European Integration and Political Conflict

Over the past half-century, Europe has experienced the most radical reallocation of authority that has ever taken place in peace-time;[5] yet the ideological conflicts that will emerge from this are only now becoming apparent. The editors of this volume, Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen, have brought together a formidable group of scholars of European and comparative politics to investigate patterns of conflict that are arising in the European Union. Using diverse sources of data, and examining a range of actors, including citizens, political parties, members of the European Parliament, social movements, and interest groups, the authors of this volume conclude that political contestation concerning European integration is indeed rooted in the basic conflicts that have shaped political life in Western Europe for many years. This volume provides a comprehensive analysis of political conflict in the European Union that will shape the field for years to come.

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The evolving European systems of governance, in particular the European Union, challenge and transform the state, the most important locus of governance and political identity and loyalty over the past 200 years. The series *Themes in European Governance* aims to publish the best theoretical and analytical scholarship on the impact of European governance on the core institutions, policies and identities of nation-states. It focuses upon the implications for issues such as citizenship, welfare, political decision-making, and economic, monetary and fiscal policies. An initiative of Cambridge University Press and the Programme on Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation-State (ARENA), Norway, the series includes contributions in the social sciences, humanities and law. The series aims to provide theoretically informed studies analysing key issues at the European level and within European states. Volumes in the series will be of interest to scholars and students of Europe both within Europe and worldwide. They will be of particular relevance to those interested in the development of sovereignty and governance of European states and in the issues raised by multi-level governance and multi-national integration throughout the world.

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Gary Marks

Over the past half-century, Europe has experienced the most radical reallocation of authority that has ever taken place in peace-time, yet the ideological conflicts that will emerge from this are only now becoming apparent. This book originated in the efforts of a group of scholars to investigate the patterns of conflict - dimensions of contestation - that have arisen from European integration. The question that motivates us is *a* broad one: how does European integration play into the domestic politics of the member states?[1] In this volume, we resolve this abstract question into a more precise and empirical one: to what extent and how are the issues arising from European integration connected to the dimensions of contestation that structure domestic politics? Is European integration assimilated within the major lines of conflict, above all the competition between left and right, or is it unrelated?

Rather than divide Europe by country, each of us examines one kind of group - citizens, national political parties, social movements, interest groups, members of the European Parliament, and European political parties - for the EU as a whole. We engage several kinds of data, including Eurobarometer surveys, party manifestos, expert evaluations of party positions, and elite interviews. We cannot claim to be of a single mind, but we do claim that we arrive at broadly consistent answers to our question. The aim of this chapter is to convey their substantive thrust. That our conclusions are based on analysis of several independent sets of data for diverse national and European actors reinforces, we think, their plausibility.

[1] Our focus is on patterns of contestation (Katz and Wessels 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999), rather than levels of support for European integration.

I propose to set out our findings in steps, beginning, in the next section, at the aggregate level. To what extent does the left/right divide constrain views of European integration *in general,* across the European Union *as a whole?* We can answer simply: there is no robust *linear* relationship. The relationship we find is curvilinear: an inverted U-curve, pronounced for political parties, weak for the general public, created by centrist support for European integration, and opposition from both left and right extremes.

When we probe beyond the aggregate level, things begin to get more interesting and more controversial. How has the ideological fit between European integration and domestic dimensions of conflict changed over time? Are ideological patterns of support and opposition to European integration visible at the level of particular policy areas? Does the ideological fit between domestic contestation and the issues arising from European integration vary from country to country, and if so, why? To answer these questions we have to cut three ways:

- [ ] *By time.* European integration is not merely a moving target; its ideological bearings have shifted 180 degrees over the past two decades. In the 1980s, European integration was essentially a market-making project, favored by the right, less so by the left. By the turn of the century, the situation was reversed, as left-leaning policies, such as environmental policy, social policy, and employment policy came on the agenda.
- [ ] *By issue.* Some European issues connect closely to domestic politics; others do not connect at all. European issues having distributional consequences within countries are most closely related to left/right contestation. European issues that affect national sovereignty relate more closely to new politics contestation.
- [ ] *By territory.* National institutions frame how European issues map on to domestic cleavages. Some issues play the same way across countries - and give rise to pure ideological cleavages - while others evoke contrasting patterns of support and opposition in different countries. Issues that have consequences for the allocation of values *across* countries give rise to national coalitions.

Our approach is fine-grained because the questions we ask require it. The devil is in the details. But our aim is not to confound the reader with complexity. By looking more precisely, we can observe - and generalize about - patterns of political conflict that are invisible at the aggregate level.

We have had to abandon our original ambition to arrive at one simple model that can describe how left/right contestation is related to support for European integration. We began by setting out four simple and

logically distinctive models, and we continue to find them useful benchmarks. But no one model is valid for the EU at every resolution of detail. The thrust of this book is to examine the conditions under which one or the other model is valid, and this leads us to inquire into variation across issues and variation across territory.

Aggregate findings

At the aggregate level - that is to say, when we treat European integration as a single dimension - the model that best describes the relationship of European integration to the left/right dimension over the past two decades is the Hix-Lord model, in which European integration and left/right positioning are orthogonal to each other. According to this model, left/right conflict allocates values among functional groups, whereas European integration allocates values among territorial groups. Hence, the position that a person takes on one dimension does not constrain her position on the other dimension. As we described this model in the Introduction, all four quadrants are feasible policy options: left/pro-integration, left/anti integration, right/pro-integration, and right/anti-integration.

