Spain

Self-rule

INSTITUTIONAL DEPTH AND POLICY SCOPE

Spain has two tiers of regional governance: 50 provincias (provinces), which date from 1833, and 17 comunidades autónomas (autonomous communities), which came into being with Spain’s transition to democracy in 1978, alongside two ciudades autónomas (autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla) (C 1978, Art. 137). Seven comunidades autónomas are single provinces (Asturias, Baleares, Cantabria, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, and La Rioja), and in these cases there is a single regional government, the comunidad. The Balearic Islands and The Canary Islands have respectively four consejos insulares and seven island regions cabildo insular instead of provinces.

Comunidades autónomas may establish comarcas (counties), which is a third tier of government between municipalities and provincias (Council of Europe: Spain 1997). Comarcas exist in Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla y León, and Catalonia (Law No. 3/1986; No. 6/1987; No. 1/1991. No. 10/1993; No. 8/1999) but only in Catalonia do they meet the population criterion for regional government. In addition, there is one autonomous comarca in Catalonia: Val d’Aran (Aran Valley) (Law No. 16/1990).

The city of Barcelona, the second most populous city of Spain after Madrid and the capital of

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1 Many Spanish provincias and comunidades have co-official spellings in the local language/s. We use both in the dataset and tables, but use English in the profiles.

2 When calculating country scores we do not include the self-rule exercised by these uniprovincial comunidades in the scores of the provincias.

3 La Villa de Madrid (the city of Madrid) has been subject to special legislation since 1963 (Law No. 1674/1963, No. 2/2003, Art. 40; No. 22/2006) but the city of Madrid did and does not enjoy much more autonomy compared to other municipalities (Council of Europe: Spain 2013; González 2012; Law No. 22/2006, Arts. 31–34; Velasco Caballero 2019: 306–313). The city of Madrid is the capital of Spain as well as of the Comunidad Madrid and it has about 3.2 million inhabitants which constitutes 50.2 per cent of the total population of the Comunidad Madrid and 6.9 per cent of the total Spanish population. A national law applied to Madrid from 1963 until 2006 (Law No. 1674/1963 and No. 7/1985, dispociones adicionales sexta). During the dictatorship, the mayor was appointed by the central government who had some stronger powers vis-à-vis the assembly compared to mayors in other municipalities. Madrid was also divided into districts (distritos) each with their own assembly (junta) and president (presidente) who was appointed by the mayor. Between 1963 and 1983, there was also a committee that adopted an urban development plan that applied to Madrid and 23 surrounding municipalities but the central government was in full control of the committee. A national law adopted in 2006 divides the city of Madrid into 26 districts (distritos) which are deconcentrated city administrations headed by an assembly councilor from the central city assembly appointed by the mayor (Council of Europe: Spain 2013; Law No. 22/2006, Art. 22). The 2006 law assigns the city of Madrid limited additional competences regarding the protection of persons and property (during national and international events and during demonstrations), local traffic management, and road safety...
Catalonia, is scored as of 1998 when a special Catalan law was adopted for the city (Law No. 22/1998). Since 1974, Catalonia also has a Barcelona metropolitan area (Law No. 5/1974; No. 31/2010). The regional capital cities of Zaragoza in Aragón (since 2018) and Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands (since 2007) also have a specific regime laid down in a comunidad law.

Under the rule of Francisco Franco from 1950–1977 the fifty provincias functioned as deconcentrated outposts of the central government. Two of them, Álava (Araba) and Navarre (Navarra/Nafarroa), enjoyed special fiscal rights (fueros discussed below).

The constitution of 1978 guarantees self-government for all nationalities and regions (C 1978, Art. 143) and lists twenty-two competences that could be transferred to comunidades. These include city and regional planning, health and hygiene, housing, public works, regional railways and roads, ports and airports, agriculture, forests and fishing, environmental protection, culture, tourism, promotion of sports, social welfare, economic development within the objectives set by national economic policy, and regional political institutions (C 1978, Art. 148; Council of Europe: Spain 1997; Harty 2002). Comunidades can assume residual powers if so stated in their autonomy statute (C 1978, Art. 149.3; Hueghlin and Fenna 2006: 172). The central government has exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policy, defense, justice, labor, civil and commercial law, social security, public safety, customs and trade, and the currency, as well as citizenship and immigration (C 1978, Art.149; Council of Europe: Spain 1997; Harty 2002; Swenden 2006; Watts 1998, 2008). The central government may also enact framework legislation and transfer or delegate competences to the comunidades, and it may adopt harmonization laws even when jurisdiction lies with the comunidades (C 1978, Art. 150; Maiz et al. 2010). The comunidades score 3 on institutional depth and policy scope from the year in which they adopt their autonomy statute.

The 1978 constitution laid out two routes to regional autonomy (Agranoff and Gallarín 1997; Harty 2002): the vía rápida (fast track, C 1978, Art. 151) and the vía lenta (slow track, C 1978, Art. 148.2). The fast track was meant to be used only by the three historic nationalities that passed

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4 The local government law was revised in 2003 which enabled municipalities with more than 250,000 inhabitants, provincial capitals with more than 175,000 inhabitants, and the capitals of the comunidades to establish districts (distritos) within their city (Law No. 7/1985, Art. 128; No. 57/2003). Once established, these districts should have a council (junta de gobierno local) and a mayor (alcalde) (Law No. 7/1985, Arts. 129–130). When cities choose to apply the separate title in the law on local government it will affect the organization of the assembly and the executive and it requires them to set up a social council (consejo de la ciudad) composed of representatives of economic and social organizations but it does not grant these municipalities additional authority compared to other municipalities (Agranoff 2010: 89–105; Council of Europe: Spain 2013; González 2012; Law No. 57/2003).

5 We score both the city of Barcelona and the Barcelona metropolitan area which includes the city of Barcelona and its surrounding municipalities.

6 The Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarre have their own regional police forces and, since 2006, Catalonia has the competence to grant labour permits to immigrants (Moreno and Colino 2010: 310–313).
autonomy statutes during the Second Republic—the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia—though Andalusia used the avenue as well (Viver 2012). The first two had their statutes approved by the Spanish congress in 1979 (effective in 1980), while those of Andalusia and Galicia were passed in 1981 (effective in 1981 and in 1982; Fernández and Nieto 2008: 55; Harty 2002; Law No. 3/1979; No. 4/1979; No. 1/1981; No. 6/1981). The remaining comunidades negotiated a limited transfer of powers with the central government, which could be extended later.

By 1983 all comunidades had approved statutes and self-governing institutions (Law No. 7/1981; No. 8/1981; No. 3/1982; No. 4/1982; No. 5/1982; No. 8/1982; No. 9/1982; No. 10/1982; 13/1982; No. 1/1983; No. 2/1983; No. 3/10983; No. 4/1983; Máiz and Losada 2016; Morales and Molés 2002; Swenden 2006: 64). Valencia, the Canary Islands, and Navarre demanded and received additional competences early on, while the rest obtained new powers through renegotiation of their statutes during the 1990s and early 2000s.


Further decentralization in the second half of the 1990s brought the competences of the slow track comunidades closer to those of the fast track comunidades (Beramendi and Máiz 2004; Law No. 5/1996; No. 3/1997; No. 1/1998; No. 5/1998; No. 11/1998; No. 1/1999; No. 2/1999; No. 3/1999; No. 4/1999; Máiz and Losada 2016) and some comunidades also negotiated increased autonomy during these years (Canary Islands, Law No. 4/1996; Valencia, Law No. 5/1994; Galicia, Law No. 16/1995; No. 6/1999). A major reform in 2002 devolved responsibility for the provision of health and education to the ten slow track comunidades that did not already control these competences (Law No. 7/2001; López-Laborda and Monasterio 2006).


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7 The new statutes accommodate prior reforms, slightly amend regional law making, or reduce the number of deputies in the regional parliament. Some comunidades also changed their preambles, declaring themselves historic nations. See Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament de Governació i Relacions Institucionals. “Quadre comparatiu de les reformes dels estatuts d’autonomia de Catalunya, Andalusia i
Ceuta and Melilla were part of Spanish Morocco until it gained independence from Spain in 1956, while they remained part of Spain. The cities were governed as dependencies under the Franco regime. After the transition to democracy, the ciudades became autonomous and self-governing within the Spanish constitutional framework. Local assemblies were set up with the first direct elections in 1979. The 1978 constitution created an option for Ceuta and Melilla to become comunidades, but this reform never took place. Instead, in 1995, both enclaves negotiated statutes as ciudades autónomas (Law No. 1/1995; No. 2/1995), a unique and intermediate status. For example, the central government still directly provides health care. However, their statutes otherwise grant similar powers as for comunidades. The ciudades score 1 on institutional depth and zero on policy scope until 1978; from 1978 the scores on institutional depth and policy scope increase to 2 until the 1995 reform, when the scores on both dimensions increase to 3.

