

Measuring International Authority

A Postfunctionalist Theory
of Governance, Volume III

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From Scoring to Aggregation

The MIA Dataset

Chapter One conceptualizes the authority of an international organization (IO) as two-dimensional. The first dimension is delegation. States may *delegate* authority to independent non-state political or legal bodies, which set the agenda, make final decisions, monitor compliance, and resolve disputes. Our measure of delegation taps the extent to which an IO body is independent of member states, its role in decision making, and the kinds of decisions that are delegated. The second dimension is pooling. States may *pool* authority in a collective body that makes joint decisions on behalf of the states themselves. Our measure of pooling taps the majority threshold for collective state decision making, the bindingness of decisions, the conditions under which they come into effect, and the kinds of decisions that are pooled. The contrast between delegation and pooling is captured by preposition: states delegate authority *to*; they pool authority *in*.

Delegation and pooling are crisp but abstract concepts. The scores produced in the Measure of International Authority (MIA) are akin to Lego blocks that summarize coherent components of international governance that can be aggregated in different ways for different purposes. The aggregates set out in this chapter use an extensive number of observations, but with the minimum fuss. We wish to set out a valid measure that uses a wide range of information in a reasonably simple and transparent way.

The first two sections of this chapter set out how we aggregate scores for delegation and pooling. The reader who is less interested in the construction of the MIA might go directly to the third section, where we take a first look at delegation and pooling over time and across decision areas.

Delegation

The variable, *delegation*, is an annual measure of the allocation of authoritative competences to non-state bodies in an IO's decision-making process. We

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distinguish between political delegation in agenda setting and final decision making and judicial delegation in dispute settlement. We assess political delegation:

- in one or more IO bodies (assemblies, executives, general secretariats, consultative bodies) that are
- partially or fully composed of non-member state actors, which
- exercise or co-exercise authority over agenda setting or final decision making
- in one or more of six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and (up to five streams of) policy making.

Judicial delegation is the conditional transfer of authority to courts, arbitrators, or tribunals. We assess judicial delegation with items that tap how obligatory and independent legal dispute settlement is, how binding, whether there is a standing tribunal, who has access, whether there is a remedy for non-compliance, and whether it can make compulsory preliminary rulings.

The scoring for delegation works as follows:

1. Each body receives a *composition score* for the degree to which it is non-state. All scores range from 0 to 1.
2. Composition scores for all bodies that participate in agenda setting are averaged in each decision area after two adjustments. An adjustment is made for a general secretariat that gatekeeps agenda setting, and an adjustment is made when an IO has more than one policy stream. This produces an agenda setting score for each decision area.
3. We identify the body with the highest (i.e. most non-state) composition score in final decision making in each decision area. This is the final decision score for each decision area.
4. A dispute settlement score is calculated for each decision area.
5. We now have three scores for each decision area: an agenda setting score, a final decision score, and a dispute settlement score. The average of these scores is the delegation score for a decision area. The delegation score for an IO is the average of the delegation scores across the six decision areas.

Composition Scores

The first step in estimating delegation is to assess the extent to which an IO body is composed of non-state actors.

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An IO body may be partially or fully independent of member states in one of three ways. It may be composed of representatives of bodies outside the executive organs of the member state, for example, representatives of national or regional parliaments, courts, interest groups, professional associations, or international organizations.¹ Or it may be composed of one or more members of an IO body who operate under an explicit norm of independence from member state control. Or it may be an external non-state body, such as an international organization that plays an independent decision making role in a second international organization. In each case, the participant in an IO body must have full voting rights to qualify as non-state.

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

A general secretariat receives a composition score of 1 when it consists of a permanent core of non-state actors with at least one of the following properties: the officials of the secretariat have international diplomatic status; they are required to take an oath of independence; member states are required to refrain from influencing the general secretariat. An IO administration receives a score of zero if none of the above conditions is met and/or the administration is lodged in one or more member state administrations or rotates among them.

ASSEMBLY

Most IOs have member state-dominated assemblies, but some have independent assemblies in which some or all members are popularly elected or are selected by national parliaments, regional governments, local governments, trade unions, business associations, or other non-state groups. We scale each assembly present in an IO as follows, with the applicable composition score in brackets:

Q. I. How are members of the assembly selected?

- All members selected by member states (0)
- A majority, but not all, selected by member states (0.33)
- At least 50 percent of the members of the assembly are selected by parliaments, subnational governments, or other non-member state actors (0.66)
- At least 50 percent of the members of the assembly are popularly elected (1)

EXECUTIVE

The composition of an executive is non-state when those who sit and vote in an executive do not receive voting instructions from their government.