This is confirmed by the chapters in this volume that are concerned with individual citizens. Matthew Gabel and Christopher Anderson (chapter 1) find that citizens' views on European integration are weakly associated with left/right self-placement. Left/right self-placement has a factor loading of 0.065 in a one-factor model (model 2) of attitudes towards more EU activity, far lower than any other item. Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin (chapter 2) find essentially the same thing. Pro-/anti-EU orientations of voters bear almost no systematic relation to their left/right self-placement, as illustrated in figure 2.1.

We reject one possible explanation for this non-association, namely that orientations toward European integration are unstructured and, consequently, random. Gabel and Anderson find that attitudes towards European integration in the public at large are quite well structured. Van der Eijk and Franklin note that respondents appear to have little difficulty placing themselves on an EU integration scale. The percentage of missing data for this scale in their survey of the European electorate is little more than half that for the left/right scale.[2] Respondents are not at a loss to place themselves on a pro-/anti-European integration scale. Moreover, as van der Eijk and Franklin point

out, respondents locate themselves further toward the extremes on the EU integration scale than they do on

[2] For a contrasting view of the extent to which individual citizens have structured opinions about European integration'see Sinnott (1997) and Green (2001).

the left/right scale - an indication that real attitudes towards the EU are being tapped.

Analyses of political parties also conclude that there is no strong and durable relationship between left/right positioning and support or opposition to European integration in general. Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson (chapter 6) find a positive linear association between left/right party position and overall support for European integration. Right parties are more likely than left parties to support European integration *in general.* However, as we discuss below, they are less likely to support further integration on issues such as the environment and employment policy.

So there is no overall significant linear association between European integration, conceived as a whole, and left/right contestation. This leads van der Eijk and Franklin to describe European integration as a "sleeping giant." European integration is orthogonal to the left/right divide, yet it is difficult to overestimate its substantive importance. European integration has transformed Europe economically and politically, yet orientations to it are not constrained by the dimension that chiefly structures contestation across European societies. If European integration were to become highly salient, it might therefore become a combustible issue (Evans 1999).

The inverted U-curve

The most powerful association that we find at the aggregate level between left/right position and European integration is an inverted U-curve describing support for European integration among centrist parties, and opposition among parties toward the extremes of both left and right (Aspinwall 2002; Hix and Lord 1997; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Taggart 1998). Doug Imig (chapter 10) finds that the bulk of popular contestation oriented directly or indirectly toward the European Union is anti-integration. Most of the groups that have organized protests are on the left, but all are outside the centrist mainstream that controls the levers of authority (Imig and Tarrow 2000, 2001). Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson find that national political parties towards the left and right extremes take Euroskeptical positions on European integration at the aggregate level and across the board on individual issues. Van der Eijk and Franklin also find an inverted U-curve in party positions as imputed by-voters

(figure 2.3).[3]

[3] To pick up the inverted U-curve one must include parties or groups at the extreme, but these tend to have small memberships and support, and as a result tend to be underrepresented in data sets such as the Manifesto Research Group data or the European elections survey.

There is a substantive explanation for this and a strategic one. *Substantively,* the European Union is a centrist project for the simple reason that mainstream parties - Christian democrats, liberals, social democrats, and conservatives - have dominated national governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Parties on the extreme left and extreme right, along with contentious social movements, have little love for institutions they have done almost nothing to create. They attack European integration as an extension of their domestic opposition. The extreme left views European integration as an elitist capitalist project that isolates decision-making from citizens in the interests of powerful corporations. The extreme right views European integration as an elitist supranational project that weakens national autonomy and traditional values.

Strategically, positions on European integration are framed with an eye to sustaining or challenging existing dimensions of domestic conflict (Steenbergen and Scott, chapter 8). Centrist political parties converge in support of European integration because they want to bottle up a potential new dimension of conflict (Hix 1999a; Scott 2001). They cannot assimilate European

integration into the dominant left/right dimension that structures national competition, and so they try to avoid competing on it. This has the considerable advantage of dampening an issue that could otherwise fracture mainstream parties. Conversely, parties that are toward the left and right extremes want to raise the heat by taking anti positions on European integration. While such parties are minor contenders on the established left/right dimension, they may be far more successful if they can impose a cross-cutting conflict on which they are more united than their mainstream competitors.

Time

The relationship between left/right orientations and the degree of support for European integration depends on *when* one is asking the question. European integration is a swiftly moving target. Two decades ago, in the early to mid-1980s, the chief issue on the agenda had to do with sweeping away non-tariff barriers to trade. This meant limiting public subsidies to industry, bypassing protectionist product standards, opening up public procurement, and reducing red tape - all of which was music to the ears of those on the right. It was no coincidence that the Single European Act of 1986 was negotiated by nine center-right governments and three left governments, the most important of which was the Mitterrand government in France which had tried, and failed, to implement an interventionist socialist program. A majority of those on the left were prepared to go

along with the market project, but they regarded it merely as a first step to a social democratic "Citizens' Europe" (Hooghe and Marks 1999; Ladrech and Marliere 1999).

Following the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and currency union (2002), the creation of a single European market is no longer a topic of debate in Euroland. Yet, as Steenbergen and Scott show (figure 8.1), the salience of European integration increased from the 1980s to the 1990s. On the agenda now are a wide variety of proposals for further integration, several of which are more popular with the left than with the right. These include market-flanking policies, such as employment and environmental policy, which draw disproportional support from the left in every EU member state.