Under the Franco dictatorship the provincias were deconcentrated. In 1978 a Law on local elections reformed the institutions of the provincias with indirectly elected assemblies as part of the return to democracy (Law No. 173/1978). The primary functions of provincias are in social services and fairs (Agranoff and Gallarín 1997). They share with municipalities responsibility for culture, solid waste treatment, coordinating municipal services, delivering rural services, technical assistance to municipal councils, and they provide drinking water, roads, public lighting, and waste collection and disposal for small municipalities (Agranoff 2010: 106–107; Council of Europe: Spain 1997).8 Provincias also coordinate and provide inter-municipal policies (Committee of the Regions 2005; Law No. 7/1985, Art. 31; No. 27/2013; Velasco Caballero 2019: 313–314). The provincias score 1 on institutional depth and 0 on policy scope until 1978 and 2 and 1, respectively, as of 1978.8

Prior to the democratic transition, Álava and Navarre were allowed to keep unique fiscal arrangements and some limited autonomy in culture and education. These two provincias score 1 on institutional depth and 1 on policy scope during the dictatorship. After the democratic transition the unique fiscal arrangements (fueros) for all four historically Basque provincias, Álava, Navarre, Biscay (Bizkaia/Vizcaya), and Gipuzkoa (Guipúzcoa) were reinstated (discussed in more detail under fiscal autonomy).

Catalonia has a third layer of intermediate government—comarcas. The legal framework was created by a 1987 regional Law (Law No. 6/1987) and reformed in 2003 (Law No. 8/2003). Municipalities may join together to establish comarcas via a popular referendum. The comarcas primarily act in public health, environment, economic development, social services, consumer protection, tourism, and regional planning (Agranoff and Gallarín 1997; Law No. 6/1987, Art. 25).

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8 Provincial competences are absorbed into the regional government in seven uniprovincial comunidades (Asturias, Cantabria, Baleares, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, and Navarre). In these cases the authority of provincias is not scored once the autonomy statute of the comunidad has been adopted and the provincias cease to function as autonomous institutions.
The 2003 reform expanded their competences within the general framework of local government and created a council of mayors with formal oversight authority in the comarca. It also allowed a comunidad, provincia, or municipality to delegate responsibilities to the comarcas. The comarcas score 2 on institutional depth and 2 on policy scope.

There is one autonomous comarca in Catalonia. Val d’Aran has special authority to protect the Aran language through the public education system (Law No. 16/1990, Art. 20). These differences are too fine-grained to be captured by our measure and Val d’Aran scores the same on institutional depth and policy scope as other comarcas.

The Spanish Constitution granted the right for each island within the Baleares and the Canarias to have their own administration in the form of an island council (consejos or cabildo insulares) (C 1978, Art. 141.4). In 1978, the central government established a pre-autonomy regime in Baleares consisting of one general interisland council (consejo general interinsular)—which would develop into the Baleares parliament in 1983 when Baleares adopted its autonomy statute—and three consejos insulares (Blasco Esteve 2016; Law No. 18/1978, Art. 3–4). The average population size for island councils is around 386,000 inhabitants but the distribution is very uneven, around 900,000 for Mallorca, about 156,000 for Ibiza-Formentera, and almost 95,000 for Menorca. In 2007, a fourth island council was created by splitting the Formentera island council from the Ibiza-Formentera island council. The island Formentera has around 12,000 inhabitants.

The consejos insulares assumed the powers ‘attributed to them by local legislation’ (Law No. 18/1978, Art. 7) and their autonomy was not clearly defined (Law No. 13/1978) until the Baleares adopted its autonomy statute in 1983 which stated that the islands councils can exercise competences in agriculture, fishing, forestry, heritage, hospitals, land planning, libraries, museums, roads, social services, sport, and water management (Law No. 2/1983, Art. 39). Island council autonomy was reinforced in 1985 when a national law on local government allowed the three islands councils to assume the same competences as provinces (Law No. 7/1985, Art. 41.3) and in 1989 a Baleares law made the islands councils responsible for coordinating municipal policy and for assisting municipalities with their tasks (Blasco-Esteve 2016; Law No. 5/1989, Art. 12).

Legislation implemented during the 1990s transferred competences in agriculture, culture, fishing heritage, local government, sports, urban planning, social services, tourism, transport, water parks, and youth. A law adopted in 2000 consolidated previous legislation and sets out the legal procedure for a transfer or delegation of additional competences (Law No. 8/2000, Arts. 29–43). The island councils exercise broad competences including local government and their own institutional set-up but the government of the comunidad has the right of supervision and may request information at any time. Furthermore, island councils are required to send an annual report on the management of the transferred competences (Blasco Esteve 2016; Law No. 8/2000, Arts. 36 and 40). Consejos insulares score 2 on institutional depth as of 1978 and 1 on policy scope until 1989 and 2 from 1990 onwards.

Island regions (cabildo insular) are also present in the Canarias and seven were created in 1912, 9

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9 A list of legislation on the transfer of competences from the comunidad to the island councils between 1990 and 2013 is provided by Blasco Esteve (2016).
four within the province of Santa Cruz de Tenerife and three within the province of Las Palmas. The average population size for island councils is around 346,000 inhabitants but the distribution is very uneven, more than 800,000 for Gran Canaria and Tenerife and close to 11,000 for El Hierro. A law of 1912 introduced direct elections for the island councils and allowed them to assume provincial competences plus ‘consultative functions’ in matters of charity, education, health, public works, and water (Law 11 de julio de 1912, Art. 5). During the Franco dictatorship the members of the island councils were appointed by the provincial governor and cabildo insular functioned as deconcentrated central government outposts. The islands councils within a province formed an interisland provincial federation (mancomunidades provinciales interinsulares) that functioned as the assemblies of the provincias (Law No. 1586/1927).

After the restoration of democracy, the Canary Islands re-established the cabildo insular (C 1978, Art. 141.4; Law No. 10/1982, Art. 22; No. 7/1985, Art. 41.2) and the first direct elections for the island councils took place in 1979. The Canary island autonomy statute in effect since 1983 transferred all powers from the inter-island councils (mancomunidades provinciales interinsulares) to the comunidad (Law No. 10/1982, Art. disposiciones transitorias séptima). The two provinces in the Canary Islands are de jure not abolished but de facto all the competences of provincias are exercised by the cabildo insular. Island councils are prohibited to establish federations for the joint provision of their own or transferred competences and the inter-island councils—which consist of the presidents of the islands councils—‘subsist exclusively as organs of representation and expression of provincial interests’ (Law No. 7/1985, Arts. 41 and 75; No. 14/1990, Art. 35; No. 8/2015, Art. 3).\(^\text{10}\)

In 1986 a law was adopted that enabled the comunidad to delegate competences to the island councils but the Canary Island government can directly control and supervise the execution of those competences. The government of the comunidad has the right of supervision and may request information at any time and island councils are required to keep record of a wide-range of institutional and budgetary details regarding the execution of their competences (Law No. 8/1986, Arts. 8, 11, 13–17, and 48; No. 14/1990, Arts. 18–19 and 36; No. 8/2015, Arts. 41–43, 100-116, and 121–122; No. 1/2018, Art. 73). In addition to the competences laid down in the 1912 law, cabildo insular are responsible for agriculture, animal health, consumer defense, culture, environmental protection fairs, fisheries, hydraulic works, public housing, roads, social assistance, sports, tourism, and water. Islands councils also coordinate municipal services and they provide assistance to municipalities (Law No. 8/1986, Arts. 43–47; No. 14/1990, Arts. 42–43, disposiciones adicionales primera and segunda; No. 8/2015, Arts. 6–8). Cabildo insular scored 1 on institutional depth and 0 on policy scope for 1950-1978 and they score 2 on institutional depth and 2 on policy scope from 1979.