¹ We define a national executive to include ministers of the central government, diplomats, military or security attachés, central bankers, civil servants, and experts representing their national government.

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We assess this by examining the explicit constraints on member state command in relation to some proportion of the members of the executive. For example, one or more members of the executive may be required to take an oath of independence or may be constitutionally bound to act on behalf of the organization rather than his or her member state. We scale each executive in an IO as follows:

Q. VIII. *Do members of the executive directly represent member states?*

- All members receive voting instructions from a government (0)
- 50 percent or more, but not all, members receive voting instructions from a government (0.33)
- Fewer than 50 percent of the members receive voting instructions from a government (1)

OTHER IO BODIES

Member states receive a compositional score of zero where they play an individual role in agenda setting or the final decision. International organizations that play a role in agenda setting or the final decision of another IO receive a score of 1. Consultative bodies, that is, bodies composed of non-state representatives selected by national or subnational assemblies, representatives of business, trade unions, social movements, or professional experts, have a composition score of 1.

Delegation in Agenda Setting and the Final Decision

We now identify those bodies that take part in agenda setting and the final decision in each decision area. Each body has a separate column in the dataset with a value—its composition score—in the row indicating the decision stage at which it participates. For the sample of seventy-six IOs in the period 1950–2010, this requires fourteen columns: three columns each for assemblies, executives, and consultative bodies; two columns for general secretariats; one column for the dispute settlement body; one column for individual member states; and one column for a non-state actor not captured by the preceding options (e.g. an international organization that operates as a non-state decision maker in this IO).

The items for agenda setting are as follows:

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| • Accession | Q. XVI.a. <i>Who can initiate the accession of new members?</i> |
| • Suspension | Q. XVIII.a. <i>Who can initiate the suspension of a member state?</i> |
| • Constitution | Q. XIX.a. <i>Who can initiate constitutional reform?</i> |
| • Budget | Q. XXII.a. <i>Who drafts the budget?</i> |

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- Financial compliance Q. XXIV.a. *Who can initiate proceedings on financial compliance?*
- Policy making Q. XXV.a. *Who can initiate policy? (We code up to five policy streams.)*

The items for the final decision are as follows:

- Accession Q. XVI.b. *Who makes the final decision on the accession of new members?*
- Suspension Q. XVIII.b. *Who makes the final decision on the suspension of a member state?*
- Constitution Q. XIX.b. *Who makes the final decision on constitutional reform?*
- Budget Q. XXII.b. *Who makes the final decision on the budget?*
- Financial compliance Q. XXIV.b. *Who makes the final decision on financial compliance?*
- Policy making Q. XXV.b. *Who makes the final decision on policy? (We code up to five policy streams.)*

AGGREGATE DELEGATION IN AGENDA SETTING

We make an adjustment in the exceptional circumstance that agenda setting must pass through the hands of a general secretariat. In our sample, this is limited to policy making. Where a general secretariat has the formal authority to serve as the sole gatekeeper in agenda setting in a particular stream of policy making, we average a score of 1 for the secretariat with the average score of all other bodies combined in that policy making stream. If, for example, the general secretariat has the monopoly of initiative in just one of three policy streams (as is the case in today's European Union), then the calculation for monopoly of initiative applies to just one of three policy streams.

We average composition scores for delegation for all IO bodies involved in agenda setting in each of the six decision areas. When an IO has more than one policy stream we average the composition scores across the policy streams to produce an aggregate policy stream score. We use this aggregate score as the policy stream score when we average across the six decision areas.

The aggregate score for delegation in agenda setting for an IO is the average score for accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budget, financial compliance, and policy making. This score, like every one of its components, ranges from 0 to 1.

AGGREGATE DELEGATION IN THE FINAL DECISION

We use the same composition scores to calculate an aggregate score for delegation in the final decision. Rather than averaging scores, we assess whether

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a body composed to some degree by non-state actors is in a position to block a decision. Whereas we estimate delegation in agenda setting by identifying all bodies that are involved in agenda setting, we ask instead whether the final decision runs through a non-state body, and if so, how non-state is its composition. So we first identify the most non-state actor in each decision area, allocate the appropriate composition score to that body, and then average across decision areas. This score varies between 0 and 1, as do all its components.

Delegation in Dispute Settlement

Legal or judicial dispute settlement is the third and final component of the delegation measure. Our measure of dispute settlement is concerned with arbitration and adjudication. It excludes diplomatic or political forms of dispute settlement involving negotiation, mediation, or conciliation by a third party which, if routinized in an IO body and involving non-state actors, are encompassed in the measure as political delegation.

