Greece

Self-rule

INSTITUTIONAL DEPTH AND POLICY SCOPE

Greece has two tiers of intermediate governance and one special region. Nomoi (prefectures) were established in 1950 as deconcentrated state administrations. These continued to function under the military junta from 1967–1973 (C 1975, Arts. 101–102; C 2008, Arts. 101–102). An additional, higher level, tier of periphereies (regions) was established in 1986. Nomoi became self-governing in 1994 and were abolished in 2010. From 2011, newly created apokentromènes dioikíseis were established in between periphereies and the central government. As an autdioikítio or autonomous monastic community, Aghion Oros (Mount Athos) has been a special autonomous region since 1950.

Nomos government was headed by a nomarch (prefect) who is a central government appointee (Committee of the Regions 2005). Representation in prefectural councils (nomarchiako simvoulio) that govern nomoi was widened in 1982 to take in representatives of interest groups (farmers, trade unions, professionals, and chambers of commerce) as well as local government representatives (Hlepas and Getimis 2011a, b). Central oversight through the prefects remained extensive (Committee of the Regions 2005). This changed in 1994 when nomoi were decentralized. The councils and prefects became directly elected and were given competences over regional development funding, education, health, roads and transport, and hospitals, as well as the right to establish agencies (Council of Europe: Greece 2001; Hlepas 2010; Law No. 2218/1994; No. 2240/1994; No. 2307/1995; Loughlin 2001a). Institutional depth increases from 1 to 2 and policy scope from 0 to 2 in 1994.

Since 1986 Greece has thirteen periphereies between the nomoi and the central state (Law No. 1622/1986). Periphereies were set up to implement development programs, mainly funded by the European Union (EU). They are deconcentrated administrations headed by a centrally appointed secretary general (genikos grammateas) who consults nomoi and local governments. In 1997, periphereies acquired additional responsibilities as well as a consultative body composed of lower tier elected representatives and interest group representatives, but they remained primarily deconcentrated (Getimis and Demetropoulou 2004; Getimis and Hlepas 2010; Law No. 2503/1997; Loughlin 2001a).

The 2010 Kallikratis plan radically reformed the institutional set up of Greece. It abolished the nomoi and transferred some of their authority to the periphereies (Council of Europe: Greece 2013; Kyvelou and Marava 2017: 306–313; Law No. 3852/2010). Since 2011 periphereies are headed by a regional governor (perifereiárchis) and a council (periferetákó symvoulíio) elected for five-year terms rather than by general secretaries appointed by central government. Competences in agriculture, culture, vocational education, environment, health permits and control, provincial roads, regional and economic development, transport, and waste management were shifted from the abolished nomoi to the periphereies (Akrivopoulou, Dimitropoulos, and Koutnatzis 2012;
Seven newly created *apokentroménes dioikíseis* (deconcentrated state administrations) serve as regional subdivisions of the central government as of 2011 (Council of Europe: Greece, 2015; Hlepas and Getimis 2011b).

The constitution (C 1975, Art. 105; C 2008, Art. 105) demarcates one *autodioikito*, the mountain peninsula of *Aghion Oros*, which has considerable autonomy under its “holy mountain” charter of 1924. It is constitutionally recognized as a “self-governed part of the Greek state, whose sovereignty thereon shall remain intact” (C 2008, Art. 105.1; Paganopoulos 2009, 2014). Its governance consists of representatives of its twenty monasteries who are under the direct jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople (Law No. 10/1926). Special permits are required to enter the region and women are not allowed. Novices and monks admitted to monastic life are granted automatic Greek citizenship (C 1975, Art. 105.1; C 2008, Art. 105.1; Council of Europe: Greece 2001). The government of Greece is represented by a governor who is directly accountable to the Greek minister of foreign affairs (Council of Europe: Greece 2001; C 1975, Art. 105.4; C 2008, Art. 105.4). We score Mount Athos 3 on institutional depth and 2 on policy scope.