In 1974, the Entidad Municipal Metropolitana de Barcelona (metropolitan municipality of Barcelona) was established and it comprised the city of Barcelona and 26 surrounding

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\(^{10}\) We do not include the two Canary Island provinces of Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas in the scores for provincias from 1983.
municipalities. The metropolitan municipality of Barcelona competences concerned cemeteries, electricity, firefighting, gas, housing, slaughterhouses, transport, waste disposal, wastewater treatment, and water supply (Law No. 5/1974, Art. 10). The metropolitan municipality of Barcelona could exercise these competencies under strict supervision of the central government which had the right to ‘dictate the precise dispositions for the development and execution of this Decree-Law’ (Law No. 5/1974, disposiciones finales sexta). Entidad Municipal Metropolitana de Barcelona scores 1 on institutional depth and 1 on policy scope.

As of 1985, a comunidad may establish metropolitan areas but comunidades need to consult the central government before they adopt a law (Council of Europe: Spain 1997, 2013; Law No. 7/1985, Art. 43). In 1987, the 1974 national law was complemented by a Catalan law which established a Metropolitan Transportation Entity (Entidad Metropolitana del Transporte) and a Metropolitan Entity for Hydraulic Services and Waste Treatment (Entidad Metropolitana de Servicios Hidráulicos y Tratamiento de Residuos) which exercised task-specific competences (Law No. 7/1987, Art. 2). The 1974 national and 1987 Catalan law were repealed by a Catalan law in 2010 which established the metropolitan area of Barcelona (Área Metropolitana de Barcelona). The metropolitan area of Barcelona consists of 36 municipalities (including the city of Barcelona) and it took over the competences exercised by the metropolitan entities for transportation and hydraulic services and waste treatment (Council of Europe: Spain 2002; Law No.31/2010, Arts. 1–2). The metropolitan area of Barcelona provides jointly with its member municipalities environmental protection, public housing, public transport, social and territorial cohesion, urban infrastructure, urban planning, waste disposal, and water (Law No. 31/2010, Art. 14). The central government lost its rights to appoint the members of the executive whose members are now appointed by the metropolitan council (Law No. 31/2010, Arts. 4 and 10). Área Metropolitana de Barcelona scores 2 on institutional depth and 1 on policy scope.

Barcelona, the capital city of Catalonia, did not enjoy substantial additional authority until the adoption of a specific Catalan law in 1998 (Law No. 1166/1960; No. 4/1979, Art. 89; No. 22/1998; No. 1/2006; Mosquera 2006). Barcelona has about 1.6 million inhabitants—which is around 22

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11 Between 1953 and 1974, a Barcelona urban commission (comisión de urbanismo de Barcelona) chaired by the mayor of Barcelona adopted an urban development plan (plan comarcal de ordenación urbana de Barcelona) which covered urban transport, water, and housing policy and which applied to the city of Barcelona and 24 surrounding municipalities (Law No. 339/1953, Arts. 1–3). The urban development plan was implemented by a manager who was appointed by the minister of the interior and the plan had to be approved by the central government (Law No. 339/1953, Arts. 2 and 4; Perez Garcia 2015). We consider the Barcelona urban commission to be task specific governance.

12 In addition to the Área Metropolitana de Barcelona, there are two metropolitan areas in Valencia: the Entidad Metropolitana de Servicios Hidráulicos and the Entidad Metropolitana para el Tratamiento de Residuos but these are task-specific entities and we do not code them.

13 A specific national law applied to Barcelona between 1960 and 2006 (Law Nos. 1166/1960; No. 7/1985, disposiciones adicionales sexta). During the dictatorship, Barcelona had a mayor who was appointed by the central government who had some stronger powers vis-à-vis the assembly compared to mayors in other municipalities. Barcelona was also divided into districts (distritos) each with their own assembly (junta)
Barcelona is divided up into ten districts (distritos) which collectively manage at least 15 per cent of the municipal budget (Law No. 22/1998, Art. 21). Each of the ten districts has their own council (consejo de distrito) and a president (presidente/presidenta) appointed by the city mayor from among the members of the district council (Law No. 22/1998, Arts. 20 and 22). In its capacity as a municipality, Barcelona has responsibility for cemeteries, culture, environmental protection, firefighting, public spaces, refuse collection, roads, sewers, social services, spatial planning, traffic, public transport, and water (Law No. 7/1985, Arts. 25–26; No. 8/1987, Art. 63). The Catalan law attributes additional competences for cultural activities, economic development, education, environmental protection, housing, museums, public health, public safety, road safety, social services, sports, town planning, telecommunications, traffic, urban police, urban transport, waste disposal, and youth (Law No. 22/1998, Arts. 64–140; Mosquera 2006). The city of Barcelona is also subject of a specific national law since 2006 which extends Barcelona’s tasks to include central government competences in central state property, public safety, road safety, telecommunication, traffic, and transport (Law No. 1/2006, Arts. 6–17 and 30; Mosquera 2006). Barcelona scores 2 on institutional depth and 2 on policy scope from 1998.

The regional capital cities of Zaragoza in Aragón and Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands have also a specific regime laid down in comunidad law but, in contrast to Barcelona, not in central government law (González 2012).14 Zaragoza has its own specific regime since 2018 and the city has around 660,000 inhabitants which constitutes about 50 per cent of the total of Aragon’s population. Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands has its own law since 2006 (effective in 2007) and the city has around 400,000 inhabitants which is about 36 per cent of the total population in the Balearic Islands. Both regional capitals are divided into districts (distritos)—Zaragoza has 16 districts and Palma de Mallorca has five districts—each with their own municipal board which administers city public services (Law No. 23/2006, Art. 27; No. 187/2004; No. 288/2015). In addition to municipal competences both Zaragoza and Palma de Mallorca are responsible for additional tasks relating to cultural heritage, education, environmental protection, fairs and markets, public housing, social services, sport, telecommunication, tourism, transport, urban planning, waste disposal, and youth (Law No. 23/2006, Arts. 70–138; No. 10/2017, Arts. 24–47).

14 The regional capital cities of the Basque Country (Gazteiz-Vitoria), Canary Islands (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Santa Cruz de Tenerife), Castilla La Mancha (Toledo), Castilla and Leon (Valladolid), Extremadura (Mérida), Galicia (Santiago de Compostela), La Rioja (Logroño), and Navarra (Pamplona) also have their own laws but these do not grant the regional capitals additional competences in comparison to other municipalities within the comunidad (González 2012; Law No. 1/1980; No. 13/1987; No. 16/1997, No. 4/2002; No. 1/2004; No. 11/2004; No. 8/2007; No. 2/2015; No. 7/2015). These specific laws either specify that a particular chapter of the law on local government applies to the regional capital (Law No. 57/2003; see footnote 4) or introduce collaboration mechanisms between the regional capital and the comunidad, and/or specify that the regional capital receives additional (un)conditional intergovernmental grants.
Palma de Mallorca (from 2007) and Zaragoza (from 2018) score 2 on institutional depth and 2 on policy scope.

FISCAL AUTONOMY

There are two tax regimes for comunidades: a special foral regime for Navarre and the Basque Country and a common regime for the remaining comunidades.\(^\text{15}\)

The common tax regime for comunidades was established in 1980 with the adoption of an organic law on the finances of autonomous communities (called the LOFCA) setting out which taxes could be devolved and which could not. Taxes that could be devolved were wealth taxes and taxes on real estate sales, inheritance, property, and gambling (Aja 2001; Law No. 8/1980, Art. 9; Toboso and Scorsone 2010).

Subsequent legislation ceded extensive regional control over spending, but little control over revenue. In 1993, comunidades began to receive 15 percent of the central income tax. In 1997 this was doubled to 30 percent and comunidades gained control over property tax and several minor taxes (inheritance and gifts, real estate, and stamp tax, and both base and rate on gambling) (Almendral 2002). Comunidades also gained authority over the rate of income tax within a band set by central government (Law No. 3/1996; Morales and Molés 2002; Toboso and Scorsone 2010). In 2002 another 3 percent of the income tax was devolved, along with 40 percent of alcohol, tobacco, and petrol, 35 percent of the VAT, and 100 percent of electricity (Law No. 7/ 2001; López-Laborda et al. 2006; López-Laborda and Monasterio 2006; Toboso and Scorsone 2010; Swenden 2006: 134). In 2010, the ceded amounts increased to 50 percent of the income tax, 50 percent of the VAT, and 58 percent of alcohol, tobacco, and petrol (Chapman Osterkatz 2013: 358; Herrero-Alcalde et al. 2012; Lago-Peñas and Solé-Ollé 2016: 194–202; Law No. 3/2009; Ruano 2017: 95–99). Comunidades can introduce new taxes if not already levied by the central government (Law No. 8/1980, Art. 6), but there are few areas where this is possible. The comunidades score 2 until 1997 and 3 from 1997 onwards.