The score for dispute settlement is the average of seven components scaled from 0 to 1. If an IO has two dispute settlement mechanisms, we use the final score of the most supranational mechanism. The items are as follows with scores in brackets.²

- Can member states opt out of the dispute settlement system or is it obligatory for all member states (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXVIII. *Is the dispute settlement system obligatory?*]
- Is the right for third-party review of a dispute mediated by a political body or automatic (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXIX. *Is there an explicit right to third-party review of disputes concerning member state compliance?*]
- Is the composition of the tribunal ad hoc or standing (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXX. *How is the tribunal composed?*]
- Are rulings non-binding, conditionally binding, or binding (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXXI. *Is adjudication binding?*]
- Who has access to dispute settlement: member states only, the general secretariat, non-state actors as well as states (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXXII. *Do non-state actors have legal standing?*]
- Is there no remedy, partial remedy (retaliatory sanctions), or full remedy (direct effect) (0, 0.5, 1)? [Q. XXXIII. *Is there a remedy for non-compliance to the ruling?*]

² Appendix II contains the full questions and range of responses.

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- Is there a voluntary or compulsory preliminary ruling system (0, 0.5, 1)?
[Q. XXXIV. *Is there a preliminary ruling system of national court referrals?*]

Aggregate Delegation Scores

The variable, *Delegation*, is the unweighted average of delegation in agenda setting, delegation in final decision, and judicial delegation across six decision areas: accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and policy making.³

Pooling

Pooling estimates the extent to which member states share authority through collective decision making. We assess pooling:

- in one or more IO bodies (assemblies, executives)
- in which member states collectively set the agenda and make final decisions
- by pooling their authority under some decision rule with some degree of bindingness and/or requiring some form of ratification
- in one or more of six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and (up to five streams of) policy making.

The scoring for pooling works as follows:

1. We determine which IO bodies are state-dominated.
2. Each of these bodies receives voting scores for the voting rule they use in agenda setting in each decision area and the voting rule they use in the final decision in each decision area. All scores scale from 0 to 1.
3. Each IO receives scores for bindingness and for ratification in each decision area.
4. Voting scores for all state-dominated bodies that participate in agenda setting are averaged in each decision area (with an adjustment when an IO has more than one policy stream). This score is multiplied by the

³ The MIA dataset contains ten aggregate variables for each IO and each year: IO delegation; delegation in agenda setting, delegation in final decision, dispute settlement; delegation in accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and policy making.

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weight for bindingness and ratification for that decision area. This produces an agenda setting score for each decision area.

5. We identify the body with the lowest (i.e. least majoritarian) voting score in final decision making in each decision area (with an adjustment when an IO has more than one policy stream). This voting score is multiplied by the weight for bindingness and ratification in that decision area. This produces a final decision score for each decision area.
6. We now have two scores for each decision area: an agenda setting score and a final decision score. These scores are averaged to produce a pooling score for each decision area. Pooling scores for each decision area are averaged to produce a pooling score for an IO.

State-Dominated Bodies

Member states pool authority in assemblies that are state-dominated and in executives that are state-dominated. We consider an assembly as state-dominated when it is chiefly selected by member states, i.e. when it meets the first or second response to the following question:

Q. I. *How are members of the assembly selected?*

- All members of the assembly are selected by member states
- A majority, but not all, of the members of the assembly are selected by member states
- At least 50 percent of the members of the assembly are selected by parliaments, subnational governments, or other non-member state actors
- At least 50 percent of the members of the assembly are selected in popular election

We consider an executive as state-dominated when most of its members represent member states.⁴ Because members of an executive, unlike an assembly, may be able to vote independently of the member states that selected them, one must probe the character of representation to determine whether an executive is state-dominated. We score an executive as state-dominated when it meets either of the first two responses to the following question:

Q. VIII. *Do members of the executive directly represent member states?*

- All representatives in the executive receive voting instructions from their government

⁴ It is possible that an IO body with a majority of member state representatives alongside one or more non-state members can feature in both pooling and delegation. This happens in eight IOs for limited time periods, as noted in the excel files.

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- 50 percent or more, but not all, members of the executive, receive voting instructions from their government
- Fewer than 50 percent of the members of the executive receive voting instructions from their government

Voting Scores

To estimate the extent of pooling we score the voting rule in a state-dominated body. We observe the voting rule for all bodies that play a role in agenda setting and the final decision in each decision area (Q. XVI.a–Q. XXV.b in Appendix II). The scores range from proposals or decisions by individual member states, which scores zero, to majority voting, which scores 1:

- Individual member states decide (0)
- A collective state-dominated body decides by unanimity/consensus (0.33)
- A collective state-dominated body decides by supermajority (qualified majority) (0.66)
- A collective state-dominated body decides by simple or absolute majority (1)

We score automatic or technocratic decision making—decision making explicitly contracted in written rules—at the mid-point on the intergovernmentalism/supranationalism scale (0.5) on the ground that it collectively ties the hands of all IO actors, including member states.