On the basis of content analysis of European party manifestos, Matthew Gabel and Simon Hix (chapter 5), find that left and right have switched positions on European integration over the past two decades. The center-right European Peoples' Party was more pro-integration than the party of European Socialists in the 1970s; by the 1990s, the situation was reversed. There is no immutable relationship between left/right positioning and support for European integration. As in the American federal system, sometimes it is the left and sometimes the right that supports more centralization (or more decentralization). It all depends on what the status quo is and what one wants to defend or achieve by reallocating authority.

Digging deeper

We refine the analysis of the connection between domestic and European contestation in two ways, by examining variation between issues and variation across countries. We discover that particular aspects of European integration evoke responses that are indeed constrained by ideology. The search for such connections leads us to analyze new politics contestation alongside left/right contestation. We also examine how territory mediates ideology across the member states of the European Union. We discover that national institutions frame how European integration plays on the left/right divide.

Disaggregating by issue *Left/right*

The connections between domestic and European contestation come into sharp view when one examines specific sets of issues. European

integration is diverse in the particular sense that the issues it raises are more weakly intercorrelated than the issues that make up the left/right dimension (see Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt, chapter 4, n. 8) 4. Both left and right can support more European integration. It

depends on what issue one is talking about. So, for example, the left favors more integration in employment policy, while the right favors market integration. At the aggregate level, when one asks about European integration in general, such contrasts wash out. There is not much difference in the degree to which left and right support European integration as a whole. This is reflected in the weak association between left/right and the standard Eurobarometer question concerning "more or less integration" (Gabel and Anderson, chapter 1) 5.

An issue-based approach tells a different story. When Gabel and Anderson examine citizens' views on "what kind of integration," rather than "more or less integration," they find that a left/right dimension underlies public attitudes. The items that load most heavily on this dimension are "improving equality of opportunity" (for minorities and women), "more help to the poor and socially excluded" (and to the Third World), "support for poorer EU regions," and "protect[ing] consumers."

European issues that have to do with the political regulation of the market are most closely connected to the left/right dimension. According to the Hooghe-Marks model set out in the Introduction, the centerleft supports political integration in order to create European regulated capitalism with the capacity to regulate markets, redistribute resources, and sustain partnership among public and private actors (1999). The project of regulated capitalism at the European level is rooted in Jacques Delors' decade-long presidency of the European Commission (198594), and his effort to build an *espace organise* around social and cohesion policy. Regulated capitalism is an ideological project - and is opposed by those on the right who consider market integration a worthy goal, rather than a point of departure for further integration.

This is consistent with Bernhard Wessels' findings for interest groups (chapter 9). He discovers three coalitions at the European level: a bourgeois alliance of Christian democrats, conservatives, and industrial groups; a labor alliance of social democrats and labor unions; and an alliance of "the weak," composed of greens, regionalists, and environmental

[4] Kris Deschouwer makes the point that differences across policy sectors are particularly pronounced under multilevel governance (2000: 11). On complexities of the left/right dimension see Elff (2002).

[5] Similarly, van der Eijk and Franklin note that left/right placement is correlated only with their more policy-relevant measure of preference for unification. Gabel and Hix note that left/right distinguishes European political parties on economic issues, but not on basic constitutional questions such as what powers should be delegated to the European level.

and consumer groups. The latter coalitions are most in favor of further Europeanization and strengthening the European Parliament.

We find that the location of national political parties on the left/right divide constrains whether they support or oppose European integration on policies related to regulated capitalism. Employment policy is a prime example. The further to the left a party is located on the left /right dimension, the greater its support for a European employment policy (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, chapter 6; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997: 172). The relationship is strongest for mainstream parties - social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, and conservative parties *(r* = 0.75) - but it is significant across all parties, despite the fact, as noted above, that extreme left and extreme right parties tend to be opposed to just about any shift of competence to the European level. Left/right positioning exerts a similar constraint on cohesion policy, which funds infrastructural and training programs in poorer regions in an effort to increase their economic growth.

The issues that motivate the classic left/right divide have to do with liberty versus equity, free markets versus government steering, and individual economic freedom versus collective rights. These encompass a fair share of conflicts in capitalist society, but they do not bear directly on questions relating to the territorial allocation of authority in a multilevel polity. In the past, socialists have fought for state centralization to counterbalance the power of property and concentrated private ownership of industry, but this does not translate into the demand for more authority at the European level. The reason for this is that social democrats are also defenders of the national institutions they have done so much to create. To the extent that social democrats have successfully created national systems of welfare, industrial relations, and health care, they fear that European integration may undermine them by intensifying regulatory competition. Many social democrats echo Fritz Scharpf in stressing that the EU is biased towards negative integration, that is, towards market-creating and market-enabling policies, rather than market regulation (Scharpf 1996; 1999). Only if further integration were to undo this bias could one be sure that shifting competencies to the European

level would be a step toward regulated capitalism. If the bias remains - and it is deeply rooted in the European Court of Justice - then Europeanizing public policy will be self-defeating from a social democratic perspective.[6] Hence, the left/right divide does not speak directly to the territorial allocation of authority.

[6] Euroskepticism on the left is reinforced by the view that the weakness of a European identity precludes redistributive policy at the European level. According to this line of argument, the absence of a meaningful European *demos* limits the legitimacy of the European Parliament, and hence its effectiveness for European regulated capitalism.

This is what Jacques Thomassen, Abdul Noury, and Erik Voeten find ((chapter 7). They diagnose three distinct issue dimensions for members of the European Parliament. The first is an integration/independence dimension composed mainly of constitutional issues that engage the territorial allocation of authority (including the general question of increasing the range of responsibilities of the EU, and strengthening the European Parliament). The second is a left/right dimension that extends the concern with state and markets to the European level (including whether to create an EU employment program versus concentrating on the single market), and the third is a libertarian/traditional or new politics dimension based on law and order and lifestyle issues.