Until 1978, Ceuta and Melilla were ruled as dependencies. From 1978 until 1997, they were

\(^{15}\) The Canary Islands also has a specific tax regime (C 1978, disposiciones adicionales tercera; Law No. 10/1982, Art. 45) which originally consisted of tax exemptions and reduced tax rates for businesses established on the Canary Islands but later also included state policies to promote socio-economic development and reduced prices for air, land and sea transport, energy, and telecommunication for citizens in the Canary Islands. The tax exemptions, reduced tax rates, and cost reductions are set by the central government. The Canary Islands can have some input on its special tax regime through a joint commission (comisión mixta) between the comunidad and the Spanish government which has advisory rights (Law No. 19/1994, Art. 16; No. 8/2018, Art. 20). Between 1972 and 1993, advisory input was provided by the interprovincial economic board (Junta Económica Interprovincial) whose members included representatives from the two provinces and seven cabildo insular (Law No. 30/1972; No 20/1991, No. 19/1994; No 8/2018). In addition, the central government needs to consult the Canary Islands parliament before changing the financial and tax regime or before adopting policy that may affect the financial and tax regime (Law No. 10/1982, Art. 45). The Canary Islands does not exercise tax autonomy or fiscal control through its special financial and tax regime.\(^{\beta}\)
entitled to an additional share of central taxes and an additional 50 percent of the fiscal portion of municipal taxes levied by the enclaves. The 1996 reform (effective in 1997) of the law on the financing of the autonomous communities put them on equal fiscal footing with comunidades (Law No. 3/1996). Ceuta and Mellila score zero until 1978, 2 from 1978 until 1997, and 3 from 1997 onwards.

Provincias have limited fiscal autonomy. They are funded with small portions of the income tax, VAT, municipal transfers, and some other minor taxes of those living in their territory (Law No. 39/1988, Art. 125). Provincias can levy a surcharge on the business tax within centrally imposed limits and control the rate of property tax, a surcharge on the municipal business tax, and a motor vehicle tax. They can also set the rate on buildings, facilities, and urban property (Agranoff 2010: 134–141; Agranoff and Gallarín 1997; Betrana, Espinosa, and Magre 2014: 232–235; Council of Europe 1997; Law No. 39/1988, Art. 124; Pedraja-Chaparro et al. 2006). Provincias score 1 from 1978.

The foral regime in Navarre and the Basque Country dates back to Roman times and during the Franco regime survived only in the provincias of Álava and Navarre (Law No. 16/1969; 2948/1976). The constitution of 1978 reauthorized the special fiscal arrangements for the provincias of Biscay and Gipuzkoa (Aja 2001; C 1978, additional provision one). While in the rest of Spain, taxes are paid to the center and set amounts are transferred back to the comunidades, the governments of these four provinces collect income, corporate, inheritance, and wealth taxes and are able to set the tax rate and base for these taxes autonomously (López-Laborda and Monasterio 2006; Toboso and Scorsone 2010). Taxes are collected at the provincial level and a portion is remitted to the central and Basque governments after negotiations (Toboso and Scorsone 2010). In the Basque territories the amount must total 6.24 percent of what the central government spends on non-transferred competences. The amount is 1.62 percent in Navarre (Chapman Osterkatz 2013: 94).

The modern fiscal regime in the Basque Country (Concierto) was set up in 1981 (Law No. 12/1981) and reformed in 2002 (Law No. 12/2002; López-Laborda et al. 2006). The Basque parliament guarantees harmonization among the three provinces with regard to their legislative and executive powers. To this end, the Basque tax coordination agency (Órgano de Coordinación Tributaria de Euskadi) was created in 1989 (Law No. 3/1989) and the three provincial councils and the Basque government are represented in this agency. However, the Basque government cannot compel its provinces to enact or revoke taxes. Fiscal autonomy lies with the Basque provinces and the comunidad scores zero. Álava scores 3 from 1950–1977 and 4 subsequently and Biscay and Gipuzkoa score zero until 1977 and 4 subsequently. Navarre’s fiscal regime (Convenio) originated in 1841 and has been renewed several times, most recently in 1969 and 1990. The arrangements were prolonged during the democratic transition and through the process of creating the comunidades (Law No. 839/1978; No. 2655/1979; No. 13/1982, Arts. 43 and 45; López-Laborda et al. 2006). The first amendment to the fiscal regime concerned the collection and administration of VAT (Law No. 18/1986). The 1990 Convenio (Law No. 28/1990) was reformed in 2003 (Law No. 25/2003). Navarre scores 3 from
The island councils in the Canary and Balearic Islands have similar tax competences since 1985 when a national law on local government allowed the islands councils to assume the same competences as of provinces (Law No. 7/1985, Art. 41). Significant redistribution between island councils take place through interinsular funds, the *fondo de compensación interinsular* and *fondo interinsular de financiación de servicios* in the Balearic Islands (Law No. 2/1989, Arts. 31–40; No. 2/2002, Art. 2) and the *fondo de solidaridad* in the Canary Islands (Law No. 1/2018, Art. 181). *Consejos insulares* and *cabildo insulares* score 0 until 1985 and 1 as of 1985.

Catalan *comarcas* and the Val d’Aran are funded by the municipalities and cannot set the base or rate of a tax (Law No. 6/1987, Arts. 43–47; No. 16/1990, Art. 25).

The *Entidad Municipal Metropolitana de Barcelona* was financially dependent on contributions from the participating municipalities set by the central government and intergovernmental transfers from the province of Barcelona and the central government (Law No. 5/1974, Arts. 11–12). The main sources of income of the *Área Metropolitana de Barcelona* are a surcharge on a real estate tax set by the member municipalities, user fees, and intergovernmental transfers from the central state, the Catalan government, and the member municipalities (Law No. 31/2010, Arts. 40–42).

The city of Barcelona can set the rates for a property tax, a tax on economic activities, and a motor vehicle tax (Law No. 39/1988, Art. 60). The national law for Barcelona allows the city to set a surcharge of up to 5 per cent on the maximum tax rate which can be set by municipalities (Law No. 1/2006, Art. 41; Mosquera 2006). Zaragoza and Palma de Mallorca can set the rate of a property tax, a tax on motor vehicles, a tax on economic activities and, optionally, a tax on constructions and installations (Council of Europe: Spain 1997, 2013; Law No. 39/1988, No. 23/2006, Arts. 1 and 9; No. 10/2017, Arts. 3 and 8). Zaragoza receives unconditional grants which are laid down in a bilateral economic-financial agreement (Law No 10/2017, Art. 57) and Palma de Mallorca is entitled to 16 per cent of the infrastructure investments of the budget of the *comunidad* (Law No. 23/2006, Art. 142).

**BORROWING AUTONOMY**

All *comunidades* may issue debt with prior authorization by the central government (Gordo and Cos 2001; European Commission 2012; Toboso and Scorsone 2010). Authorization is also necessary for loans raised outside the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Council of Europe 2000). Only access to short term credit of less than one year is not subject to prior central approval. Furthermore, *comunidades* may borrow only to finance capital investments and the sum on annual repayments and interest may not exceed 25 percent of the regional government’s revenue (Gordo and Cos 2001; Law No. 8/1980, Art. 14; Swenden 2006: 134). *Comunidades* may borrow to mitigate temporary cash imbalances if the bond maturity does not exceed one year.

Since 2002, *comunidades* must run balanced budgets or budgets with a surplus (Law No. 5/2001; No. 3/2006; López-Laborda and Monasterio 2006) and, as of 2010, they have an obligation to publish budgetary execution data on a quarterly basis (European Commission 2012).
Since 2012, comunidades have a debt ceiling of 13 per cent of regional GDP. The central government can impose sanctions and regional expenditure will automatically be adjusted in case of non-compliance (Law No. 2/2012; Moreno 2016). In addition, the central government must authorize all loans cases and comunidades are required to submit information on debt on a quarterly basis when a comunidad does not meet budgetary stability targets or when debt limits are exceeded (Lago-Peñas and Solé-Ollé 2016: 194–202; Law No. 6/2015, Art. 20). Comunidades score 1 on borrowing autonomy from 1980 or from the year in which their autonomy statute was adopted.

