporary division of France into départements in Map 4.2.

Map 4.2. Départements in France (2015)
Community and Geo-history

An alternative approach is to build jurisdictions on durable patterns of human interaction. The boundaries of social, economic, and political interaction almost never coincide, and most persons consider themselves members of more than one territorial community. So the command: “Build government on community” may mean little or nothing. But there are some circumstances in which distinctive communities can be readily perceived. Many countries have, within them, geographically concentrated groups of people of distinct ethnicity, language, or religion. If such communities serve as building blocks, one can expect a more haphazard jurisdictional design than one based on abstract principles of technical efficiency.

We draw on the work of Stein Rokkan and his conceptualization of difference, distance, and dependence to identify such communities (Dahl-Fitjar 2010; Flora, Kuhnle, and Urwin 1999: 64; Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Difference refers to the normative distinctiveness of a community. Rokkan (in Flora et al. 1999: 171) regards language as decisive because it is “a focal point of identity ... a collective act in which everyone in a territory must share.” Communication and community have a single root, the Latin communis, “common, public, general, shared by all or many.” On similar grounds, Karl Deutsch regards language as a litmus test for the creation of a community because it profoundly affects the breadth and density of communication within a group relative to that between groups: “Membership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders” (Deutsch 1953: 95).

Distance refers to the geographical barriers that impede political, economic, and cultural interaction and which sustain cultural distinctiveness even in the face of a prolonged state strategy to assimilate. The intuition here is that the greater the transaction cost (in time and effort) of communication from a core to a peripheral community, the weaker the pressure of homogenization.

Dependence refers to the economic, political, and cultural reliance of the periphery on the center and the periphery’s corresponding vulnerability to homogenization. “They possess some sense of their separate identity, but this is constantly threatened by central agencies” (Flora et al. 1999: 115). To what extent is a region able to sustain its distinctiveness against a centralizing core? Though Rokkan is not explicit about what it takes for a region to be independent, former statehood is clearly a contributing factor. Autonomous states develop institutions for control, mobilization, and protection, and these may leave a durable legacy.

We hypothesize that difference, distance, and dependence underpin jurisdictional architecture in contrasting ways. Communities that are distant from
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

the center may sustain difference even if they have a small population and no history of independence. Islands are fascinating in this respect because they impede certain kinds of interaction while facilitating others. They facilitate trade because transport of goods by sea is considerably cheaper than transport over land. Hence island trade tends to be more geographically dispersed than that of landlocked regions, and islands are consequently less dependent on trade with a single dominant core. But it is no simple thing for armies or populations to traverse the sea. Islands that do not lie in the lap of a mainland core are not easily conquered or overwhelmed by migration. Islands tend to produce states or strong self-governing regions despite their small population size. In short, islands are not easily absorbed in mainland states and are not easily assimilated in Napoleonic jurisdictional design.

Communities on the mainland within reach of the center are in an entirely different situation. Those that persist tend to be large and resourceful. Their populations face formidable economic, social, and political pressures for assimilation into the larger society. National systems of roads and railways puncture their borders. National labor markets pull their population into the wider economy. National educational systems and media facilitate cultural assimilation. These pressures appeared so strong to Ernest Gellner (1983: 33) that he claimed “sub-units of society are no longer capable of self-reproduction.” He argued, “Industrialization,” he argued, “engenders a mobile and culturally homogeneous society” (72). The functional dictate of modernization is for “a mobile division of labour, and sustained, frequent and precise communication between strangers involving a sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required.”

Which groups would succeed in forming nation states? “Size, historicity, reasonably compact territory, a capable and energetic intellectual class: all these will obviously help; but no single one is necessary; and it is doubtful whether any firm predictive generalization can be established in these terms” (45).

In our theory, three of these conditions—size, historicity, and compact territory—are associated with an outcome that Gellner did not anticipate: the jurisdictionalization of a minority community within a state. A large population, a history of independent statehood, and territorial concentration are key assets in resisting assimilation for a minority that has access—and is accessible—to the wider society.

A sufficient population is vital to sustain a language that is different from the official language of the state. David Laitin’s tipping model theorizes the

---

6 Of 190 islands around the globe with a population greater than 100,000, forty-six lie 30 km or more from their nearest neighbor or mainland. Of these, twenty-five are states with a median population of 849,000. On the continental mainlands there are 170 states with a median population of 9.3 million.

7 To be fair, Gellner sometimes nuances this conclusion (Meadwell 2015; O’Leary 1997: 215).
incentives that face individuals in choosing which language to speak: “The payoff for an individual linguistic choice depends on how many other individuals make the same choice” (1998: 26). Only if sufficient numbers of others find a reason to use the titular language rather than the official state language as the medium of communication is it rational to resist assimilation. A history of independent statehood can provide a region with a national myth and, more importantly, institutions that sustain its distinctive language and customs. Finally, geographical concentration is important because members of a concentrated group will interact more frequently with colinguals than will members of a dispersed group (Deutsch 1953: 43).

Whereas the rational application of technical efficiency creates equivalently sized jurisdictions or jurisdictions that optimize population and territory, the politics of resistance to assimilation has the opposite effect. Minorities may resist assimilation in isolated jurisdictions which are small in both territory and population or in large and populous jurisdictions nearer the center. If so, the forces that shape jurisdictional design will come to light in the overall pattern of jurisdictions in a country.

Conceptualizing Jurisdictional Design

We are now in a position to conceptualize a jurisdictional design as a comprehensive plan for the construction of a system of governance. A jurisdictional design is comprehensive in that it encompasses a tier of governance rather than a single jurisdiction, and it is systemic in that individual jurisdictions are conceived as part of an interrelated whole. The unit in jurisdictional design is the individual jurisdiction, but to compare jurisdictional designs one must examine how the jurisdictions in a tier fit together.

Figure 4.1 sets out a two-dimensional frame on which one can plot the population and area of jurisdictions in a tier. The reference point at the center is the area of the median jurisdiction on the X-axis and the population of the median jurisdiction on the Y-axis. The jurisdictions in a tier can then be depicted in relation to the median to produce a scatterplot.

Figure 4.2 envisages four distinct designs. Each is an ellipse encompassing the jurisdictions in a particular tier. The two at the top are rationalist designs that apply abstract principles of scale on the population and area of jurisdictions.

At the top left, a Napoleonic model applies principles of uniformity in subnational governance. Jurisdictions are similar in both population and area. They pay little or no attention to history or geography. Next to this at the top right is a more nuanced design that trades off population and area. A Napoleonic design may be impossible if a country has vast open spaces with relatively few inhabitants alongside densely populated urban areas. Rationalist
design in this case must take the more subtle path of minimizing variance in the combination of area and population. Jurisdictions with low population density have relatively large areas, while jurisdictions with high population density have small territories.

The two designs at the bottom of the figure reflect geo-historical communities that combine jurisdictions with small population/small area and large population/large area. At the bottom left of Figure 4.2 is a design that we call Rokkanian. Whereas the two prior designs apply abstract rationality to governance, this design mirrors communities as they have emerged over time. Its distinctive shape arises because the communities that depart from the median tend to be small in both population and area, or large in both population and area.

At the bottom right is an irregular design comprising jurisdictions in all four quadrants. It attests no abstract principles, but is an adaptation to geo-history and community which produces jurisdictions of widely varying populations and areas.

Can one generalize about the incidence of these alternatives? To do so, we must first propose metrics for comparing jurisdictional designs.

Figure 4.1. An analytical frame for jurisdictional design
Comparing Jurisdictional Designs

Jurisdictional design is best observed fresh. As a design recedes in time it is concealed by the uneven growth and movement of population across the country. For this reason, we examine jurisdictions at the time they are established, or as near to that time as the data allow. Forty regional tiers were established or comprehensively redesigned in the eighty-one countries in this study between 1950 and 2014, and we match the dates of these with census information on population and area. We also include two famous historical cases—the creation of the French départements in 1790 and Spanish provincias in 1833.

We measure the population of a jurisdiction relative to the median jurisdiction in its tier and, similarly, we measure area relative to the median jurisdiction, using the following formulas:

\[
\text{Population difference (PopDiff)}_{ij} = \frac{\text{Population}_{ij} - \text{Median population}_{j}}{\text{Population}_{ij} + \text{Median population}_{j}}
\]

\[
\text{Area difference (AreaDiff)}_{ij} = \frac{\text{Area}_{ij} - \text{Median area}_{j}}{\text{Area}_{ij} + \text{Median area}_{j}}
\]

Figure 4.2. Jurisdictional designs
The subscript $i$ refers to an individual jurisdiction and $j$ refers to the tier. These are standardized measures ranging from $-1$ to $+1$, which provide a simple and reliable way to plot jurisdictions. Negative scores indicate units that have a smaller population (area) than the median; positive scores indicate units that have a larger population (area) than the median. A unit with the same population as the median unit scores zero; a unit with a population that is twice the median unit scores $+0.33$; and a unit with a population that is half that of the median unit scores $-0.33$. The measure is inverse exponential. A unit that is three times (or one-third) as large as the median unit scores $+0.5$ ($0.5$) and one that is six times (or one-sixth) as large as the median unit scores $+0.71$ ($0.71$). Hence, the measure is most sensitive to values around the median, which is a desirable property given our theory.

Relatively small scores reveal a uniform or Napoleonic model. The criterion is that $\sigma$ (the standard deviation of $\text{PopDiff}_j$ plus the standard deviation of $\text{AreaDiff}_j$) is less than or equal to $0.5$ (Table 4.2). This would be the case if the standard deviation for $\text{PopDiff}_j$ and $\text{AreaDiff}_j$ were each $0.25$, which would result if the median jurisdiction had a population of $100,000$ and an area of $10,000$ km$^2$ and two-thirds of the jurisdictions have a population between $60,000$ and $166,666$ and two-thirds of the units have an area between $6,000$ km$^2$ and $16,666$ km$^2$.$^8$ Of the forty-two tiers listed in Table 4.3, fifteen are Napoleonic.

Some designs optimize population and area so that some jurisdictions have larger populations than the median but smaller areas, while others have smaller populations and larger areas. This design is optimized in the specific sense that it minimizes the sum of $\text{PopDiff}_j$ and $\text{AreaDiff}_j$ for each jurisdiction.$^9$

We consider a design as falling into this category if the tier does not meet the criterion for a Napoleonic design and if $\rho$ (the association between $\text{PopDiff}_j$ and $\text{AreaDiff}_j$) is greater than $0.40$ or less than $-0.40$.

### Table 4.2. Operationalizing jurisdictional design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\sigma$ (sigma)</th>
<th>$\rho$ (rho)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Napoleonic</td>
<td>$\sigma \leq 0.50$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimized</td>
<td>$\sigma &gt; 0.50 \cap \rho &lt; -0.40$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rokkanian</td>
<td>$\sigma &gt; 0.50 \cap \rho &gt; +0.40$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>$\sigma &gt; 0.50 \cap -0.40 &lt; \rho &lt; +0.40$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

$^8$ These figures assume a normal distribution. Because the distribution of jurisdictions in most tiers is skewed, with one or two jurisdictions (usually including the capital city) being very much larger than the median, the range of values for two-thirds of the regions is usually smaller than the example in the text.

$^9$ It is worth noting that whether this produces optimal policy in a general sense is entirely open to question.
and $AreaDiff < -0.40$. Eight tiers have $\rho < -0.40$, of which three meet the criterion for a Napoleonic design. The five remaining designs have an average $\rho$ value of $-0.57$.\(^{10}\)

Tiers reflecting community contain jurisdictions that are diverse in population and area. The pure form of a community design exhibits a substantial positive association between $PopDiff$ and $AreaDiff$. We observe ten such designs with a positive association of 0.65. This leaves twelve irregular designs with jurisdictions that are all over the map on population and area. These have an average standard deviation in population and area of 0.72 and no discernable association between $PopDiff$ and $AreaDiff$.

The effect of community on jurisdictional design is sharply evident when one maps the population and size of “Rokkan” regions, i.e. regions that are geographically distant, linguistically distinct, or have a history of political

---

\(^{10}\) Regiók (Hungary), planski ryegioni (Macedonia), and planošanas regioni (Latvia) meet the criteria for Napoleonic design and have a negative association greater than 0.40.
independence. When a “Rokkan” region varies from the median jurisdiction in its tier, it tends to be either small or large in both population and area. In Figure 4.3 the positive association between population and area for 101 “Rokkan” regions is 0.5. The three cases in the bottom right-hand corner of the figure are vast, sparsely populated regions: the Antarctic region of Chile (1974) and Greenland, which features twice in Danish reforms (1970; 2007). When these are excluded the association among the remaining ninety-eight cases is 0.71.

Some “Rokkan” regions are assimilated as standard regions within a tier, whereas others are differentiated by having special authority in their homeland. Our expectation is that differentiated “Rokkan” regions—regions that have sustained a distinctive claim for self-rule—are small regions at the geographical edge of the state or large regions that have resisted assimilation without the benefit of isolation. When one compares the absolute scores on

---

**Figure 4.3. Rokkan regions**

*Note:* Population and area size of Rokkan regions relative to the median jurisdiction in their tier following jurisdictional reform. A region is Rokkanian if it has one or more of the following characteristics: island or noncontiguous territory that is at least 30 km from the mainland; a majority that speaks a different language from the main national language; prior statehood. In this dataset 101 of 739 jurisdictions (14 percent) are Rokkan.
PopDiff + AreaDiff for “Rokkan” regions that have special authority (n=30) to those that do not (n=71) this is precisely what one finds. “Rokkan” regions that have greater formal authority than other regions in their tier have an absolute $\sigma$ score that on average is twice that of “Rokkan” regions that are standard regions in their tier (1.05 compared to 0.51). The difference is highly significant ($\rho = 0.002$). A $\sigma$ score of 1.05 would result if a region had a population that was three times that of the median region in its tier and an area that was three times that of the median population, or if the region had one-third of the median population and one-third of the median area.

What does it take for a territorially concentrated, normatively distinct minority to persist within a state? There appear to be two paths. One is that of the failed center. A region without the fortune or power to sustain an independent state may be strong enough to resist assimilation. Catalonia, Johor, Flanders, and Sicily are examples. These regions tend to be large in relation to their host states. They are swallowed but not digested in the course of geo-political struggle. Remoteness offers an alternative path. A small region with a small population may sustain independence on the fringes of a state. The Åland Islands, Balearic Islands, Easter Island, the Dodecanese, and Jeju are examples.

The Effect of Regime Change

When do rulers choose a scale design, and when a community design? Scale design conceives government as an instrument for the efficient provision of public goods. Community design conceives government as an expression of local self-rule. Scale design imposes rationality on the structure of governance. Community design reflects endogenous historical processes. Scale design is determined at the center. Community design accommodates the status quo in the provinces. Each of these features suggests that scale design is a function of political discontinuity and that community design is a function of path dependence. Our prior is that scale design is most likely following revolution, decolonization, regime transition (e.g. the demise of communism), regime split, and regime amalgamation.

Accession to the European Union is a constitutional shock with domestic repercussions, and we consider it a form of regime change. Beginning in 1988, the EU’s cohesion policy required “partnership” among the Commission, national authorities, and regional/local governments in designing, running, and monitoring economic development programs which accounted for about one-third of the EU budget (Hooghe 1996). The desire of candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe to accede to membership “allowed the EU an unprecedented influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and
the entire range of public policies in these countries” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 669; Vachudova 2005). In particular, there was substantial pressure to reform domestic governance, including subnational institutions (Bauer and Börzel 2010; Börzel 2002).¹¹

The effect of regime change for the mode of jurisdictional design is very strong in bivariate analysis for forty-two cases of jurisdictional reform. Of the twenty-three cases of regime change preceding jurisdictional reform, sixteen are scale designs. By contrast, of the nineteen cases of jurisdictional reform in the absence of regime change, fifteen are community designs. A chi-squared test produces a likelihood ratio of 10.31, significant at \( p < .001 \).¹²

Table 4.4 confirms that regime change robustly produces scale design under controls both when EU accession is included within Regime change (models 1 and 3) and when EU accession is excluded (models 2 and 4). We transform the

---

¹¹ In Ireland, Greece, and Portugal, the European Commission made EU funding conditional upon the creation of regional administrations (Laffan 1996). The Commission has followed a similar strategy in Central and Eastern Europe, and more recently in the Balkans and Turkey (Atanasova and Bache 2010; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012; Ertugal and Dobre 2011; Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004a).

¹² If we exclude European accession, a chi-squared test produces a likelihood ratio of 7.91, significant at \( p < .005 \).
coefficients in these logit models into odds ratios which estimate the relative odds of the two possible outcomes—scale design or community design—resulting from a one-unit change in an independent variable (Long 1996). In the bivariate analysis, regime change is estimated to increase the odds of a scale design by a factor of 8.58 (model 1) or 6.22 (model 2). Models 3 and 4 control for the possibility that democratic regimes and government coalitions which include regional parties are biased against scale design and that left-leaning governments favor scale design. The effect of regime change is consistently large and statistically significant in these specifications. Holding the control variables at their means, the odds of a scale design are estimated to be 9.19 times greater than a community design under Regime change and 6.05 times greater under Regime change excluding EU accession.

**Napoleonic Design**

Fifteen cases exhibit a Napoleonic design which minimizes variation among jurisdictions. Figure 4.4(a) represents départements in Napoleonic France using census data from 1851—the earliest reliable information on population. The result is a tight oval which leaves out just one region, Paris. Fifty years after the original design, no département other than Paris had a population less than half or more than twice the median. The areas of départements are even more tightly bunched. The model was extended to countries conquered by Napoleon—Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal—and it was implanted in most of their colonies (Alesina et al. 2011; Flora et al. 2016; Marti-Henneberg 2005a, b).

Figure 4.4 (b) plots Spain’s forty-nine provinces in 1833, when the design was re-imposed after its short-lived introduction in 1822 by liberal revolutionaries. As in France, it “swept away the rather anarchic and overlapping local jurisdictions and institutions of the Ancien régime, replacing them with two tiers of legally uniform units” (Clegg 1987: 130). The intention was to “build the Spanish nation by applying a unifying program” (Moreno 2001: 45). Provinces were created from scratch; boundaries were redrawn; enclaves eliminated (except for those in the Basque country); and all but four provinces were given new names (Marichal 1977: 53; Pérez 1999: 464). The three outliers in the bottom-left corner are the Basque provinces of Araba, Gipuzkoa, and Bizkaia which, together with Navarra, rebelled to preserve their traditional

---

13 These variables are specified in the Appendix to this chapter.
14 Using GIS technology to map population and boundary changes in subnational jurisdictions in Europe since 1850, Marti-Henneberg (2005a: 793) observes that European countries “divided into similar-sized units. [The] majority of European countries chose units with average sizes between 3,000 and 10,000 km².”
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

(a) Départements in Napoleonic France (1790)

(b) Provincias in Napoleonic Spain (1833)

Figure 4.4. Napoleonic designs
rights and territories. These provinces retain fueros, special legal and judicial systems, to the present day.

The revolutionary reforms in France and Spain were centralizing as well as uniform. Napoleon imposed central control in départements by prefects: “Your mission... reaches all branches of internal administration... Your prerogatives embrace everything that concerns the public welfare and national prosperity, for the best interests of those whom you serve.”\(^\text{15}\) Spanish provinces were headed by governors appointed by the central government who were responsible for maintaining order, controlling trade unions, overseeing the press, allocating public funds, distributing patronage, and implementing central policies (Carr 1983; Clegg 1987: 131; Mény 1987).

Scale design usually occurs as a break from the past. Regime change provides an opportunity for radical reform as new rulers design a new system of governance. In several Central and Eastern European countries, the demise of communism and transition to democracy created an opportunity for top-down reform that could frame subnational governance on a standardized, presumably more efficient, basis.

Such reform often involves bargaining, which leaves its fingerprints on the outcome. After the transition from communism in Poland, a center-right government led by Jerzy Buzek sought to reduce forty-nine vojvodships, established under communism, to eight or twelve (Hughes et al. 2004a: 130). In the end, the reform established more regions than the government wished—sixteen—to accommodate social-democrats who campaigned to reduce the loss of public sector jobs and a small German-speaking minority which resisted merging its vojvodship into adjacent regions (Yoder 2007).

However, the plan retained its scale character, as Figure 4.4(c) reveals. All jurisdictions lie within 0.5 on the population and area axes; \(\sigma = 0.41\). The two deviant jurisdictions outside the ellipse are the capital region of Mazowiecki, almost twice as large as the median region, and Opole, which is half the size of the median region. Opole is the region that was hastily conceived to assuage the German-speaking community.

Impending EU membership has provided an impetus for jurisdictional reform (Bruszt 2008; Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004b: 542). Entirely new jurisdictional tiers have been set up to negotiate and implement EU cohesion funding. These levels of governance tend to be light in authority and representative institutions. They are the nearest approximation to scale design in which jurisdictions have identically sized territories and populations.

Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

Figure 4.4. Napoleonic designs (continued)
Designing Jurisdictions

Figure 4.4. Napoleonic designs (continued)
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

Figure 4.4(d) and (e) depict planning jurisdictions set up from scratch in Macedonia and Romania in prospect of EU membership. Only Skopje and Bucharest, capital regions combining large population with small area, stand out. Slovakia’s kraje were created in 1996 in similar fashion and have the lowest $\sigma$ score at 0.285 among the forty-two reforms we observe. The population of the eight regions ranges from 624,000 to 762,000. To achieve this, the government relaxed territorial uniformity, producing the flattened oval in Figure 4.4(f). Unlike the Polish government, the Slovak government, headed by the nationalist Vladimír Mečiar, did not make concessions to internal diversity. Jurisdictional boundaries “gerrymandered the Hungarian minority, splitting its population across several regions and thus weakening its political presence” (Hughes et al. 2004a: 54). Mečiar also refused to set up representative institutions—against the European Union’s explicit wish. After Mečiar’s electoral defeat in 1998 a pro-European coalition government introduced limited self-government with directly elected councils within the same jurisdictional boundaries (Brusis 2005).

