

Online Appendix II: Two new datasets

This document introduces the revised dataset on regional authority (RAI-MLG v.3) and a new dataset on language regions, which was produced to examine the causes and consequences of language regions for the jurisdictional architecture of modern states. These data are available on the authors' website (<https://garymarks.web.unc.edu>).

These data accompany the following article:

Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman-Osterkatz, Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks. 2021. "Language difference and Regional Authority. *Regional and Federal Studies*, 31(1): 73-97. (Anniversary Issue)

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I. THE. REGIONAL AUTHORITY INDEX (RAI DATA V.3.)

The **RAI DATA PROJECT V.3** estimates the authority—self-rule and shared rule—exercised by regional governments on an annual basis from 1950 to 2018 spanning 4700+ regions across 96 countries. This release packages the data in five user-friendly datasets (see below).

FOR USERS

How to reference the data?

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman Osterkat, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield. 2016. *Measuring Regional Authority*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman-Osterkat, Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks. 2021. "Language difference and Regional Authority. *Regional and Federal Studies*, 31(1): 73-97.

Where to find the data?

The data and supporting material (including country profiles) are available online on <https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/data/regional-authority>

The unit of analysis is the region, which is defined as a *general-purpose jurisdiction between national and local government*. We draw the boundary between local and regional government at an average population level of 150,000 (census data of 2011). This excludes the lowest tier of government in all 96 countries, but allows us to capture intermediate governments, often arrayed at two nested levels between the local and national. We relax the population criterion for individual jurisdictions, such as Greenland or the Galápagos islands, that stick out from a tier of government that meets the regional threshold.

The dataset encompasses only **general purpose jurisdictions**, i.e. jurisdictions that “bundle together multiple functions, including a range of policy responsibilities, and in many instances, a court system and representative institutions. . . . Type I jurisdictions express

people's identities with a particular community" (Hooghe and Marks 2010: 17, 27; 2003). Our measure does not cover task-specific or sectoral jurisdictions at the regional level.

Our measure of regional authority focuses on **legal authority**, which is institutionalized, i.e. codified in recognized rules; circumscribed, i.e. specifying who has authority over whom for what; impersonal, i.e. designating roles, not persons; territorial, i.e. exercised in territorially defined jurisdictions. These characteristics distinguish legal authority from its traditional, charismatic, and religious variants (Weber 1968).

In estimating regional authority, our first move is to distinguish **two domains** that encompass the concept of regional authority. *Self-rule* is the authority that a subnational government exercises in its own territory. *Shared rule* is the authority that a subnational government co-exercises in the country as a whole. The domains of self-rule and shared rule provide an elegant frame and they are familiar in the study of federalism (Elazar 1987; Keating 1998, 2001; Lane and Errson 1999; Riker 1964). Each domain is decomposed into five dimensions, estimated as interval scales, and these **ten dimensions** can be added to generate an authority score for a region that ranges between 1 and 30.¹ Tables A.1.1-A.1.3 reproduce the coding schema. For in-depth discussion of conceptualization and operationalization, please see chs 1-3 in *Measuring Regional Authority* (Hooghe et al. 2016; Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2014; Niedzwiecki et al. 2019, for RAI v.2; Hooghe et al. 2008, 2010 for RAI v.1).

¹ A region may exercise shared rule multilaterally with other regions or it may exercise shared rule bilaterally with the center. Multilateral shared rule is contingent on coordination with other regions in the same tier; bilateral shared rule can be exercised by a region acting alone. Table A.1.3. compares our coding for multilateral and bilateral shared rule.

