

Codebook RAI-Country Regional Authority Index (RAI v. 3)

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Data for the Regional Authority Index (RAI) v.3. are available in five different aggregations. RAI-MLG contains the most disaggregated coding; it provides annual estimates for all regional tiers and all differentiated regions across 95 countries. **RAI-Country** aggregates these scores up, for each year and each dimension, to the country level. **This is the codebook for RAI-Country.**

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Table 1: Five RAI V.3 datasets

RAI-MLG	Annual scores for each individual region or regional tier from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a region–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, overall RAI. This is the master dataset that has a comprehensive record of all scores at the most disaggregated level.
RAI-Country	Annual scores for each country from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a country–year down in ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Region	Annual scores for the most authoritative regional tier from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a tier–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Metro	Annual scores for each individual metropolitan region or metropolitan tiers from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a metro–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Indigenous	Annual scores for each individual indigenous region or collective indigenous territorial arrangements from 1950-2018. Each row breaks an indigenous–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.

A codebook accompanies each dataset. **This is the codebook for RAI-Country.**

Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is a country in a given year of evaluation. Country scores aggregate scores for each regional tier and individual regional governments in a country. These regional scores are available in the RAI-MLG dataset.

Deriving country scores

The aggregation is implemented in three steps. First, each dimension is estimated for each standard tier and each non-standard region (see RAI-MLG). Second, these estimates are weighted by population.¹ Where a tier is composed of regions with different scores, a score for that tier is calculated by weighting each region’s score by its share in the national population. Where lower-level regions exist only in a subset of higher-level regions or where scores for lower-level regions vary across higher-level regions, the lower-level scores are weighted by the population of the

¹ We use population figures for 2010 or the nearest year except in the rare case that a country gains or loses territory or partitions.

higher-level regions of which they are part. Third, for each dimension, we sum the scores of each tier.

Self-rule and shared rule domains

We evaluate five dimensions of self-rule: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and representation. We evaluate five dimensions of shared rule: law making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform.² The table below breaks these ten dimensions down into institutional categories that are coded at the regional level. The categories for shared rule refer to multilateral shared rule (see the RAI-MLG codebook for the descriptions of bilateral shared rule.) The range refers to the theoretical range at the level of the individual region or regional tier—not the empirical range at the aggregate country level, which can be higher than the theoretical range in countries with more than one tier.

Documentation

For a discussion of how we develop the RAI measure, we refer to “Chapter 1: Measuring Regional Authority” (Hooghe et al. 2016). For a discussion of how we apply the measure and adjudicate gray cases, please consult “Chapter 3: How We Apply the Coding Scheme” (Hooghe et al. 2016). Both chapters can be downloaded from <https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/regional-authority/>

Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandi Chapman Osterkatz, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (2016). *Measuring Regional Authority*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

² There are two forms of shared rule. We code multilateral shared rule when a region’s authority is contingent on coordination with other regions. We code bilateral shared rule when a region’s authority is not contingent on coordination with other regions. We use the higher number of multilateral and bilateral shared rule for each dimension at each tier to calculate the country score.

Table 2: Explanation of entries in excel file

VARIABLE NAME	RANGE	VALUES AND LABELS
Cowcode	2-920	Correlates of War codes (http://www.correlatesofwar.org)
iso3166	8-999	International Organization for Standardization (ISO 3166-1). Kosovo = 999
country_ID	1-152	Country ID (see table below)
country_name		Country name in English (see table below)
abbr_country		Abbreviation of country name
year	1950-2018	Year of evaluation
n_instdepth	1-4	The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated: 0: no functioning general-purpose administration at regional level 1: deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration 2: non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration subject to central government veto 3: non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration *not* subject to central government veto.
n_policyautonomy	0-4	The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible: 0: very weak authoritative competence in a), b), c), d) whereby a) economic policy; b) cultural-educational policy; c) welfare policy; d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set-up, local government 1: authoritative competencies in one of a), b), c) or d) 2: authoritative competencies in at least two of a), b), c), or d) 3: authoritative competencies in d) and at least two of a), b), or c) 4: criteria for 3 plus authority over immigration or citizenship.
n_fiscalautonomy	0-4	The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population: 0: central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes. 1: regional government sets the rate of minor taxes 2: regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes 3: regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax 4: regional government sets base and rate of at least one major tax.
n_borrowautonomy	0-3	The extent to which a regional government can borrow: 0: the regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing) 1: the regional government may borrow under prior authorization (<i>ex ante</i>) by the central government and with