Optimized Design

Jurisdictional design can be standardized by optimizing population and area around the median so that jurisdictions large in area are small in population, and those small in area are large in population. Five designs exhibit a strong negative association between population and area: Chile’s regiones, Russia’s okruga, Indonesia’s provinsi-provinsi, Comissões de cooperação e desenvolvimento in Portugal, and Irish regional authorities. The motives of the designers were diverse. Indonesian provinces were standardized to fulfill a nationalist agenda undercutting regional particularism. Ireland’s regions and those of Portugal were created chiefly to orchestrate EU cohesion funding. Reform in Chile and Russia had a bitter partisan edge. However, each of these reforms is a top-down plan optimizing population and area within standardized tiers. All except Indonesian provinces are centralized with no representative institutions. All except Ireland’s regions were established by a new regime.

Standardization was explicit in Augusto Pinochet’s 1974 reform. Chile’s geography made Napoleonic design infeasible, so standardization took the form of designating jurisdictions with Roman numerals in the mold of Roman legions. Thirteen regional administrations were numbered on a north–south axis from Region I in the north to Region XII in the Antarctic south, with Santiago, the capital region, Region XIII. The ellipse in Figure 4.5(a) stretches from Santiago, with a population of 6.7 million and an area of around 15,000 km² to Aysén, Region XI, in the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, with a population of 98,000 and an area of 108,000 km².
Designing Jurisdictions

Figure 4.5. Optimized designs
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

Pinochet implemented what policy makers had been suggesting for at least a decade: an intermediate tier “untainted by the traditional political practices that the regime was trying to eliminate” (Eaton 2004c: 231; Illanes 2000). A centrally appointed intendente ran the administration, assisted by a council of provincial governors and military advisors. This new centralized tier was tasked with privatizing social services in line with the government’s neoliberal doctrine (Eaton 2004a: 121). At the same time, it empowered conservative, land-owning interests and outflanked the regime’s leftist opponents in the provinces and municipalities.

Russia’s seven (nine since 2014) federal districts (federalnyye okruga) were set up in 2000 by Vladimir Putin to reign in and standardize the chaotic “parade of sovereignties” that emerged from bilateral treaties between Yeltsin’s government and eighty-nine federal regions (Hale 2000) (Figure 4.5(b)). Each super-district is headed by a presidential envoy who coordinates federal agencies in the region, supervises law and order, and determines whether regional law is consistent with Russian law (Petrov 2002, 2010). Their capitals never coincide with the capital of a non-Russian ethnic republic (Kahn, Trochev, and Balayan 2009: 320). Their boundaries correspond precisely with the interior ministry’s security regions. Five of the seven initial presidential envoys were former generals. All served at the President’s pleasure. And, as one might expect, they are arrayed in population and area along a sliding scale: $\rho = -0.73$.

Rokkanian and Irregular Design

The logic of community is to accommodate territorially concentrated groups in a bottom-up design. These designs tend to be incremental in spirit, endowing geo-historical regions with authoritative self-rule. The population and area of jurisdictions are either irregular or positively associated. The reason for this is that distinctive regions come chiefly in two forms. Remoteness produces jurisdictions that tend to have small populations in small territories. Resistance to assimilation nearer the center produces jurisdictions that tend to have large populations in large territories. Ten tiers exhibit a positive association between population and area, and twelve are irregular.

Figure 4.6(a) plots Malaysia’s thirteen negeri at its founding in 1957. The federation was cobbled together by the British from federated and non-federated kingdoms, sultanates, and directly governed colonies (Esman 1972; Harper 1999; Reid 2010a, b; Shair-Rosenfield, Marks, and Hooghe 2014). The British preferred a unitary state, but Malay resistance led to a looser federal structure. In 1963, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore negotiated special status upon entry into the federation. Singapore was ousted two years later, and the remaining jurisdictions are portrayed in Figure 4.6(a). The constituent units
were centuries older than the newly born state. They maintained separate political institutions under the British and have had considerable self-rule following independence (Harper 1999: 18). Eleven of the thirteen negeri meet our criteria for distinctive language, distance, or prior independence and they form a forward-leaning ellipse with $\rho = 0.41$.

Scale design may come to nothing in the face of historical regions. Territorial identities embedded in distinctive cultures are astonishingly durable, especially when rooted in language. Spain provides an example. From Napoleon to Franco, centralizing regimes imposed a top-down, rationalist structure that fragmented linguistic regions into more or less equally sized provinces, a project that was finally broken by the mobilization of regional communities after the transition to democracy (Lecours 2001; Marti-Henneberg 2005b).

The jurisdictional design in Figure 4.6(b) breathes community. Spanish comunidades created between 1978 and 1983 form a Rokkanian design with the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla at one extreme and the populous historical communities of Andalusia, Catalonia, and Galicia at the other ($\rho = 0.76$). The outlier on the upper left is Madrid.

Community design is endorsed in the Spanish constitution of 1978. Regions consisting of “adjacent provinces with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics,” “island-territories,” and “provinces with an historical regional identity” were invited to form autonomous communities.\footnote{Article 143.1 of the Spanish constitution states: “In exercising the right to autonomy recognized in article 2 of the Constitution, adjacent provinces with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics, remote territories [territorios insulares], and provinces with a historical regional identity can accede to self-government and constitute an Autonomous Community” (authors’ translation).}

Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque country could follow a fast track to autonomy because they had historic claims to self-government.\footnote{The transitional provision DT-2 attached to Article 151.1 of the Constitution reads as follows: “The territories which in the past have, by plebiscite, approved draft Statutes of Autonomy and which at the time of promulgation of this Constitution have provisional autonomy regimes, may proceed immediately in the manner contemplated in paragraph 2 of Article 148, when so decided by an absolute majority of their higher pre-autonomous corporate bodies” (authors’ translation).}

Andalusia, initially not invited, demanded and received access to the fast route, as did the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands, and Valencia.\footnote{Some historical claims were contested. For example, the region of León, once an independent kingdom and still the site of a sizable autonomist movement, was merged with Old Castile.} The principle is expressed in regional constitutions. Article 1 of the Valencian Constitution declares:

The Valencian People, historically organized as the Kingdom of Valencia, is constituted as an Autonomous Community, within the unity of the Spanish nation, as an expression of its distinct identity as an historical nationality and exercising the right to self-government that the Spanish Constitution recognizes for any nationality, with the name of the Valencian Community.
Figure 4.6. Rokkanian and irregular designs
Figure 4.6. Rokkanian and irregular designs (continued)
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

Figure 4.6. Rokkanian and irregular designs (continued)
Geography shaped jurisdictional design in Greece (Figure 4.6(c)). Regional administrations (periphereies) set up in 1986 to coordinate EU regional aid were formed around island groups—the Dodecanese, Crete, the Ionian Islands, the Aegean Islands—alongside distinctive mainland regions—Thessaly, Epirus, Attica—producing a $\rho$ value of 0.61. Periphereies were initially deconcentrated administrations but have since gained authority, including directly elected regional governors and councils (Skrinis 2013).

Prior statehood can put a heavy stamp on jurisdictional design. Italy was unified only in the late nineteenth century, and nation building did not have time to grind down distinctive cities and regions (Ziblatt 2006). Regionalization came in two stages. Five regions with distinct languages were granted a special statute in the immediate postwar period. The Italian constitution of 1948 envisaged regionalization for the whole country “to react against the centralization enforced by fascism” (Cassese and Torchia 1993: 95), but this was not implemented until 1971. The ruling Christian democratic party feared it would give the communist opposition local bases, and it was encouraged in its reluctance by the “markedly authoritarian and centralist mentality of bureaucracy” (Cassese and Torchia 1993: 96; Piattoni and Brunazzo 2011; Putnam, Leonard, and Nanetti 1985). The cultural and political ground shifted in the late 1960s, and in 1971 the rest of the country was finally regionalized, producing a Rokkanian design where $\rho = 0.81$ (Figure 4.6(d)).

Indonesia illustrates how communal pressures can unravel a scale design. Figure 4.6(e) plots the ten provinces created at Indonesian independence in 1950. The provincial boundaries had been provisionally set in 1945 when Indonesia’s constitution was drafted under Japanese occupation (Horowitz 2013: 59; Reid 2010a: 36–7). The nationalists “were inclined to dismiss the traditional aristocracy through whom the Dutch ruled, with all their culturally specific hierarchies, as an anachronistic and feudal façade” (Reid 2010a: 34). The design was rationalist, anti-federalist, and decidedly anti-ethnic. Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, expressed his intent: “We are one nation (natie), not three or four, but one bangsa Indonesia. There is no bangsa Kalimantan, there is no bangsa Minangkabau, there is no bangsa Java, Bali, Lombok, Sulawesi or any such. We are all bangsa Indonesia” (quoted in Reid 2010a: 42). The outcome is an optimized design ($\rho = -0.53$) with just two exceptions, the sultanate of Yogyakarta and the remote island group of the Moluccas.

---

19 The reform was dominated by politicians from Java, the one culturally and ethnically homogenous Indonesian island.

20 The original template had eight provinces. In 1950, Sumatra was divided into three provinces, which brought the total to ten.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

In subsequent decades the design fell apart. With the exception of East Java, no province remained undivided. In 1951, Yogyakarta on the island of Java was the first to be granted special status. Five provinces harboring claims of jurisdictional and linguistic distinctiveness followed in the decade after independence. Figure 4.6(f) plots the thirty-three provinces that emerged by 2010. So, after six decades the predominantly optimized design of Figure 4.6(f) had become the irregular design of Figure 4.6(d).

Twelve reforms in our dataset exhibit similarly irregular patterns. Reforms producing irregular designs tend to be modest in ambition. Seven redraw boundaries rather than create a new tier, and of the five new tiers, three are deconcentrated and two are designed as a platform for collaboration among existing lower-tier jurisdictions. All but three of these reforms (Cuban provinces in 1966; Chilean provinces in 1974; and Greek perifereies in 1986) took place in the absence of regime change or EU accession.

“An Average is But a Solitary Fact”

The physical characteristics of subnational jurisdictions—their territorial size and population—appear to be the result of conscious design. They exist as blueprints in the mind of the agent before they are constructed. The dimensions of the individual units reflect overarching principles of governance. Yet those principles can be detected only in the design of the whole. The average area or population of a jurisdiction tells one only where a tier is placed in the ladder of governance. But the dispersion of jurisdictions around the central tendency tells one about the motivations and goals of the designers—their conception of governance within the state.

Should governance seek to provide public goods to discrete individuals living in different parts of the country or should it recognize the right of

---

21 Borneo was partitioned into four provinces in 1956; Central Sumatra was split in three and North Sumatra in two in 1957; the Lesser Sunda Isles became three in 1958, and Celebes two in 1960.

22 It is worth noting that the classification of a region as distinctive is particularly complex in Southeast Asia. Both before and under colonialism, statehood was evaluated in terms of feudal bonds and vassal relations rather than in Westphalian categories. Language also operates as a less distinctive marker. Printing, which Benedict Anderson (1991) highlights as the defining feature for linguistic and state standardization in Europe, was introduced very late. Most ethnic groups preferred to use their local language for oral communication, and wrote in Romanized Malay (Reid 2010b). After independence, the Indonesian government sought to promote a national lingua franca, but the relationship between local languages and the national language remains less zero-sum than in Europe.

23 The title of this section is a quotation from Sir Francis Galton (1889: 62–3) who continues, “whereas if a single other fact be added to it, an entire Normal Scheme, which nearly corresponds to the observed one, starts potentially into existence.”
Designing Jurisdictions

territorial communities to govern themselves? Should the central state implement a rational design for the country as a whole or should it adapt to jurisdictional boundaries rooted in the past? Should the design of jurisdictions be oriented to the efficient provision of public goods or should it be oriented to self-rule? To what extent should governance be concerned with the allocation of authority as well as the provision of policies?

Scale design conceives the individual as the unit of jurisdictional design. The inhabitants of a country are interchangeable except for their preferences over different baskets of public goods. Jurisdictions are designed instrumentally to provide public goods to individuals dispersed across the country. The competences, populations, and territorial size of jurisdictions are standardized in line with the policy portfolio and the heterogeneity of policy preferences. Policies with extensive economies of scale and externalities produce larger jurisdictions, while heterogeneity produces smaller jurisdictions. If concentrated populations make it difficult to generate jurisdictions with identical population and area, these can be optimized by creating small jurisdictions where population is dense and large jurisdictions where population is sparse.

Community design conceives the group, not the individual, as the unit of jurisdictional design. Territorial communities exist as historical “facts” that constrain design. This approach differentiates, rather than standardizes, territorial governance. The authority exercised by regions may vary within the territory of the state. And because the presence of a distinctive territorial community is constrained by its capacity to survive national assimilation, the physical characteristics of jurisdictions are neither uniform nor optimized. The outcome is a mix of jurisdictions that are small in area and population alongside jurisdictions that are large in both.

Community design is inductive, bottom-up, and gradualist; scale design is deductive, top-down, and radical. The causal roots of community design lie in slow moving geo-political processes. The proximate condition for this design is the capacity of a territorial community to bargain self-rule within its historical borders. Scale design occurs in relatively homogenous societies or when the regime wishes to undo history by reforming jurisdictions along rational lines. Its ambition is to make governance efficient or overcome regional particularism. This usually requires a definitive break from the past. Revolution (or European accession) may un hinge the status quo and provide an opportunity for de novo jurisdictional design.

Community and scale are more than ideal types. They appear as concrete alternatives that enter into the heads of those who carve countries into jurisdictions. In this chapter we have sought to conceptualize, measure, and hypothesize the incidence of these fundamental alternatives. The traditions of political philosophy sketched out in the first
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

chapter of this book—governance as the provision of public goods and governance as the expression of community—hit the ground, so to speak, in the physical layout of jurisdictions.

Appendix

Table 4.A.1. Jurisdictional tiers and key correlates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regional tier</th>
<th>Reform year</th>
<th>Domestic regime change</th>
<th>EU accession</th>
<th>Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Napoleonic France</td>
<td>départements</td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napoleonic Spain</td>
<td>provincias</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>provinci-provinsi</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile2</td>
<td>regions</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>comissões regionais</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>županije</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>qarku</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>okruga</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>negeri-negeri</td>
<td>1957–63</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>comunidades</td>
<td>1978–83</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>do/gwangeoks</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba1</td>
<td>provincias</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile1</td>
<td>provincias</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>apskritis</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>kraje</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>regiuni dezvoltare</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>regiók</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland2</td>
<td>województwa</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>kraje</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>planski ryejioni</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>kalkunna ajanslari</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>regionalni saveti</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>regionalne agencije</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland1</td>
<td>województva</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>départements</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>development regions</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>planošanas regioni</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>régions</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark1</td>
<td>amskommunerne</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>regions/communities</td>
<td>1970–80</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>regioni</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>counties</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand1</td>
<td>regions</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba2</td>
<td>provincias</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece1</td>
<td>peripheries</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand2</td>
<td>regions</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>regions</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland1</td>
<td>maakuntien</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>regions</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland2</td>
<td>läänit</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark2</td>
<td>regioner</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece2</td>
<td>peripheries</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.A.2. Operationalization: the effect of regime change on jurisdictional design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
<td>1 = scale design, 0 = community design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime change</strong></td>
<td>1 if the reform was within a decade of a revolution, decolonization, communist transition, partition, or shift to or from democracy (criterion ≥ 6 on Polity2) or if the reform occurred while the country was in formal accession negotiations with the European Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU accession</strong></td>
<td>1 if the reform occurred while the country was in formal accession negotiations with the European Union (from the structural funds reform in 1988). Sources: Hooghe (1996); Hughes, et al. (2004a, b); Yoder (2007); for particular cases, see text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime change excluding EU accession</strong></td>
<td>1 if the reform was within a decade of a revolution, decolonization, communist transition, partition, or shift to or from democracy (criterion ≥ 6 on Polity2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>1 if Polity2 is higher than 5 at the time of reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left government</strong></td>
<td>1 = rightwing, 2 = centrist, 3 = leftwing. Sources: Worldbank Development Indicators (WDI) for executive (execrlc) or government (gov1rlc, gov2rlc); complemented by the Party Government Dataset (Woldendorp et al. 2000; 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional party in government</strong></td>
<td>1 if the government contains a party that has regionalism or decentralization as a key component of its platform at the time of reform. Sources: WDI execreg, gov1reg, gov2reg, gov3reg; complemented by Woldendorp, et al. (2000; 2011) and the CHES dataset (Bakker et al. 2015).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.A.3. Descriptives: the effect of regime change on jurisdictional design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU accession</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change excluding EU accession</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left in government</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional party in government</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5

Community and Differentiated Governance

The classic model of governance within the state conceives a series of uniform, nested tiers. At the top is the central government of the state. Within it is a tier of regions or provinces. Each contains smaller jurisdictions, which in turn contain smaller jurisdictions. The jurisdictions at any level may vary in population and area, but they have the same authoritative competences. The model is uniform, elegant, and bears out the idea that a state standardizes rights and duties in its constituent jurisdictions (Weber 1927/2003: ch. 29).

There have always been countries that break the mold, but one of the most interesting developments over the past half century is that the classic model has become the exception rather than the rule. Thirty-three of fifty-nine countries with regional governance in 2010 have at least one region that stands out from its tier because it has more or less authority. Governance within an increasing number of states has become differentiated.

Differentiated governance arises in the postfunctionalist tension between the benefits of scale in national states and the desire for self-rule on the part of distinct communities within them. An inquiry into the subject engages some fundamental questions of political rule. Under what circumstances will one territory exercise authoritative competences that set it apart from other territories within a state? What are the ways in which distinct territorial communities can be accommodated? How has the character of accommodation changed over time?

These questions have been at the core of the study of politics from at least the time of the Roman Empire and its foederati (Marks 2012). Here our concern is limited to governance within states over the past six decades, and we build on the work of Stein Rokkan. In contrast to modernization theorists, Rokkan views peripheral distinctiveness as a persistent response to national integration: “For each process of centralization there is a corresponding effort of boundary accentuation, of attempting to preserve peripheral distinctiveness: juxtaposing the process of cultural standardization, for instance, is the peripheral concern for maintaining a separate identity” (Olsen 2005: 10; Rokkan and
Community and Differentiated Governance

Urwin 1983: 14). Rokkan explains peripheral distinctiveness as a response to deep-seated territorial tensions arising from nation building and state building. The variables that he puts on the table—and there are many—are primarily structural features that shape cultural practices and constellations of political conflict. Chief among them are geographical location, language, and a prior history of independence. Few have been as sensitive as Rokkan to geography—attested by his conceptual maps and his effort to place the center-periphery structure of a country “within its broader context, whether ‘geoethnic,’ ‘geoeconomic,’ or ‘geopolitical’” (Rokkan et al. 1987: 51).

This chapter seeks to extend Rokkan’s analysis by engaging the strategic context of regional governance. The characteristics that underpin political peripherality—geographical location, language, and a prior history of independence—influence the form that differentiation takes. And how a region is differentiated—whether it is part of a regional tier or stands alone as an anomaly; whether it has a bilateral or multilateral association with the central state—appears to be decisive for the authority exercised by the region.

The puzzle that we take up here is to explain the character of differentiation. As one engages the cases, the variation becomes prodigious. There are an almost unlimited number of ways in which an individual region can be empowered or disempowered (Wolff 2010). For example, Aceh and Scotland are able to impose a distinct legal order within their territory. Bolivia’s indigenous communities can elect representatives under their own conventions. The Basque provinces collect their own taxes. Sabah and Sarawak are able to spend a given proportion of the taxes raised in their regions. Quebec controls immigration into the province. The Åland Islands can exclude non-resident Finnish citizens from buying land. Greenland is exempt from Denmark’s membership of the European Union. Yogyakarta in Indonesia has special dispensation to be governed by a hereditary ruler.

The immediate challenge is to conceptualize the range of possibilities along a limited number of dimensions. We suggest three: how a region stands in relation to others in its tier; the region’s relationship to the central state; and the character of its rule. This conceptual schema makes sense of the differentiation we detect in the regional authority index (RAI) and allows us to generalize about within-country variation adapting Stein Rokkan’s theoretical framework.

Types of Differentiation

We define a differentiated region as a region with authoritative competences that distinguish it from other regions in the same country. The RAI allows us to estimate differentiation across 3,465 regions in eighty-one countries in a systematic way by comparing scores across ten dimensions that tap...
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

authoritative competencies in policy making, finance, law making, representation, and constitutional reform (see Chapter Two). We categorize a region as differentiated if it has a score on one or more of these dimensions that distinguishes it from other regions in the same country.

Differentiated regions exist in distinct forms that provide a key to their genesis, their consequences for the countries in which they exist, and their trajectories over time. If we wish to explain their causal dynamics, we need to probe the structure of interaction among individual regions and between regions and the central state.

- **How does the region stand in relation to the central state?** Does the region relate to the central state bilaterally; does it relate multilaterally alongside other regions; or is the region subordinate to the center?

- **How does the region stand in relation to other regions?** Is the region one-of-a-kind and unrelated to a regional tier; is the region part of a tier of regions from which it deviates; or is the region excluded from the status of a standard region?

- **What is the mode of rule in the region?** Does the region exercise authority only within its own territory; does it exercise authority both within its own territory and in the country as a whole; or is the region governed directly by the central state?

Table 5.1 conceives these characteristics as logically related in three distinct types. Figure 5.1 illustrates how each connects to the central state and to standard regions.

An *autonomous* region is exempt from the country-wide constitutional framework and receives special treatment as an individual jurisdiction in a bilateral relationship with the center—represented in Figure 5.1 by a double-headed arrow between the region and central government. An autonomous region is both part of the state, and also distinct from it. It exerts rule within its territory, but little beyond. While an autonomous region might be classified as a unit within a national scheme, it stands apart from other regions, often geographically as well as politically.

An *asymmetric* region is part of a regional tier, yet differentiated from it—perhaps because it has a historical claim to self-governance, a distinct culture, language, or religion. The region has authoritative competences that set it apart from other regions, yet it is part of an overarching national framework. Hence the asymmetric regions in Figure 5.1 are linked both to other regions in their tiers and to the central state. This opens the possibility that an asymmetric region can co-govern the entire country alongside standard regions.