The left/right dimension constrains support for European issues that have distributional consequences *within,* rather than *among,* member states. This is consistent with a bounded rationality explanation of response to European integration. The strategic response of an organization to new issues depends on its prior ideology, which acts as a lens through which it interprets new opportunities or challenges arising on the political agenda (Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, and Stephens 1999). Groups that mobilize functional interests within national states - political parties and functional interest groups - are particularly responsive to the distributional effects of a European issue across domestic groups. They are primed, so to speak, to interpret European integration in the light of their ideological concerns. Conversely, organizations (such as national and regional governments) that mobilize *territorial* interests are particularly responsive to the distributional effects of issues *among* territorial units, as I discuss below.

New politics

By the same logic, one would expect that EU issues engaging lifestyle, gender, environment, participatory decision-making, and national culture to be most closely associated with the new politics dimension within member states. Items that load strongly on the new politics dimension include those that ask whether protecting consumers, controlling immigration, increasing EU transparency, protecting human rights, and protecting national cultures should be key priorities for EU activity (see Gabel and Anderson, chapter 1). Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (chapter 6) find that the position of political parties on the new politics dimension is strongly associated with their support for an EU environmental policy *(r* = 0.61; sig. > 0.01) and for an EU asylum policy *(r* = 0.57; sig. > *0.01).*

In some respects, the new politics dimension is more intimately connected to European integration than is the left/right dimension. New politics conflicts engage the "nation" and its defense, alongside individual choice versus traditional values, the environment,, and participation versus hierarchy. Those on the right of this dimension oppose European integration for essentially the same reasons that they oppose immigration: both infuse foreigners into the society; both threaten the national community. The Flemish Block's campaign slogan in the 1999 Belgian election was "In charge of our own country," an update on their earlier "Our own people first." The defense of national sovereignty lies close to the heart of those on the *TAN* (traditional-authoritarian-nationalist) side of this divide, not because national sovereignty is useful for other ends, but because it is *intrinsically* valued.

This distinguishes the new right from market liberals. Market liberals view national sovereignty in terms of its implications for economic exchange. They are opposed to barriers to trade, and they therefore support strong international regimes that can facilitate market integration, even if this eviscerates key national state competencies, including monetary control. At the same time, market liberals oppose the creation of a powerful and legitimate continental authority that could be used to control markets. The European orientations of those on the right of the left/right divide are nuanced, unlike those on the new right.

Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (chapter 6) conclude that a party's position on the new politics dimension is considerably more powerful than its position on the left/right dimension in predicting its support for integration across each of the seven issue areas they examine. Radical right parties are now by far the most Euroskeptical of any of the eight party family groupings in Europe, including the radical left. Conservative parties that lean to the *TAN* side of the new politics dimension - emphasizing traditional or authoritarian values - tend to be more Euroskeptical than those that do not. The relationship is weaker for new politics/green parties on the other side of this dimension, except on issues, such as the environment and asylum, that relate directly to their core concerns. This is consistent with Wessels' finding that of the three alliances he distinguishes, it is the new politics alliance that is most supportive of European integration.

Models

Of the four models that we set out in the Introduction, the one that appears most valid at the level of issues is the Hooghe-Marks model. Several contributors to this volume stress that the moderate left has become more

supportive of European integration on issues related to regulated capitalism, and that the moderate right has become skeptical of integration beyond market-making. But the pro-EU orientation of the moderate left is not written in stone. It was, for example, not evident before the great market reforms of the 1980s. In 1984, according to Leonard Ray's data on party positions, social democrats supplied the largest reservoir of *opposition* to European integration (1999). However, since the early 1990s, debates about the balance of European and national policy-making are intelligible in left/right terms.

The research reported in this book goes considerably beyond the models set out in the Introduction. First, we have discovered a connection between new politics and European integration. There is good reason - and some evidence - to believe that new politics contestation is intimately related not only to particular policy choices, but also to fundamental .constitutional issues raised by European integration. Such a connection, is consistent with the dogged opposition to European integration on the part of radical right parties in recent national elections, including those in France and the Netherlands in 2002, where the National Front and the List Pim Fortuyn raised the heat on European integration. Conservative parties in the UK and France have been deeply riven by conflicts between market liberals who are pragmatic on issues of national sovereignty and new politics rightists who reject European supranationalism.

Furthermore, the models we set out in our Introduction say nothing about *territorial* variation in the ideological bases of European contestation. The Hooghe-Marks model hypothesizes variation among the issues that make up European integration, but assumes that the European Union is ideologically homogeneous. We need now to relax this assumption and theorize about how left/right structures positioning on European integration in different countries. Territorial variation is as fundamental to an understanding of European contestation as variation across issues, and I turn to this topic next.

Disaggregating by territory

The European Union both tames and intensifies territorial politics. It tames territorial politics by creating a web of mutual dependencies that reduce - and perhaps eliminate - the possibility of war among mem
ber states. The EU routinizes international relations within a system of multilevel governance. It internalizes - and domesticates - territorial relations by transforming diplomacy among states

into the making, implementation, and adjudication of laws. I have already described one decisive outcome of this process: ideological conflicts that *cross-cut*

territorial conflicts and that meld domestic groups of one ideological stripe or another into transnational coalitions. This was Jean Monnet's hope and goal, but it is one side only of European integration.