Bindingness and Ratification

Member states can blunt the effect of pooling on state sovereignty by making decisions that are only conditionally binding or not binding at all. They can also subject IO decisions to domestic ratification. Both steps shift the ultimate decision from the IO back to the member states. Table 3.1 lists the decision areas that may be subject to these intergovernmental constraints.

The baseline for estimating the effect of bindingness and ratification is the pooling score produced by the voting rules. If decision making is conditionally

Table 3.1. Decision areas that may be subject to ratification or bindingness

	Ratification	Binding
Accession	✓	
Suspension		
Constitutional reform	✓	
Budgetary allocation		✓
Financial compliance		
Policy making	✓	✓

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Table 3.2. Weights for bindingness and ratification

		BINDINGNESS		
		BINDING	CONDITIONALLY BINDING	NOT BINDING
RATIFICATION	Weight	1.00	0.75	0.25
NO RATIFICATION		1.000	0.750	0.250
RATIFICATION BY SUBSET & BINDING ON ALL	0.75	0.750	0.563	0.188
RATIFICATION BY SUBSET & BINDING ON SUBSET	0.50	0.500	0.375	0.125
RATIFICATION BY ALL	0.25	0.250	0.188	0.063

binding or not binding, or if ratification applies, we adjust the score downwards by multiplying the baseline pooling score with a weight that varies between 0 and 1. Table 3.2 shows by how much.

The bolded row in Table 3.2 lists the weights for bindingness that apply to budgetary decision making and policy making. The relevant questions in the coding scheme are *Q. XXIII. Is budgetary decision making binding?* and *Q. XXVI. Are policy decisions binding?*

The bolded column in Table 3.2 list the weights for ratification that apply to accession, constitutional reform, and policy making. The relevant questions in the coding scheme are *Q. XVII. Is ratification of accession by existing member states required?* *Q. XX. Is ratification of constitutional reform required?* and *Q. XXVII. Is ratification of policy required?*

A stream of policy making can be subject to both ratification and bindingness. The weight that we use for a policy stream is the product of the weights for ratification and bindingness which is the number listed in the cells of Table 3.2. Hence, if a policy stream produces decisions that are conditionally binding (bindingness = 0.75) and that require ratification by a subset of member states to be binding on those member states that ratify (ratification score = 0.5), the multiplier for that policy stream is $0.75 \times 0.5 = 0.375$.

Aggregate Pooling Scores

We average the voting scores for all state bodies that participate in agenda setting in a decision area. We then apply the weights for bindingness and ratification applicable in that decision area. In policy making, we average the voting scores for all state bodies that participate in agenda setting in a policy stream and then apply the weights for bindingness and ratification applicable in that policy stream. The score for policy making averages the scores for the policy streams. The aggregate score for pooling in agenda setting averages scores for the six decision areas, ranging between 0 and 1.

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To produce a summary score for the final decision, we identify the least majoritarian state-dominated body in each decision area, on the ground that this is the strongest point at which member states can control the outcome. We make an adjustment for policy making as follows. In each stream of policy making we identify the score of the body with the least majoritarian voting rule and adjust the score for bindingness and ratification in that policy stream. The policy making score is the average of the scores across the policy streams. The summary score for pooling in the final decision is the average across the six policy areas, ranging between 0 and 1.

The variable, *Pooling*, is the unweighted average of pooling in agenda setting and pooling in final decision.⁵

A First Look at Delegation and Pooling

What does the Measure of International Authority (MIA) reveal about the distribution of authority across international organizations? We begin by summarizing the data for pooling and delegation and then we present descriptive statistics over time, by decision area, and for each IO.

Delegation and pooling can be estimated as latent factors or as summated rating scales. Factor analysis uses the available information more efficiently by weighting each indicator according to its contribution to the score for a given IO. Summated rating scores, by contrast, have the virtue of being unaffected by the composition of the sample. Both methods produce aggregate delegation and pooling scores using components for each decision area—accession, suspension, constitution, budget, financial compliance, and policy—as described in the previous section. Each component is scaled 0–1, where 0 is pure intergovernmentalism and 1 is pure supranationalism.

Principal components analysis yields two latent variables with eigenvalues greater than 1 corresponding to delegation and pooling (Table 3.3). These latent variables capture the bulk, 60 percent, of the variance in the twelve indicators.