A *dependency* is a region, often a colonial or frontier territory, subject to direct rule by the central state. This denies it the status of a standard region.
Table 5.1. Types of differentiation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>How does the region stand in relation to the central state?</th>
<th>How does the region stand in relation to other regions?</th>
<th>What is the character of rule in the region?</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Anomaly without a standard</td>
<td>Self-rule</td>
<td>Aceh, Greenland, Jeju, Mount Athos, Nunavut, Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The region relates to the central state directly.</td>
<td>The region stands apart from a regional tier.</td>
<td>The region exercises authority in its territory and little beyond.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetry</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>Deviation from a standard</td>
<td>Self-rule and shared rule</td>
<td>Catalonia, Flanders, Gran Chaco, Quebec, Tatarstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The region relates to the central state as part of a regional tier.</td>
<td>The region is differentiated from other regions within a regional tier.</td>
<td>The region exercises authority in its territory and co-exercises authority in the country as a whole.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>Excluded from the standard</td>
<td>Central rule</td>
<td>Isla de la Juventud, Labuan, Yukon to 1979, Indian Act Bands, Svalbard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The region receives central state direction.</td>
<td>The region is excluded from the status of a standard region.</td>
<td>The region is governed directly by the central state.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The flow of commands goes in one direction, from the center to the dependency, represented in Figure 5.1 by a single-headed arrow.

The concepts of autonomy and asymmetry have wide circulation in the literature on federalism and subnational governance.¹ Autonomy is applied generally to any region that exercises significant self-rule, while asymmetry conventionally describes a federal or quasi-federal system in which one of the states or provinces exercises some additional powers (Stepan 1999; Watts 1998, 1999b, 2008).² The concepts have also gained currency in the literature on conflict resolution in divided societies. This literature tends to use autonomy and asymmetry interchangeably when a region acquires special legislative, executive, or fiscal competences (Horowitz 2007; McGarry 2007; Weller and Nobbs 2010; Wolff 2010: 20).

Our unit of analysis is the individual region rather than the country, and if these concepts are to serve our purpose, we must make sharper distinctions. We can do so by drawing on their original meanings. Autonomy is the quality of being autonomous, from the Greek autonomia, self-ruling. This is precisely how we use the concept in this chapter. Asymmetry is the quality of being asymmetrical or incommensurate, from the Greek asymmetria, which is derived from a (¼ not), syn (¼ together, alike), metron (¼ meter). In our conceptual scheme this appropriately describes a region that lacks symmetry with regions in its tier.

---


² Watts (1998: 123) distinguishes between “asymmetry among the full-fledged constituent units within a federation or confederation” and “constitutional asymmetry… the relationship between a small or peripheral state (often a small island or group of islands) and a larger state (often a former colonial power) in which the smaller unit shares in the benefits of association with the larger polity but retains internal autonomy and self-government.” In later work Watts (2008: 127–8) emphasizes that asymmetry may be constitutionally specified or merely enabled as an option.
These distinctions allow one to probe variation at the level of the region. Many countries encompass regions with more than one form of differentiation. Canada, which would be classified as an asymmetric federal polity on account of Quebec, has had dependencies in its far north and Nunavut, an autonomous Inuit region. The United States, Brazil, and Malaysia, which are usually considered to be symmetrical federal polities, contain both autonomous regions and dependencies. Spain encompasses both asymmetric and autonomous regions. Colombia and Bolivia are unitary countries with asymmetric indigenous regions.

Just as importantly, a disaggregated approach reveals that things can change over time. Whereas country descriptions such as asymmetrical federalism are essentially static, it is not uncommon for differentiated regions to shift form over time. Standard regions become asymmetric, dependencies become standard or gain autonomy. The fixity that one can detect at the country level is only skin deep.

**Autonomy**

An autonomous region has a bilateral association with the center. It is exempt from the country-wide constitutional framework but receives special treatment as an individual jurisdiction. It is subject to special legislation, and in most cases its status is constitutionally affirmed. Unlike an asymmetric region, an autonomous region does not stretch a standard model because there is no standard model to which it can fit. It is one-of-a-kind, an outlier where there is no mean, an anomaly without a rule. Papua, Aceh, Scotland, and Tobago each have particular relationships with the central state that produce idiosyncratic arrangements. These regions are characterized by their particularities rather than their departure from state-wide standards.

Several autonomous regions are islands: Åland Islands, Azores, Corsica, the Faroes, Tobago. Some are located on a mainland separated by sea from the rest of the country: Ceuta, Mindanao, Northern Ireland, Papua, Sarawak. Or they are on the mainland, but remote: the Northwest Territories and Nunavut in Canada, the Northern Territory of Australia, the five indigenous comarcas in Panama, the two autonomous regions in Nicaragua. Val d’Aran, the smallest autonomous region in our dataset, is a nearly inaccessible valley tucked away in the Pyrenees in northern Catalonia and facing northwards to France. Twenty-one of the forty regions that are located 30 km or more from the mainland are autonomous.³

³ 2010 data. Twenty-one of the forty-six autonomous (non-capital) regions we observe in 2010 are geographically peripheral.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creation of autonomy</th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Åland (Finland)</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oros Athos (Greece)</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta (Indonesia)</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia, Trentino-Südtirol, Sicilia, Valle d’Aosta (Italy)</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuna Yala (Panama)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarra, Araba (Spain)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland (UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska, Hawaii (US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico (US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1959</strong> Aceh (Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1959</strong> Alaska, Hawai (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1965</strong> Aceh (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1966</strong> Singapore (I)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1979</strong> Araba, Navarra (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition to different status</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1965</strong> Aceh (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1966</strong> Singapore (I)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition to different status</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1972</strong> Northern Ireland (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1979</strong> Araba, Navarra (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Status pre-dates entry in dataset. Status abbreviations:**

- A = autonomy
- Y = asymmetry
- D = dependency
- S = standard region
- I = independence
- P = protectorate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Created</th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuna Yala (Panama)</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Self-governing Aboriginal Peoples (Canada)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Emberá-Wounaan (Panama)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Territorios Autónomos Indígenas (Bolivia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Tribes (US)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Northwest Territories (Canada)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Región Autónoma del Norte, Región Autónoma del Sur (Nicaragua)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Resguardos Indígenas (Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Act Bands (Canada)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Greenland (Denmark)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Kuna de Madugandí (Panama)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ngäbe Buglé (Panama)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Arrangement pre-dates entry in dataset.*
Several autonomous regions are indigenous, and many are non-standard in an additional way (Table 5.3). Writing about indigenous mobilization in Latin America, Deborah Yashar (1999: 93) observes that:

Rejecting state-formation projects that have sought to centralize or decentralize political institutions according to a single blueprint, indigenous movements throughout the region have demanded that the state recognize administrative boundaries that are unique to indigenous peoples. In other words, they are arguing that a differentiated citizenship should coincide with differentiated administrative boundaries.

American Indian tribes, Canadian self-governing Aboriginal peoples, Colombian indigenous reserves, and Bolivian indigenous territories sit uneasily in their national jurisdictional frames. Few indigenous groups had bounded territories, and their reserves were established piecemeal. Many indigenous reserves do not fit into a particular tier, but straddle tiers (Madrid 2008; Yashar 2005). The United States contains 225,000 km$^2$ of federal Indian Reservations with half a million inhabitants. Almost all reservations cross county lines and several cross state borders. In Canada, Nunavut was carved out of the Northwest Territories in 1999 as an indigenous homeland in a bilateral arrangement alongside the provinces (Hicks and White 2000). In addition, Canada has signed twenty-two comprehensive self-government arrangements that involve thirty-four aboriginal communities, several of which cross provincial boundaries. In Colombia, 700 or so small and sparsely populated resguardos indígenas were created as a self-standing tier covering around one-third of the country’s surface and home. In all three countries, indigenous jurisdictions exist apart from the nested, non-intersecting units that comprise the ladder of governance.

Autonomous regions have a basis in community. Unless they have been subject to colonization and inward migration, these communities sustain distinctive norms and forms of speech. The demand for self-rule in such communities is both an expression of resistance to rule by foreigners and a recognition that their endurance depends in part on their capacity to make their own laws. However, independent statehood is less appealing if the population is small. The median population of the autonomous regions that

---

4 There is no generally accepted definition of an indigenous people, and some claim that a precise definition is overly restrictive (Comtassel and Witmer 2006; van Cott 2005; Warren and Jackson 2002). The UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues suggests the following guidelines: self-identification as an indigenous people; historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies; a strong link to a territory and its natural resources; distinct social, economic, or political norms; a distinct language, culture, and beliefs; status as a non-dominant group of society; commitment to maintain and reproduce their ancestral heritage as a distinctive people. <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/Ssession_factsheet1.pdf>.
we observe in 2010 is just 286,000.\textsuperscript{5} The demand for independent statehood tends to be greatest among outliers with exceptionally large populations. Scottish nationalists stress that their country, with a population of 5.3 million, is similar in scale to that of the Nordic states and considerably larger than the Baltic republics.

Autonomous regions are biased to self-rule at the expense of shared rule. They segment political institutions along territorial lines, insulating local elites and raising the salience of differences between the region and the center. To the extent that they have shared rule, it is bilateral, not multilateral. It involves the region and the center co-determining governance in the region itself rather than the country as a whole. The region is an anomaly in the polity—sometimes connected with the thinnest of threads to the national fabric.

Small population, the absence of a tier of comparable regions, the lack of a standard model as reference—each of these characteristics helps to explain why central rulers can grant autonomy without fearing it will have knock-on effects. These insulating features also help to explain why autonomous regions tend to remain that way. Autonomy is self-replicating. It reinforces the cultural distinctiveness of small, peripheral populations. Such regions often have idiosyncratic party systems and structures of political contestation. Many have the authority to sustain their local language in public services. Some can control immigration into the region. In short, their autonomous authority provides them with a capacity for collective strategy that reproduces their distinctiveness.

Once a region becomes autonomous, it is unlikely to switch. There are just a handful of exceptions. Several involve heavy-handed state intervention, often in the context of violence. Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in 1963 to become an independent state following race riots. Kosovo became a UN protectorate and then an independent state in the aftermath of civil war. Aceh shifted back and forth from an autonomous to a standard region in bouts of rebellion and violent repression. Northern Ireland saw home rule suspended in 1972 and 2003 in the wake of communal violence. The federal district of Brasilia lost institutional autonomy under military rule, but regained it in 1988.

The non-violent cases are few in number and involve regions that aspired to become standard regions, such as Alaska and Hawaii, which had bilateral arrangements until they became standard states in 1959, or Washington, DC, which was directly administered by a congressionally appointed control board from 1995 to 2000.

\textsuperscript{5} This figure excludes autonomous capital regions and indigenous reserves.
Autonomy is a stable equilibrium. Many enter, few leave. This is evident when one charts differentiated regions over time, as in Figure 5.2. The hexagon labeled autonomy indicates that fourteen autonomous regions remain in place from 1950 to 2010. In that period they were joined by twenty-four regions that shifted from dependency to autonomy, thirteen regions that were once standard regions, two regions that were asymmetric, and ten newly created autonomous regions (the dashed arrow). Sixty-three regions were autonomous in 1950 or became autonomous in the following six decades; just nine regions lost autonomy in that period.

Asymmetry

An asymmetric region is part of a national tier, yet is distinctive. It interacts both with the regions in its tier and with the central state. This sets it apart from autonomous and dependent regions, and shapes its strategic situation.
A region may demand special powers in its claim for a homeland, rooted in a history of independence prior to the formation of the current state, and reinforced because its population has a distinctive language or religion that differentiates it from its peers. The central state faces a choice between accommodating the demand or maintaining the coherence of the national state. However, this is not a game played solely between the region and the center. It includes standard regions in the same tier. This complicates the strategic terrain. The pressure to accommodate a national minority may be great, but resistance can be expected from both the central state and from standard regions (Hombrado 2011; Zuber 2011). The central state may fear competitive regional mobilization for greater self-rule or, worse, a slippery slope to separatism. Regions in the same tier may resist the empowerment of one of their number or they may seek to imitate it. Once the principle of jurisdictional equality is broken, this may unleash a spiral of competing claims.

The central state may accommodate the region by giving it exceptional self-governance while tying it to the country as a whole by making it co-responsible for national policy. Shared rule may soften the sharp edges of self-rule. This is the classic federal strategy for uniting independent territories under a single roof, and it has been inordinately successful. Indeed, we find that nearly three-quarters of regions with a history of statehood (92 of 127) are now standard constituent units of a federation. Asymmetry stretches the band of unity in order to accommodate a region that has separatist leanings. Asymmetry is an effort to square the circle by recognizing minority nationalist demands without setting the region adrift from the body politic. Asymmetry is the back-stop of federalism which seeks to hold a country together by allowing its constituent parts extensive control over their own affairs and a serious measure of co-governance in the whole (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011: 18).

In contrast to autonomous regions, most asymmetric regions exercise considerable multilateral shared rule. The diamonds in Figure 5.3 plot the mean levels of multilateral and bilateral shared rule in asymmetric and autonomous regions. On a scale from zero to 12, the median asymmetric region is 5.5 on the RAI for multilateral shared rule and just 0.5 on bilateral shared rule. The asymmetric province of Quebec, for example, participates in a dense network of executive and fiscal intergovernmental meetings and, in conjunction with other Canadian provinces, has a veto on constitutional reform (Bakvis and Brown 2010; Bolleyer 2009; Pelletier 2013). By contrast, the median autonomous region scores 3.0 on bilateral shared rule and zero on multilateral shared rule. The Azores and Madeira are typical autonomous regions in having the constitutional right to be consulted on policy and fiscal issues that might affect them, but without the right to delay or block nation-wide constitutional reform, even collectively, with other Portuguese regions.
The barrier to asymmetry is particularly high in federal countries where there is a norm of equality among formerly independent jurisdictions. Most federal provinces are constitutionally embedded in a network of cooperation and competition. Empowering one of their kind is no easy matter if it requires constitutional rejigging. There is a clearly articulated benchmark—the federal standard—which throws any claim for differentiation into sharp relief. Quebec is a case in point. It exercises special powers over immigration, employment, health, and taxation, but failed to be designated as a “distinct society” when the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords were defeated by English-speaking Canadians mobilized around the principle of provincial equality (Cairns 1988; McRoberts 1994; Noel 2013; Russell 1993; Simeon 1988, 2013).

Conflict is intensified if the region in question is perceived to be an integral part of the state. Quebec, with a population of eight million, is the second most populous Canadian province. Catalonia with seven million and the Basque Country with two million are second and seventh among nineteen Spanish comunidades and first and fifth in GDP. Fifty-seven percent of Belgium’s population lives in Flanders. In 2010, the median population of an asymmetric region is 1.2 million, more than four times that of the median autonomous region. Asymmetric regions are seven times less likely than autonomous regions to be geographically peripheral, i.e. 30 km or more from the mainland.

![Figure 5.3. Shared rule in asymmetric and autonomous regions](image-url)

*Figure 5.3. Shared rule in asymmetric and autonomous regions*

*Note: n = 65 asymmetric and autonomous regions in eighty-one countries (1950–2010). Box plots whereby the diamond indicates the median region. Capital regions, indigenous arrangements, and Russian regions are excluded.*
We observe just one asymmetric region, Quebec, which has kept its status since 1950, in Figure 5.2. The wide arrows to and from asymmetric and standard regions record events in Russia, beginning with a flood of bilateral treaties in which regions gained asymmetry and ending in the reimposition of standardization under President Putin.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, minority ethnic demands led President Yeltsin to concede asymmetry to all twenty-one republics and nine of eleven okrugs (Giuliano 2006; Zuber 2008: Table 5 and Appendix A.2). Tatarstan made the first move in a 1992 referendum that declared its sovereignty, and in 1994 it gained additional powers in external trade, natural resources, and citizenship. By the end of 1995 six other republics had broken the standard frame (Chuman 2011: 136–8; Frommeyer 1999: 14). This triggered competitive bidding among Russia’s non-ethnic regions. Between 1996 and 1998 sixteen additional regions extracted special powers from a weak center (Zuber 2008). Eventually, forty-six of Russia’s eighty-nine regions concluded bilateral treaties. Each negotiation followed a legally specified procedure using a template setting out the supremacy of federal law, conditions for federal pre-emption, and dispute resolution (Frommeyer 1999). But the outcome was anything but orderly. Most treaties contravened federal law, and almost half of the 44,000 regional acts examined by the Ministry of Justice in 1999 were deemed to violate the constitution (Chebankova 2007; Hahn 2003; Stepan 2000: 144, 149). “There [was] no unified legal space in Russia” (Stepan 2000: 144).

In 2000, the center regrouped under President Putin. Seven overarching super districts were set up under central control. Regional economic development was placed under a federal ministry. Popular elections for regional governors were abolished. And Putin, as chairman of the United Russia party, effectively put himself in charge of selecting governors (Chuman 2011; Ilchenko 2013; Kahn, Trochev, and Balayan 2009; Ross 2010). Of the forty-six regions that had acquired asymmetry in the 1990s, only Tatarstan remained in 2007.

Outside Russia, four regions have evoked historical distinctiveness to acquire asymmetry. In 1978, the Basque provinces of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa regained their centuries-old fueros, which had been taken away under Franco. Callao, which had secured greater self-rule in Peru’s founding constitution of 1836 but subsequently lost it, had its special status restored as an asymmetric region in 2003. Bolivia’s Gran Chaco claims a distinctive Chaqueño identity “cultivated throughout the twentieth century as one grounded in shared productive practices (ranching), shared culture (music, dance), and shared grievances (the suffering of the Chaco War and the marginalization of the Chaco within Tarija and Bolivia)” (Humphreys, Bebbington, and Bebbington 2010: 143). In 2009, president Morales, dressed as a Chaqueño, promised to hold a referendum on regional autonomy, which, if successful, would give it

Community and Differentiated Governance
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

45 percent of the hydrocarbon royalties generated in the province. Eighty-one percent of the population voted in favor (Humphreys et al. 2010: 156).

All fifty-three standard regions that gained asymmetry did so in countries that were moving to democracy. Wresting asymmetry from a standard tier is greatly facilitated by the fluidity of democratic transition. However, holding on to asymmetry is no easy matter (Zuber 2011). Of the fifty-three, only five retained their asymmetric status.6

Ten asymmetric regions are newly created, as the dashed arrow in Figure 5.2 indicates. Galicia, the Basque country, and Catalonia were granted special competences following democracy. Andalusia, which had been on the verge of passing an autonomy statute before the civil war, gained asymmetry in 1981, though it was folded back as a standard region a few years later. In Belgium, the Flemish, Francophone, and German communities were each accorded special competences in the early 1970s. Asymmetric regions in Spain and Belgium share one key feature: they were set up as part of entirely new tiers. No standard regions were on hand to resist.

Still, pressure for standardization has been palpable. The Spanish center has responded to Basque and Catalan demands for independence by seeking to encase them in a “federation in disguise” (Chapman Osterkatz 2013; Keating 1998; Moreno 2001: 61, 2007). As in Canada, there is an enduring tension between the desire to maintain the integrity of the national frame and the need to accommodate diversity—with the Spanish constitutional court acting as gatekeeper. In 2008 the constitutional court rejected the Basque government’s plan to hold a referendum for co-sovereignty with Spain (Moreno and Obydenkova 2013). And in 2010 the court struck down a Catalan statute extending regional competences which would have established Catalan as the preferred public language (Arbós Marin 2013). In Belgium, the responsibilities of the center have been progressively swallowed by the Flemish, Francophone, and German communities, though this has not assuaged Flemish separatism (Deschouwer 2009; Hooghe 2004; Swenden 2010, 2013).

Asymmetry can have a more prosaic function beyond the effort to accommodate distinctive regions that wish to break free. Before implementing a reform across the country, it may be useful to experiment, as three asymmetric regions in Table 5.4 exemplify. The Auckland and Wellington development regions in New Zealand piloted directly elected councils in 1963 and 1974 respectively, and once the experiment was seen to work, it was extended across the board. Similarly, Kainuu was set up in 2005 as a trial region encompassing nine Finnish municipalities. The expectation was that pooling municipal

---

6 Bizkaia, Callao, Gipuzkoa, Gran Chaco, and Tatarstan.
Table 5.4. Asymmetry (1950–2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creation of asymmetry</th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Québec (Canada)</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bozen-Südtirol, Trentino (Italy)</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland (New Zealand)</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington (New Zealand)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Communauté française, Deutsche Gemeinschaft (Belgium)</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland, Wellington (S)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Région wallonne (Belgium)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia, Galicia (Spain)</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan, Bashkortostan (Russia)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euskadi/Pais Vasco, Catalunya (Spain)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Andrés-Prov., Santa Catalina (Colombia)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincia Constitucional del Callao (Peru)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincia Constitucional del Callao (Peru)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kainuu (Finland)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition to different status</th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bozen-Südtirol (A)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia (S)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland, Wellington (S)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan, Bashkortostan (Russia)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 subyekti federatsii (Russia)</td>
<td>1994–98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gran Chaco (Bolivia)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 subyekti federatsii (S)</td>
<td>2000–04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status pre-dates entry in dataset. Status abbreviations: A = autonomy; Y = asymmetry; D = dependency; S = standard region.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

functions in health care, education, and social services in a sparsely populated area would enhance efficiency (Moisio, Loikkanen, and Oulasvirta 2010: 172–3; Moisio 2012). When one of the municipalities withdrew its support for the experiment, Kainuu re-entered the standard frame (Ministry of Finance of Finland 2013). The Finnish government is preparing to overhaul subnational government along the lines of a 2007 Danish reform, with larger, more authoritative municipalities overseen by leaner, possibly task-specific, regional bodies.