All provincias may borrow only for investment purposes and under prior authorization by the ministry of finance or by the government of its comunidad (and then only if the comunidad has assumed monitoring competences) (Council of Europe 1997; Law No. 39/1988, Arts. 50–54; Monasterio-Escudero and Suárez-Pandiello 2002; Velasco Caballero 2019). Prior to the democratic transition, a network of public banks issued credit to provincial and municipal governments on a regular basis. Soon after the transition, central bailouts were required to stabilize local finances. Provincias therefore score 1 from 1950.

Until 1978, Ceuta and Melilla were ruled as dependencies but fell under the same borrowing regime as provincias between 1978 and 1995. They are subject to the same borrowing rules as comunidades from 1995. Ceuta and Melilla score zero until 1978 and 1 from 1978 onwards.

The island councils in the Balearic Islands and Canary Islands have similar borrowing autonomy as provinces since 1985 when a national law on local government allowed the three islands councils to assume the same competences as provinces (Law No. 7/1985, Art. 41). Borrowing autonomy was reinforced in the Balearic Islands in 2000 when the latest comunidad law on island councils was adopted and in the Canary Islands in 2018 when its autonomy statute was revised (Law No. 8/2000, Art. 8; No. 1/2018, Art. 180). Consejos insulares and cabildo insulares score 0 until 1985 and 1 as of 1985.

Catalan comarcas and Val d’Aran are funded by their municipalities and have no borrowing autonomy (Law No. 6/1987, Arts. 43–47; No. 16/1990, Art. 25).

The Entidad Municipal Metropolitana de Barcelona was not allowed to borrow (Law No. 5/1974, Art. 11). The Área Metropolitana de Barcelona does not have borrowing autonomy (Law No. 31/2010, Art. 40).

The city of Barcelona can borrow for investment purposes and with prior approval from the ministry of finance (Law No. 8/1987, Art. 181; No. 39/1988, Arts. 50–54). Zaragoza and Palma de Mallorca can borrow with prior approval by their comunidad or central government but only for investment purposes and when outstanding debt does not exceed 75 per cent of current revenues (Council of Europe: Spain 1997, 2013; Law No. 39/1988; No. 23/2006, Arts. 1 and 9; No. 10/2017, Arts. 3 and 8).

REPRESENTATION
At the level of the comunidad, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, and Andalusia hold direct elections on a date set by their assembly (Colino and del Pino 2010; Gómez Fortes and Cabeza
The first elections took place in Catalonia and the Basque Country in 1980, followed by Galicia in 1981 and Andalusia in 1982. Direct elections were introduced in all other comunidades in 1983 and take place every four years. In all comunidades, executives are elected by and from the assemblies. Comunidades score 2 on assembly and 2 on executive from the first election onwards.

Ceuta and Melilla were managed directly from the center during the Franco regime and have had popularly elected councils since 1979, with executives elected by the assembly (Law No. 1/1995; No. 2/1995). Ceuta and Melilla score zero on assembly and executive until 1979 and 2 and 2, respectively, from 1979.

All provincias have had indirectly elected assemblies (juntas generales or cortes) selected by the municipalities and an executive (diputación provincial or foral) since 1812 (Betrayna, Espinosa, and Magre 2014: 228–232; Law No. 173/1978, Art. 31). The assembly elects the executive (Law No. 173/1978, Art. 34) but under the dictatorship of Franco the president of the executive (gobernador civil) was centrally appointed. Provincias score 1 on assembly and zero on executive until 1978 and 1 and 2, respectively, from 1978.

Between 1978 and 2007, representatives elected to the Baleares parliament (not including the president of the comunidad and the president of the Baleares parliament) were also member of an island council from the island where they were elected from (Blasco-Esteve 2016; Law No. 2/1983, Art. 38; No. 8/2000, Art. 3). In 2007, dual mandates were abolished and separate elections are held for the consejos insulares and comunidad (Blasco Esteve 2016; Law No. 2/1983, Art. 64.1). The president of an island council is elected by the council and the president can appoint members from the council to join a government committee (comisión de gobierno) presided by the president or the president can appoint an executive council (consejeros ejecutivos) consisting of at least one vice-president and three executive directors (Law No. 8/2000, Art. 7).

Between 1950 and 1979, the members of the cabildo insular in the Canary Islands were appointed by the provincial governor. Since 1979, the members of the cabildo insular are directly elected every four years and the first candidate on the list that receives the most votes becomes the president of the island council (Law No. 5/1985, Art. 201; No. 1/2018, Art. 68).

The comarcas in Catalonia have indirectly elected councils (Law No. 6/1987, Art. 20). The assembly of Val d’Aran (Conselh Generau d’Aran) is directly elected (Law No. 16/1990, Arts. 11–13). The executive in the comarcas is elected by the council (Law No. 6/1987, Art. 22; No. 16/1990, Art. 15). Comarcas score 1 on assembly and 2 on executive and Val d’Aran scores 2 and 2, respectively.

The members of the council (consejo metropolitano) of the Entidad Municipal Metropolitana de Barcelona were elected by the assembly members of the participating municipalities of the Barcelona metropolitan area (Law No. 5/1974, Art. 3). The president (presidente) of the metropolitan council was appointed by the minister of the interior who had to select one of the assembly presidents of the member municipalities (Law No. 5/1974, Art. 3). The executive was formed by the metropolitan administration commission (comisión administrativa metropolitana) whose members were appointed by the metropolitan council except for the metropolitan manager.
(gerencia metropolitana) who was appointed by the minister of the interior (Law No. 5/1974, Arts. 6–7). The Entidad Municipal Metropolitana de Barcelona scores 1 on assembly and 1 on executive.β

The mayors of the member municipalities are ex officio members of the metropolitan council (consejo metropolitan) of the Área Metropolitana de Barcelona and municipalities elect additional representatives relative to their population size from among the members of the municipal assemblies (Law No. 31/2010, Art. 6). The mayor members of the metropolitan council are eligible to elect the president (presidente/presidenta) and a presidential candidate requires the support of mayors who represent two-thirds of the total population of the metropolitan area (Law No. 31/2010, Art. 10). The executive board (junta de gobierno) assists the president and its members are selected by the metropolitan council and appointed by the president (Law No. 31/2010, Art. 4).

As of 1979, the council of the city (pleno/ayuntamiento) of Barcelona is directly elected every four years. The council appoints from among its members a mayor (alcalde/batlle) and an executive board (junta de gobierno/comisión de gobierno) to assist the mayor (Law No. 7/1985, Art. 19). The assemblies of Palma de Mallorca and Zaragoza are also directly elected and the assemblies elect the mayors (Law No. 5/1985; No. 23/2006, Arts. 1 and 9; No. 10/2017, Arts. 3 and 8).

Shared rule

Provincias do not participate in intergovernmental meetings with the exception of those in the Basque Country, and have no executive, fiscal, or borrowing control. The consejos insulares and cabildo insulares exercise multilateral shared rule within respectively the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands. There is no shared rule for comarcas and Val d’Aran. The city of Barcelona exercises bilateral shared rule within Catalonia but the Entidad Municipal Metropolitana de Barcelona and Área Metropolitana de Barcelona do not have shared rule. The regional capitals of Zaragoza and Palma de Mallorca also exercise bilateral shared rule within respectively Aragón and the Balearic Islands.

LAW MAKING

Until 1977, the Spanish parliament was unicameral. The Cortes Generales (lower house) was set up in 1942 by the Franco regime. Provincial representation consisted of the mayor of the capital city of each provincia and one representative from the municipalities (Law No. 200/1942, Art. 2.e), but provincial weight in the Cortes as a whole was minimal (Law No. 200/1942, Art. 2). Moreover, the parliament lacked authority since Franco could legislate by decree.