		<p>one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank c. no borrowing above a ceiling d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes <p>2: the regional government may borrow without prior authorization (<i>ex post</i>) and under one or more of a), b), c), d)</p> <p>3: the regional government may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.</p>
n_representation	0-4	The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive, which is the sum of <i>assembly</i> and <i>executive</i> .
n_lawmaking	0-2	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation, which is the sum of <i>law_a</i> to <i>law_f</i> (see below for breakdown).
n_execontrol	0-2	The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings: 0: no routine meetings between central and regional governments 1: routine meetings between central and regional governments without legally binding authority 2: routine meetings between central and regional governments with legally binding authority
n_fiscalcontrol	0-2	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues: 0: neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues 1: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto 2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues
n_borrowcontrol	0-2	The extent to which a regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing constraints: 0: regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints 1: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto 2: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints
n_constitutional	0-4	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change: 0: the central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution

		<p>1: a national legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum</p> <p>2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum</p> <p>3: a legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation</p> <p>4: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature can veto constitutional change</p>
n_selfrule	0-18	The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region, which is the sum of <i>n_instdepth</i> , <i>n_policy</i> , <i>n_fiscauto</i> , <i>n_borrowauto</i> , and <i>n_rep</i> .
n_sharedrule	0-12	The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole, which is the sum of <i>n_lawmaking</i> , <i>n_execon</i> , <i>n_fiscon</i> , <i>n_borrowcon</i> , and <i>n_constit</i> .
n_RAI	0-30	Regional authority index, which is the sum of <i>n_selfrule</i> and <i>n_sharedrule</i> .
COMPONENTS		
n_representation	0-4	See above.
n_assembly	0-2	<p>0: no regional assembly.</p> <p>1: indirectly elected regional assembly</p> <p>2: directly elected assembly</p>
n_executive	0-2	<p>0: no regional executive or appointed by central government</p> <p>1: dual executive appointed by central government and regional assembly</p> <p>2: regional executive appointed by a regional assembly or is directly elected</p>
n_lawmaking	0-3	See above.
n_L1lawmaking	0-0.5	<p>0: a region or regional tier is <i>not</i> the unit of representation in a national legislature</p> <p>0.5: a region or regional tier is the unit of representation in a national legislature</p>
n_L2lawmaking	0-0.5	<p>0: a region or regional tier does <i>not</i> designate representatives in a national legislature</p> <p>0.5: a region or regional tier designates representatives in a national legislature</p>
n_L3lawmaking	0-0.5	<p>0: regions do <i>not</i> have majority representation in a national legislature</p> <p>0.5: regions have majority representation in a national legislature.</p>

n_L4lawmaking	0-0.5	0: the legislature based on regional representation does *not* have extensive legislative authority 0.5: the legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority
n_L5lawmaking	0-0.5	0: the regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature are *not* consulted on national legislation affecting the region 0.5: the regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature are consulted on national legislation affecting the region
n_L6lawmaking	0-0.5	0: the regional government or its regional representatives in a legislature do *not* have veto power over national legislation affecting the region 0.5: the regional government or its regional representatives in a legislature have veto power over national legislation affecting the region