Similar experiments are taking place in Sweden. Between 1996 and 2010 four pilot regions, each combining two or three counties, were set up to achieve economies of scale in economic development, regional transport, and culture (Hanssen et al. 2011). Three regions chose to have directly elected councils that replaced county councils, while the fourth opted for an indirectly elected council operating alongside directly elected county councils. In 2007, a government report suggested extending the experiment across the country (OECD 2012).7

Dependency

A dependency is a jurisdiction that is subject to central state control. Its association with the center is hierarchical rather than bilateral or multilateral. Many dependencies are remote and sparsely populated. Many are colonial or frontier territories with indigenous populations. The number of dependencies has declined drastically over the past six decades. There were thirty-seven in the forty-eight countries we observe in 1950. In 2010 there were five in the eighty countries we observe.8

Most have been transformed into standard or autonomous regions, as Figure 5.2 charts. The decline of colonialism and the spread of democracy have put pressure on central governments to give indigenous populations differentiated self-rule, or at least the same measure of authority as other regions in the state. The only dependencies that remain in our dataset in 2010 are the Isla de la Juventud in Cuba, the Dependencias Federales off the coast of Venezuela, the financial district of Labuan in Malaysia, the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard in the Arctic sea, and Indian Act Bands in Canada. Table 5.5 lists dependencies and the timing and mode of their change in status.

7 Sweden now has six regions with extended competences which cover much of the country. They are, for now, superimposed on the counties (Sweden 2015).
8 The figures for 1950 and 2010 do not include capital regions and Indian Act Bands in Canada.
Table 5.5. Dependency (1950–2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creation of dependency</th>
<th>Transition to different status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950 32 regions in nine countries (all change status)</td>
<td>1951 Chaco, La Pampa (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1952 Puerto Rico (US) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependencias federales (Venezuela)</td>
<td>1953 Misiones (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Act Bands (Canada)</td>
<td>1953 Grenland (Denmark) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Ceuta, Melilla (Spain)</td>
<td>1953 Baja California (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1955 Formosa, Neuquén, Río Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Dependencias federales (Venezuela)</td>
<td>1950 Indian Act Bands (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Indian Act Bands (Canada)</td>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Svalbard (Norway)</td>
<td>1967 Northwest Territories (Canada) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>1974 Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo (Mexico) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Galápagos (Ecuador)</td>
<td>1980 Tobago (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Labuan (Malaysia)</td>
<td>1991 Tierra del Fuego (Argentina) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Northern Ireland (UK)</td>
<td>2000 Northern Ireland (UK) (A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

■ Status pre-dates entry in dataset. A = autonomy; Y = asymmetry; D = dependency; S = standard region.
Empowering a dependency can generate resistance. Just as standard federal units can be expected to oppose the differential empowerment of one of their number, so they may resist giving a sparsely populated region the same shared rule that they exercise.

Promotion to standard federal status for the Northern Territory in Australia and the Northwest Territories and Yukon in Canada requires the consent of existing federal regions. The six states of the Australian federation are reluctant to allow a sparsely populated seventh around the table on equal terms, and since the final decision is in the hands of the Commonwealth parliament, they have a collective veto. The latest plan to hold a referendum on statehood in the Northern Territory was shelved in 2012 when it became apparent that the Commonwealth was going to offer just two senate seats while existing states each have six. Canadian provinces have also been unwilling to extend full equality to sparsely populated territories. Since 1982, upgrading a territory to a province has required a constitutional amendment ratified by seven of the ten provincial legislatures representing at least half the national population. The stakes are small for the Australian Northern Territory, but considerable in Canada, where a territory is subject to federal control of mineral resources, immigration, and borrowing, and has no vote on constitutional reform.

The Galapagos Islands, off the coast of Ecuador, also have less self-rule than a standard region. The bulk of the territory is UNESCO-protected natural habitat under central ministry control. Relations between local residents and the scientific community in the Charles Darwin Institute located in the park have sparked conflict, including the kidnapping of giant turtles. In 1998, the Ecuadorian parliament passed a special statute that set the province on a path to autonomous self-governance. This was halted in 2007 when UNESCO placed the islands on an “in danger” list. Since then, central control has been tightened over immigration, economic development, and the regulation of invasive species (Hennessy 2010; Hoyman and McCall 2012).

It is not unusual for capital regions to be governed as dependencies in non-democratic societies. Capital cities are potential sites for protest, revolt, or revolution, and their proximity to national power intensifies their importance for both rulers and their opponents. Hence, issues of governance come sharply into play. Should the capital have an autonomous government? Should the capital or the central government control the police? Should the capital be governed as one unit or partitioned into smaller units? Bogotá, Santo Domingo, Mexico City, Managua, Asunción, Caracas, Jakarta, and Kuala Lumpur have been hierarchically governed by the center at one time or another over the past six decades.

Democratization and the end of colonialism transformed most dependencies to autonomous regions. The shift was marked in the role of mayors and municipal councils, particularly in Latin America, where the executives of the
capital city “were all but invisible” and presidents appointed mayors (Myers and Dietz 2002: 3). The dependency of the capital in bureaucratic authoritarian rule was a particular target for democratic reformers, who introduced popular election for mayors and executives. Capital city mayors then became major players with wide-ranging competences that provided a platform for national recognition. Of the cities listed above, only Caracas under President Hugo Chávez and Kuala Lumpur under Barisan Nasional rule have remained dependent (Myers 2012: 223–4).

In established democracies it is not unusual for capital regions to exercise some special autonomy in a bilateral arrangement with the central government. As large, urban centers that can be several times as populous as the next largest city in the country, capital regions stick out from their tier. Their distinctive scale and function can justify differentiated governance, as in the case of London, which in the words of the 1997 Labour party manifesto, “urgently required . . . responsibility for London-wide issues—economic regeneration, planning, policing, transport and environmental protection.”

The median RAI for capitals with special arrangements was 3.0 in 1950, rising to 12.0 in 2010. That shift has mostly occurred over the past three decades as democratization introduced the principles of consent and representation that underpin decentralization. The gap between the authority of capital regions and that of standard top-tier regions has decreased, and in a growing number of countries it has been reversed.

Conclusion

Differentiation among regions is structured in ways that allow one to generalize about its genesis, its systemic consequences, and its continuity and change over time. We distinguish three forms of differentiated governance on the basis of a region’s strategic situation. Each form has a distinctive basis in peripherality arising from geographical remoteness, language, or historical independence. Each has a distinctive mode of rule. Each affects governance in the country as a whole in a characteristic way. And each exhibits a distinctive pattern of stability or change over the past six decades.

An autonomous region is set apart from standard regions embedded in country-wide tiers of governance. Its geographical peripherality is echoed in its political peripherality. It is usually too small to provide for itself, but too different to fit into a country-wide frame. It stands in relation to the center

9 Available at <http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm>.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

rather than to other regions. It does not provoke competition with other regions, but is a place apart. It neither incites other regions to deny it special autonomy, nor does it raise the specter of state dissolution. Its effects on governance are ad hoc rather than systemic. It is biased towards self-rule rather than shared rule. And for all these reasons, autonomy tends to be an equilibrium outcome.

An asymmetric region is embedded in, yet differentiated from, a regional tier. Some asymmetric regions are pilots for authoritative reforms that may or may not be extended across the country. Others are quasi-states with profound political implications. These regions tend to be large and resourceful. Many could themselves have been states but for dynastic union or defeat in war. They interact with other regions alongside the central state. The stakes are high. Differentiation breaks the standard frame. Standard regions may emulate or oppose. If faced with secession, the central state may resist self-rule while offering to share national rule. Neither pilot schemes nor high-voltage asymmetry are particularly stable.

Finally, a dependency is denied the status of a standard region but is governed hierarchically by the central state. These are colonies on the path to statehood or territories that are sparsely populated, technologically deficient, or otherwise regarded as lacking the capability for self-rule. Dependency has become a temporary condition, as direct rule of “backward” peoples has lost legitimacy even in authoritarian regimes. As the incidence of autonomy and asymmetry has increased, so the number of dependencies has declined over the past six decades.

Autonomy and asymmetry reveal the possibilities of flexible jurisdictional design. In 2010, 149 million people lived in regions with special status—6.6 percent of the population in our dataset. However, differentiated governance has implications beyond the regions it affects directly. It has established the principle that territorial governance is negotiable—even in nominally unitary states. Regions within the same tier may have diverse representative institutions, taxation powers, and policy competences. The territorial structure of authority is increasingly adapted for individual regions with some special need or circumstance. Institutional fordism has given way to diversified institutional provision.

As the incidence of autonomy and asymmetry has increased, so subnational governance has become multilevel in a way that breaks with the classic model of nested, uniform tiers. As the classic model has lost traction, so the range of authoritative outcomes for individual regions within countries has widened. The majority of differentiated regions result from the accommodation of normatively distinct territorial communities. The chief tension in territorial rule arises in the diversity of territorial communities under a single authoritative roof. Community—and the mobilization of
communal difference through political parties and social movements—has been the most potent driver of differentiated governance. As we show in Chapter Six, the effects of accommodating diversity reverberate beyond distinct communities. Diversity appears to shape the structure of territorial governance in the state as a whole.
Community and the Structure of Governance

Just 8.5 percent of the intermediate jurisdictions in the eighty-one countries we observe are geographically peripheral, have a population speaking a distinct language at home, or have a prior history of independence. Such regions are the quintessential sources of postfunctionalist dynamics. Our claim in this chapter is that territorial minorities do more than gain self-rule. They also shape the entire structure of governance in the states of which they are part.

There are several ways in which this can happen. One mechanism is competitive mobilization, in which a demand for self-rule from those living in one region triggers demands from other regions (Zuber 2011). Self-rule can give a region not just greater control over its own laws, but greater bargaining power in the country as a whole, putting other regions at a disadvantage. Once the frame of territorial governance is jarred loose to accommodate a single region, this may unleash a broader struggle. When the Basque Country and Navarre demanded constitutional recognition of their foral rights, Convergència i Unió (CiU) responded by seeking a constitutional revision for Catalonia. This, in turn, precipitated demands from other Spanish regions—a process Luis Moreno (1997) dubs “ethnoterritorial mimesis.”

Regional identities are not mobilized in isolation. If one part of a country activates a distinct identity, others may follow suit. In the Soviet Union, the mobilization of national popular fronts which began in Estonia in Spring 1988 spread quickly to Lithuania and Latvia before moving on to Moldova and Transcaucasia, an “international demonstration effect” which concluded with the assertion of Russian national consciousness (Lapidus 1992: 55, 61).¹

Within Post-Soviet Russia, competitive bidding among regions sparked a chain reaction. Tatarstan, which based its claim on former statehood and

¹ Gorbachev argued for sustaining a “large and powerful federal state” on classic scale grounds, to exploit economies of scale in defense and foreign policy and for “coordinating and resolving common problems in the spheres of the economy, science and culture; guaranteeing and protecting individual rights; promoting integration processes and organizing mutual assistance” (quoted in Goldman, Lapidus, and Zaslavsky 1992: 11).
cultural-linguistic distinctiveness, extracted a special arrangement in 1993. What followed was a “parade of sovereignties” leading to bilateral negotiations and special statutes for nineteen of twenty-one respubliki and thirty-five of forty-six oblasti (Hale 2000; Ilichenko 2013; Zuber 2011).

The mobilization of a distinctive community may trigger emulation. Recognition of one minority nation can spur those in other parts of the country to reassess their own identities, and perhaps to realize that they too have a claim to nationhood. Regional distinctiveness can stimulate minority nationalism. Aragon, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Galicia, and Valencia became sensitive to their distinctive identities in the “interplay among Spanish nationalities” (Moreno 2001: 79). Opinion leaders began to use the language of peoples and nations rather than regions.

The mobilization of Scottish identity in recent decades provoked many people living in the south to feel English rather than British. The flag of St George, rarely in evidence three or four decades ago, is now more commonly waved in English sports crowds than the Union Jack of the United Kingdom. England itself has been a coherent jurisdiction for more than a millennium, but there are now signs of minority mobilization. “The swagger and success of the Scottish National party has encouraged a string of new pro-devolution parties in England’s regions to press for more self-government” (Bounds, Tighe, and Brown 2015). These include Yorkshire First, the North East party, and the Wessex Regionalist party. The British government granted the people of Cornwall official minority community status in 2014.

Indonesia is an extreme example of the jurisdictional consequences of identity mobilization. At independence in 1949 the country had ten provinces overarching ethnic and linguistic groups. The idea—on the model of the French revolution of 1789—was to create functional jurisdictions that would ignore ethnic ties and traditional loyalties. Two years later the ancient sultanate of Yogyakarta extracted itself as a distinct region. Kalimantan followed in 1957 and Aceh in 1959. By 2010, thirty-three provinces had been carved out on ethnic lines. Only the island province of Java Timur retains its original form.

Competition among political parties may precipitate regional reform in the country as a whole (Meguid 2008; Swenden and Maddens 2009). National parties may seek to fend off regionalist challenges by offering system-wide decentralization. Christian democrats and socialists jurisdictionalized communities in Belgium to preempt Flemish nationalists and Walloon regionalists (De Winter et al. 2006; Hooghe 2004). The British Labour party put devolution on the agenda in response to the rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party in the

---

2 In the 1990 World Cup, the Union Jack was the flag of choice for English football fans. At Euro 96, it was the flag of St George.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

early 1970s (Bogdanor 1999; Dardanelli 2009; Lynch 2013). Following devolution for Scotland and Wales and a mayorship for London, the five largest political parties in Britain each proposed wider decentralization and in May 2015 the Conservative government set out a general plan for metropolitan government with tax and spending powers.

Conversely, a regionalist political party may pursue country-wide reform to lever autonomy for its territory (Toubeau and Massetti 2013). This is most feasible if the party can pivot governing coalitions in the legislature (Hopkin 2009; Swenden and Maddens 2009). In Spain three regionalist parties, led by the Catalan CiU, extracted regional fiscal autonomy from the Partido Popular in 1997 in exchange for their support in a hung parliament (Agranoff and Gallarín 1997; Barberá and Barrio 2006; Llamazares and Marks 2006). In 2001, the ethnic Hungarian minority party (SMK), which was part of an anti-Meciar government coalition, provided the votes to set up directly elected regional councils across the country (Brusis 2005; Pridham 2002).

Regionalization can have a knock-on effect for national political parties which may regionalize campaign finance, organization, and candidate nominations to compete more effectively at the regional level (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004; Garman, Haggard, and Willis 2001; Montero 2005; Schakel 2013; Swenden and Toubeau 2013). Once a national political party is regionalized, it may have an incentive to emphasize further decentralization, as in Belgium from the 1970s and Spain following democratization (Massetti and Schakel 2013a, b).

Spillover may result from the central government’s effort to tame a minority demand. By extending the same level of self-rule to all regions, a government may seek to use the principle of equal treatment to constrain a minority. In Spain this has been described as “café para todos,” an offer of “coffee for everyone instead of champagne for the historic regions” (Agranoff 2005: 7; Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013: 427). Or perhaps, the central government can give regions a role in decision making in the country as a whole. This is the federal cure for minority nationalism. It could involve a national chamber in which regions are represented, or intergovernmental arrangements in which regional governments bargain directly with the central government. In Belgium both strategies were used in an effort to contain Flemish nationalists, culminating in the leap to federalism in 1995 (Hooghe 1989, 2004). The idea is that the centripetal effects of shared rule will offset the centrifugal effects of self-rule.

Federalism—often derided as the “F-word” in Britain—is now proposed by some leading Conservatives and Labourites as the only way to save the United Kingdom. Federalism not only provides each region with a stake in the

3 Johnson (2015); Rifkind (2015); Williams (2014).
whole, but may hinder the ability of any region to break the country-wide template. Federal regions are usually jealous of their equality. The efforts of the Parti Québecois to translate Quebec’s “société distincte” in a “statut autonomiste” have met vigorous resistance from other provinces.

Of course, minority demands for self-rule may be rejected by national hardliners. Various forms of suppression have been tried. The most common is to fragment a territorial minority across multiple jurisdictions. Central rulers may ban the regionalist movement and its publications. Divide and repress has been extensively used to subdue Kurds, who are the majority in sixteen of eighty-one Turkish provinces (Ertugal 2010; Ertugal and Dobre 2011; Penner Angrist 2004; Yavuz and Özcan 2006). The establishment of an upper regional tier in Turkey was consistently shelved for “fear that the wider geographical area of a region might include a dominant ethnic group endangering the unity and security of the nation” (Ertugal 2010: 98). Suppression was particularly severe in the 1980s and 1990s under a state of emergency to combat the insurgent PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). When reform came in 2009, the new regions cut across Kurdistan.4

Nation-wide reform can also result from the violent efforts of regional groups. Indonesia experienced decades of civil conflict in the northernmost province of Aceh. The introduction of weak regional autonomy in 2001 did not stem the violence. The Free Aceh Movement took up arms until a 2006 reform conceded much greater authority (Aspinall 2009; Bertrand 2004; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2014a, b). Regionalist groups espousing violence include ETA in the Spanish Basque Country, the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao, Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand, Miskitu along the Nicaraguan coast, and Zapatistas in Chiapas. None of these movements has succeeded in breaking away from their respective states, but several have gained self-rule, often in the context of national reform (Chalk 2001; Eisenstadt 2011; Sánchez-Cuenca 2007).

The scenarios sketched above have a single focal point: a minority community can have systemic effects. It may un hinge the status quo and unleash regional competition. Other territorial groups may come to reassess their identity and demand the same rights. National political parties may offer self-rule in competition with regionalists or agree to decentralize in exchange for coalition support. The central government may accommodate a minority community within a national reform, or go further by co-opting regions in a

---

4 From 1987 to 2002 rebellious Kurdish territories were combined under a Regional State of Emergency Governate run by a super-governor with far-reaching emergency powers (Heper 2007). Never in its history was Turkish Kurdistan so uniformly governed, and according to a contemporary observer, this “legal and administrative rule has further consolidated Kurdish nationalism” (Yavuz 2001: 13).
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

system of shared rule. The central government may seek to quash communal demands by pulling authority away from the rebellious region or it may seek to centralize the country as a whole. And finally, violence on behalf of a distinctive community may persuade the government to make concessions. The mechanisms are diverse, but there are strong grounds to believe that the efforts of a minority community to gain self-rule for itself can shape governance in the country as a whole.

Expectations

Under what circumstances will a minority community have knock-on effects for the structure of governance in the country as a whole? The elements of peripherality diagnosed by Stein Rokkan—distance from the center, a history of jurisdictional independence, and linguistic difference—describe contrasting conditions for resisting assimilation, and we expect that they have contrasting implications for the structure of governance. Our core expectation is that linguistic difference and a history of jurisdictional independence produce regions with systemic effects, whereas geographical distance produces self-contained regions.

This is surprising because geographical distance is usually regarded as the archetypal form of peripherality. Deductive models of governance use distance from the center as a proxy for heterogeneity of preferences and the demand for self-rule (Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby 2004; Arzaghi and Henderson 2005; Spolaore 2008; for theoretical arguments see Inman and Rubinfeld 1997 and Oates 1972). Distance increases the costs of transport, and those living in an inaccessible region are likely to have distinctive norms, habits, forms of speech, and perhaps religious practices, all of which contribute to a sense of exclusive community, and further, to a felt need for self-rule. All of this is true, yet we claim that distance alone has little effect and usually produces regions that have only a marginal impact on the structure of governance in the country as a whole. The social isolation that sustains a geographically peripheral community yields an anomaly which can be accommodated in the body politic as a special autonomous region.

A minority community that has a systemic effect will tend to be larger in population and closer to the national core. A populous, centrally located community is impossible to ignore and cannot be tucked away as an anomaly. Its demands for self-rule will be salient for the polity as a whole. But how will it withstand assimilation?

Language and prior statehood are decisive assets (Gellner 1983). A minority community that retains a distinctive language vastly complicates the monistic ambitions of the center to create uniform educational, cultural, and legal
institutions around national patterns of socio-economic interaction. A distinctive language, if spoken by a large enough population, can shield minority institutions and slow down, or even halt, assimilation. Language is perhaps the most valuable resource for sustaining a minority community that is not geographically isolated.

Prior statehood can provide a community with bargaining power in the course of state building. This is the basis for federalism, which arises in a compact among independent polities to achieve national scale while retaining self-rule for the constituent units. Our purpose is to generalize about systems of multilevel governance more broadly, and our hunch is that the same logic bites in non-federal systems. A previously independent people may bargain self-rule even when union is non-consensual.

Following dynastic union, the smaller or weaker part can expect to gain formal recognition of its rights, language, and customs. Catalonia, Navarre, and the Basque provinces retained their constitutions, norms, and laws, after dynastic merger with Castilian Spain. Coercive union does not preclude institutional persistence. It is one thing to defeat a state in war, but quite another to swallow it into the body politic (Marks 2012). Sheer coercion is a blunt instrument for assimilating a people with a history of independence. It is not unusual for a vanquished people to retain self-governing institutions that sustain difference in the face of national assimilation. Scotland, defeated in war and dynastically united with England, adopted the language of the core but was able to retain its legal and educational institutions.

Our second line of hypothesizing concerns regime type. Democracy tends to increase the incidence of regional governance because it reduces the benefits of centralization for those in power and lowers the cost of political mobilization for those seeking self-rule (Haggard 2000; Marks, Hooghe, and Schakel 2008; Stepan et al. 2011). This effect is independent of the existence of a territorial minority. However, we expect the effect of democracy to intensify in polities which encompass a language region or prior-statehood region. Democracy is hollow on the Who Question—the question of whether this group or that group has a right to self-rule. Silent on who, democracy tells us how. Allow this or that group to canvass, organize, and vote for self-rule. And in the face of a claim supported by a local majority, on what basis can democracy deny self-rule?

The world looks different to a dictator. The claim to self-rule on the part of a large minority community threatens the very basis of authoritarian rule. It undermines the ruler’s monopoly of authority and signals his weakness. If the dictator agrees to some accommodation, will this quench future claims, or will it open a Pandora’s box? The demand for self-rule on the part of a previously independent region will appear particularly menacing if it raises the specter of local insurgency demanding separatism. Hence, one can expect that the more
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

authoritarian a regime, the more it will constrain self-rule when faced with a region having a history of independence.\(^5\)

Variables

Regional Authority

Postfunctionalist theory, with its emphasis on community, has implications for regional authority at the country level both cross-sectionally and over time. The dataset consists of eighty-one countries and 3,775 country-years.\(^6\) When we compare cross-sections over time, we use a consistent sample of forty-eight countries for which we have continuous data from 1950 to 2010.