Table 3.4 is a correlation matrix for these factors and additive scales for delegation and pooling across the six decision areas. The Cronbach's alpha for the additive scale for pooling is 0.80 and 0.90 for delegation, indicating very high internal consistency. To use the analogy with which we started this chapter, the Lego blocks that comprise delegation and pooling fit together coherently. In the remainder of this chapter, we use the additive scales, which,

⁵ The MIA dataset contains nine estimates for each IO and each year: IO pooling; pooling in agenda setting; pooling in final decision; pooling in accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and policy making.

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Table 3.3. Factor analysis

Components	Two-factor solution	
	Delegation	Pooling
Delegation in accession	0.416	-0.027
Delegation in suspension	0.375	0.036
Delegation in constitutional reform	0.437	-0.001
Delegation in budgetary allocation	0.425	0.038
Delegation in financial compliance	0.341	0.056
Delegation in policy making	0.421	-0.025
Pooling in accession	0.001	0.440
Pooling in suspension	-0.012	0.401
Pooling in constitutional reform	0.039	0.410
Pooling in budgetary allocation	-0.129	0.444
Pooling in financial compliance	0.035	0.462
Pooling in policy making	0.054	0.247
Eigenvalue	4.17	3.01
Explained variance (%)	0.35	0.25

Note: Principal components factor analysis, promax rotation, listwise deletion. N = 3295 (all IOs between 1950 or establishment and 2010). The highest score for each dimension is in bold.

Table 3.4. Correlation matrix

	Delegation (additive)	Delegation (PCA)	Pooling (additive)	Pooling (PCA)
Delegation (additive scale)	1			
Delegation (PCA)	0.999	1		
Pooling (additive scale)	0.274	0.277	1	
Pooling (PCA)	0.287	0.290	0.996	1

Note: N = 3295.

as Table 3.4 shows, are very highly correlated with the comparable predicted components from the principal components analysis (PCA).

We begin by taking a look at aggregate trends over time.⁶ Figure 3.1 displays the mean delegation scores for the fifty-one IOs in our sample that were in existence from 1975 to 2010. In these years, the number of IOs increased as well, indicated by the background bars and the Y-axis on the right of the figure. Figure 3.2 displays the same information for pooling. Both delegation and pooling remained stable until the mid-1980s, at which point they increased substantially. The rise in delegation is markedly steeper than that for pooling. The mean delegation score inches up from 0.16 in 1975 to 0.18 in 1992 and then grows rapidly to 0.24 in 2010, equivalent to replacing ad hoc

⁶ Appendix III lists delegation and pooling scores along with their chief components for each IO over time.

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


Figure 3.1. Delegation (1975–2010)
Note: N=51 IOs that were in existence 1975 to 2010.




Figure 3.2. Pooling (1975–2010)
Note: N=51 IOs that were in existence 1975 to 2010.

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interstate arbitration with a standing tribunal that can hear cases filed by private parties and can authorize retaliatory sanctions. The mean pooling score increases from 0.29 in 1975 to 0.30 in 1992 and then climbs steadily to 0.35 in 2010. This rise is equivalent to relaxing the final decision from consensus to supermajoritarian voting or from supermajoritarian voting to simple majority in two decision areas. It is also equivalent to replacing policy instruments that are conditionally binding and require ratification by all with directly binding instruments (e.g. by replacing conventions with acts, directives, or regulations).

These aggregate trends mask wide variation across decision areas. Delegation is considerably higher in budgetary allocation and policy making than in suspension, constitutional reform, financial compliance, or accession (Figure 3.3). Framing the budget and initiating policy are day-to-day concerns in which non-state actors, including the IO secretariat, often play a large role. By contrast, suspension, financial compliance, accession, and constitutional reform are extraordinary matters, often involving high politics, and in most IOs they are dominated by member state bodies.

The upward trend in delegation may reflect both the expanding competences of many IOs and the willingness of democratic states, at least in this




Figure 3.3. Delegation by decision area (1975–2010)

Note: N = 51 IOs that were in existence 1975 to 2010.

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period, to impose international rules on recalcitrant states. The largest proportional increases are in suspension and financial compliance, chiefly reflecting the growing powers of secretariats to begin proceedings against non-compliant states and the strengthening of dispute settlement mechanisms in many IOs.

However, delegation varies widely across IOs, as can be seen from beanplots in Figure 3.4 which visualize the distribution density for the seventy-six IOs in 2010. Each plot traces the density of the distribution which is mirrored to form a polygon (Kampstra 2008). The horizontal bars are sample averages, and the dashed line is the sample average across the decision areas. The prevailing pattern is an elongated normal distribution, skewed to lower values in accession, suspension, constitutional reform, and financial compliance. Budgetary allocation and policy making are the most elongated. These are the decision areas in which one finds powerful secretariats, assertive non-state assemblies, and well developed courts in some IOs and strong member state executives exercising the lion's share of authority in many others.