**FISCAL AUTONOMY**

The budget of *nomoi* consisted mainly of their share of centrally collected value added taxes and car registration taxes, for which the central government determined base and rate. In 1998 *nomoi* gained some limited capacity to set fees for transport and other services, but not to levy taxes (Chortareas and Logothetis 2016: 137–138; Council of Europe: Greece 2001; Hlepas and Getimis 2014: 132–138).

*Periphereies* are dependent on transfers from the central state and the EU (Council of Europe: Greece 2015; Hlepas and Getimis 2011b).

Mount Athos has full tax autonomy according to its 1926 charter (Law No. 10/1926). Its special status was ratified by the EU in 1979, and the Schengen agreement exempted the jurisdiction from the EU’s value added tax, subject to special rules concerning excise duty and value added tax (Paganopoulos 2014).

**BORROWING AUTONOMY**

The decentralization reform of 1994 allowed *nomoi* to borrow under prior authorization of the central government. *Nomoi* had to receive prior approval from the ministry of economy and finance (Council of Europe: Greece 2001; Chortareas and Logothetis 2016: 137–138). A further requirement was that all loans had to be linked to investment projects, and loan requests had to be supported by project studies (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003; Ter-Minassian and Craig 1997).

The *periphereies* are not allowed to borrow, but Mount Athos has full borrowing autonomy.

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1 The Kallikratis plan endows the metropolitan regions of *Attiki* and *Kentriki Makedonia* with additional responsibilities in environment, spatial planning, transport and waste disposal but these provisions have not been implemented through the necessary ministerial decisions and presidential decrees (Council of Europe: Greece 2015; Law No. 3852/2010, Art. 210-213).
REPRESENTATION
Before 1994, *nomoi* were deconcentrated administrations with weak advisory councils of interest group and local representatives. From 1994 until 2010, *nomoi* councils, which selected a prefect from the council’s majority, were directly elected every four years (Hlepas and Getimis 2011b).

*Periphereies* had no representation until the introduction of consultative bodies in 1997. These bodies are composed of *nomoi* prefects, representatives of local authorities, the executive head of the *periphereies*, and representatives of various regional-level public interest groups (Committee of the Regions 2005; Getimis and Demetropoulou 2004; Loughlin 2001a). The executive head was appointed by the central government. Since 2011, councils (*perifereiakó symvoúlio*) and executive heads (*perifereiárchis*) of *periphereies* are directly elected in a two-round system (Council of Europe: Greece 2013, 2015; Skrinis 2013).

The Holy Community of Mount Athos, which has its seat at Karyes, is a standing body of monks annually elected by each of the island’s twenty monasteries in accordance with their internal regulations. The four-member executive (Holy Epistasia) rotates among the twenty representatives to serve one year in five. Executive authority is shared with a centrally appointed governor, who is responsible for safeguarding public order and security and is directly accountable to the Greek minister of foreign affairs (C 1975, Art. 105.4; C 2008 Art. 105.4; Paganopoulos 2009).

*Shared rule*

There is no regional power sharing for *nomoi, periphereies, and apokentroménes dioikíseis*, but Mount Athos exerts some constitutional control over its charter. It can initiate reform, but the charter is subject to ratification by the Greek parliament (Law No. 10/1926). Like *nomoi* and *periphereies*, and *apokentroménes dioikíseis*, Mount Athos has no role in amending the Greek constitution. Constitutional amendments are adopted by a three-fifths majority in the Greek parliament and by an absolute majority in the next parliament after elections (C 1975, Art. 110; C 2008, Art. 110).

**Primary references**


Secondary references


Council of Europe. 2015. Local and Regional Democracy in Greece. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.


Kyvelou, Stella Sofia, and Nektaria Marava. 2017. “From Centralism to Decentralization and Back to Recentralization Due to the Economic Crisis: Findings and Lessons Learnt from the Greek Experience.” In José Manuel Ruano, and Marius Profiroiu (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook

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## Self-rule in Greece

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## Shared rule in Greece

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National legislature has: L1 = regional representation; L2 = regional government representation; L3 = majority regional representation; L4 = extensive authority; L5 = bilateral regional consultation; L6 = veto for individual region. Total for shared rule includes the highest score of either multilateral (M) or bilateral (B).

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