Figure 6.1 summarizes the sample variation in the Regional Authority Index (RAI) in box plots. Median values range from zero (nineteen countries) to just under 34.7 for Germany. Five other countries have a median RAI greater than 25: Serbia-Montenegro (29.9), the United States (29.6), Belgium (28.9), Bosnia-Herzegovina (27.1), and Canada (25.2). The remaining fifty-six countries are quite evenly distributed across the range. The boxplots indicate considerable variation over time. The countries with the greatest interquartile range in the RAI are Spain (29.3), Belgium (16.1), France (12.0), Brazil (10.4), and Italy (10.4).

Figure 6.2 arrays countries according to their annual change in RAI. Spain, Italy, and Belgium are at the upper extreme. Belgium has been transformed from a unitary to a federal state, and Spain and Italy have moved in that direction without yet being considered fully federal. They are joined by four postcommunist countries, which we observe over shorter periods. The Czech Republic, Croatia, and Slovakia created self-governing regions from scratch following democratization. At the other extreme, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the one country with a high negative annual change. In 1995 it had the second-highest RAI score, but since 1998 it has had limited self-governance as a UN/EU protectorate. Eight additional countries show a small negative average annual change: Costa Rica, Russia, Brazil, Serbia and Montenegro, Cuba, Malaysia, Ecuador, and Sweden.

Community

We operationalize Territorial community as the percentage of a country’s population located in one or more jurisdictions that are geographically peripheral,

\(^5\) Except, of course, in a federation where many regions in the country have such a history.

\(^6\) We lose fifty-two country-years because of data limitations on affluence (per capita GDP) and democracy in the 1950s and early 1990s.
Figure 6.1. Annual regional authority

Note: Boxes display the interquartile range of annual values in RAI over the period of observation for each country. Diamonds indicate the median for each country series, and circles are extreme annual values.
linguistically distinctive, or have a history of political independence. These features are not exclusive. A region may have none, one, or more of these characteristics. In order to test expectations about type of territorial community, we need to disaggregate.

Distance A jurisdiction is coded as geographically peripheral if it is an island or non-contiguous territory that is 30 km or more distant from the mainland.

---

7 An online appendix at <http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe> provides detail on how we code distinctive communities in eighty-one countries.
of its state. If distance has an effect on regional governance, one is likely to observe this in isolated regions. Distance from the geographical center of a country is an alternative measure, but it is problematic. Many countries have grown over time so that their geographical center lies far from their political center. Belle Fourche in South Dakota is designated by the US Coast and Geodetic Survey as the geographical center of the United States, the point on which the United States could be balanced if it were a plane of uniform thickness. By the same criterion, the center of Canada is arguably the “Unnamed Lake” in a tundra forest region of Nunavut. Equally problematic is distance from the capital of a state, which would make the states of Washington, Oregon, and California 500 or more miles more peripheral than Puerto Rico.

Language A jurisdiction is coded as linguistically distinctive if a majority of its population speaks a language at home that differs from the language of the core. As straightforward as this criterion is in principle, information is occasionally thin or ambiguous, and we triangulate sources. Conceptual judgment is also involved. For example, we code Flemish as a minority language despite the fact that Flemish is spoken by around 60 percent of the Belgian population and is currently one of three official languages of the country. However, French was the only language used by public authorities in Flanders until well into the twentieth century. Only since 1967 does the Dutch version of the Belgian constitution have equal status with the original French one.

It is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether the minority language is spoken by at least 50 percent of the population. Large proportions of the Región Autónoma del Atlántico Sur (RAAS) and the Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte (RAAN) in Nicaragua speak languages other than Spanish, including Miskito, creole English, and Mayangna. Although these non-Hispanic groups were a majority in both regions until the 1950s, recent migration from western Nicaragua may have tipped the balance. Until we have better information on the current situation, we code both regions as meeting the language criterion.

Prior statehood A jurisdiction is coded as having a history of political independence if (1) it has been an independent state for a continuous period of thirty years or more since AD1200; (2) it encompasses the core or capital region of the prior state; and (3) it includes at least half the territory of the prior state. Most of the 116 cases of prior statehood meet these conditions over the past two centuries. However, a thin tail of regions were independent for a

---

8 Available at: <http://confluence.org/confluence.php?visitid=11375>
9 This is contested by two other remote locations in Nunavut: <http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-centre-of-controversy-where-is-canadas-middle>.
10 Laitin (2000) has developed a more refined schema of language communities with indices to estimate their coherence, but we lack survey data to implement this.
continuous period of at least three decades only in late medieval times. Wales and Galicia lost their independence in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, respectively, though the institutional (and mythical) legacies are in evidence today.

The second and third criteria are necessary to exclude the vast number of regions that previously existed in some other state. A region must constitute the core and bulk of a prior state to be coded as such. For example, even though they can be conceived as its successors, neither of Nicaragua’s autonomous regions (RAAS and RAAN) encompasses as much as half of the Miskito kingdom.

Of 3,465 regional jurisdictions in eighty countries in 2010, 295 or 8.5 percent meet the criteria for distance, language, and/or prior statehood (Table 6.1). The largest category, 196 or 5.7 percent, consists of regions where a majority speaks a language that is different from the national language. Regions with prior statehood contain the largest share of the population overall, on average 8.2 percent across eighty countries. The incidence of such regions is heavily biased to federal countries. Ten of thirteen federal countries have regions that were prior states, and these ten countries contain ninety-eight of 127 historic regions in the sample. Brazil, Venezuela, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are the only federal countries in our sample that are composed of regions that were not states.

The jurisdictionalization of “Rokkan” regions has increased in a minority of the forty-eight countries that we observe from 1950 to 2010. Five countries—Spain, Italy, Belgium, Indonesia, and France—saw increases of more than 10 percent over the period. The median change is zero and the average increase is 3.4 percent.

**Democracy**

*Democracy* is the Polity2 indicator rescaled from 0 (strongly authoritarian) to 20 (strongly democratic) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).
Community and the Structure of Governance

Population, Area, Affluence

We control for functional pressures arising from scale and affluence. First, as discussed in Chapters One and Three, the more populous a country, the more authoritative its regional governance. Second, there is the expectation that countries with a larger footprint will have more regional governance. Third, governments in countries with a higher per capita GDP can be expected to provide a wider range of public goods, and hence to have more regional governance. Population, Area, and per capita GDP are logged on the ground that the effect of an additional unit declines as the absolute number of units increases. Annual data on population, area, and real purchasing power parity at 2005 constant prices are from Penn World Tables 8.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013; Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012).11

Ethnic Diversity

To assess the effect of the territorial concentration of community, we control for Ethnic diversity, which is a non-territorial measure of the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to different ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups. This variable is an average of three cross-sectional indices (Alesina et al. 2003). We calculate values for Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo (post-2006) using data on ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity from CIA World Facts (2013).

Supranational Governance

We control for membership of a regional international organization because it may lower the cost of separatism by allowing small states access to international markets (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Jolly 2015; Marks and Hooghe 2000). Supranational governance is the product of two variables: (a) the extent of authoritative delegation in a regional international organization of which the state is a member; and (b) the range of policies for which that regional international organization is responsible (Hooghe et al. forthcoming; Marks et al. 2014). Authoritative delegation is an annual measure from 1950 to 2010 of the agenda-setting and final decision-making role of non-state actors in the organization’s assembly, executive, general secretariat, and court. The range of

11 Government spending is a more proximate measure of the public goods hypothesis. IMF statistics for general government expenditure cover all countries except Kosovo and Cuba for 2010. Cross-sectional models for 2010 specifying Size of government or Per capita GDP yield similar estimates and standard errors for all independent variables and controls. However, government expenditure data are available only for around one-third of the country-years in our full dataset (excluding most non-OECD countries and all years prior to 1990) so we use Per capita GDP in our analysis.
policies is an annual measure of the extent of an organization’s portfolio over twenty-five policy fields. Around half of these are concerned with economic policy. The annual score for a state is the annual score of the most authoritative regional international organization of which it is a member. The organizations are the Andean Community, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Caribbean Community, the Central American Integration System, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union, Mercosur, the North American Free Trade Association, and the Pacific Community. Many of these organizations have had weak or non-existent delegation. However, 43 percent of the country-year observations of membership of a regional international organization are greater than zero. Non-membership is scored zero.

Tiers

Finally, we control for the creation of new jurisdictions, which is measured as the annual change in tiers by country. An increase in country-wide regional authority may result from the creation of new tiers. By controlling for the number of tiers we estimate the effect of distinctive community net of a change in tiers on country-wide regional authority.

The Effect of Prior Statehood and Language on Governance

We begin with a cross-sectional model for the mean level of regional authority in eighty-one countries using between-effects OLS regression with robust standard errors (Table 6.2). Consistent with theory, we find significant positive coefficients for Territorial community, Prior statehood, and Language, and insignificant coefficients for Distance. Population and Per capita GDP also have positive and statistically significant coefficients.

Territorial community in the first column is the share of the population living in geographically distant, linguistically different, and/or historically sovereign jurisdictions averaged over all yearly observations in the dataset. The second and third columns disaggregate Territorial community into its components for all eighty-one countries and for the sixty-seven non-federal countries, respectively. Estimates for Distance are insignificant, while those for Prior Statehood and Language are positive and substantively large. Regional authority in a country without a region with prior statehood is, on average, 7.3 (+/−1.4).12 When 25 percent of a country’s population lives in such a region—Vojvodina

12 Confidence intervals at the 0.95 level.
in today's Serbia, for example—this increases the RAI to 11.0 (+/− 1.75). A country in which 75 percent of the population lives in regions with prior statehood is predicted to have an RAI of around 18.3 (+/− 5.4). This would be equivalent to a regional tier that has an independently elected assembly and executive whose decisions in economic and educational policy, policing, local government, and residual powers are not subject to central veto. The region can set the rate or base of major taxes and borrow within centrally determined limits. In addition, the region is represented in a second national chamber, has some executive or fiscal shared rule, and can raise the hurdle on constitutional reform. This is a summary of the powers of negeri negeri in Malaysia, which have an RAI of 19 in 2010 in a country where 74.5 percent of the population live in regions with a history of independence.

Linguistically distinct regions also have large substantive effects on regional governance. Each 10 percent of the population speaking a distinct language...
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

increases the RAI by an estimated 1.2. A country that has 50 percent of its population in such regions could expect to have an RAI of 13.5 (+/− 4.3).

Is the effect of territorial community driven by federal countries, which pack three-quarters of regions with prior statehood and one-third of linguistically distinctive regions? Model 3 limits the sample to non-federal countries. The findings are robust, though unsurprisingly, Prior statehood loses some statistical power and Language strengthens.

The results provide cross-sectional confirmation that distinct territorial communities have a country-wide effect on regional governance. This is consistent with the meticulous country evidence that is available. Bolivia illustrates how the mobilization of territorial communities can set off wider reform. Two departments in the southeast, Potosí and Oruro with 13 percent of the population, have majorities speaking Quechua and Aymara rather than Spanish. Indigenous mobilization had its roots in resistance to centralizing policies, beginning with the 1953 land reform, that were intended to homogenize local communities and replace traditional authority structures (Yashar 2005: 159ff). Indigenous organizations, such as the leading Katarista movement, combined economic issues with a demand for recognition of their traditional customs and community. The 1983 Katarista political manifesto begins by stating that “We, the current leaders, refuse to accept and will never accept class reductionist ideas which transform us to the status of mere ‘peasants.’” It goes on to call for “a state which, recognizing all national groups, develops our different cultures and authentic forms of self-government” (quoted in Yashar 2005: 179).

Whereas military rulers from 1964 to 1982 could ignore or repress these demands, this changed with democratization and the return of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) to power:

Why did Bolivia suddenly turn to decentralization? And why then? Two factors stand out. The less important one arises from Bolivia’s failure to achieve sustained growth despite wrenching economic reform. . . The more important factor is the rise of ethnically based, populist politics in the 1980s, which undercut the MNR’s traditional dominance of the rural vote and posed a serious challenge to its (self-declared) role as the “natural party of government. (Faguet 2012: 16)

In 1990 the boundaries of four indigenous territories were recognized, and in 1996 indigenous groups gained the right to claim native land and exercise communal ownership (Faguet 2005, 2011). By the end of the twentieth century, indigenous movements in Bolivia “had fundamentally changed the terms of political discourse” (Yashar 2005: 152). Indigenous mobilization has in turn fueled regionalism in other parts of the country, particularly in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz in eastern Bolivia, where separatist tendencies have long simmered (Faguet 2012; Klein 1982). In the 2000s,
gained directly elected assemblies and governors with responsibilities in economic development, industrial policy, tourism, energy, public health, and education. Departments also control their own institutional set-up, are co-responsible for the local police, and have shared rule through the senate and through intergovernmental meetings. Autonomous indigenous communities have the same powers, and can also veto constitutional changes of their statute by referendum. Bolivia’s RAI increases from 1.0 in 1981 to 8.5 in 1996 and 13.5 in 2010.

In contrast to Prior statehood and Language, Distance does not have a positive effect on regional governance. In fact, the sign of the coefficient in most specifications is negative, though it does not reach statistical significance. We observe seventeen regions in 2010 that are 30 km or more from the mainland of their state but which do not meet the criteria for linguistic distinctiveness or prior statehood. Most are islands or peninsulas with small indigenous populations that became minorities under immigration from the mainland. The Azores, Tierra del Fuego, and Galapagos are peripheral regions in which the indigenous language is spoken by a minority of the population or has almost disappeared. Many of these regions were at some point dependencies. Today most such regions are part of a standard tier. Among these seventeen regions only the Azores and Madeira of Portugal have more self-rule than other regions in their country. Geographical peripherality can underpin statehood and linguistic distinctiveness, but controlling for these variables reveals that distance alone has no positive effect on a country’s regional governance.

Beyond community, we see substantial marginal effects for Population and Per capita GDP. Under controls (Model 2), the RAI for a country with an average population of one million is typically 4.0 (+/−2.7); for a country with a population of ten million, it is 9.4 (+/−1.2); and for a country with one hundred million, it is 14.7 (+/−3.3). The confidence bars are quite wide at the low and high ends, but the effect is large. In short, decentralized intermediate governance is the norm in a country with a population of at least ten million.

The RAI for a country with an average per capita GDP of US$2,500 (e.g. Nicaragua or the Philippines in 2010) is typically 6.0 (+/−2.5); at $10,000 (e.g. Portugal or Latvia) it is 9.2 (+/−1.3); and at $20,000 (Denmark or Sweden) it is 11.4 (+/−2.5).

Democracy is not significant in these models, though we will see that democracy enhances the effect of Language and Prior statehood on regional authority. Supranational governance is not significant in these cross-sectional models. This variable covaries with Per capita GDP (r=0.43) and drops out of significance in cross-sectional estimation chiefly because the European Union, which has by far the highest score on Supranational governance, is composed of relatively affluent countries.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

Community’s Effect over Time

Our key interest concerns the causal effect of territorial community on regional authority over time. Time-series cross-sectional models provide informative tests of the argument set out here. Given the complex ways in which regional authority compounds cross-sectional with time-series inferential threats (e.g. longitudinal and country-wise heteroskedasticity and correlation of standard errors), choosing the appropriate estimator is not straightforward (Beck and Katz 2011). Moreover, the panel is unbalanced since countries vary in the year that they enter the dataset. And modeling regional authority faces bias arising from possible endogeneity. For all these reasons, we consider an array of estimators and specifications to subject our findings to robustness tests. All models use one-year lagged variables for regressors and controls.13

Once a normatively distinct region has been established, does it affect how a country’s regional authority evolves? The answer appears to be yes, and the causal power of such a region over time is similar to its power cross-sectionally. Across all models, Prior Statehood and Language are strongly and positively associated with the dependent variable. However, Distance—controlling for confounding variables—is negatively associated or insignificant.

Models 1 and 2 consider the influence of community in random and fixed-effects models, and Hausman tests suggest that the causality underlying these models is mutually consistent.14 The direction, size, and significance of the coefficients of Prior Statehood, Language, and Distance are similar, which gives us confidence that the same causality is present across space and time.

Models 3, 4, and 5 provide robustness checks. Model 3 reports a random effects model with a panel-specific autoregressive one-year process (Prais-Winsten transformation) and panel-corrected standard errors to deal with autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity respectively. The direction and significance of the key variables are nearly identical. Model 4 adds a lagged dependent variable to address autocorrelation in a fixed effects model. Model 5 explains change in the RAI with a first-difference model, which allows us to control for the growth of the population in a country’s distinctive communities relative to the population of the country as a whole. The results broadly confirm that it is the presence of distinctive community net of its relative change in population that shapes regional authority. Again, Distance is negative, while Language and Prior Statehood are positive.15

13 Results are consistent when using a year count or year dummies to address pressures of time in an unbalanced panel.
14 Area and Ethnic diversity are dropped for the Hausman test because they are constants (or in the case of Area, nearly constant).
15 The results are very similar for non-federal countries (see Table 6.A.1 in the Appendix to this chapter).
The effect of affluence is significant but modest. An increase in GDP per capita from US$1,000 to 10,000 per capita is predicted to raise regional authority, on average, by 1.5. Together, that is equivalent to expanding the regional portfolio by one or two policies. The effect for Supranational governance is consistently significant, though small. An increase in supranationalism equivalent to that in the European Union from before the Single European Act (i.e. 1985) to post-Maastricht (1993) is associated with an increase of 0.7 on the RAI, holding all other variables at their means.

Estimates for Population are inconsistent across the specifications in Table 6.3. The reason for this appears to lie in time. The functional pressures arising from the scale of a country’s population impact governance only over the long term. This would explain why the effect of Population is robust in cross-sectional analysis, which picks up long-term effects, but is erratic when we seek to model it over just a few decades. It may take a considerable time for an increase in population to manifest itself in structural reform. The median population for the countries we observe in 1950 is 6.6 million. In 2010 the median population for the same countries is 12.4 million. In cross-sectional analysis this would produce an increase in the RAI of just 1.5 (+/− 1.3). So even if one tracks population growth over six decades, its expected effect is small. Over time, scale can be considered a weak, but persistent, force. Imagine a die with a hundred sides showing the numbers 1 to 100. As the number of throws increases, so does one’s confidence that a particular number will come up. Over the short term, the effect of scale is indeterminate. In the long run it would be surprising if it did not make an imprint on governance.

Democracy in these models is consistently positive and significant. We expect democracy to act independently in reducing the cost of decentralization for central rulers while facilitating the efforts of distinctive communities to mobilize and gain allies. If so, a variable that interacts Democracy and Language will be positively signed to indicate that the impact of Language on regional authority increases when a country becomes more democratic. Similarly, a variable that interacts Democracy with Prior statehood will also be positive if prior statehood makes a greater impact on regional authority when a country becomes more democratic.

A region with prior statehood can threaten a dictatorial regime. The effect is limited to non-federal countries, i.e. countries where regions with a history of independence are few in number and weak in self-rule. But these regions have social resources that are difficult to coercively suppress. Acquiescence by a dictator to a demand for self-rule in a non-federal regime may signal weakness. During the Spanish Civil War General Franco targeted Catalonia and the “traitor provinces” Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia in the Basque country with particular virulence because they led the opposition against his Falangist coalition. After his victory, Franco stripped the territories of their centuries-old powers
and privilege. Democratic regimes, by contrast, are biased towards accommodation. So we expect that Prior statehood will be negative for non-federal countries because a dictator is disposed to curb regional authority when faced with a prior statehood region. In conjunction with the interaction term Democracy * Prior statehood, the constituent term Prior Statehood captures

Table 6.3. Time-series cross-section estimation for 81 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Regional Authority Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior statehoodt-1</td>
<td>0.283***</td>
<td>0.297***</td>
<td>0.127***</td>
<td>0.031***</td>
<td>0.032***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinct language</td>
<td>0.320***</td>
<td>0.326***</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>0.031***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>−0.426***</td>
<td>−0.449***</td>
<td>−0.143**</td>
<td>−0.034**</td>
<td>−0.043***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      |              |              |              |              |
| Δ Prior statehood    | 0.028        |              |              |              |
|                      | (0.034)      |              |              |              |
| Δ Distinct language  | 0.095**      |              |              |              |
|                      | (0.037)      |              |              |              |
| Δ Distance           | −0.188**     |              |              |              |
|                      | (0.083)      |              |              |              |
| Ethnic diversity     | −6.356       | 7.619***     |              |              |
|                      | (6.705)      | (2.062)      |              |              |
| Democracy            | 0.242***     | 0.243***     | 0.030**      | 0.021**      | 0.021**      |
|                      | (0.050)      | (0.051)      | (0.014)      | (0.008)      | (0.008)      |
| Populationt-1        | 0.104        | −0.136       | 5.643***     | 0.028        | 0.062        |
|                      | (1.564)      | (1.751)      | (0.470)      | (0.213)      | (0.211)      |
| Area                | 2.811**      | 1.086***     |              |              |
|                      | (1.364)      | (0.401)      |              |              |
| Per capita GDP       | 1.670*       | 1.751*       | 1.406***     | 0.420***     | 0.400***     |
|                      | (0.924)      | (0.984)      | (0.492)      | (0.138)      | (0.140)      |
| Supranational        | 0.139**      | 0.135**      | 0.038**      | 0.002        | 0.002        |
| governance           | (0.063)      | (0.064)      | (0.019)      | (0.008)      | (0.008)      |
| Tiers               | 0.960*       | 0.975*       | 1.586***     | 2.819***     | 2.466***     |
|                      | (0.540)      | (0.551)      | (0.165)      | (0.559)      | (0.519)      |
| ΔRAI               | 0.912***     | 0.090***     |              |              |
|                      | (0.015)      | (0.015)      |              |              |
| Constant            | −10.773***   | −6.682       | −25.482***   | −1.730***    | −1.803***    |
|                      | (3.935)      | (4.775)      | (2.380)      | (0.620)      | (0.618)      |
| Fixed effects        | No           | Yes          | No           | Yes          | Yes          |
| R² overall           | 0.57         | 0.47         | 0.21         | 0.99         | 0.02         |
| R² between           | 0.54         | 0.43         | 0.99         | 0.04         |              |
| R² within            | 0.58         | 0.58         | 0.93         | 0.13         |
| Wald chi²            | 514.3        | 840.1        |              |              |
| AIC                  | 3694         | 3694         | 3694         | 3694         | 3694         |

Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1) Random effects estimation with robust standard errors clustered by country; (2) Fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors clustered by country; (3) Random effects estimation with panel-specific autoregressive one-year process (Prais-Winsten transformation); (4) Fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors clustered by country using a lagged dependent variable; (5) Fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors clustered by country using a first-difference annual change in RAI (ΔRAI) as dependent variable.