Table A.1.1.: Scoring self-rule

Self-rule	The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region		
Institutional depth	The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated.	0–3	<p>0 No functioning general purpose administration at regional level. .</p> <p>1 Deconcentrated, general purpose, administration.</p> <p>2 Non-deconcentrated, general purpose, administration subject to central government veto.</p> <p>3 Non-deconcentrated, general purpose, administration not subject to central government veto</p>
Policy scope	The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible.	0–4	<p>0 Very weak authoritative competencies in a), b), c), or d) whereby: a) economic policy; b) cultural-educational policy; c) welfare policy; d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set-up, local government.</p> <p>1 Authoritative competencies in <i>one</i> of a), b), c) or d).</p> <p>2 Authoritative competencies in at least <i>two</i> of a), b), c), or d).</p> <p>3 Authoritative competencies in d) and at least <i>two</i> of a), b), or c).</p> <p>4 Criteria for 3 <i>plus</i> authority over immigration, citizenship, or right of domicile.</p>
Fiscal autonomy	The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population.	0–4	<p>0 Central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes.</p> <p>1 Regional government sets the rate of minor taxes.</p> <p>2 Regional government sets the base and rate of minor taxes.</p> <p>3 Regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.</p> <p>4 Regional government sets the base and rate of at least one major tax.</p>
Borrowing autonomy	The extent to which a regional government can borrow.	0–3	<p>0 The regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing).</p> <p>1 The regional government may borrow under prior authorization (<i>ex ante</i>) by the central government and with one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank c. no borrowing above a ceiling d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes.</p> <p>2 The regional government may borrow without prior authorization and under one or more of a), b), c), or d).</p> <p>3 The regional government may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.</p>
Representation	The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive.	0–4	<p>Assembly:</p> <p>0 No regional assembly.</p> <p>1 Indirectly elected regional assembly.</p> <p>2 Directly elected assembly.</p> <p>Executive:</p> <p>0 Regional executive appointed by central government.</p> <p>1 Dual executive appointed by central government and regional assembly.</p> <p>2 Regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or directly elected.</p>

Table A.1.2: Scoring shared rule

Shared rule	The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole			
Law making	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation.	0–2	0.5	Regions are the unit of representation in a national legislature.
			0.5	Regional governments designate representatives in a national legislature.
			0.5	Regions have majority representation in a national legislature based on regional representation.
			0.5	The legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority.
Executive control	The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings.	0–2	0	No routine meetings between central and regional governments to negotiate policy.
			1	Routine meetings between central and regional governments <i>without</i> legally binding authority.
			2	Routine meetings between central and regional governments <i>with</i> legally binding authority.
Fiscal control	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues.	0–2	0	Neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues.
			1	Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto.
			2	Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.
Borrowing control	The extent to which a regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing constraints.	0–2	0	Regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints.
			1	Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto.
			2	Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints and have a veto.
Constitutional reform	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change.	0–4	0	The central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution. A national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum. Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum. A legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change; <u>or</u> constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation. Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change.

Table A.1.3: Scoring multilateral and bilateral shared rule

Multilateral shared rule		Bilateral shared rule	
A. Law making		A. Law making	
Regions are the unit of representation in a national legislature.	0.5	The region is the unit of representation in a national legislature.	
Regional governments designate representatives in a national legislature.	0.5	The regional government designates representatives in a national legislature.	
Regions have majority representation in a national legislature based on regional representation.	0.5	The regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature are consulted on national legislation affecting the region.	
The legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority.	0.5	The regional government or regional representatives in a national legislature have veto power over national legislation affecting the region.	
B. Executive control		B. Executive control	
No routine meetings between the central government and regional governments to negotiate policy.	0	No routine meetings between the central government and the regional government to discuss national policy affecting the region.	
Routine meetings between the central government and regional governments without legally binding authority.	1	Routine meetings between the central government and the regional government without legally binding authority.	
Routine meetings between the central government and regional governments with legally binding authority.	2	Routine meetings between the central government and the regional government with legally binding authority.	
C. Fiscal control		C. Fiscal control	
Neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues.	0	Neither the regional government nor its representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.	
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of national tax revenues, but do not have a veto.	1	The regional government or its representatives in a national legislature negotiate with the central government the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region, but does not have a veto.	
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.	2	The regional government or its representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region.	