Figure 3.4. Beanplots for delegation by decision area (2010)

Note: N=74 IOs for 2010.

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When one charts the distribution of IOs across the decision stages of delegation (Figure 3.5), an extraordinary—and revealing—diversity comes into view. Delegation in agenda setting on the left of the figure is normally distributed. This is the phase in which non-state actors, including particularly general secretariats, may play an important role in discovering areas of cooperation and in framing alternative courses of action (Marks, Lenz, Ceka, and Burgoon 2014). In sharp contrast, the distribution in the final decision is squat and skewed to zero. Member states tend to be jealous of final control and deny non-state bodies a formal vote at the final stage of decision making. However, some conspicuous non-state bodies—including the European Parliament, the East African Legislative Assembly, and the Executive Council of the World Meteorological Organization—break this general pattern, and are chiefly responsible for the sharp upward spike. General secretariats are almost always confined to agenda setting. But here again, there are exceptions. We detect two instances where the secretariat makes the final decision. Between 1952 and 1967, the European Coal and Steel




Figure 3.5. Beanplots for delegation by decision stage (2010)

Note: N = 74 IOs for 2010.

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Community’s High Authority decided on the budget and made the final call on some policy decisions, and since 2004 the Commonwealth’s general secretariat has been taking the final decision on financial compliance.

The distribution in dispute settlement is altogether different. It is extremely dispersed with marked bimodality (Hooghe et al. 2014). One group of mostly weak regional IOs and global IOs responsible for standard setting clusters at zero. The remaining IOs are dispersed across the intermediate and high range. At the high end of the scale are IOs, such as the European Union, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Council of Europe, the East African Community, and the Andean Community, with unusually authoritative supranational courts.

Figure 3.6 displays boxplots, which allow one to compare how delegation within the seventy-six IOs in our sample has varied between 1950 and 2010. At one extreme, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) stick at zero. NATO, the OECD, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have moderate, but stable, delegation. Forty-nine IOs, however, have shifted over time, and twenty-five have minimum and maximum scores that range over at least one tenth of the




Figure 3.6. Boxplots for delegation (1950–2010)

Note: N=76 IOs for 1950–2010. The boxplots summarize the median, interquartile range, and 95 percentile whiskers for the values that each IO takes on delegation across its years of existence in our dataset. The circles mark outside values beyond the range of the whiskers.

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scale. The most dynamic are regional IOs: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the refounded East African Community (EAC2), the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is interesting to note that there is almost no association between an IO's median level of delegation and the extent to which it has changed over time. Delegation does not appear to feed on itself. However, the general trend has been upward. Forty-four of the forty-nine IOs that have experienced change have seen increasing levels of delegation.

Turning to pooling, Figure 3.7 reveals that average levels vary widely across decision areas for the fifty-one IOs that are in the dataset for 1975 to 2010. A score of 0.5 in budgetary allocation would result if member states had no possibility of opting out of budgetary decisions that were drafted under supermajority and decided by consensus. Accession, financial compliance, and policy making are moderately pooled, and constitutional reform and suspension are at the low end for reasons that have to do with their transparent implications for national sovereignty.

Average levels of pooling in accession, constitutional reform, and policy making have increased only slightly from 1975 to 2010. By contrast, pooling




Figure 3.7. Pooling by decision area (1975–2010)

Note: N=51 IOs that were in existence 1975 to 2010.

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in budgetary allocation, and particularly in suspension and financial compliance have increased perceptibly, reflecting a willingness to tighten the screws on non-compliant states. The Commonwealth is a case in point. In 1995 it set up a procedure to assess infringement of constitutional rule with authority—used in the case of the Fiji Islands—to suspend or expel a recalcitrant member state.

The distribution of IOs in each decision area can be gauged from the beanplots in Figure 3.8. Pooling exhibits noticeably more diversity across decision areas than does delegation. The distribution for IOs in suspension is skewed to zero, with a long tail reaching up to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which can suspend a member state on a vote by two-thirds of its Board of Governors and General Conference. The distributions for constitutional reform and policy making are also pear shaped with long tails for higher values. In the remaining decision areas, IOs are more evenly dispersed, with two or even three humps as in budgetary allocation. The bimodal distribution in financial compliance chiefly distinguishes IOs in which there is




Figure 3.8. Beanplots for pooling by decision area (2010)

Note: N = 74 IOs for 2010.