European integration intensifies territorial politics and intensifies the *national*. It does this both within and among countries. It does so *within* countries by generating insecurities that provoke a nationalist reaction. Chapters in this volume detail the way in which the radical right mobilizes anti-European feelings in defense of national authenticity. European integration undermines national sovereignty - and citizens understand this. Barriers to economic competition within Europe have been dismantled at the same time as the capacity of national states to ameliorate the effects of competition - either through welfare or fiscal subvention - has narrowed. Citizens who have the least to gain from economic integration because they lack mobile skills and capital, and who feel personally vulnerable, are most likely to support a *TAN* ideology: traditionalism, authoritarianism, nationalism. Root-and-branch opposition to European integration fits comfortably with reactionary defense of the nation, and radical right parties now make up the largest voting bloc of outright opposition to European integration across the EU.

European integration exacerbates territorial conflict *among* countries because it engages national (and regional/local) governments in a process of ongoing bargaining over a range of policies that formerly were determined within, rather than among, national states. To the extent that such policy-making involves redistribution and the territories in question have a capacity for strategy-that is to say, they are collective actors, not merely aggregations - so the outcome will be intense territorial bargaining. Intergovernmental institutions - the European Council and the Council of Ministers - are key venues for such bargaining. In the European Parliament such territorial conflicts fragment ideologically based party fractions.

Territorial variation may refract ideological coalitions. The allocation of a particular policy competence to the European level may have dissimilar - or even contrary - consequences in different countries. Distinctive political and economic institutions filter how actors apply their ideological preferences to European issues (cf. Eichenberg and Dalton 1998; Hall and Gingerich 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hix 1999b; Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, and Stephens 1999). This is the point of departure for the chapters by Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin (chapter 2), Leonard Ray (chapter 3), and Adam Brinegar, Seth Jolly, and Herbert Kitschelt (chapter 4). Van der Eijk and Franklin observe that "It is the dynamics of the domestic political arena that here and there brings forth a connection with either the right or the left." Ray's thesis is that:

In those nations where the prevailing national policy regime is closer to the ideal preferences of "leftist" individuals, support for integration should be concentrated on the right side of the political spectrum. Conversely, in nations where national policy is relatively far from the preferences of "leftists," the left will be more supportive of integration as a way to achieve, at the European level, outcomes unobtainable under a purely national regime (chapter 3).

Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt find compelling evidence that "In redistributive welfare states it is the left that opposes further EU integration, in liberal-residual welfare states the right" (chapter 4).

The chapters in this book analyze the domestic ideological underpinnings of the debate concerning European integration. We have gone furthest in probing how European integration is connected - or not connected - to the left/right divide in a variety of arenas for several kinds of actors. This was our main objective when we began this project. We have raised the question of how European integration is related to the new politics dimension. And we have begun to inquire into the way that territory mediates ideology across the European

Union. The final section of this chapter no longer encapsulates the findings of previous chapters, but takes some tentative steps in linking two lines of analysis we discuss in some detail throughout the book. Readers who seek in this conclusion a concise overview of our project and its conclusions can stop here. What follows is meant, at best, to suggest some fruitful avenues for further inquiry.

Combining issues and territory

Let me begin by combining two basic strategies adopted by the contributors to this book: an issue-based approach, and an appreciation of the way in which territory (e.g., via national institutions) mediates ideology. When one analyzes the territorial dimension of European contestation from the standpoint of variation across issues, it is useful to consider the mediating effect of national institutions as *a variable* rather than a constant. At one extreme, there are issues that have decisively different distributional consequences from country to country. As Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt inform us, the distributional impact of a European welfare policy in a liberal uncoordinated economy, such as the UK, is very different from that in a social democratic coordinated economy, such as Sweden. Hence, left and right take different positions in different countries. At the other extreme are issues - the decision whether to expand EU competencies in higher education, for example - that have consistent domestic distributional implications across EU countries. In such cases, one would

expect the pattern of support and opposition from left and right to be the same across countries.

Figure 11.1 hypothesizes how this variation constrains the positions that individuals and groups adopt on an issue and the coalitions they form. The idea that motivates this model is simple: the greater the territorial congruence of a policy's distributional impact, the more one can expect domestic actors to line up the same way.[7] The extent to which one finds ideologically based coalitions depends on whether a policy has the same distributional effects across its territorial subunits.[8] Conversely, the greater the territorial *heterogeneity* of distributional effects across territory, the more one can expect ideologically *inconsistent* coalitions. In this case the outcome will be "unholy alliances" - ideologically mixed coalitions that combine left and right groups on both sides of the issue.[9]

A policy may also engage territory directly by distributing values *across* constituent units. What might one expect when European integration allocates values not only *within* countries, but *across* them? This question is logically independent from the question of the homogeneity of domestic distributional impacts. The reasoning here follows the same format as in figure 11.1, but with a twist: how does the allocation of values *across* constituent units affect coalition building?[10] The logic of this analysis is multilevel. It can apply to states in a transnational polity, regions within a state, or localities within a region.

Figure 11.2 summarizes these ideas. It explains coalitions in terms of the interaction of territory and ideology. The y-axis in figure 11.2 represents the extent to which the domestic distribution of costs and benefits is homogeneous across territory, in this case, across the member states of the European Union. If domestic costs/benefits are similar across countries, two things follow: first, left and right can be expected to line up in a consistent way across countries; second, European-wide, ideologically pure, coalitions will emerge. The x-axis represents the extent to which an issue involves distribution *across* territory (i.e., across EU member states). If there is extensive distribution of values across territory,

7 Homogeneity/heterogeneity of distributional impact" and "consistency of ideological positioning" may serve as useful concepts for evaluating political cohesion in federal political systems. These concepts provide analytical leverage on the following question: "To what extent is there a common ideological playing field across a particular territory?"