A law on political reform was passed in the Cortes in 1976 and put to popular referendum in early 1977 (Law No. 1/1977). The law re-established the senate as a body of territorial representation, giving the king the right to appoint a fifth of the members (Law No. 1/1977, Art. 2). The 1978 constitution eliminated royal appointment and introduced representation for the
comunidades (C 1978, Art. 66), which had not yet been formed. Since then, the provincias have 208 members and comunidades 58 members in the 266-seat chamber (Harty 2002; Watts 2008). The Senado has some reserved powers over constitutional appointments (C 1978, Arts. 122 and 159), but can be overridden by a majority in the lower house on normal legislation and may not initiate legislation (C 1978, Art. 90).

The assembly of each comunidad selects at least one member up to a limit of one senator per million inhabitants (C 1978, Art. 69.5). In the current Senado, the number of seats ranges from one for La Rioja, Cantabria, and Navarre to eight for Catalonia and nine for Andalusia. While the aggregation rule clearly falls between the principle of “one region, one vote” and “one person, one vote,” it appears closer to the latter. Comunidades’ assemblies designate representatives in the Senado (L2) but their representatives constitute a minority (zero on L3).

All provincial senators are popularly elected and four senators are elected per provincia. The island councils serve as electoral constituencies instead of provinces in the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands, three for the larger islands, and one for the smaller islands (C 1978, Art. 69; Hueghlin and Fenna 2006: 211–213; Law No. 5/1985, Art. 165). Provincias and island councils are the unit of representation (L1) and provincial and island council senators constitute a majority in the Senado (L3).16

Under their special autonomy status, Ceuta and Melilla each had three representatives, one directly elected deputy in the lower house and two directly elected senators, but they did not have special bilateral arrangements for law making (C 1978, Arts. 68.2 and 69.4). Since 1995, they have had two directly elected senators. Ceuta and Melilla are units of representation (L1) and together with the provincial and island council senators they constitute a majority in the Senado (L3).

The consejo insular in the Balearic Islands have the right to propose legislation to the Baleares Parliament but there is no obligation for the comunidad government to consult the islands councils on comunidad legislation (Law No. 2/1983, Art. 26; No. 2/1989, Art. 7; No. 8/2000, Arts. 8 and 25). Since 1982, cabildo insular in the Canary Islands are consulted on draft comunidad bills that affect their competences (L5) and they have the right to propose comunidad legislation in the comunidad parliament (Law No. 10/1982, Arts. 11.4 and 64; No. 8/1986, Art. 38; No. 14/1990, Arts. 37–39 and 45; No. 8/2015, Arts. 4 and 10).

The statute of Catalonia specifies that the city council of Barcelona has the right to participate in the drafting of bills that affect the special regime of the city of Barcelona (L5) but Barcelona does not have a veto (Law No. 4/1979, Art. 89). Similarly, Zaragoza in Aragón and Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands are consulted when proposed comunidad laws affect the cities’ competences laid down in their specific regimes (L5) (Law No. 23/2006, disposición adicional segunda; No. 10/2017, disposición adicional primera).

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16 Asturias, Cantabria, Islas Baleares, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, and Navarre combine the institutions of provincias and comunidades. Island councils in the Balearic Islands and Canary Islands exercise the shared rule that is allocated to provincias in other comunidades. When calculating country scores we include the collective shared rule in law making exercised by these uniprovincial comunidades and the islands councils in the scores of the provincias.
EXECUTIVE CONTROL

Over time three types of intergovernmental meetings have developed: sectoral conferences (conferencias sectoriales), the conference on European Affairs (Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas), and the bilateral cooperation commissions (comisiones bilaterales de cooperación) (Law No. 40/2015, Arts. 145–154). A Law on the process of autonomy adopted in 1983 stipulated that sectoral committees consisting of representatives from central and regional government would meet at least twice a year (Agranoff 2004; Agranoff and Gallarín 1997; Bolleyer 2006a; Law No. 12/1983, Art. 4). The committees convened at the request of the central government or one of the comunidades, but meetings were ad hoc and did not result in binding agreements (Beramendi and Máiz 2004: 137; Gómez 2008: 132–133). Negotiation between the national government and the comunidades were kick-started from 1987 with intergovernmental meetings on health (Consejo Interterritorial del Sistema Nacional de Salud) that can conclude binding agreements (Law No. 14/1986, final provision 7; No. 16/2003, Arts. 69–75; Nieto 2008).

In 1992, the intergovernmental framework was consolidated by a Law allowing central government ministers to initiate sectoral conferences which may result in binding collaboration agreements (Law No. 30/1992, Arts. 5–6; Nieto 2008). Decision-making varies from simply and qualified majority to unanimity and in many sectoral committees at least half of the comunidades must adopt a decision (Gómez 2008: 134-137). In 1999, the 1992 Law was amended to formalize and institutionalize sectoral conferences by specifying the items to be included in the collaboration agreements (Law No. 4/1999; Morales and Marín 2015). More recently, the autonomy statutes of Andalusia, Aragon, Baleares, Castilla y León, Catalonia, and Extremadura, have further enhanced the formalization of intergovernmental meetings (Law No. 6/2006; No. 1/2007; No. 2/2007; No. 5/2007; No. 14/2007; No. 1/2011).

In addition to the sectoral committees, there is the Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas (Conference for European Affairs) established in 1988 and the Conferencia de Presidentes (Conference of Presidents) established in 2004 (Morales and Marín 2015). In 1994 the Conference on European Affairs adopted an agreement that involved comunidades in preparing a Spanish position in the Council of Ministers (Hueghlin and Fenna 2006: 242–243). In 1997, this agreement was formalized in law (Law No. 2/1997). It sets out rules on the adoption of decisions that require the support of a majority of comunidades (Law No. 2/1997, Annex). In addition, comunidades obtained one representative in the Spanish delegation to the EU who, since 2004, participates as a permanent representative in the Councils of Ministers for employment, social policy, health and consumers; agriculture and fishing; environment; and education, youth, and culture.

The Conferencia de Presidentes consists of the presidents of the Spanish government and the seventeen comunidades and Ceuta and Melilla and has held meetings on European affairs, health care finance, research, technological development and innovation, fiscal stability and the
employment situation. In 2009 it adopted internal regulations which stipulate that resolutions at 
the annual meeting are adopted by consensus and recommendations are adopted with the support 
of Spanish president and two-thirds of the presidents of the comunidades (Law No. 3409/2009).

Since 1987 comunidades score 2 on multilateral executive control. Multilateral executive 
control was extended to Ceuta and Melilla when they adopted their autonomy statutes in 1995. 

The system of multilateral executive control—i.e. the sectoral conferences and the conference 
of presidents—is complemented by a system of bilateral executive control which consists of 
nineteen bilateral cooperation commissions (comisiones bilaterales de cooperación). The first 
bilateral cooperation commissions were established in Andalusia, the Basque Country, and 
Catalonia in 1987, most other comunidades followed during the 1990s, and the final bilateral 
commissions were established in Madrid and Valencia in 2000 (Ridaura Martinez 2007; Gallarín 
2008). Until 2000, all bilateral cooperation commissions had a similar governing structure: the 
central state and comunidad provided an equal number of representatives, the presidency was 
rotating or the central state delivered the president, the comunidad delivered the vice-president, 
the commission met at the request of the central state or comunidad, and decisions were adopted 
by consensus. However, the bilateral cooperation commissions lacked a legal basis and meetings 
were ad hoc and rarely resulted in binding agreements (Gallarín 2008).

A law adopted in 1999 provided a legal basis for the bilateral cooperation commissions and a 
law adopted in 2000 required the central state and comunidades to first discuss and try to resolve 
a disagreement through the bilateral cooperation commission before filing a case before the 
Constitutional Court (Lattora Vila 2012; Law No. 4/1999, Art. 3.2; No. 1/2000). During the 2000s, 
several bilateral cooperation commissions adopted new internal rules (normas de funcionamiento) 
and a number of comunidades formalized their bilateral cooperation commission through their 
autonomy statutes whereas six comunidades did not change anything since their bilateral 
cooperation commission was established in the 1980s or 1990s (Expósito Suárez 2010; Lattora 
Vila 2012). The bilateral cooperation commissions of nine comunidades adopted new internal 
rules during the 2000s which set up a joint secretariat and required the comunidad and central 
government to discuss mutual collaboration on a variety of issues but these commissions very 
rarely meet or have not met at all (Aja and Colino 2014: 455; Gallarín 2008; Morales and Marín 
2015). Four comunidades formalized their bilateral cooperation committee in their autonomy 
statute during the 2000s and their bilateral cooperation committees subsequently introduced a 
rotating presidency, established a permanent secretariat, instituted sub-committees on cooperation 
and participation, dispute resolution, economic and fiscal affairs, EU and external affairs, and state

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18 Ceuta, La Rioja, Melilla, Murcia, Navarra, and the Basque Country.