Community, Scale, and Regional Governance
the conditional effect of a history of independence when democracy is absent (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). The interaction with democracy will be positive because democratic regimes tend to accommodate demands for self-governance on the part of distinctive communities.

Table 6.4 introduces interactive variables for Democracy * Prior statehood and Democracy * Language. Democracy * Language is positive and significant for the full sample and non-federal countries, suggesting that the impact of Language on the RAI increases as a country becomes more democratic. Democracy * Prior statehood is insignificant in all countries because most regions with a history of independence are in federal countries where they are merely part of the crowd. Where such regions stick out—i.e. in non-federal countries—they are a particular threat, and the constituent term is statistically significant and strongly negative. In non-federal countries a 1 percent increase in the proportion of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.4. Democracy, community, and regional reform</th>
<th>All countries (1)</th>
<th>Non-federal countries (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Regional Authority Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior statehood</td>
<td>0.123***</td>
<td>−0.139**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
<td>0.086***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>−0.145**</td>
<td>−0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior statehood * Democracy</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language * Democracy</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>7.680***</td>
<td>0.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>−0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>5.670***</td>
<td>4.163***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>1.082***</td>
<td>1.139***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP</td>
<td>1.490***</td>
<td>2.168***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational governance</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiers</td>
<td>1.589***</td>
<td>1.701***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−25.423***</td>
<td>−21.445***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi²</td>
<td>890.1</td>
<td>401.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3694</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p <.01. Random effects estimation with panel-specific autoregressive one-year process (Prais-Winsten transformation).
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

population living in a region with prior statehood decreases the RAI by around 0.14 point when Democracy is at zero.\textsuperscript{16} Taking the constituent and interactive terms together, we see that in non-federal countries Prior statehood has a positive effect on the RAI only in democracies. The more authoritarian the regime, the more negative the effect of prior independence on regional governance in the country as a whole.

Figure 6.3 shows the marginal effects of Democracy and its statistical significance over the range of values for Language or Prior statehood. Democracy plays some role in amplifying the effect of Language on the RAI in both the full sample and in non-federal countries. In the full sample (top-left), when 30 percent of the population lives in a linguistically distinct region, the expected RAI is 9.4 in an autocracy and 10.5 in a democracy. This difference is significant under the 65 percent confidence intervals in the graph, but only just. The 95 percent confidence intervals for these estimates are 8.1 to 10.8 for autocracy and 9.5 to 11.5 for democracy, so the effect is quite small. In the sample of non-federal countries (bottom-left), the equivalent estimates for the RAI when 30 percent of the population lives in language regions are 5.3 for autocracy and 7.9 for democracy. A difference greater than 2.5 on the RAI is substantively large and reaches statistical significance under 95 percent confidence intervals.\textsuperscript{17}

The marginal effects for Democracy $\times$ Prior statehood tell a different story. Here our expectations distinguish sharply between federal countries and non-federal countries. Federal countries are formed by previously independent units that come together under a single jurisdictional roof on the condition that they retain significant regional authority. In such countries, the effect of prior statehood on the RAI is chiefly given at birth. Democracy makes no appreciable difference for the effect of Prior statehood on the RAI in the full sample where around three-quarters of regions with prior statehood exist (Figure 6.3, chart at top-right). Not so in non-federal countries. Here we expect Democracy to be decisive in conditioning the effect of Prior statehood on regional governance. In the subsample of non-federal countries (bottom-right), the effect of Prior statehood is heavily conditioned by regime type. A democratic country in which no one lives in a region with prior statehood will have an estimated RAI of 5.5 compared to 9.9 if 40 percent of the population lives in such a region. The increase which amounts to more than four points is well within the 95 percent confidence bounds. In Italy and Spain 46 and 44 percent of the population, respectively, lives in regions with a history of independence.

\textsuperscript{16} We center Democracy in Models 1 and 2 in Table 6.4 to facilitate interpretation. This has no effect on the substantive predictions of the models (Brambor et al. 2006: 71). The mean level of Democracy for all country/years in the sample is 15.5 on a zero to 20 scale.

\textsuperscript{17} The 95 percent confidence intervals for Language at 30 percent and Democracy at minimum value are 4.0 to 6.6, and for Language at 30 percent and Democracy at maximum value are 6.8 to 9.0.
Figure 6.3. Language and prior statehood in democracies and autocracies

Note: The plots display marginal effects under controls (Table 6.4).
Predictive margins with 65% Cls

Population share in language regions (non-federal countries)

Autocracy
Democracy

Predictive margins with 65% Cls

Population share in prior statehood regions (non-federal countries)

Autocracy
Democracy

Figure 6.3. Language and prior statehood in democracies and autocracies (continued)
Autocracy has the opposite effect. Higher levels of Prior statehood reduce a country’s RAI, to the tune of 9.9 when one compares an authoritarian country with zero on Prior statehood with one in which 10 percent of the population lives in a region with Prior statehood. This may seem larger than life, but it accords with the history of regional governance in Indonesia, where four regions with a history of independence (Aceh, Banten, Yogyakarta, and Kalimantan Barat) encompass 9.7 percent of the population. Under Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime, which Polity scores as three (on our zero-to-20 scale) from 1967 to 1997, the RAI falls 8.1 points from 14.0 in 1958 to 5.9 in 1979. This is consistent with the observations of Indonesia experts, including Ed Aspinall (2009: 52), who writes: “The new government was... highly centralized. It gave local legislatures and administrators little scope to design policies reflecting local circumstances, and it became obsessed with the idea of national unity to the point of stressing uniformity.” The conflict was most violent in Aceh, where about 15,000 people died in armed struggle against a military led by a general who said he intended to eliminate the Free Aceh Movement “down to its roots” (Stepan 2013: 242). The movement’s founding document begins:

We, the people of Acheh, Sumatra, exercising our right of self-determination, and protecting our historic right of eminent domain to our fatherland, do hereby declare ourselves free and independent from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the island of Java. Our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent sovereign State since the world began.18

After a process of democratization, which is registered in a Polity score of 18 in 2004, the RAI for Indonesia rises to 20.7 in that year. When Suharto was forced out by street demonstrations in 1998, the incoming democratic government passed decentralization laws setting in motion “one of the world’s most ambitious decentralization policies” (Aspinall 2011; Malley 2009: 139). After this initial “big bang” decentralization, the Indonesian government conceded special autonomy to Aceh and Papua; it consented to independence for East Timor; and later extended Aceh’s autonomy (Bertrand 2007; Stepan, et al. 2011).

Conclusion

Distinctive territorial communities form only a part of a society, but a demand for self-rule on the part of a minority community can affect the society as a whole. Just one in twelve of the jurisdictions in the countries we observe are


145
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

geographically peripheral, have a history of independence, or have a population speaking a distinct language at home. Yet demands for self-rule by minority communities can trigger emulation, competitive mobilization, identity construction, and efforts on the part of the central government to quench separatism by standardizing self-rule and shared rule across the country. The bottom line is that minority communities can have an effect far beyond their weight in population. Friction in one part of a system may destabilize the whole.

Community, as we conceive it here, refers to three features that Stein Rokkan identified as key sources of territorial distinctiveness: geographical location, language, and jurisdictional history. Each may contribute to a sense of difference, but just two of these—linguistic and historical difference—have a tendency to spill over into demands for regional governance in the country as a whole.

Geographical isolation is the standard case of peripherality, but distant or isolated regions can be accommodated with self-rule without affecting territorial governance of a country. Small, isolated communities are an anomaly and are often treated as one of a kind. This has been the experience of the Azores, Madeira, Jeju, and Greenland, alongside indigenous communities in Latin America, Canada, and the United States.

Language regions and prior statehood regions that lie closer to the state’s core tend to be populous and have institutional resources. If not, they may never have resisted assimilation. Their size generates competition, emulation, and political conflict. The examples we discuss in this chapter along with the quantitative analysis suggest that these regions can have a powerful effect on country-wide territorial governance. Language regions do so in federal and non-federal countries alike, and all the more so as a country becomes democratic. The systemic effect of regions with prior statehood depends on whether they exist in a federal regime or not, and if not, the extent to which the regime is democratic or authoritarian.

Polities with prior statehood are the ingredients of classic federalism. Federalism transforms such polities into regions that share rule for the whole while sustaining extensive self-rule in their homelands. This is the great virtue of federalism. Federalism constitutionalizes the benefits of scale among regions that might otherwise find no angle of repose.

Regions with prior statehood are major sources of systemic change in non-federal countries. In authoritarian non-federal regimes, they can generate intense and enduring conflict. Territorial ethnicity can provide a basis for resistance even in a regime that has eliminated all other sources of resistance. The existence of a minority community with a history of independence may lead a dictator to centralize the country as a whole and to deny to all what he intends to deny to a few. This may result in violence. Aceh in Indonesia,
Catalonia in Spain, Mindanao in the Philippines, and Tatarstan in Russia resisted the centralizing ambitions of authoritarian rulers, and were violently punished by Suharto, Franco, Marcos, and Stalin. The analysis in this chapter finds that the presence of regions with prior statehood actually depresses regionalism in authoritarian regimes.

Perhaps nothing distinguishes a democracy from a dictatorship so much as its response to minority nationalism. Democracies are biased to the accommodation of regions with prior statehood, and the outcome is often to restructure governance in the country as a whole. There are several pathways. If one minority within a country asserts itself as a nation, the remaining groups may reconsider their own identities. A bid for more power on the part of one group may generate a spiral of competitive claims. National political parties may be drawn into the process as they compete for votes. Regionalist parties may grow; national parties may regionalize. Central rulers may seek to accommodate a minority by giving it self-rule or they may go further and offer regions a share of rule in the country as a whole.

An influential literature reveals how functional economic pressures affect the structure of governance. The size of a country’s population, the size of its territory, and the character of a government’s policy portfolio each have a diffuse, but persistent, effect on how a country is structured politically. However, a functionalist account tells only half of the story. The structure of governance is also determined by the communities that individuals form and how they think and act in relation to those communities. This chapter has probed far back in the chain of causality to generalize about how community affects governance. Patterns of human settlement, language use, and histories of political independence appear to have distinct and detectable effects on contemporary political structure.
Appendix

Table 6.A.1. Time-series cross-section estimation for non-federal countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Regional Authority Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior statehood, t−1</td>
<td>0.316***</td>
<td>0.317***</td>
<td>0.071***</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinct language, t−1</td>
<td>0.302***</td>
<td>0.313***</td>
<td>0.074***</td>
<td>0.019***</td>
<td>0.024***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance, t−1</td>
<td>−0.281</td>
<td>−0.324</td>
<td>−0.116</td>
<td>−0.015</td>
<td>−0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Δ \text{ Prior statehood}]</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Δ \text{ Distinct language}]</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.096*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Δ \text{ Distance}]</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.302</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>−8.522***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy, t−1</td>
<td>0.181***</td>
<td>0.184***</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.021**</td>
<td>0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, t−1</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.184*</td>
<td>4.164***</td>
<td>−0.018</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.402)</td>
<td>(1.091)</td>
<td>(0.536)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area, t−1</td>
<td>2.006*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.074***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.031)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP, t−1</td>
<td>1.862*</td>
<td>1.844*</td>
<td>1.839***</td>
<td>0.338**</td>
<td>0.314**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.977)</td>
<td>(1.091)</td>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational governance</td>
<td>0.140**</td>
<td>0.139*</td>
<td>0.046**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiers</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>0.945*</td>
<td>1.597***</td>
<td>2.925***</td>
<td>2.548***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.563)</td>
<td>(0.567)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.584)</td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[RAI, t−1]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−9.385***</td>
<td>−7.383</td>
<td>−20.220***</td>
<td>−1.293**</td>
<td>−1.366***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.049)</td>
<td>(5.244)</td>
<td>(2.517)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.499)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² overall</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² between</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² within</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi²</td>
<td>667.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>291.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>12855</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>6641</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>6581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Models: (1) Random effects estimation with robust standard errors clustered by country; (2) Fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors clustered by country; (3) Random effects estimation with panel-specific autoregressive one-year process (Prais-Winsten transformation); (4) Fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors clustered by country using a lagged dependent variable; (5) Fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors clustered by country using a first-difference annual change (Δ RAI) as dependent variable.
### Table 6.A.2. Operationalization of Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial community</td>
<td>Percentage of population in a country living in jurisdictions categorized as distant, linguistically different, or formerly independent. Sources: own coding following Rokkan and Urwin's conceptualization (1983; Flora et al. 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior statehood</td>
<td>Percentage of population living in jurisdictions that have a history of sovereign statehood for at least 30 years between 1200AD and 1950.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinct language</td>
<td>Percentage of population living in jurisdictions where a majority speaks a language different from the national language in 1950, or date of entry in dataset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Percentage of population living in jurisdictions that are an island, archipelago, or are noncontiguous and being at least 30 km from the mainland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>The probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to different ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups (averaged across these three properties). Source: Alesina et al. (2003); own coding for Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro using CIA World Facts (2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Polity2 values varying between –10 (authoritarian) and +10 (democratic), rescaled to 0–20. Source: Polity dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Annual population in 1000s and logged (10). Data from Penn World Tables 8.0 (Feenstra et al. 2013; Heston et al. 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Area in km² and logged (10). Data from Penn World Tables 8.0 (Feenstra et al. 2013; Heston et al. 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>Annual GDP per capita, real purchasing power parity at 2005 constant prices and logged (10) (Feenstra et al. 2013; Heston et al. 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government spending</td>
<td>General government expenditure from IMF statistics covering all countries except Kosovo and Cuba for 2010 (Dziobek et al. 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational governance</td>
<td>The product of: (a) delegation in a regional international organization of which a state is a member; and (b) the range of policies for which that regional international organization is responsible. Delegation is an annual measure from 1950 to 2010 of the agenda setting and final decision-making role of nonstate actors in the organization’s assembly, executive, general secretariat, court; the range of policies is an annual measure of the organization’s portfolio over one or more of 25 policy fields (Hooghe et al. forthcoming; Marks et al. 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiers</td>
<td>Measured as the annual change in the number of tiers. Source: RAI data (Hooghe et al. 2016).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.A.3. Descriptives of independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial community</td>
<td>14.96</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior statehood</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinct language</td>
<td>7.98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>5.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government expenditure 2010</td>
<td>37.45</td>
<td>38.89</td>
<td>11.46</td>
<td>14.58</td>
<td>65.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational governance</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in tiers</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** $n = 3775$ (except for general government expenditure (2010), where $n = 78$).
5

Five Theses on Regional Governance

A postfunctionalist theory goes beyond economic utilitarianism to stress the sociality of governance. In common with functionalists and neofunctionalists we explain the existence of multiple levels of governance as a response to functional pressures arising from the need to provide public goods at diverse scales. In common with constructivists we pay detailed attention to the sociality of governance, including the geographical, cultural, and historical sources of group distinctiveness and the demands on the part of minority communities for self-rule.

The premise of functionalism is that a phenomenon depends not on its internal character, but on its function—the role it plays—in the system of which it is part (Levin 2013). Governance, from a functionalist perspective, consists of institutions that can be explained by their effects, not their meaning for those affected. This undergirds an economic utilitarian approach to governance based on the assumption that society is composed of individuals with egocentric preferences who have a rational interest in creating government to provide themselves with public goods. The inputs in Alesina and Spolaore’s theory (2003) are income-maximizing utility functions over policy and the outputs are the level of taxes and policy provision in a jurisdiction.

This approach provides plausible explanations for a range of political phenomena including the allocation of policy responsibilities to jurisdictions at widely diverse population scales from the local to the global (Hooghe and Marks 2009a; Jensen, Koop, and Tatham 2014; Wildason 1996). The ladder of governance in Chapter One is a general implication of a functionalist approach to jurisdictional design. However, functionalist theorists have a thin understanding of individual preferences and their genesis. They ignore the question of where community and the desire for self-rule come from because they regard individuals as thinly rational beings, “disconnected singulars” (Wolin 1960: 246).

Postfunctionalism starts from the premise that jurisdictions are populated by groups of persons who may conceive a jurisdiction as an expression of their
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

Preferences over jurisdictional design depend on the groups that individuals conceive as politically relevant, their attachments to those groups, and the way in which they interpret the implications of those attachments.

Preferences over jurisdictions are intrinsic in the sense that people care about whether they have self-rule. Whereas functionalist explanations of governance explain it in terms of its effects, postfunctionalist explanations give causal weight to the emotional attachments that individuals have to the societies of which they are part. In the field of cognitive science this is the qualia problem. What is it like to have a particular mental state, to feel love or fear (Levin 2013; Nagel 1961)? The political scientist can ask the same question. What is it like to have this government rather than that government? What, for example, is the meaning that a US citizen attaches to the existence of the United States as a self-governing country, independent of that person’s preferences regarding its policies? Governance sustains individual and community reproduction by providing this group (but not that group) with the ability to make collectively binding decisions. Governance, in short, is the means by which a community gains a capacity for strategy.

Regional Governance Has Undergone a Quiet Revolution

The growth in regional governance since World War II amounts to a quiet revolution in the territorial structure of the state. It is quiet in that it is rarely constitutionalized and almost never catapults countries into full-blooded federalism. The quiet revolution transcends the unitary/federal distinction. Of the eighty-one countries that we observe, just one—Belgium—has become federal. Yet almost every non-federal country that is middle-sized or larger has been deeply affected. It has left its mark in East and West and in developed and developing countries. Federal countries have see-sawed on the regional authority index (RAI) with no aggregate trend. But non-federal countries with a population greater than ten million have been transformed.

We track twenty-three such countries in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Twenty of these countries experienced an increase in regional authority over the time we observe them. The three countries that buck the trend do not appear to augur a general move in the direction of centralization.2 The median

1 Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand; Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru.

2 Ecuador centralized when it abolished its second chamber representing regions. Cuba centralized under the Castro regime. Guatemala’s RAI score did not change when it decentralized local rather than regional government in response to indigenous mobilization.
country saw its RAI increase by 5.0. Eleven of these countries more than doubled their regional authority score. Entirely new regional tiers were created in twelve of the twenty-three countries.³

The quiet revolution changes the way one looks at governance. No longer can governance be conceived as a once-and-for-all choice about which fork to take in the road of state creation: federal or unitary. This was the fundamental decision in the life of a country that shaped all others. The divide between federal and non-federal countries has narrowed. Non-federal countries may, like federal countries, have multiple levels of governance, directly elected regional assemblies, and strong regional executives collecting taxes, borrowing on financial markets, with extensive policy portfolios not subject to central veto.

The key difference between a federal and a non-federal country lies not in the capacity of regions to rule themselves, but in their capacity to co-rule the country as a whole. Regions in federal countries are represented in country-wide second chambers in which they can co-determine national laws, including the distribution of national tax revenues. Many bargain directly with national governments over the budget and taxes. The greatest change has been in borrowing control. Today, most federations involve their constituent units in regulating and monitoring the polity’s public debt. In 1950, Australian states were the only regions with shared rule over borrowing. By 2010, they were joined by Argentine provinces, Austrian Länder, German Länder, Malaysian negeri, along with communities and regions in Belgium and comunidades in Spain, a quasi-federation.

In federal countries, the quiet revolution has been mostly centripetal, drawing constituent units into joint decision making. In non-federal countries, it has been mostly centrifugal, giving regions greater self-rule without compensating reforms that give them greater responsibility for the country as a whole. This partitions authority across the territories of a country, but does not recombine authority in joint decision making. It conveys central authority to the regions, but does not convey the regions to central authority.

In short, regions in federal countries are assimilated in the body politic in ways that are rarely available to regions in non-federal countries. The median self-rule in twelve federal countries is 14.4, compared to 12.2 in the twelve most regionalized non-federal countries. The median shared rule in these federal countries is 7.7, compared to 1.1 in the non-federal countries. Hence, shared rule accounts for three-quarters of the overall difference between the federal and non-federal countries in our dataset.⁴ The upshot is that the quiet revolution is heavily biased to self-rule in non-federal countries. Shared rule has barely shifted even in the larger non-federal countries. The median change

³ Not including Cuba and Peru, which abolished and established a regional tier.
⁴ We exclude Belgium from this comparison because it appears in both categories.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

on shared rule is zero for the twenty-three most populous non-federal countries, and the average has increased by less than one on the twelve-point aggregate scale for shared rule.

The changes we have mapped since World War II reverse a centuries-long process of centralization. The development of the national state from the twelfth century was a long, zig-zag process in which central states claimed and gradually gained a monopoly of legitimate coercion, creating national armies, national courts, national taxation systems, national health, national education, and national welfare. However, centralization reached its peak in the first half of the twentieth century. It has been superseded by an era of multilevel governance that began in the second half of the twentieth century.

Regional Governance Has Become Differentiated

Regional governance varies within as well as among countries. A one-size-fits-all approach has given way to a differentiated approach tailored to the demands and conditions of different regions within a country. At stake are not just the policies that are provided to different jurisdictions, but something far more important—the authority to determine their own laws.

In 2010, twenty-four of the forty-eight countries we track since 1950 had differentiated regional governance, up from sixteen at the beginning of the period. Jurisdictional reforms targeted at particular regions constitute 59 percent of all reforms. In 1950 the predominant form of differentiated governance was dependency, direct rule from the center. In 2010, the predominant forms were autonomy, a bilateral arrangement with the center giving a region additional self-rule, and asymmetry, in which a region is distinguished from its tier by having both more self-rule and more shared rule. While the number of dependent regions declined from thirty-four to four from 1950 to 2010, the number of autonomous regions increased from fifteen to forty-one, and the number of asymmetric regions increased from three to eighteen. Standardized governance has given way to differentiated governance.