D. Borrowing control		D. Borrowing control	
Regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints.	0	The regional government is not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints affecting the region.	
Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints, but do not have a veto.	1	The regional government negotiates routinely over borrowing constraints affecting the region, but does not have a veto.	
Regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints and have a veto.	2	The regional government negotiates routinely over borrowing constraints affecting the region and has a veto.	
E. Constitutional reform		E. Constitutional reform	
The central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution.	0	The central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the region's constitutional relation with the center.	
A national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum.	1	A regional referendum can propose or postpone reform of the region's constitutional relation with the center.	
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum.	2	The regional government can propose or postpone reform of the region's constitutional provisions or require a popular referendum.	
A legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation.	3	A regional referendum can veto a reform of a region's constitutional relation with the center.	
Regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change.	4	The regional government can veto a reform of the region's constitutional relation with the center.	

The chief additions to the **RAI V.3** release compared to RAI V.2 (Hooghe et al. 2016) are as follows:

- **Country coverage** is extended from 81 to 96 countries. The following countries are new: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Laos, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Vietnam. This version then includes sovereign states with a minimum population of 250,000 (in 2010) in Europe (except Belarus, Moldova, and the Caucasus), Turkey, and Israel; the Americas; East, Southeast, and South Asia (except for Afghanistan), and the Asia-Pacific. Table A2 lists all countries in the dataset.
- **Temporal coverage** is extended from 2010 to 2018. The dataset covers countries from 1950, or from the time a country becomes independent, to 2018.²
- **Coverage is extended to metropolitan regions**, which are coded as a separate type of region. A metropolitan region is a contiguous general purpose jurisdiction that combines one, two, or more cities and their surrounding municipalities to deal with issues stemming from conurbanization.³ A region is coded as metropolitan if it meets the following criteria: a) it exists between the local level of government and the national level; b) metropolitan jurisdictions within a country have on average a population of at least 150,000; and c) the jurisdiction is codified in law.

² European countries are included after they transitioned from communism. Serbia-Montenegro is in the dataset until its dissolution in 2006.

³ A pilot project led by Arjan Schakel (2020) is developing a coding scheme that encompasses both metropolitan governance and other forms of urban governance.

- **Five user-friendly datasets** summarize our estimation (Table A.2). RAI-MLG contains the most disaggregated and most comprehensive coding information, and four datasets aggregate this information to a higher level or focus on subsets of regions.

Table A.2: Five RAI V.3 datasets

RAI-MLG	Annual scores for each individual region or regional tier from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a region–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, overall RAI. This is the master dataset that has a comprehensive record of all scores at the most disaggregated level.
RAI-National	Annual scores for each country from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a country–year down in ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Region	Annual scores for the most authoritative regional tier from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a tier–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Metro	Annual scores for each individual metropolitan region or metropolitan tiers from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a metro–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Indigenous	Annual scores for each individual indigenous region or collective indigenous territorial arrangements from 1950-2018. Each row breaks an indigenous–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.

II. THE ROKKAN DATASET

The **ROKKAN DATASET** estimates normative, political, and geographical distinctiveness of 1766 regions in 95 countries that have a regional government as of 2018.⁴ The unit of analysis is the territorial unit with the most authoritative general purpose government between the local and the national level in a country. Each region is assessed on how distinctive it is from the national state's core with respect to language, religion, political history, and geography (Hooghe and Marks 2016).

The dataset operationalizes Stein Rokkan's concepts of **difference**, **dependence**, and **distance** as indications of a territory's peripherality (Rokkan and Urwin 1983) on the hypothesis that these structural characteristics that might facilitate a demand for regional authority.

FOR USERS

How to reference the data?

Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. 2016. *Community, Scale, and Regional Governance*. Oxford University Press.

Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, Arjan H. Schakel, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sandra Chapman-Osterkat, Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks. 2021. "Language difference and regional authority." *Regional and Federal Studies*, 31(1): 73-97.

Where to find the data?

The data and supporting material are available online on <https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/data/regional-authority>

⁴ For regions with stable jurisdictional boundaries these estimates could be extended backwards in time.

