AN INITIAL ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN REALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY AMONG REGIMES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO DIFFUSION OF AUTHORITY IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE

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The creation and deepening of the European Union over the past four decades induces us to look again at the historical experience of Western Europe.[1] Some scholars, including myself, have argued that European integration is part of a many sided dispersion of political authority away from states up to the European level and down to regional and local governments.[2] This general trend towards "multi-level governance" after World War II is evident from a decades-long perspective, though the pace and institutional character of change obviously vary from country.

To what extent is the experience of the past half-century sui generis? What are its distal causes? Such questions induce one to take a long historical view. If multi-level governance describes a re-organization of authority in Europe, then it should find its place in a broader analysis of authoritative reallocation across larger reaches of space and time.[3] If one wishes to find periods in European political experience in which authority was diffused away from states then one must turn to the book ends of the state building period, the post-state era after World War II and the era prior to modern state building in which dark-age states were dissolved into numerous, small, overlapping and intersecting regimes. The question I am asking of both periods is why did rulers shift authority away from institutions they controlled? How can we explain the systematic diffusion of authority away from states? The answer has to involve the preferences and strategies of rulers themselves, because in neither period were rulers coercively forced to reshape government against their will.

This essay is a first cut at posing the issue of authoritative reallocation, creating a set of concepts to facilitate empirical analysis, and suggesting some avenues for theory building. This is, all too obviously, the initial draft of a paper that will need much refinement, not to say rethinking. For that I beg the reader's indulgence. I offer this essay as a point of departure for discussion, not as a finished product. This is not intended for quotation or for citation.

In the next two sections I set out some elements of my approach and the basic concepts that issue from it. In the final two sections I sketch some substantive lines of explanation for European integration and the development of feudalism.

Conceptual Bases

My analysis is based on the following conceptual choices:

1) D*istinguishing between actors and institutions*. In order to understand how and why powerful groups and individuals reshape authority in a society, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish between political actors and authoritative rules. From this conceptual starting point, a regime can be regarded as a set of formal and informal rules that specify the allocation and operation of authority in society. One advantage of this is that it avoids reifying a regime as an actor with preferences, strategies and a capacity for action in pursuit of its own goals. Speaking of a regime or state as if it were an actor with goals

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[1] The reader may be relieved to hear that the title of this paper this is merely a working title. I would like to thank Liesbet Hooghe who has had the task of co-developing these ideas without the responsibility of authorship.

[2] Reference.

[3] One approach, taken here, is to examine European integration as an historical process, as the latest reallocation of competencies in a series of such changes reaching back in human experience. Another approach, which I pursue elsewhere, is to compare the creation and deepening of the European Union with other regional regimes in other parts of the World. Finally, one may compare the EU with other state-based federal and confederal regimes.

capable of making decisions is a conceptual shortcut that is fatal if the development of particular authoritative rules is the outcome to be explained.

2) *Relaxing assumptions about actor motivation.* One cannot assume that individuals who play some specified role in an institution wish to strengthen that institution. Political actors who exert authority within a central government (or, for that matter, a regional or supranational government) do not necessarily wish to strengthen that institution. Such political actors are likely to have a variety of personal and substantive policy goals which may, or may not, lead them to try to centralize authority in their own hands. One cannot assume that those in positions of state authority act to strengthen or defend the state as an institution.

3) *The unusual nature of power as a goal.* Among the goals that political actors have, the goal of projecting political power is unusually significant. Power is a good unlike other goods, because it shapes the capacity to achieve one's goals in the future.[4] Children are quick to understand that if they meet a genie that promises to fulfill just one wish, they would ask for the fulfillment of future wishes. Whatever substantive goals a person has, it is likely that political authority, the capacity to exercise legitimate power over other individuals, will help to realize them.