The quiet revolution in governance has produced a mosaic of regional forms. Regions are differentiated in myriad ways. The Faroe Islands can join (or exit) international treaties without Danish consent. Mindanao in the Philippines has authority over Sharia courts. Only indigenous Papuans can stand for election in Indonesia’s Papua. German has equal official status with Italian in Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, and every civil servant must take a bilingualism test. Nicaragua’s Autonomous Regions of the North and South Atlantic have a judicial system that follows Miskitu practice. Mount Athos in Greece has a theocratic government.
Five Theses on Regional Governance

There are about as many possibilities as there are differentiated regions. Yet, the net result draws one to reassess the meaning of stateness. The changes documented here and in Volume I of this study undermine essentialist conceptions of the state. They do this from the inside, by creating institutional possibilities that question the idea that a state imposes the same laws throughout its territory. In short, comparing countries tells us less and less about how populations living within them rule themselves. Conventional definitions of stateness emphasizing sovereignty and a monopoly of legitimate coercion are the wrong place to begin an inquiry into governance.

If differentiated regions were merely half-way houses on the path to independent statehood, then we would be witnessing a spin-off process in which nation-states replicate themselves. The national state, based on the principle of fit between the nation and the state, would be consolidated, albeit in smaller parcels. But once one relaxes the assumption that differentiated regions are inherently secessionist, it becomes clear that they challenge the national state in a more fundamental way. Differentiated regions have some state-like qualities, but they exist within states. Most exercise authority over broad areas of policy, including economic development, communications infrastructure, and local government. Most manage their own police force, control entry into civil service jobs within their territory, and run their own state schools, including the language of instruction.

If the national state was the only meaningful solution to the aspiration for national self-rule, then territorially concentrated minority groups within states would be confronted with an all-or-nothing choice: leave or stay. Differentiated regions are interesting precisely because they raise a set of possibilities about the co-existence of territorial communities that escape “either/or.” The secessionist dream of a perfect fit between nation and state is a chimera. After all, most break-away states also contain territorially concentrated minorities. Differentiated regions are compromises that relax the premise that a state exerts uniform authority over its population. Differentiation negates the nationalist doctrine of symmetry between nation and state.

Regional Governance Grows with Affluence

People in affluent societies want policies that are best provided at widely diverse scales. The primary functions of government prior to the twentieth century were to provide security, law, and economic exchange, all of which were chiefly national. Total government spending in fourteen economically advanced societies in the late nineteenth century averaged less than 11 percent. In 1960 government spending had increased to 28 percent, and by 1996...
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

It was 45 percent (Funk and Gathmann 2011; Lindauer 1988). The bulk of the increase has resulted from the expansion of government responsibilities for policies that have diverse externalities and economies of scale. The consequence is a long-term trend towards multilevel governance, including governance at the regional level.

In most countries, military spending has fallen sharply since World War II and it has continued to decline as a proportion of government spending in recent decades. The Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database tracks twenty countries in the RAI dataset from 1988 to 2014, and of these only Colombia has seen an increase in military spending.

This has been balanced by a rapid and unparalleled extension of public competences in welfare, health, education, and the environment, policies that tend to involve regional and local authorities (Agranoff 2014; Charbit 2011; Loughlin 2007b; Sharpe 1993). Health, education, and social security are now the most important expenditure categories for subnational government (Osterkamp and Eller 2003; see also Braun 2000; Kleider 2014; Ter-Minassian 1997).

Central states persisted as predominant purveyors of public goods because conflicts among them made military security a chief concern. The decline in interstate war since World War II, along with the diversification of the policy portfolio, have contributed both to the rise of international governance among states and decentralization within them.

Most policies that have mushroomed over the past half-century are multilevel. Many environmental issues require coordination across governance actors at different scales (Weibrust and Meadowcroft 2014). Summarizing her decades-long research on common pool resources, Elinor Ostrom and her co-authors stress that “no fixed spatial or temporal level is appropriate for governing ecosystems and their services sustainably, effectively, and equitably. We point to the need to recognize the multilevel nature of such problems and the role of institutions in facilitating cross-level environmental governance” (Brondizio, Ostrom, and Young 2009: 253). An interdisciplinary literature has grown up around the need for multilevel governance in climate change, “a ‘super-wicked issue’ [Lazarus 2009] that does not respect geographical boundaries or institutional structures” (Bache and Flinders 2015a: xxii; 2015b).

Like environmental policy, health policy is scale diverse. A study of twenty-eight European countries finds that thirteen of sixteen health care policy

US scholars of federalism stressed from the early 1940s that it made little sense to compartmentalize policies in separate tiers (D. Wright 1974: 16; 1988). Joseph McLean coined the term “marble cake federalism” to describe a system in which policy is routinely coordinated across governments at different scales (Grodzins 1966; D. Wright 1974:7; see also Elazar 1991). A similar phenomenon has been detected in non-federal states (Bakvis and Brown 2010; Bakvis and Chandler 1987; Blom-Hansen 1999; Bolleyer 2009; V. Wright 1979).
functions involve some decentralization: “Responsibility for pharmaceuticals, framework legislation, and most finance lodges at the highest levels of government, acute and primary care at the regional level, and provision at the local and regional levels” (Adolph, Greer, and Massard da Fonseca 2012: 1595). However, the sixteen functions identified by Adolph et al. are far from homogenous. A comprehensive coding breaks health policy into 192 sub-areas. Many of these sub-areas contain policies that are themselves diverse and require collaboration across levels of governance. For example, the “construction of hospitals” usually involves governments at multiple levels, as do “providing . . . personnel . . . in underserved areas,” and “nurse training.”

Scale diversity arises from heterogeneity of context even when there is little heterogeneity of preferences (Henderson et al. 2013). The provision of elderly care should match individual caretakers to elderly persons in low-density rural areas as well as to elderly living in close proximity to services. An active labor market policy should retrain unemployed textile workers, engineers, or automobile workers to meet the particular demands of regional labor markets. Health care needs to be adjusted to the needs of those living in different regions. For example, the prevalence of reported heart disease for people living in Nova Scotia in Canada is almost twice that for those living in Alberta (Chow et al. 2005: 24). Such differences, which tend to be even greater in less developed societies, underpin regional strategies for health care provision. Even when patient preferences do not vary much from region to region, health care practice can vary considerably (Barnato et al. 2007; O’Hare et al. 2010).

From a public goods perspective, states are both too large and too small: too large because they encompass heterogeneous contexts that are best served by local jurisdictions; too small because they cannot encompass the efficient scale for providing non-rival goods, including market exchange, security, and a sustainable environment. This has produced new bottles as well as new wine. Jurisdictional architecture has come to resemble the ladder of governance depicted in Chapter One in which authority is dispersed across several jurisdictional levels at increasing population scales from the local to the global.

Regional Governance is Social

Regional governance is about who rules whom. The first thing that must be confronted in deciding who rules whom is the allocation of authority. What are the boundaries of the polity? Which group gets the most precious good of

---

6 Available at <http://www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook>.
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

all—the power that controls all other powers—namely, a capacity for governance? This is the Who Question, and in the field of human relations it is prior to all others. It is the master question that precedes rules for making collective decisions and selecting leaders. It lies at the core of much conflict among peoples, and in this book we argue that it is decisive for territorial politics within the state. Whereas efficiency lies far back in the causal chain leading to jurisdictional reform, the demand for self-rule on the part of a minority community can have a direct effect. Contestation about the boundaries of the polity has a way of upstaging contestation about policy.

In western democracies following World War II, demands for self-governance appeared to be settled, but they merely lay dormant. The “German Question,” which dominated Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century and the world in the first half of the twentieth century, suppressed discourse about ethnicity following World War II. But the effect was temporary. Demands for self-rule on the part of groups who conceive themselves as peoples have been a major source of territorial reform over the past sixty years.

Within states, peripheral groups are most liable to demand self-rule. Geographical isolation, linguistic distinctiveness, and a history of independence can lead members of a group to see themselves as a people entitled to self-rule. Some peripheral communities divide the world into “them” and “us” and resent the rule of those they regard as foreign. The geo-historical bases for such identities are especially strong in Europe and Asia. Territorially concentrated ethnic minorities are less common in Latin America, though in recent decades Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela have seen the mobilization of indigenous communities demanding self-rule.

We find that the form peripherality takes is decisive. A peripheral community that sustains distinctiveness by virtue of distance or isolation tends to be small in size. The region may be arid, mountainous, poor in resources, or simply difficult to access. The population is spread very thinly over a great area or is compressed within an island or archipelago. Many such regions were dependencies, ruled from the center, but almost all have gained some form of self-rule over the past half-century. This has little effect on governance beyond the region. The distance that sustains distinctiveness also reduces political salience. Other regions regard them neither as a model nor as a competitor. Their small population lowers the stakes in self-rule. They are regarded as an exception that does not threaten the integrity of the country as a whole. And their small population makes full independence less enticing if it inflicts a serious lack of scale in the provision of public goods.

Peripherality without distance requires power. To sustain a distinct people in the proximity of the center requires embedded institutions and a population large enough to resist assimilation. But for the accidents of history, the Basque
Five Theses on Regional Governance

Country, Catalonia, Flanders, Kalimantan (Borneo), Kurdistan, Mindanao, Quebec, Scotland, and Tatarstan could now be independent states. Each has distinctive institutions, and in most cases, distinctive forms of speech. All were, at some time in the past, independent states with the capacity to make their own laws. These regions contain a non-negligible share of the entire population of their respective countries. Full independence would seriously truncate the host state.

In the functional-utilitarian model, those living in a region will demand self-rule when their policy preferences are different from those in the rest of the country. Yet, this is not the case in Scotland, where the Labour party continues to represent the left-leaning policy preferences of a large proportion of voters. In the 2015 general election, the Scottish National Party explicitly modeled its policy proposals on those of the Labour party. The premise was that Scottish voters would prefer to be represented in Westminster by a Scottish rather than a British political party.

Such regions have systemic effects for the countries in which they are located. The transformation is sharp in Britain, once a bastion of democratic class conflict. As the bases of traditional class conflict have eroded, territorial issues have become more salient. The motive force is Scottish nationalism, and it has shaken up Britain as a whole. English nationalism has come to the fore not just in opposition to Europe, but in a preference for expressly English political institutions, including most recently an English national anthem. Support for beefing up the Welsh assembly has also grown over the past decade.\(^7\) Diagnosing an “ever looser union,” Charlie Jeffery (2013: 326) observes that “broad-based discontent over current governing arrangements signifies the emergence, in nascent and as yet rather unfocused form, of an English political community.” A recent attempt to draw lessons from the 2015 general election (Kenny and Pearce 2015: 7) comes to the conclusion that Britain:

\[\ldots\text{is now fundamentally broken up in geopolitical terms}\ldots\]

\[^7\text{In 1997, just over half of those questioned in Wales were in favor of a continued shift of authority, including tax powers, to a Welsh assembly. By 2013 this had risen to around two-thirds. }\langle \text{http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-politics-21602742}\rangle.\]

When community comes into play, regional governance involves not just an issue, but the underlying structure of contestation. Mobilization for self-rule on the part of a core region can affect which issues come to the surface in the
Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

society as a whole. Regional governance raises communitarian issues that are associated with a dimension of contestation hinging on nationalism, territorial governance, and immigration. These issues are only weakly related to left-versus-right conflict concerning the distribution of income, welfare, and the role of the state. Whereas class conflict divided society along functional lines, regional governance divides society along territorial lines (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Whereas class conflict was instrumental in constructing national states, conflict over regional self-rule produces new lines of conflict and identity formation that can fragment national states.

Regional Governance is Democratic

Regional governance and democracy engage entirely different questions. Regional governance responds to the Who Question: who gets to form a polity? Democracy responds to the How Question: how are decisions made in a polity? Democracy says nothing about the territorial structure of governance; regional governance says nothing about how decisions are made within regions. Yet democracy provides a key to the rise of self-governing regions over the past half century.

It is precisely because democracy is silent about who should exercise self-rule that it allows groups that have some special social nexus—rooted in language, remoteness, or sense of shared history—to demand and receive special treatment. The democratic principle, the expressed will of the people and the defense of minority rights, requires a prior determination of the people and this is external to the democratic principle. Democracy combines diffidence about the ingredients of a people with a pluralist bias towards accommodation of group demands, and this has opened the door to regional governance.

Hence, democracy intensifies the effects of community for regional governance. Democracy diminishes the cost of political mobilization on the part of those who desire self-rule and multiplies the points at which they can access decision makers. Whereas autocrats rule by denying others the right, democratic leaders can retain rule by shifting authority out of their own hands if that wins them support.

The transition of an authoritarian regime to a democracy unleashes pent up pressures. The breakup of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia are cases in point (Lapidus 1992: 48ff). If the authoritarian regime has suppressed ethnic groups, these may secede.

As in Central and Eastern Europe, regionalization in Latin America and Southeast Asia closely tracks democracy. The dip in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America corresponds to the authoritarian turn in all but a handful of
countries. Of twenty-one countries, only Costa Rica has not experienced authoritarian rule in the past sixty years. The onset of democratization came later in Southeast Asia, and this is reflected in the fact that regionalization began in earnest only in the early 1990s.

When authority is conveyed to regional institutions in a democracy there is a presumption that citizens should have some say. The phenomenon of regional elections has swept across the democratic world in recent decades. The largest shift among the ten dimensions on which we measure regional authority has been the creation and empowerment of regional assemblies and executives. The median increase on this four-point scale is 2.0, which is equivalent to introducing directly elected assemblies across a regional tier. In 1950, elections for regional legislatures were part of the federal package and unusual beyond. The incidence of regional elections in federal countries was 90 percent and in non-federal countries it was 36 percent. By 2010, the incidence among non-federal countries had risen to 59 percent. The change took place chiefly in the larger non-federal democracies. By 2010, 82 percent of democracies with a population greater than ten million had regional as well national elections.8

Those who mobilize for self-rule express communitarian claims about the right of a people to self-rule, claims that are no different in kind from those made by central rulers when they speak about their national state. On what basis can one say that an ethnic group with majority support in their homeland should not collectively exercise authority over their lives?9 On what grounds can those in a democracy say, “We have a right to self-rule, but you have not that right.” The counter argument usually takes a pragmatic form. It seeks to counter appeals for self-government “here” in the homeland by pointing out that taxes would be higher or that welfare would be thinner. In short, it appeals to the benefits of scale in the provision of public goods.

The Scottish government begins its argument for Scottish independence with the following statement:

The referendum is a choice between two futures for Scotland. We can choose independence, which will put Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands, or we can leave big decisions on Scotland’s economy and the future shape of our society in the hands of Westminster. We believe independence is the right choice for

8 The exceptions are Chile, Guatemala, and Portugal.
9 The Declaration of sovereignty and of the right to decide of the Catalan nation adopted by the Parliament of Catalonia in 2013 begins with the statement: “The people of Catalonia, during the course of their history, have democratically demonstrated their collective desire to govern themselves, with the objective to advance their development, their well-being, and provide equal opportunity to all citizens, while reinforcing their culture and collective identity” (translated by Xavier Macià). <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Declaration_of_sovereignty_and_of_the_right_to_decide_of_the_Catalan_nation> 7/13/2015>.
Scotland because it is better for you and your family if decisions about Scotland are taken by the people who care most about Scotland: the people who live and work here. ¹⁰

The response from Better Together is that this would be costly: “In the future Scotland’s prosperity will be strengthened by keeping the British connection. We need more growth, more jobs, and more prosperity in Scotland. We don’t need uncertainty, instability, and barriers for our businesses.”¹¹

Democracy provokes the desire for separation, but it takes away the performance. ¹² It provides opportunity for separatist movements and at the same time opens the possibility for accommodation. Our evidence provides many cases of regional empowerment, but no case of complete separation in a consolidated democracy. ¹³ Several democracies contain regions in which there is considerable support for full independence. These include Aceh, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Flanders, Greenland, Mindanao, Puerto Rico, Quebec, and Scotland. But even if several of these regions were to break away, it would still be true to say that consolidated democracies commonly disperse territorial authority, but rarely break apart. Our hunch is that the former is the reason for the latter.

¹¹ The Better Together website no longer exists. The campaign arguments can be accessed at <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/03/04/against-scottish-independence-no-vote_n_4895582.html>.
¹² To paraphrase Macbeth’s porter.
References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


Frederick Smith Carney. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

Amat, Francesc, and Albert Falco-Gimeno. 2014. “The Legislative Dynamics of Political
Decentralization in Parliamentary Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(6):
820–50.

Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of

Anderson, George, ed. 2012. *Internal Markets and Multi-level Governance: the Experience of
the European Union, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States*. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

asc41.com/code%20of%20ethics%20copies/APSA_ethicsguideweb.pdf>.

Diversity in Spain.” In Alberto Lopez-Basaguren and Leire Escajedo San Epifanio (eds), *The Ways of Federalism in Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial


Firms.” In *Contributions to Scientific Research in Management*, 9–18. Los Angeles:
UCLA, Western Data Processing Center.

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1991. “Scale Returns in Communication and Elite Control of Organiza-

Arzaghi, Mohammed, and J. Vernon Henderson. 2005. “Why Countries are Fiscally

Aspinall, Edward. 2009. *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia*. Stan-


Atanasova, Gorica, and Ian Bache. 2010. “Europeanization and F.Y.R. Macedonia:

Auffhammer, Maximilian, and Richard T. Carson. 2009. “Exploring the Number of First
Order Political Subdivisions Across Countries: Some Stylized Facts.” *Journal of

Axelrod, Robert. 1997. “The Dissemination of Culture: a Model with Local Conver-

University Press.

Bache, Ian, and Matthew Flinders, eds. 2015a. *Multi-Level Governance: Essential Readings,
References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

References


d’Antonio, Simone. 2014. “‘Metropolitan Cities’ are Born in Italy.” Available at <http://citiscope.org/story/2014/metropolitan-cities-are-born-italy>


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


172
References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


References

Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

References


Community, Scale, and Regional Governance

Index

Aarebrot, Frank H. 101
Abrucio, Fernando Luiz 33
Adcock, Robert 27, 28
Adolph, Christopher 157
Agnew, John 18
Agranoff, Robert 34, 104, 124, 156
Aldrich, Howard E. 11
Alesina, Alberto 6, 8, 16, 67, 72, 83, 126, 133, 151
Althusius, Johannes 29
Altman, David 35, 59
Amat, Francesc 35
Amoretti, Ugo 30
Andean Community 15, 134
Anderson, Benedict 69, 96
Anderson, George 30
Anthony, Denise L. 157
Arbós Marin, Xavier 114
Argentina 13, 32–3, 49, 51, 55–6, 62, 118, 129–30; Mendoza 13; Tierra del Fuego 137
Aristotle 7, 8, 17
Arretche, Marta 26
Arriba, Ana 18
Arrow, Kenneth J. 9
Arzaghi, Mohammed 25, 126
Aspinall, Edward 49, 125, 145
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 134
Atanasova, Gorica 82
Aten, Bettina 133
Auffhammer, Maximilian 67
Australia 56, 58, 62, 105–6, 117–18, 129–30, 153; Northern Territory 105, 118
Axelrod, Robert 68
Bache, Ian 18, 82, 156
Bäck, Hanna 35
Bäck, Henry 35
Bakvis, Herman 111, 156
Balayan, Nikolay 113
Baquir, Reza 67, 126
Barberà, Oskar 124
Barker, Alex 16
Barnato, Amber E. 157
Barrio, A. 124
Bauer, Michael W. 82
Bebbington, Anthony 113–14
Beck, Nathaniel 138
Bednar, Jenna 30
Benelux 14–15
Benz, Arthur 30, 104
Bermend, Pablo 30
Bermeo, Nancy 30
Bernhard, Helen 18
Bernhard, Michael 35, 59
Bertrand, Jacques 34, 125, 145
Bevir, Mark 18
Beyers, Jan 35
Bezuijen, Jeanine 133
Biggs, Michael 69–70
Bird, Richard M. 33
Block, Ned 15
Blom-Hansen, Jens 51, 156
Bochsler, Daniel 124
Boode, Derk 69
Bogdanor, Vernon 124
Bollen, Kenneth 38
Bolleyer, Nicole 30, 111, 156
Bonett, Douglas C. 47
Börzel, Tanja A. 82
Bosnia-Herzegovina 45, 128, 132
Bounds, Andrew 123
Brambor, Thomas 141–2
Brandt, Dawn 25
Branch, Jordan 70
Braun, Dietmar 156
Brazil 33, 45, 49, 51, 56, 58, 61–2, 104, 117, 128–30, 132; Brasilia 109
Brenner, Neil 18
Breuss, Fritz 10
Briggs, Stephen 9
Index