19 Asturias (from 2005), Balearic Islands (from 2006), Canary Islands (from 2002), Cantabria (from 2003), Castilla La Mancha (from 2001), Extremadura (from 2005), Galicia (from 2003), Madrid (from 2001), and Valencia (from 2001).
investments in infrastructure,\textsuperscript{20} and introduced the requirement that the commission meets at least once or twice per year. These four comunidades score 2 on bilateral executive control from the year their bilateral cooperation commission introduced the aforementioned changes into their internal regulations.\textsuperscript{21}

Since 2008, the presidents of the four islands councils and the comunidad Baleares meet in the conferencia de presidentes (Blasco Esteve 2016; Law No. 2/1983, Art. 74). The conference of presidents meets at least twice per year, is chaired by the president of the comunidad, and decisions are taken by unanimity (Law No. 24467/2007). Consejos insulares score 2 on multilateral executive control within the Balearic Islands from 2008.

In the Canary Islands, representatives from the comunidad and cabildo insular meet in an insular collaboration council (consejo de colaboración insular) since 2015. Half of the members is appointed by the comunidad and the other half is appointed by the island councils. The insular collaboration council is chaired by a comunidad representative and a decision is adopted when it is supported by a majority of representatives from the comunidad and a majority of representatives from the island councils (Law No. 8/2015, Art. 128). In addition to the permanent insular collaboration council, the comunidad and cabildo insular can also set up sectoral cooperation bodies which are chaired by the comunidad (Law No. 8/2015, Art. 129). The reform of 2015 also introduced the conference of presidents (conferencia de presidentes) which consists of the presidents from the comunidad and island councils (Law No. 8/2015, Art. 141; No. 1/2018, Art. 74). Cabildo insulares score 2 on multilateral executive control within the Canary Islands from 2015.

The Catalan specific law for the city of Barcelona introduces consortia (consorcio) which are set up by agreement between the Barcelona city council and the Catalan parliament to coordinate the activities and policies of the city of Barcelona and the Catalan government (Law No. 22/1998, Art. 60). Consortia have to be established for education, health, public housing, social services, transport, and urban planning (Law No. 22/1998, Arts. 61.7, 66, 90, and 104). Three-fifths of members of these consortia are appointed by the Catalan government and two-fifths by the Barcelona city council but for few consortia (e.g. health) the ratios are reversed. The central government may have a non-voting member in the consortia for urban planning and transport (Law No. 22/1998, Arts. 66, 85, 90, 105, 108, and 124). The city of Barcelona scores 2 on bilateral executive control within Catalonia from 1998.

Aragón has a bilateral capital council (consejo bilateral de capital) which consists of an equal number of representatives from the comunidad and Zaragoza (Law No. 10/2017, Art. 20). The bilateral capital council meets at least twice per year to discuss joint actions, to coordinate city and comunidad policy, and to reach agreements regarding the transfer or delegation of powers (Law No. 10/2017, Arts. 21–22). Zaragoza scores 2 on bilateral executive control within Aragón from 2018.

\textsuperscript{20} The bilateral cooperation committee of Catalonia also has a subcommittee on immigration to discuss work and residence of foreigners in Catalonia.

\textsuperscript{21} Andalusia (from 2007), Aragón (from 2007), Castilla y León (from 2008), and Catalonia (from 2007).
The Balearic Islands has a capital city council (consejo de la capitalidad) which consists of an equal number of representatives from the comunidad, the island councils (consejos insulares) and the city council (Law No. 23/2006, Art. 23). The capital city council is presided by the mayor of Palma de Mallorca and meets at least twice a year to coordinate the exercise of the competences of the comunidad, the island council, and the city. Agreements are adopted by majority whereby each of the three groups of representatives has one vote (Law No. 23/2006, Arts. 22 and 24). Palma de Mallorca scores 2 on bilateral executive control within the Balearic Islands from 2006.

FISCAL CONTROL
Comunidades can influence national tax policy through their institutional representation in the Senado, but the Senado can be overridden by a majority in the lower house (C 1978, Art. 90). In addition, there is considerable attention to fiscal matters in the intergovernmental meetings through the Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera (Council on Fiscal Policy and Finance), created by the LOFCA 1980 and used for making recommendations on regional finance formulas, transfers, and revenue sharing (Law No. 8/1980, Art. 3). The council is composed of representatives of the ministry of finance, the minister of economic planning, and regional finance ministers and it meets at least two times per year (Santamaria and Gallarín 2008; Watts 2005). The Basque Country and Navarre are members of the Consejo. The Law on the finances of autonomous communities, LOFCA, establishes an inter-territorial compensation fund (Law No. 8/1980, Art. 16) and reforms of the Law, including the articles concerning inter-territorial compensation, are subject to debate in the Consejo (Law No. 7/2001, Art. 4). Comunidades score 1 on multilateral fiscal control from the year in which their autonomy statute was adopted. When Ceuta and Melilla became ciudades autónomas in 1995, they also became members of the Consejo (Law No. 3/1996) and score 1 on multilateral fiscal control.

The foral rights of the Basque provinces and Navarre are embedded in the 1978 constitution but the implementation of the special tax regimes is subject to bilateral agreements (C 1978, Additional provision one). A fixed amount of the revenue collected by the Basque Country and Navarre is transferred to the central government to cover central government activity in those territories. This fixed amount, or cupo, is settled in advance in bilateral foral economic treaties (Toboso and Scorsone 2010). During the Franco regime, the Basque provinces had no special intergovernmental avenues for negotiation. The fiscal regime for the Basque Country (Concierto) was set up in 1981 and was renegotiated in 2002 but the cupo is negotiated every five years (Law No. 12/1981, Art. 48; No. 12/2002, Arts. 49–50). The negotiations on the fiscal regime take place in a coordination committee (Comisión coordinadora) composed of four central government representatives and four Basque representatives, one from each of the three Basque provinces and one from the Basque government (Law No. 12/1981, Art. 40). The cupo is decided by a joint committee (Comisión Mixta del Concierto Económico) which meets every five years and consists of an equal number of representatives from the central government and the Basque region (half of whom are appointed by the provinces and half by the Basque government (Law No. 12/1981, Art.49; Swenden 2006: 135–136). The 2002 fiscal agreement made the joint committee responsible
for determining the cupo and for negotiating amendments to the fiscal agreement. It stipulates that
decisions are taken unanimously (Law No. 12/2002, Arts. 61–62).

Within the Basque Country a tax coordination agency (Órgano de Coordinación Tributaria de Euskadi) is responsible for coordinating the tax regimes of the three provinces. The agency was set up in 1989 and the board consists of three representatives from the Basque government and one representative from each provincial council. Its competences are limited to issuing reports (Law No. 3/1989, Arts. 16–17). The Basque government and Álava, Biscay, and Gipuzkoa score 2 on bilateral fiscal control from 1981 onwards.

Navarre’s fiscal regime (Convenio) was in place during the Franco regime and was extended into the democratic transition (see Fiscal Autonomy, discussed earlier). A new fiscal regime was concluded in 1990. The 1990 agreement installs an arbitration board (Junta Arbitral) with a president appointed by the Spanish government (after the opinion of the supreme court of Navarre) tasked with resolving regional/central government disputes. Four of its members are appointed by the central government and four by the government of Navarre (Law No. 28/1990, Arts. 45–46). A similar arrangement exists for the Basque Country (Law No. 12/2002, Arts. 65–67). The annual cupo of Navarre is negotiated every five years by a coordination commission (Comisión Coordinador) of twelve members, also split between the central government and Navarre (Law No. 28/1990, Arts. 53 and 61; Swenden 2006: 135–136). Changes to the Convenio need to be approved by the parliaments of both Spain and Navarre (Law No. 13/1982, Art. 45). The latest revision was adopted in 2003 (Law No. 25/2003). Navarre scores 2 on bilateral fiscal control from 1983 onwards.