8 In the European Union, the chief territorial subunits are the member states, but the logic of the model applies within as well as among countries.

9 Figure 11.1 spells out these pure types as answers to the questions posed in the thicklined boxes. The model is recursive in that coalitions make policy, which affects the allocation of values (the dotted arrows in figure 11.1).

Figure 11.1 A model of coalition formation.

two things follow: first, this will give rise to territorial conflict; second, coalition-building will be territorial.

Keep in mind that the two logics of allocation, preferences, and coalition-formation - ideology and territory - are intrinsically independent of each other. Hence, particular policies may give rise to one, both, or neither of the patterns of coalition-formation. Figure 11.2 illustrates four possibilities:

☐ Ideology trumps territory in the *lower-left quadrant.* Here coalitions arise from a consistent pattern of distributional conflicts *within* countries in the absence of distributional conflicts *among* countries.

☐ Ideology and territory are both powerful sources of coalition-building in the *bottom-right quadrant.* This quadrant describes a consistent pattern of distributional conflicts *within* countries, but one that is cross-cut by territorial coalitions arising from high levels of redistribution *among* countries.

☐ Neither ideological nor inter-state conflict structures coalitions in the *top-left quadrant.* Territorial distribution is low, and national institutions filter the impact of issues so that the positioning of left and right varies from country to country - creating "unholy alliances."

Is the *domestic* distributional impact of an EU policy
similar or different across countries?

DIFFERENT

IDEOLOGY
MEDIATED BY
TERRITORY:
UNHOLY
ALLIANCES

Is the *inter-
country*
distributional
impact of an   SMALL
EU policy
large or
small?

TERRITORY
DOMINANT:
NATIONAL
COALITIONS

LARGE

IDEOLOGY
DOMINANT:
EUROPEAN-WIDE
COALITIONS

SIMILAR

SIMILAR Figure 11.2 Patterns of contestation.

☐   ☐ Territory, but not ideology, structures coalition-building in the *top-right quadrant.* This quadrant combines unholy alliances with national coalitions arising from high levels of inter-country distribution. Ideological lines of conflict are muddied by national institutions; inter-state conflict is dominant.

The analyses of this volume generate a set of expectations about the location of actors, institutions, and issues within this two-dimensional space. With respect to *actors,* we expect the positioning of political parties on European issues to be more ideologically consistent in left/right terms than the positioning of citizens. That is, on any given issue, political parties should be located further towards the bottom of figure 11.2. Contributions to this volume indicate that the preferences of national political parties on a subset of issues arising from European integration

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are sometimes quite closely related to left/right position - certainly far more so than for the public at large. I have already noted that Gabel and Anderson and van der Eijk and Franklin discover only a weak and insignificant linear association between left/right positioning and support for European integration among the general public. In contrast, Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten find that the left/right dimension explains 23 percent of the variance in MEP preferences across fifteen issues. Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson conclude that the effect of left/right positioning for national parties is significant across a subset of European issues, including employment and environmental policy. We therefore expect that left/right constrains party positions on European integration more strongly than it constrains the positions of citizens.

This expectation can be grounded in political psychology. One of the best-established generalizations in the study of political attitudes is that there is wide variance among citizens in their

political knowledge and sophistication, and that this is associated with the extent to which citizens structure their views of the political world (Jennings 1992; Kinder 1998). Elites are more likely to understand and use political abstractions, such as "left" and "right." Correspondingly, their attitudes towards political objects are usually more stable and more structured. Party leaders do not just structure their views coherently, they also inform the public about new issues that arise and how they should be evaluated (Steenbergen and Scott, chapter 8).

In terms of *arenas,* our expectation is that those dominated by political parties - e.g., national parliaments and the European Parliament - should be located further toward the ideological quadrants at the bottom of figure 11.2 than arenas dominated by territorial organizations, such as national governments. Political parties compete on ideology; national governments compete by representing distinct territorial communities. *11* The logical implication is that the European Council and the EU's Council of Ministers will be biased towards the top right-hand quadrant of figure 11.2, while European and national parliaments will be biased towards the bottom left-hand quadrant.

Coalition-building in these arenas is likely to be mixed if both sources of distribution are present. Each arena exhibits this in a characteristic way. European-wide ideological coalitions are most visible in the European Pariament, but in the face of territorial redistribution one can usually trace national tensions within party fractions. Territorial coalitions

11 Political parties representing the demands of particular territorial minorities are an interesting exception.

are most visible in the Council of Ministers, but on ideologically salient issues, these are modulated by the party composition of national governments.[12]

Finally, the authors of this volume find wide variations in the interaction of ideology and territory across *issues.* There are two big questions here. What kinds of issues are likely to generate ideological (in)consistency across the left/right divide? How are countries grouped on whether the left or the right is most supportive of European integration? Let us take these questions in turn.

Our expectations on ideological consistency across the left/right divide are informed by the regulated capitalism hypothesis. In recent years the left has come to support further integration on issues that flank market integration. These are policy areas - employment, the environment, social policy, cohesion policy-that were part of Jacques Delors' project to create a citizens' Europe. We would therefore expect these policies to be placed in the lower-left quadrant of figure 11.2.

At the opposite extreme (in the top-right quadrant) are constitutional issues. These often allocate values (power or resources) across countries, but have murky consequences for the allocation of values within countries. So, for example, the distribution of voting weights in the Council of Ministers engages countries as contending players, but has no clear consequences for who gets what within countries. Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten find that membership in a particular party family shapes the views of MEN on socio-economic left/right issues and libertarian-traditional issues, while nationality is the most powerful influence for constitutional issues. Foreign and defense policy are similar in that they allocate values among countries more transparently than they allocate values within countries.