Brondizio, Eduardo S. 156
Broschek, Jorg 30, 104
Brown, Douglas 111, 156
Brown, John Murray 123
Brunazzo, Marco 49, 95
Brusis, Martin 88, 124
Bruszt, Lazlo 85
Budge, Ian 25
Bulgaria 58, 63, 129–30
Burgess, Michael 30
Burgoon, Brian 15, 149
Burke, Edmund 71
Bynum, Julie P.W. 157
Cairns, Alan C. 112
Camões, Pedro 67
Campbell, Tim 25
Caramani, Daniele 19, 22, 72, 83
Caribbean Community 134
Caricom 15
Carmichael, Paul 67
Carr, Robert 85
Carson, Richard T. 67
Carter, Matthew 67
Casella, Alessandra 11
Cassese, Sabino 95
Ceka, Besir 15, 133, 149
Central American Integration System 134
centralization 1, 4, 6, 8–9, 11, 16, 19, 30–4, 45–52, 56–62, 66, 73, 85, 88, 90–1, 95, 100, 108, 126–7, 136, 145–7, 152, 154
Chandler, William M. 156
Chandra, Kanchan 67
Chang, Chun-Shu 29, 69
Chang, Hasok 38
Chapman Osterkatz, Sandra 27, 39, 49, 114
Charbit, Claire 51, 156
Chebankova, Elena 113
Chhibber, Pradeep 124
Chile 34, 49, 50, 58, 63, 69, 79–80, 88–9, 96, 98, 129–30, 152, 161; Easter Island 81; Santiago 88–9
China 13, 26, 29
Chow, Chi-Ming 157
Chuman, Mizuki 113
Clark, William Roberts 141–2
Clegg, Thomas 83, 85
Colino, Cesar 104
Collier, David 27, 28
Colombia 61, 63, 105, 107–8, 115, 118, 129–30, 152, 156, 158; Bogotá 118
Commonwealth of Independent States 134
Condorcet, Jean-Louis 70
Connor, Walker 19
Coppedge, Michael 35, 59
Corntassel, Jeff 108
Costa Rica 45, 48–50, 58, 63, 128–30, 161
Cox, Nicholas J. 46
Crouch, Colin 10
Curtis, Amber K. 18
Czech Republic 50–1, 58, 63, 79, 98, 128–30, 152
Czechoslovakia 162
d'Antonio, Simone 51
dahl, Robert A. 10, 29
dahl-Fitjar, Rune 73
Dardanelli, Paolo 124
de Leeuw, Jan 34
De Rynck, Filip 49
De Rynck, Stefaan 49
De Winter, Lieven 123
Debus, Marc 35
Dellmuth, Lisa M. 82
denmark 49–50, 63, 68, 79, 98, 101, 106–7, 117, 129–30, 137; Copenhagen 20; Faroe Islands 20, 51, 68, 105–6, 154; Greenland 20, 24, 51, 80, 101, 103, 107, 117, 146, 162; Nuuk 20
erderyn, Svét 133
Deschouwer, Kris 114
Deutsch, Karl 9, 21, 68, 73, 75
Devleeschauwer, Arnaud 133
Dietz, Henry A. 119
differentiated governance 2, 4, 7, 18–19, 23, 26, 34, 52–5, 59–61, 66, 68, 80, 97, 101–21, 154–5
Dobre, Ana Maria 82, 125
Dominican Republic 58, 63, 129–30; Santo Domingo 118
Donas, Tom 35
Donovan, Linda 157
dowding, Keith 9
Durose, Catherine 53
Easterly, William 67, 72, 83, 133
Eaton, Kent 33, 34, 49, 90
Eckstein, Harry 29
Ecuador 45, 63, 69, 106, 117–18, 128–30, 152, 158; Galápagos Islands 20, 24, 106, 117–18, 137

190
Index

Eichenberger, Reiner 11
El Salvador 45, 49–50, 58, 63, 129–30
Elazar, Daniel J. 26, 29, 33, 35, 104, 156
Elder, Stuart 18
Elliott, Markus 10, 15, 155
Enderlein, Henrik 18, 31
Englebert, Pierre 18
Erk, Jan 30
Ersson, Svante 35
Errson, Svante 35
Ertugal, Ebru 82, 125
Esman, Milton J. 90
Estonia 63, 122, 129–30
European Union 12, 14–16, 24, 46, 53, 81–3, 88, 95, 99, 101, 134, 137, 139
Ezcurra, Roberto 35

Faguet, Jean-Paul 6, 136
Falcó-Gimeno, Albert 35
Falleti, Tulia 30, 33, 35, 57
Federalism 22, 29–31, 35, 104–5, 111, 124, 127, 146, 152, 156
Fenstra, Robert C. 133
Fehr, Ernest 18
Filippov, Michael 124
Finland 48, 50, 63, 79, 98, 106, 115–16, 129–30; Åland Islands 20, 81, 101, 105–6; Kainuu 114–16
Fischbacher, Urs 18
Fish, Steven 35, 59
Fisher, Elliott S. 30
Gabaix, Xavier 67
Gallagher, Patricia M. 157
Gallarín, Juan A.R. 34, 124
Galton, Sir Francis 96
Garman, Christopher 33, 124
Gathmann, Christina 156
Gellner, Ernest 18
Germany 22, 48–9, 56, 63, 128–30; Bavaria 22; Berlin 48; Bremen 48; Hamburg 48
Gerring, John 35, 38, 59
Gey, Benny 6
Gibson, Edward 33
Giraudy, Agustina 49
Giuliano, Elise 113

Goertz, Gary 30
Golder, Matt 141–2
Goldman, Philip 122
Goldsmit, Michael J. 26
Gómez-Reino, Margarita 123
Gordon, Claire 82, 85, 88
Greece 21, 49–51, 63, 79, 82, 93, 95, 98, 106, 129–30, 152, 154; Aegean Islands 95; Attica 95; Crete 95; the Dodecanese 21, 81, 95; Epirus 95; Ionian Islands 95; Lesbos 21; Samos 21; Thessaly 95
Green, Elliott 67
Greer, Scott 157
Groth, Morton 156
Guatemala 55, 58, 63, 129–30, 152, 161

Haggard, Stephan 33, 124, 127
Hahn, Gordon M. 113
Haider-Markel, Donald 30
Hailpern, Susan M. 157
Haiti 58, 63, 79, 98, 129–30
Hale, Henry E. 123
Hallerberg, Mark 57
Hanssen, Gro Sandkjæer 114
Harbers, Imke 33
Harper, Timothy Norman 90–1
Headrick, Barbara 10
Heeager, Anne 51
Henderson, Ailsa 157
Henderson, J. Vernon 25, 126
Hendriks, Frank 26
Hennessy, Elizabeth 118
Heper, Metin 125
Henry, M. Brooke 157
Heston, Alan 133
Hicken, Allen 35, 59
Hлепас, Николаус-К. 49
Hobbes, Thomas 5, 6, 8, 16
Holzinger, Katharina 53
Hombrook, Angustias 104, 111
Honduras 45, 55, 58, 63, 129–30
Hooghe, Liesbet 10, 11, 12, 18, 27, 30, 37, 39, 57, 67, 90, 114, 123–4, 127, 133, 151–2
Hoogland DeHoog, Ruth 9
Hopkin, Jonathan 33, 124
Horowitz, Donald 95, 104
Hotzby, Caroline 67, 126
Hoyman, Michele Mata 118
Hughes, James 82, 85, 88
Hume, David 70
Humphreys Bebbington, Denise 113–14
Hungary 49–50, 63, 79, 98, 129–30

Iceland 48–9, 55, 63, 129–30
Ilchenko, M.S. 113, 123
Illanes, Ignacio 90
Index

India 13, 26
Indonesia 20, 34, 49, 51, 53, 58, 61, 63, 79, 88, 94–6, 98, 101, 106–7, 123, 125, 129–30, 132, 145–6, 152, 154, 162; Aceh 109, 123, 125, 145–6, 162; Banten 145; Borneo 96, 159; Celebes 96; East Java 96; East Timor 63, 129–30, 162; Jakarta 118, 145; Java 95–6, 123; Java Timur 123; Kalimantan Barat 95, 123, 149, 159; Lesser Sunda Isles 96; Moluccas 95; New Guinea 20; Papua 20, 34, 53, 105–7, 145, 154; Sumatra (Central and North) 95–6, 145; Yogyakarta 53, 94–6, 101, 106, 123, 145
Inklaar, Robert 133
Inman, Robert P. 126
Inter-American Development Bank 33
Ioannides, Yannis M. 67
Israel 45, 55, 58, 63, 93, 95, 98, 106–7, 128, 129–30, 132, 142, 152; Sicily 81; Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 60, 106–7, 154; Valle d’Aosta 20, 106
Jackson, Jean E. 108
Jaggers, Keith 59, 132
Japan 58, 63, 95, 129–30, 152
Jeffery, Charlie 157, 159
Jensen, Mads D. 151
Jespov, Bob 18
Johansen, Helen 157
John, Peter 9
Johnson, Boris 124
Jolly, Seth 133
Jones, Martin 18
Jones, Richard Wyn 157
Kahn, Jeffrey 113
Kaiser, Kai 33
Kaká, László 49
Katz, Jonathan N. 138
Keating, Michael 35, 49, 114
Keeble, David 10
Keman, Hans 25
Kenny, Michael 159
Keohane, Robert O. 12, 38
Keuffe, Nicholas 26
Kincaid, John 30
King, Gary 38
Kleider, Hanna 156
Klein, Herbert 136
Koch, Menfred 9
Kölliker, Alkuin 53
Kollman, Kenneth 30, 33, 124
Konrad, Kai K. 6
Koop, Christel 151
Kosovo 62–3, 106, 109, 129–30, 133, 149, 162
Kraus, Franz 19, 22, 72, 83
Kroenig, Matthew 35, 59
Krugman, Paul 67
Kuebler, Daniel 26
Kuhnle, Stein 22, 73
Kurat, Sergio 133
Kyracou, Andreas P. 35
Ladner, Andreas 26
Laffan, Bridgid 82
Laitin, David D. 21, 22, 74, 131
Lake, David 29, 67
Landefeld, J. Stephen 154
Lane, Jan-Erik 35
Lapidus, Gail 122, 160
Larson, Eric B. 157
Latvia 50, 63, 79, 98, 122, 129–30, 137
Lawson, Clive 10
Lazarus, Richard J. 156
le Gales, Patrick 10
Leff, Carol Skalnik 33
Lemhriere, Max 53
Lenz, Tobias 15, 133, 149
Leonardi, Robert 95
Levin, Janet 15, 151–2
Lidström, Anders 26
Lijphart, Arend 91
Lindauer, David L. 156
Lindberg, Staffan I. 35, 59
Linz, Juan J. 30, 111, 125, 127, 145
Lipset, Seymour Martin 160
Lithuania 50, 63, 79, 98, 122, 129–30
Llamazares, Ivan 57, 124
Lloret Feijoo, Maria del Carmen 33
Loikkanen, Heiki 116
Long, Scott 83
Loughlin, John 26, 30, 49, 156
Lowery, David 9
Lownes, Vivien 53
Luxembourg 14–15, 48–9, 55, 63; Echternach 13–14
Lynch, Peter 123–4
Lyons, W.E. 9
Macedonia 50, 63, 79, 86, 88, 98, 129–30
Macià, Xavier 161
Macleod, Gordon 18
Maddens, Bart 123–4
Madrid, Raúl 108
Mahoney, Angela 67
Malaba, Pamela 101
Malaysia 20, 22, 33, 45, 53, 56, 59, 63, 68, 79, 90, 92, 98, 105–6, 109, 116–17, 128–30, 135, 153, 162; Johor 22, 81; Kuala Lumpur 53, 118–19; Labuan 103, 116–17; Malacca 68; Sabah and Sarawak 20, 33, 90, 101, 106
Malinowitc, Stanley 33
Index

Malley, Michael S. 145
Mann, Michael 18
Manuel, Doug 157
Marichal, Carlos 83
Marks, Gary 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 27, 30, 37, 39, 57, 67, 90, 100, 124, 127, 133, 149, 151–2
Marshall, Monty G. 59, 132
Marti-Henneberg, Jordi 19, 22, 72, 83, 91
Massard da Fonseca, Elize 157
Massetti, Emanuele 124
McCall, Jamie Randall 118
McGarry, John 104
McLean, Joseph 156
McMann, Kelly 35, 59
McMillan, Janice 51
McRoberts, Kenneth 112
Meadowcroft, James 156
Meadwell, Hudson 74
Meguid, Bonnie M. 123
Méndez Delgado, Elier 33
Mény, Yves 85
Mercosur 13, 134
Mergoupis, Thanos 9
Mexico 56, 63, 117–18, 129–30; Chiapas 125; Mexico City 118
Mirabeau 70–1
Moisio, Antti 116
Moldova 122
Montero, Alfred P. 33, 35, 55, 124
Moore, Barry 10
Moreno, Luis 18, 83, 104, 114, 122–3
Morral-Palacin, Noemi 35
Mount Athos 103, 154
Müller, Jochen 35
multilevel governance 1–4, 6, 11, 17–18, 29–31, 34, 48–52, 61–2, 69; 120, 127, 151–60
Musgrave, Robert A. 6, 8
Myers, David J. 119
Nagel, Ernest 152
Tanett, Rafaela 95
Nergaard, Erik 114
Netherlands 12, 22, 63, 83, 95, 129–31, 152; Baarle-Nassau 12
Neudorfer, Benjamin 35
Neudorfer, Natascha 35
Nicaragua 20, 58, 63, 105–7, 131–2, 137, 154, 158; Managua 118; RAAS and RAAN 20, 131–2
Nickson, Andrew 26
Niedzwiecki, Sara 27, 35, 39, 49
Nobbs, Katherine 104
Noel, Alain 112
North American Free Trade Association 134
Norton, Alan 25
Norway 19, 63, 117, 129–30; Lofoten 19; Oslo 19; Svalbard 103, 116–17; Vågan 19;
Vesterfjord 19
O’Donnell, Guillermo 21
O’Hare, Ann M. 157
O’Leary, Brendan 74, 104
O’Neill, Kathleen 33, 61
Oates, Wallace 6, 8, 9, 10, 31, 126
Obydenkova, Anastassia 114
OECD 24, 49, 57, 116
Olsen, Johan 101
Ord, Keith 47
Orendshook, Peter C. 124
Osterkamp, Rigmar 15, 155
Ostrom, Elinor 9, 17, 67, 156
Oulasvirta, Lasse 116
Özcan, Nihat Ali 125
Ozouf-Martignier, Marie-Vic 72
Paciﬁc Community 134
Page, Edward C. 26
Panama 20, 53, 58, 63, 105–7, 129–30, 158
Panizza, Ugo 9
Paraguay 63; Asunción 118
Parsons, Talcott 29
Paxton, Pamela 35, 38, 59
Pearce, Nick 159
Penfold-Becerra, Michael 61
Penner Angrist, Michele 125
Pérez, Joseph 84
Peterson, Paul E. 15
Philippines 21, 34, 53, 63, 106, 129–30, 137, 147, 152, 154; Mindanao 20, 34, 53, 61, 105–6, 125, 147, 154, 159, 162; Palawan 21
Piattoni, Simona 18, 49, 72, 95
Pierce, Jon 114
Pinochet, Augusto 34, 58
Plato 7
Pocock, J.G.A. 7
Poland 46, 63, 66, 79, 85–6, 98, 129–30, 152; Mazowiecki 85–6; Opole 85; Skopje 86, 88
postfunctionalism 1–4, 17–19, 25, 43, 97, 100, 122, 128, 151–2

193
Index

Pridham, Jeffrey 124
Pritchett, C. Herman 10
Putnam, Robert D. 95
Quaranta, Mario 35
Quine, Willard van Orman 42
Rawls, John 5–6
Razin, Eran 26
Rector, Chad 30
Reid, Anthony 34, 90, 95–6
Rezvani, David A. 104
Rhodes, Rod 51–3
Rifer, Malcolm 124
Riess, Thomas 18
Roddon, Jonathan 30
Rodriguez, Rudolph A. 157
Rodriguez-Pose, Andrés 35
Roeder, Philip 30
Rokkan, Stein 19, 22, 68, 73, 76–81, 90–5, 101, 126, 132, 146, 149, 160
Roman, Peter 33
Romania 50, 63, 79, 87–8, 98, 129–30, 152;
Bucharest 87–8
Ross, Cameron 113
Rousseau 5
Roux, Christophe 49
Rowe, John Howland 29
Rubinfeld, Daniel L. 126
Russell, Peter 112
Russia 16, 34, 45, 50, 60, 63, 79, 88–90, 98,
112–13, 115, 122, 128–30, 147;
Central Federal District 89;
Tatarstan 103, 113–15,
122, 147, 159
Sahlins, Peter 69
Samuels, David 33, 35, 55
Sandefjord, Jerle 101
Sandel, Michael 7
Sartori, Giovanni 31
Sasse, Gwendolyn 82, 85, 88
Schakel, Arjan H. 10, 27, 30, 37, 39, 57, 124, 127
Scharpf, Fritz 12, 57
Schedler, Andreas 39
Schimmelfennig, Frank 53, 82
Schmitter, Philippe 12, 53
Scholz, John T. 10
Schweikart, Jürgen 19, 22, 72, 83
Sedelmeier, Ulrich 81–2
Sellers, Jeffrey M. 26
Semanet, Holi A. 35, 59
Serbia-Montenegro 45, 63, 128–30, 162;
Serbia 45, 48, 50, 63, 79, 98, 106, 128–30, 133, 135, 149, 162;
Montenegro 45, 133, 149;
Vojvodina 106, 134
Serrano, Araceli 18
Seskin, Eugene P. 35
Shah, Anwar 6, 10
Shah, Shama 6, 10
Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah 27, 39, 90
Sharpe, L. Jim 155
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 57
Shvetsova, Olga 124
Simeon, Richard 112
Simon, Herbert A. 11
Singapore 45, 63, 90, 106, 109, 129–30, 162
Skaalholt, Asgeir 114
Skaanig, Svend-Eric 35, 38, 59
Skelcher, Chris 12, 53
Skinner, Jonathan S. 157
Slovakia 46, 50–1, 58, 63, 79, 87–8, 98, 128–30;
Bratislava 87
Smethurst, David 20
Smoke, Paul 33
Sober, Elliot 15
Soros, Gábor 49
South Korea 48–51, 52, 68, 79, 98, 106, 129–30,
152;
Jeju 20, 53, 68, 81, 103, 106, 146
Soviet Union 113, 122, 160, 162;
Transcaucasia 122
Spain 20, 22, 34, 49–51, 58, 64, 66, 75, 79,
83–5, 91–2, 98, 105–6, 114–15, 117, 124,
127–30, 132, 142, 146, 152–3;
Andalusia 66, 91, 114–15;
Araba 83, 106, 115;
Aragon 123;
Asturias 123;
Balearic Islands 81, 91, 123;
Basque Country 20, 34, 83, 91, 101, 112–14,
122, 125, 127, 139, 159, 162;
Bizkaia 83, 113–15, 139;
Catalonia 83, 91, 114–15;
Ceuta and Melilla 91, 105–6;
Galicia 34, 91, 114–15, 123, 132;
Gipuzkoa 83, 113–15, 139, 162;
Madrid 84, 91;
Navarra 83, 106, 115;
Val d’Aran 105–6;
Valencia 91, 123
Spinner-Halev, Jeff 20
Spolaore, Enrico 6, 8, 16, 67, 133, 151
Stalin 16
Staton, Jeffrey 35, 59
Stein, Jeremy C. 9, 67
Stephan, Alfred 30, 104, 111, 113, 125, 127, 145
Stigler, George J. 6
Stockholm Peace Research Institute 156
Stoffel, Michael F. 82
Stoyan, Alissandra 35
Stuart, Alan 47
Stub, Alexander C.-G. 12, 96
Summers, Robert 133
Sweden 21, 45, 64, 116, 128–30, 137;
Gotland 21
Swenden, Wilfried 30, 114, 123–4
System for Central-American Integration
(SICA) 15
Szöcsik, Edina 124
Index

Tal, Eran 38
Tamura, Manjula Kurella 157
Tarango, Michael 35, 151
Tatham, Michaël 35, 151
Ter-Minassian, Teresa 156
Tatham, Michaël 35, 151
Tal, Eran 38
Tamura, Manjula Kurella 157
Tarthan, Charles D. 104
Tarrow, Sidney 18–19
Tatham, Michael 35, 151
Tearrell, Jan 35, 59
Ter-Minassian, Teresa 156
Thau, Mads 35
Thompson, James D. 11
Tighe, Chris 123
Timmer, Marcel 133
Tobago 64, 105–6, 117, 129
Torchia, Luisa 95
Toubabou, Simon 124
Treisman, Daniel 6, 9, 10, 16, 31, 35
Trigilia, Carlo 10
Trochov, Alexei 113
Tsebelis, George 57
Tu, Jack V. 157
Tufte, Edward 10
Turkey 50, 58, 64, 79, 82, 98, 125, 129–30, 152;
Kurdistan 125, 159
Twolmby, John 10
United Kingdom 16, 22, 53, 64, 123, 129–30;
England 22, 50, 53, 79, 98, 123, 127; Ireland
49–50, 63, 70, 79, 82, 88, 98, 129–30; London
119, 124; Northern Ireland 105–6, 109, 117,
125; Scotland 16, 22, 53, 68, 101, 103, 105–6,
124, 127, 159, 161–2
United Nations 13–14, 45, 108–9
United States 12, 14–15, 30, 35, 64, 68, 105,
108, 128–9, 131, 146, 152; Alaska 109;
Arkansas 12; Chapel Hill 13–14; Connecticut
59; Hawaii 109; North Carolina 14;
Texas 12, Washington DC 59, 109
Urwin, Derek 19, 22, 68, 73, 100
Vachudova, Milada 82
Vaillavocla, Francois 33
Vallée, Jean-Joseph 35
Vannuelle, Camilla 51
Van Cott, Donna Lee 21, 108
Van Houten, Pieter 33
Venezuela 53, 56, 64, 116–17, 129–30, 132;
Caracas 53, 118–19; Dependencias
Federales 116
Verba, Sidney 38
Vitor, David 12
Voelzkow, Helmut 10
Vrangbaek, Karsten 51
Wacziarg, Romain 133
Wallace, Helen 12, 53
Walili, Sonja 18, 31
Walton, Rick 19, 22, 72, 83
Walzler, Michael 7
Warren, Kay B., 108
Watts, Ronald L. 30, 104
Wayenberg, Ellen 49
Weber, Max 22, 29, 31, 39, 100
Weibrust, Inger 156
Weingast, Barry 9
Weller, Marc 104
Wibbels, Erik 9, 30
Wildason, David 151
Wilkinson, Frank 10
Wilkinson, Steven 67
Williams, Shirley 124
Willis, Eliza 33, 124
Wincott, Daniel 157
Winzen, Thomas 53
Witmer II, Richard C. 108
Woldendorp, Jaap 25
Wolff, Stefan 101, 104,
Wolin, Sheldon 6, 151
Wright, Deil 156
Wright, Vincent 156
Yack, Bernard 7, 8, 18,
Yadav, Yogendra 30, 111, 125, 127, 145
Yashar, Deborah 21, 108, 135–6
Yavuz, Hakani 125
Yoder, Jennifer A. 85
Young, Orion R. 156
Zaslavsky, Victor 122
Ziblatt, Daniel 95
Zuber, Christina Isabel 104, 111–12, 114, 122–3
Zürn, Michael 18, 31