Difference

Difference refers to the normative distinctiveness of a community. Our coding operationalizes two sources of distinctiveness: language and religion.⁵ In Brubaker's words (2013: 3), "both language and religion sort people into distinct, bounded and largely self-reproducing 'communities . . . Language, religion or both are . . . constitutive of most ethnic and national identifications, and they frequently serve as the key diacritical markers, emblems or symbols of such identifications."

A region is a **language region** if a majority of its population speaks one or more mother tongues that are different from the mother-tongue of the majority in the country. In the face of considerable debate about what constitutes a separate language, we code language difference for standard languages according to the ISO-639 classification—level 2, which encodes languages for library cataloguing and bibliographic purposes and is curated by the US Library of Congress. This level seems by and large appropriate to sift standardized languages from dialectic variants. Dialects of a standard language (e.g. mutually intelligible variants of Malay) or diglossia involving a codified and vernacular version of a common language (e.g. Mandarin Chinese and its local variants) do not meet this criterion. Some gray cases remain, such as Mandarin Chinese and Cantonese Chinese, which ISO-639/2 considers cases of diglossia because of a shared written form but many language specialists consider separate languages because they are mutually unintelligible. We follow dominant practice with linguistic and area specialists. We codify a person's so-called "mother tongue," i.e. the first language that a person grows up with in childhood. Where data is available, reported

⁵ Our coding decisions are documented in detailed profiles for 95 countries for language (291pp) and religion (225pp) respectively. See <https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/data/regional-authority/>

language use is averaged over the course of the past three decades, and triangulated with information from census data, Ethnologue (Eberhard et al. 2020), Wikipedia, and scholarly sources. This is operationalized in two ways:

- A **language region L1**: a majority speaks a mother-tongue that differs from a majority in the country.
- A **language region L2**: a majority speaks a single mother-tongue that differs from the majority in the country.

Rokkan (in Flora et al. 1999: 171) regarded language as decisive because it is “a focal point of identity . . . a collective act in which everyone in a territory must share,” but other scholars emphasize the return of religion as a source of difference and conflict about authority (Brubaker 2013, 2015; Gorski 2019; Safran 2008).

A **religion region** has a majority of its population declaring to adhere to one or more religions that differ from the majority in the country. We collect separate information on whether a country has a state religion, which is defined as a religion that is formally endorsed by the state (“established church”). Any country that had a state religion in the 1990s (or introduced one after 1990) is conceived to have a state religion for our 2018 coding purposes. State atheism is treated as equivalent to a state religion. The constitutional status of a religion is usually fairly easy to assess. We base our assessment on a detailed list provided on Wikipedia,⁶ which documents its categorization for most cases. For ambiguous or poorly

⁶ https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_religion

documented cases, we complement with research that draws on primary and secondary sources (for a historical review, see Barro and McCleary 2005).

We follow established practice to distinguish between Sunni Islam and Shia Islam, and Catholicism, Protestantism, and Eastern Christianity (orthodox churches), but we do not differentiate among different forms of Sunni, Shia, Catholicism, Protestantism, or Eastern Christianity. In calculating the proportion of a population attesting a religion we include those who attest no religion.

This produces three operationalizations:

- A **religiously distinctive region R1**: the region resides in a country that has a state religion, and the population in the region attesting the state religion is a minority.
- A **religiously distinctive region R2**: the region resides in a country that has a state religion, and a majority of the population in the region attests a single religion that is not the state religion.
- A **religiously distinctive region R3**: the region resides in a country that has no state religion, and a majority of the population attests one or more religions that are different from the majority religion in the country.

R1, R2, and R3 can be combined to identify a **religiously distinctive region R5**, in which a majority of a region's population adheres to one or more religions that differ from the majority religion in the country.

Dependence

Dependence refers to the political reliance of the periphery on the center and the periphery's corresponding vulnerability to homogenization (Flora et al. 1999: 115). To what extent is a

region able to sustain its distinctiveness against a centralizing core—a state, an empire, a colonizer? We code two plausible scenarios.