Our expectation concerning national patterns of conflict is rooted in the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999). Assuming that European integration leads to policy convergence, integration should be supported by those on theright and opposed by those on the left in leftist policy regimes, and supported by those on the

12 On the role of territoriality in the EU see Egeberg (2001), Sbragia (1993) and Ansell and Di Palma (forthcoming), particularly chapters by Christopher Ansell, Stefano Bartolini, Giuseppe Di Palma, and Sidney Tarrow. The effects of cross-cutting pressures surface in research on the European Parliament, where voting can be measured. Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten find a high level of party group discipline in EP voting, "an indicator of the success of European parliamentary institutions in framing European politics according to ideological and party lines rather than national interests" (Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten, this volume; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2003).

left and opposed by those on the right in rightist policy regimes (Ray, chapter 3).[13]

A second line of theorizing explores how variation among party systems structures debate (Steenbergen and Scott, chapter 8). I have noted that there is a strong curvilinear relationship between party positioning on the left/right divide and support for European integration. Extreme parties of the left and right mobilize publics against European integration, and where only one or the other is present, one can expect this to have a significant impact on the sign of the coefficient for left/right positioning on European integration. Where an extreme left party exists in the absence of an extreme right party, I expect a positive association between left/right position and support for European integration. Conversely, where an extreme right party exists in the absence of an extreme left party, this should give rise to a negative association.

Locating issues in the schema

Where are European issues located in the two-dimensional space conceptualized here? Figure 11.3 illustrates where national political parties stand on seven policies, and figure 11.4 illustrates public opinion positions on thirteen policies. 14

13 As Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt argue: "In residual, liberal welfare states, leftists who would like to see more economic redistribution would obviously see European integration as a benefit, if it moves national conditions from the status quo to at least a conservative, but more encompassing and redistributive welfare state. Rightists, in that setting, will be opposed. Conversely, in encompassing, egalitarian, universalistic, social democratic welfare states, leftists who are fond of the national status quo can only fear that European integration will lead away from their personal ideal point. In such countries, the left is likely to be more anti-European and the right more pro-European ... In countries with conservative encompassing welfare states, EU integration should not be significantly related to left/right ideology, but cross-cutting" (chapter 4).

[14] Figure 11.3 is derived from expert evaluations of positions of national parties on a sevenpoint scale that ranges from strongly opposes integration to strongly in favor of integration (Marks and Steenbergen 1999). For example, our question on the EP is as follows: "We would like to start with the party leadership's position on the powers of the *European Parliament*. Some parties advocate that the powers of the European Parliament should be drastically expanded, to remove the so-called `democratic deficit.' Other parties argue that the powers of the European Parliament are already extensive and that there is no need to expand these powers further. In your judgment, where does the leadership of the parties listed below stand vis-a-vis expansion of the powers of the EP?" Figure 11.4 is based on question 30 in Eurobarometer 54.1, conducted in the fall of 2000, which reads: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the [nationality] government, or made jointly within the European Union? 1 = nationality, 2 = jointly within the European Union, 3 = don't know." These scores are recoded in analysis.

Figure 11.3 Party positions on European issues.

Ideological consistency across territory (the y-axis) is operationalized as the proportion of countries where left and right line up in the same way. I measure this by estimating regressions for left/right position on support for European integration for each policy in each country, and comparing the signs of the coefficients (i.e., the slope of the regression line). A policy located at the bottom-most point on the y-axis indicates that left and right take consistent positions with respect to each other in all countries. A policy located at the top-most point indicates that in 50 percent of countries the left takes one position with respect to the right, and in the remaining 50 percent the positions of left and right are reversed. The reference line in figures 11.3 and 11.4 is located at the point where 75 percent of EU countries have a consistent pattern of left/right support. This may be a conservative benchmark from which to evaluate ideology in the European Union: it demands that a given pattern of left/right support is three times as frequent as the alternative.

I measure diversity of national preferences for each policy by calculating the mean score for political parties (figure 11.3) or for individuals (figure 11.4) in each country, and then calculating the interquartile range

European integration and political conflict   255

Figure 11.4 Public opinion on European issues.

of these country averages. The interquartile range for each policy is represented on the x-axis.[15]

The results for ideological consistency are roughly in keeping with the expectations set out above. In figure 11.3, two policies have almost complete ideological consistency: employment and environment policy. These policies are integral to regulated capitalism, and directly engage the question of the role of the state in the economy. Foreign policy, fiscal policy, and the powers of the European Parliament are, as we expect,

15 The scale in figure *11.3 is* support for integration measured in *six* intervals from *1* (strongly opposed to European integration in this *policy* area) to *7* (strongly in favor *of* integration in this policy area). The scale in figure *11.4* is from zero (strongly opposed to European integration in this *policy* area) to *1* (strongly in favor *of* integration in this *policy* area). The simple correlation *of* interquartile range scores for the five common *policy* areas in figures *11.3* and *11.4 is 0.55,* which *is* not statistically significant given the small number *of* cases. It *is* interesting to note that the standard deviations *of* national preferences aggregated for national political parties are significantly associated *(r = 0.83,* sig. = *0.081)* with the standard deviations among government positions across five *policy* areas that are common to the Marks and Steenbergen data set and the compiled by Mark Aspinwall (2002).

the least consistent. Regional policy, however, is further north than we expect.

Comparison of figures 11.3 and 11.4 reveals that political parties are more ideologically consistent across the EU than is the general public. Of the five policies represented in both figures, political parties are more consistent on employment, environmental, regional, and foreign policy, and less consistent only on asylum policy. The simple correlation between public and party scores for ideological consistency on these five policies is 0.46: insignificant given the small number of cases.