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an autonomic non-compliance procedure from those where the national veto holds sway.

Figure 3.9 compares beanplots for pooling in agenda setting and the final decision. The distributions are similarly normal with a slight skew to lower values. Average pooling is significantly higher (with 95 percent confidence) in the final decision because, in contrast to agenda setting where it is common to give individual member states the right to initiate, the final decision is almost always taken by a collective IO body.⁷ An average of 0.35 on the final decision is equivalent to a state-dominated IO body taking binding decisions on the budget by supermajority and by consensus in the other five decision areas with no ratification. Interestingly, pooling is relatively high in the final decision compared to agenda setting, whereas in delegation it is the other way around. Delegation is strongly agenda focused; pooling is tilted to the final decision.




Figure 3.9. Beanplots for pooling by decision stage (2010)

Note: N=74 IOs for 2010.

⁷ Individual member states are final decision makers in just 1 percent of more than 21,000 decisions coded in our dataset.

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Figure 3.10 displays boxplots for pooling for all IOs in the dataset between 1950 and 2010. As with delegation, most of the change has been upward over time. We detect an increase of pooling in thirty-seven IOs, a decline in twelve IOs, and stasis in twenty-seven. Interestingly, the panel on the left reveals much more change than the one on the right: change is most widespread at low to intermediate levels of pooling. The organizations that have changed the most are those with low initial values, including the uniquely dynamic Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF)—now “intergovernmental” in name only—which entered the dataset in 1950 with a score of 0.04 and in 2010 scored 0.54. In general, high levels of pooling tend to be the result of initial design. With the exception of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the League of Arab States (LOAS), the change in pooling is very small or non-existent in the upper third of our sample.

The organizations that pool most extensively tend to be task-specific and global. They include the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). UNESCO and ICAO, both with a




Figure 3.10. Boxplots for pooling (1950–2010)

Note: N = 74 IOs for 2010.

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median pooling score above 0.60, have abolished the national veto in all six decision areas.

Figure 3.11 maps the seventy-six IOs in our sample on delegation and pooling in 2010 and reveals that these distinctive forms of IO authority are weakly associated ($r = 0.14$). This might be surprising to those familiar with the European Union or the World Trade Organization which have high levels of both delegation and pooling. However, these IOs are far from representative. To illustrate how delegation and pooling can vary independently, we survey three less studied IOs—the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).




Figure 3.11. Delegation and pooling in 2010

Note: N = 74 IOs in 2010.

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The IMO has extensive pooling and weak delegation. It was established in 1958 as a UN special agency for maritime safety. Following the Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967 it was tasked also with marine environmental standard setting (Nordquist and Moore 1999). Its chief purpose is to provide a venue for negotiating conventions and international regulations. These become binding once two-thirds of the members have ratified. Ratification has been made less restrictive since 1972 when the IMO began using the tacit consent procedure whereby a member state is presumed to have ratified unless it objects within a set time period. The rule was introduced because reaching the two-thirds hurdle became increasingly difficult as membership expanded beyond the initial group of shipping nations. Simple non-weighted majority voting is the decision rule in its intergovernmental Assembly and Council for regulations and conventions, the budget, and suspension of non-paying members. This places the IMO in the top 10 percent of our sample on pooling. However, delegation to independent non-state bodies is minimal. Aside from co-drafting the budget as a junior partner to the Council, the IMO's 300-strong staff provides secretarial support for the organization's technical intergovernmental committees (Hooghe and Marks 2015).

By contrast, the Economic Community of West African States has extensive delegation, but limited pooling. ECOWAS was created in 1975 by fifteen former British and French colonies to promote a common market, and has since branched out to become a peace and security player in West Africa. ECOWAS' high delegation score is owed to its general secretariat, court, and parliament. Its general secretariat is a collegial body that also functions as ECOWAS' chief executive "responsible for the smooth running and for protecting the general interest of the Community" (2006 Memorandum, Art. 12). It drafts the annual budget, sets the agenda in suspension and financial compliance, and has a monopoly of initiative in all policy areas except peacekeeping (2006 Memorandum, Art. 12). The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is the third-most authoritative court in our dataset (preceded only by the European Court of Justice and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States' Court of Justice). It can hear cases brought by private individuals, provide preliminary rulings upon the request of national courts, and make rulings with direct effect (Alter, Helfer, and McAllister 2013). Unusually for a consultative body, the ECOWAS parliament must be consulted on constitutional reform. However, member states have preserved the national veto in collective bodies in every policy area except peacekeeping, where the member state-dominated Mediation and Security Council can deploy election monitors, mediators, and peacekeepers by two-thirds majority. ECOWAS is in the top decile of our sample on delegation and in the bottom third on pooling.