An interinsular financial council (consejo financiero interinsular) was introduced in the Balearic Islands in 2002 when a specific financial system was established. This council consists of three representatives from the comunidad government and three representatives from the islands councils and it advises the comunidad government on the application of the interinsular compensation fund (fondo de compensación interinsular) and the interinsular fund for financing services (fondo interinsular de financiación de servicios) (Law No. 2/2002, Art. 8). The interinsular financial council does not negotiate the regulations of the financial system laid down in comunidad law and consejos insulares do not exercise fiscal control.

Between 1986 and 2015, cabildo insular in the Canary Islands were represented in the territorial administration commission (comisión de administración territorial) which advised and produced opinions on the fiscal economic regime of the Canary Islands which includes rules on indebtedness, public investment, and tax harmonization. This commission was chaired by the vice-president of the comunidad and one half of the members included comunidad councilors, directors, and other members appointed by the comunidad. The other half of the members consisted of the presidents of the seven island councils plus three mayors including one from each of the two capital cities (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Santa Cruz de Tenerife). The comunidad government regulated the operation of this commission and decided on the fiscal economic regime (Law No. 8/1986, Art. 24; No. 14/1990, Art. 21). The cabildo insular fall short of exercising fiscal control. A law adopted in 2015 abolished the territorial administration commission and the law explicitly
states that the comunidad coordinates the fiscal, financial, budgetary, and indebtedness policies of the island councils. This regime was reinforced by a revision of the autonomy statute in 2018 (Law No. 8/2015, Art. 134; No. 1/2018, Art. 180).

BORROWING CONTROL
Coordination of public debt is discussed in the Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera (see Fiscal control, discussed earlier). The decisions of the council are adopted by two-thirds of the votes or, when falling short in the first round, an absolute majority in a second round (Council of Europe 2000; Santamaría and Gallarín 2008). However, the Consejo originally had only an advisory role (Law No. 8/1980, Art. 3.2; López-Laborda et al. 2006).

The control of the Consejo on borrowing increased when, in response to EMU, a Law was adopted in 2001 (in force since 2002) stipulating that comunidades should achieve budgetary stability and that they must submit recovery plans subject to approval of the Consejo when they run deficits (European Commission 2011; Gordo and de Cos 2001; Law No. 5/2001, Arts. 2 and 8). The 2001 Law also applies to the Basque Country and Navarre (Law 5/2001, final disposition one). The central government has 50 percent of the votes and can overrule comunidades when one comunidad decides to support the central government. Before 2006, comunidad budgets were presented and approved in the Consejo. A reform in 2006 reduced the role for the Consejo to an agreement on overall targets and comunidades were required to negotiate fiscal restoration plans bilaterally with the central government (Argimón and de Cos 2012; Law No. 3/2006, Arts. 1.3–1.4; López-Laborda et al. 2006; Ruiz-Palmero 2017: 196–215).

Since 2012, government debt is subject to a balanced budget law stipulating that all tiers of government may incur deficits only when an absolute majority of the national parliament recognizes a case of natural disaster, economic recession, or other emergency (Law No. 2/2012, Art. 11; Ruiz Almendral 2013). Comunidad debt may not exceed 13 percent of regional GDP and the Consejo sets annual debt targets for each of the comunidades (Colino and del Pino 2017: 209–215; Lago-Peñas and Solé-Ollé 2016: 194–202; Law No. 2/2012, Arts. 13 and 16). The procedure of budget approval was also slightly amended. The federal government proposes a three-year plan for the overall budget for all comunidades which has to be approved by the Consejo. The proposed budget is then sent to the Cortes Generales and Senado for an up or down vote and, when the budget is approved, individual comunidad budgets are negotiated bilaterally with the central government (Law No. 2/2012, Arts. 15 and 16; Ruiz-Palmero 2017: 196–215). The 2012 Law was amended in 2013 to include commercial debt and to improve the monitoring and enforcement of budgetary stability (Law No. 9/2013). Comunidades score 1 from 1980 (or the year in which their autonomy statute was adopted) until 2002, and 2 since 2002 on multilateral borrowing control.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

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Senators representing the assemblies of the comunidades are too few in number (58 out of a total of 266 members, just under 22 percent) to be able to raise the decision hurdle so comunidades score 0 on multilateral constitutional reform. The lack of collective comunidad control over the constitution of the Spanish state is balanced by the fact that each comunidad has a veto over amendments to its own statute.\(^\text{23}\) A revised autonomy statute requires in any case the approval of a majority in the Cortes, in both the congress and senate (C 1978, Art. 81; Colino 2009; Viver 2012). The procedure within the comunidades differs according to type of majority and whether the revision of the autonomy statute is subject to ratification by a regional referendum, but in all cases the comunidades have veto power (Orte and Wilson 2009) and score 4 on bilateral constitutional reform from the year in which their autonomy statute was adopted.

According to the Spanish constitution, Ceuta and Melilla may become comunidades when their councils so decide and when the national parliament approves it (C 1978, transitional provision five). Both cities became ciudades autónomas in 1995 and amendments to their autonomy statutes require a two-thirds majority of the regional assembly (Law No. 1/1995, Art. 41; No. 2/1995, Art. 41) as well as the approval of a majority in the Cortes, in both the congress and senate (C 1978, Art. 81). Ceuta and Mellilla score 0 on bilateral constitutional reform from 1950 until 1978, and 4 from 1978 onwards.

Provincias in Spain played no role in constitutional reform during the dictatorship. Since 1978, constitutional reform requires a three-fifths majority in both the upper and the lower house on the first vote and—failing agreement—a two-thirds majority in the lower house and absolute majority in the Senado in a subsequent vote before the proposal can be submitted for ratification in a referendum (C 1978, Art. 167; Harty 2002; Swenden 2006: 77). The directly elected provincial and island council senators can therefore veto constitutional change and score 3 on multilateral constitutional reform from 1978.

The island councils in the Balearic Islands have the right to propose legislation to the Baleares parliament including the autonomy statute of the Baleares and the law on consejos insulares which further regulates their institutional set-up (Law No. 2/1983, Art. 26; No. 2/1989, Art. 7; No. 8/2000, Arts. 8 and 25). An interinsular technical commission (comisión técnica interinsular) consisting of four members appointed by the comunidad and four members from each of the island councils advises the comunidad on the transfer or delegation of powers (Law No. 8/2000, Art. 50). In addition, each of the island councils can refuse the transfer or delegation of a competence (Law No. 8/2000, Arts. 28 and 51). Consejos insulares score 2 on multilateral constitutional reform within the Balearic Islands from 1983.

Cabildo insular are consulted when a reform of the autonomy statute of the Canary Island affects the competences of the island councils (Law No. 10/1982, Art. 64; No. 8/2015, Art. 10). In addition, cabildo insular have the right to propose legislation in the parliament of the Canary Islands on all matters on which the parliament can legislate including the autonomy statute (Law

\(^{23}\) One tenth of the senators—which is about half the number of senators appointed by comunidades parliaments—can request a national referendum on a constitutional amendment affecting comunidad powers (C 1978, Art. 167.3; Moreno and Colino 2010: 302).

The statute of Catalonia specifies that the city council of Barcelona has the right to propose revisions of its special regime to the Catalan parliament and the Catalan parliament has to consult the city council when it develops legislative initiatives that affect the special regime of the city of Barcelona (Law No. 4/1979, Art. 89). Barcelona scores 2 on bilateral constitutional reform within Catalonia from 1998. Zaragoza in Aragón may invite the comunidad to exercise the latter’s right of legislative initiative to change the cities’ specific regime (Law No. 10/2017, disposición adicional primera). This arrangement falls short of bilateral constitutional reform. Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands has the right to initiate a reform of its law and the city has to be consulted when comunidad legislative initiatives affect the city’s special regime (Law No. 23/2006, Art. 11 and disposición adicional segunda). Palma de Mallorca scores 2 on bilateral constitutional reform within the Balearic Islands.

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* The establishment of cabildo insulares in Canarias and consejos insulares in Islas Baleares replaced the provincias.

** Uniprovincial comunidades autónomas where the establishment of a comunidad government replaced the provincias.
## Shared rule in Spain

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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National legislature has: L1 = regional representation; L2 = regional government representation; L3 = majority regional representation; L4 = extensive authority; L5 = bilateral regional consultation; L6 = veto for individual region. Total for shared rule includes the highest score of either multilateral (M)