In figure 11.4, as in figure 11.3, policies that have to do with regulated capitalism exhibit relatively high levels of ideological consistency. Education, employment, and social policy are in this camp, while Third World aid and asylum policy have obvious connections to it. However, the public shows much less ideological consistency on environmental policy than do political parties. As we expect, foreign policy and defense policy have little ideological consistency.

Before concluding, let us take a brief look at how ideology plays out across the territory of the EU. Certain countries stand out as exceptions to the patterns of ideological consistency illustrated in figures 11.3 and 11.4. Across the seven policy areas and fourteen countries for which we have data for national political parties (108 cases in total), there are twenty-seven cases where the right is more pro-integration than the left. Three countries - Denmark, Greece, and Sweden - account for seventeen of these." In the remaining countries, the connection between left/right and European integration is consistent: the left is most favorably oriented to European integration in 89 percent of country/policy cases.

For the general public, 59 cases out of a total of 182 (thirteen policy areas across fourteen countries) have either no left/right constraint on European positioning, or have the right more favorably oriented than the left. Three countries stand out. Sweden, Denmark, and Finland account for thirty-four, or a little over half, of these fifty-nine cases. In the remaining countries, the left is favorably oriented to European integration in 83 percent of country/policy cases. Variation in the articulation of left and right on European integration appears as great, or greater, across territory as across policy areas.

So, clearly, there are strong national patterns in the data. They appear to broadly match expectations derived from variation among types

16 The concentration of contrary cases in Denmark, Greece, and Sweden is even greater when we undertake the same analysis for the consistency of new politics ideology. These three countries account for eighteen of twenty-five contrary cases.

Table 11.1 *Country and ideology*

	Proportion of policies in a country where the left supports European integration and the right opposes	
	National political parties	Public
Presence of extreme left party in absence of extreme right party	2.57**	2.79*
Scandinavia		−9.17***
R-squared	0.32	0.68
N (EU minus Luxembourg)	14	14

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

of capitalism and variation among party systems. For public attitudes, the simplest explanation of national variation is to invoke a proper name: Scandinavia (Svasand and Lindstrom 1996). A dichotomous variable that splices the Scandinavian countries apart from the rest explains almost 60 percent of variance where the dependent variable is the number of policies for each country in which the left is more supportive of European integration than the right. This is in line with Ray's and Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt's argument that the prevailing type of capitalism in a

country interacts with personal ideology, and that in redistributive social democratic welfare states, it is the left that has most to lose from European integration, while the right has most to gain.

This variable does not have much strength for political parties. To explain the territorial pattern of ideology for parties it may be more fruitful to examine a more proximate factor: the presence/absence of extreme parties. A dichotomous variable with the value 1 for a country having an extreme left party but no extreme right party is significantly associated with the ideological consistency of public support for European integration, explaining an estimated 32 percent of the variance (see table 11.1).

Concluding remarks

Our focus in this volume has been on how conflict over European integration connects - or does not connect - with the dimensions of contestation that structure politics within European societies. Our endeavor is "second generation" in that it departs from the analysis of levels of support for

European integration, which has dominated the field of EU opinion research for the past twenty years. Whereas *levels of support* can change quite quickly over time (Eichenberg and Dalton 1998), *patterns of conflict* are far more stable. Lipset and Rokkan stressed that the interaction of social cleavages, rooted in the national revolution, Protestant Reformation, and industrial revolution in the sixteenth to early twentieth centuries, maintained a tight grip on party competition through the 1960s and, they speculated, beyond. An adjective that comes to their minds when discussing change is "glacial." By following them in investigating patterns of conflict, we seem to be on firm ground.

Or are we? Recall that in left/right terms, the character of support and opposition for European integration has changed decisively over the past two decades. The European Union is a moving target, not just because it evokes quite rapidly changing levels of support, but because the essential nature of the beast has been transformed from a market-making to a polity-making process. Twenty years ago, the right supported further European integration in order to achieve an integrated market. The bulk of the opposition came from the moderate and far left. Today, it is the right, particularly the radical right, that opposes further integration, especially in the areas most favored by the moderate left - e.g., in employment policy, environmental policy, and asylum policy. The left is more favorably inclined to integration in every single policy represented in figures 11.3 and 11.4 but one: foreign policy. As economic and monetary integration have passed from contentious issues into accomplished facts, so the focus of debate has shifted from creating a market to regulating it. As a result, conflict about the future of the EU more closely resembles conflict within member states, pitting a left in favor of a more active, caring government against a right defending markets and economic freedom.

If one takes the period as a whole, it is clear that there is no intrinsic connection between being on the left or right and being pro- or antiintegration. In principle, as the Hix-Lord model assumes, the territorial organization of authority is orthogonal to functional conflicts that motivate left vs. right at the domestic level. Alternative architectures of multilevel governance do not translate, once and for all, into left vs. right conflict. The Hooghe-Marks model is most appropriate for the post-1980s when one breaks open European integration into its constituent issues. A significant subset of European issues involves distributional choices that are closely related to left/right conflict.

But our efforts to understand precisely how European integration is linked to domestic conflicts have raised questions that go beyond the models we began with. Three stand out as challenges for future research.

We need to theorize territorial variation in ideological positioning as well as variation across issues and across time. We need to explore links between new politics and European integration alongside those between the left/right divide and European integration. And we need a theory of coalition-building that encompasses conflict *among* constituent polities as well as conflict *within* them.

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