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The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation scores almost zero on delegation and pooling. SAARC was founded in 1985 by Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan and four neighboring countries to promote trust and cooperation in some technical areas, and in 2006 was tasked with trade liberalization. All decisions are taken by consensus, usually by the Intergovernmental Council of Ministers or its Standing Committee. Common projects are not binding and conventions signed by SAARC members bind only those that subsequently ratify. The SAARC Secretariat has no formal agenda setting role in any of the areas we monitor. As one commentator observes, the Secretariat “hardly exercises even the modest role assigned to it by the Charter. It has only occasionally been involved in the preparation of documentation for important meetings” (Ashan 2006: 146).

We conclude this preview of the MIA dataset with summary statistics for the components of delegation and pooling for the seventy-six IOs in the dataset from 1950 to 2010 (Tables 3.5 and 3.6).

Several commonalities between delegation and pooling stand out when one compares the mean levels in decision areas. There is least delegation and pooling in suspension and constitutional reform, the decision areas in which national sovereignty is most implicated. By the same logic, delegation and pooling are strongest in budgetary allocation, the decision area which facilitates day-to-day operations. Delegation and pooling are relatively strong in policy making, perhaps for similar reasons. Accession and financial compliance have relatively high levels of pooling among member states, but generally cut out delegation to non-state bodies.

Table 3.5. Descriptives on delegation

	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75
Delegation by decision area							
Accession	0.140	0.143	1.143	0	0.778	0	0.191
Suspension	0.109	0.119	1.128	0	0.643	0	0.167
Constitutional reform	0.130	0.134	1.110	0	0.644	0	0.191
Budgetary allocation	0.321	0.333	0.623	0	1	0.167	0.443
Financial compliance	0.137	0.143	1.183	0	0.667	0	0.191
Policy making	0.278	0.254	0.659	0	0.933	0.167	0.369
Delegation by decision stage							
Agenda setting	0.235	0.208	0.654	0	0.708	0.139	0.333
Final decision	0.052	0	2.227	0	0.55	0	0
Dispute settlement	0.271	0.286	1.080	0	1	0	0.5
DELEGATION SCORE	0.186	0.184	0.724	0	0.652	0.061	0.261

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Table 3.6. Descriptives on pooling

	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75
Pooling by decision area							
Accession	0.355	0.330	0.693	0	1	0.125	0.540
Suspension	0.137	0	1.857	0	1	0	0.165
Constitutional reform	0.209	0.165	0.959	0	0.75	0.040	0.330
Budgetary allocation	0.439	0.330	0.723	0	1	0.165	0.660
Financial compliance	0.305	0.165	1.082	0	1	0	0.580
Policy making	0.312	0.250	0.690	0	1	0.165	0.375
Pooling by decision stage							
Agenda setting	0.253	0.222	0.748	0	0.749	0.083	0.375
Final decision	0.332	0.316	0.612	0	0.790	0.179	0.538
POOLING SCORE	0.293	0.287	0.633	0	0.728	0.138	0.425

Overall there is slightly more variation in delegation than in pooling, taking their mean levels into account. The coefficient of variation in the third column describes variability relative to the mean of the distribution. Interestingly, decision areas and decision stages with the lowest means tend to have the largest coefficients of variation. Variation among IOs is relatively great for those components of authority which are the most difficult to achieve. So we see, on average, little delegation in the final decision, but there are some IOs that stand out. The same is true of pooling on suspension. The association between the mean and the coefficient of variation for the twelve decision areas in delegation and pooling combined is -0.71 . International organizations are particularly diverse in areas of stark national sovereignty.

Perhaps the functional pressures for delegation and pooling are more persistent in day-to-day policy and financial matters than for quasi-constitutional matters. Who should we allow in our club? How shall we punish violators? Who can rewrite the IO contract? Member states intent on preserving their freedom of action may refuse to subject these matters to the rule of law. But not always, and not consistently over time. When do states delegate? When do states pool authority? What drives member states to sometimes relax and sometimes tighten control? These are puzzles for further research.

The MIA cannot answer such questions. What it can do is reveal patterns of international authority that have hitherto remained murky. The need for such information arises from the challenge of bringing observation into contact with theory. In the social sciences, theories often run far beyond the data

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necessary to confirm or disconfirm them. Human ingenuity in devising coherent models of the world is perhaps no less great in the social sciences than in the natural sciences, but the information we have at our disposal to discipline and inform theory is usually far poorer. Our purpose in this book is to provide a range of conceptually coherent observations, which can be assembled—like Lego blocks—in diverse ways for diverse purposes.