A region is coded as a **former state core** if it meets the following criteria: (a) it was part of a prior independent state or empire for a continuous period of thirty years or more since AD1200; (b) it encompasses the core or capital of the prior state; and (c) at least half of its territory was part of the prior state. We apply a thin definition of statehood that focuses on the extent to which there is jurisdictional coherence—a single regime—controlling the legitimate means of coercion (Marks 1997a; 1997b: 24; Weber 1948). Statehood emerged in Europe from multicephalous quasi-feudal orders between the 12th-14th centuries (Strayer 1970), and given the durable effect of statehood, we code former state core from AD1200.

A region is coded as having **early overarching governance** if the region was encompassed in a durable overarching polity by the time the region was colonized by a European power (with Laos most recently in 1892), or absent colonization, by 1600AD. The criterion of durable overarching governance is met if it existed uninterrupted for at least thirty years. An overarching polity can take on a variety of forms including that of a state or empire. Our measure has some affinity with Borcan et al.'s (2018) State History Index, which measures the presence and duration of supra-tribal government since 3000BC. However, while Borcan et al. estimate governance for a country as a whole in half-century increments, our measure estimates the structure of governance region by region prior to European colonization (see also Wimmer and Min 2006). The converse of early overarching governance is **tribal governance** at the regional level. The coding for former state core and early overarching governance relies on *Wikipedia*, historical atlases, and *Encyclopedia Britannica*, crosschecked with scholarly sources.

Distance

Distance refers to the spatial transaction costs that impede interaction and which may sustain distinctiveness even in the face of a sustained national strategy of assimilation. We estimate three variables that assess these costs.

Travel distance is the distance in kilometers as-the-crow-flies between a region's capital and the capital of the country in which the region is located. We use a publicly available online search tool to calculate distance.⁷ Two regions in Poland and one in Spain have two capitals; distance is the average between these and the national capital. One region in Panama, and all but one region in North Macedonia do not have a formal capital, and we calculate the distance from each region's largest town or city to the national capital. We code the distance of the median region in their country for indigenous communities in Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, and the United States, which are composed of multiple tribes in non-contiguous territories across the country.

Travel time is the travel time in minutes by road or water, calculated by using <https://maps.google.com> (taking the shortest travel time), and when google does not provide estimates, <https://www.rome2rio.com/> was used. Forty-eight regions can only be reached by air (commercial, private, or military air transport), and since calculated travel time there is incommensurate with travel by road or water, we allocate a missing value.

Island-region takes a value of 1 if the region is 30km or more removed from any other region of its state. We measure the shortest distance between the coastal shore of the region

⁷ <https://www.freemaptools.com/how-far-is-it-between.htm>.

and that of the nearest region of the state. Two neighboring regions of the same state on the same island do not meet the 30km distance criterion.

A region can have none, one, or several of the characteristics described above. Table A.3 summarizes the correlations among these properties for the regions in our sample.

Table A.3: Correlation matrix of Rokkan characteristics of regions

	Language region L1	Language region L2	Religion region R1	Religion region R2	Religion region R3	Religion region R5	Former state core	Early overarching governance	Travel distance	Travel time
Language L1	1.00									
Language L2	0.79	1.00								
Religion R1	0.26	0.23	1.00							
Religion R2	0.26	0.24	0.89	1.00						
Religion R3	0.28	0.26	0.64	0.73	1.00					
Religion R5	0.32	0.28	0.79	0.77	0.91	1.00				
Former state core	0.22	0.22	0.10	0.14	0.20	0.21	1.00			
Early overarching governance	-0.15	-0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.05	1.00		
Travel distance	0.13	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.07	-0.18	1.00	
Travel time	0.23	0.14	0.04	0.06	0.12	0.13	0.07	-0.17	0.85	
Island-region	0.17	0.13	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.11	0.06	-0.05	0.20	0.28

Note: n=1749 (n=1706 for travel time).

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