Table 3: Country id, country name, country abbreviation, year-rows in dataset

Country ID	Country Name	Country Abbreviation	Years Evaluated
1	Albania	ALB	1992-2018
2	Australia	AUS	1950-2018
3	Austria	AUT	1955-2018
4	Belgium	BEL	1950-2018
5	Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	1995-2018
6	Bulgaria	BGR	1991-2018
7	Canada	CAN	1950-2018
8	Croatia	HRV	1991-2018
9	Cyprus	CYP	1960-2018
10	Czech Republic	CZE	1993-2018
11	Denmark	DNK	1950-2018
12	Estonia	EST	1992-2018
13	Finland	FIN	1950-2018
14	France	FRA	1950-2018
15	Germany (FRG until 1990)	DEU	1950-2018
16	Greece	GRC	1950-2018
17	Hungary	HUN	1990-2018
18	Iceland	ISL	1950-2018
19	Ireland	IRL	1950-2018
20	Italy	ITA	1950-2018
21	Japan	JPN	1950-2018
22	Latvia	LVA	1990-2018
23	Lithuania	LTU	1992-2018

Country ID	Country Name	Country Abbreviation	Years Evaluated
24	Luxembourg	LUX	1950-2018
25	North-Macedonia	MKD	1991-2018
26	Malta	MLT	1964-2018
27	Netherlands	NLD	1950-2018
28	New Zealand	NZL	1950-2018
29	Norway	NOR	1950-2018
30	Poland	POL	1990-2018
31	Portugal	PRT	1950-2018
32	Romania	ROU	1991-2018
33	Russian Federation	RUS	1993-2018
34	Serbia and Montenegro	SCG	1992-2005
35	Slovakia	SVK	1993-2018
36	Slovenia	SVN	1990-2018
37	Spain	ESP	1950-2018
38	Sweden	SWE	1950-2018
39	Switzerland	CHE	1950-2018
40	Turkey	TUR	1950-2018
41	United Kingdom	GBR	1950-2018
42	United States	USA	1950-2018
43	Israel	ISR	1950-2018
44	Montenegro	MNE	2006-2018
45	Serbia	SRB	2007-2018
46	Kosovo	KOS	2008-2018
47	Ukraine	UKR	1991-2018
80	Indonesia	IDN	1950-2018
81	Malaysia	MYS	1957-2018
82	Philippines	PHL	1950-2018
83	Thailand	THA	1950-2018
84	South Korea	KOR	1952-2018
85	Singapore	SGP	1965-2018
86	Brunei	BRN	1984-2018
87	East Timor	TLS	2002-2018
88	Bhutan	BTN	1950-2018
89	Myanmar	MMR	1950-2018
90	Cambodia	KHM	1953-2018
91	China	CHN	1950-2018
92	Laos	LAO	1953-2018
93	Mongolia	MNG	1992-2018
94	Nepal	NPL	1950-2018
95	Papua New Guinea	PNG	1975-2018
96	Sri Lanka	LKA	1950-2018
97	Taiwan	TAW	1950-2018

Country ID	Country Name	Country Abbreviation	Years Evaluated
98	Vietnam (North until 1974)	VNM	1950-2018
100	Argentina	ARG	1950-2018
101	Bahamas	BHS	1973-2018
102	Barbados	BRB	1966-2018
103	Belize	BLZ	1981-2018
104	Bolivia	BOL	1950-2018
105	Brazil	BRA	1950-2018
106	Chile	CHL	1950-2018
107	Colombia	COL	1950-2018
108	Costa Rica	CRI	1950-2018
109	Cuba	CUB	1950-2018
110	Dominican Republic	DOM	1950-2018
111	Ecuador	ECU	1950-2018
112	El Salvador	SLV	1950-2018
113	Guatemala	GTM	1950-2018
114	Guyana	GUY	1966-2018
115	Haiti	HTI	1950-2018
116	Honduras	HND	1950-2018
117	Jamaica	JAM	1962-2018
118	Mexico	MEX	1950-2018
119	Nicaragua	NIC	1950-2018
120	Panama	PAN	1950-2018
121	Paraguay	PRY	1950-2018
122	Peru	PER	1950-2018
123	Suriname	SUR	1975-2018
124	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	1962-2018
125	Uruguay	URY	1950-2018
126	Venezuela	VEN	1950-2018
150	India	IND	1950-2018
151	Bangladesh	BGD	1972-2018
152	Pakistan	PAK	1950-2018