It may be useful to compare this approach with the one adopted by Charles Tilly in his book, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990. Tilly argues that individuals in positions of coercive authority ordinarily tried to use their resources to "extend the range of population and resources over which they wielded power. When they encountered no one with comparable control of coercion, they conquered; when they met rivals they made war".[5] My base supposition is that hunger for territory or resources is normally secondary to the desire to retain one's personal position in authority. In societies where the personal security of a ruler depends entirely upon conquering enemies the distinction does not amount to much. But there are also societies, like our own, in which sustaining one's position of authority depends upon not engaging in wars of conquest. The supposition that rulers wish to preserve their authoritative control appears to be a more robust basis for a theory of authority than one which postulates that rulers wish to conquer territory.[6]

However, it is important to realize that preference for authority is not a constant.[7] Historically, the extent to which political elites value positions of authority varies in some

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[4] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, Vol. I (New York: Free Press, 1968), 263 and Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power. A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760.* Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 6 make this point. However, I do not follow Parson's use of the term power to refer to capacity vis-à-vis nature. Instead I follow Max Weber and Robert Dahl in conceiving power as a zero-sum relation among humans. See Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, "European Integration Since the 1980s: State-Centric vs. Multi-level Governance," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34 (September 1996). In Dahl's terms, A has power over B to the extent that she can make B do something that B would not otherwise do. Robert Dahl . ..

[5] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990, 14).

[6] Tilly argues that there were limits to such hunger for power over population and resources. When they met defeats or fragmentation of control, "most rulers settled for a combination of conquest, protection against powerful rivals, and coexistence with cooperative neighbors" Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 15. From the perspective developed here, this was because rulers usually calculated strategy not from the standpoint of the resources of the regime, but in terms of their own security.

[7] Desire for a peaceful or humble life may lead a person to reject power. Each of us is familiar with cases in which individuals in positions of authority decide to voluntarily give up their position because they value something else

fairly transparent ways. Barrington Moore has argued that a vital difference between Britain and Germany in the 19th century is that the English aristocracy had placed their landed estates on a commercial basis and as a result could be economically viable even if they relinquished their traditional monopoly of political authority. In contrast, German Junkers needed to control authority to sustain the tariffs and control of the labor force that they needed to survive economically.[8] Juan Linz and others have suggested that where economic and political outcomes are interdependent, those in positions of authority are less willing to tolerate open competition for office.[9] One can hypothesize that to the extent that an elite's life chances are tied to controlling positions of authority, the more that elite will value authority relative to other goods.[10]

Political authority, regimes and states

I propose the following terms and distinctions. My decisions here are linguistically arbitrary. That is to say that there is no justification for selecting one definition or distinction over another beyond the contribution a particular concept makes within a substantively driven theory. My goal is simply to try to use words clearly, in ways that do not foul up empirical analysis. This is no mean goal, for in this area, as I noted above, established usages have sometimes obfuscated empirically important distinctions. To avoid taxing the mental economy of the reader, I have also sought to make my choices congruent where possible with established scholarly usage.

I distinguish four basic and irreducible elements of authority:
1) Legitimate coercion
2) Law making
3) Implementation of laws
4) Adjudication of laws

A *regime* is an integrated set of rules for allocating and exercising authority (i.e. decision making involving one or more of the four elements listed above) for a particular territory or territories.[11]

This is a broad definition that encompasses established usages both in comparative politics and international relations.

Regimes may be described generically (e.g. democracy/aristocracy/autocracy) or in historically concrete terms (e.g. the Third French Republic; the monarchy of Elizabeth I; the European Union; the World Trade Organization).[12]

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more highly. Jürg Steiner . . . has researched the conditions under which politicians are prepared to put normative concerns above their desire to hold office.

[8] Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press), xx.

[9] Reference.

[10] This line of analysis has clear implications for the study of democratization, but these lie beyond the scope of this paper.

[11] Note that this dimension does not refer to the whether authority is exercised by a single political actor. This dimension refers to the existence or non-existence of multiple sets of rules specifying the allocation and organization of authority.

[12] The reader may question whether the Elizabeth I's monarchy should be considered a distinct regime. "Tudor monarchy" might be a more appropriate description.

A *state* exists to the extent that a single regime dominates the exercise of authority in a given territory.

Here I follow common usage in making a distinction between state creation (or dissolution) and regime change. Regimes may come or go without altering the state or non-state character of a polity.

What matters for the stateness of a particular polity is whether authority is diffused among a plurality of regimes or concentrated in a single regime.[13] Here I follow Max Weber in conceiving of monopoly of legitimate coercion as a necessary characteristic of a state. But I do not think it is sensible to regard this as a sufficient condition of stateness given the kinds of authoritative competencies that states actually wield.[14]

I conceive of stateness as a variable rather than an absolute quality. While a polity monopolized by a single regime is unambiguously a state, there are the following gray areas:

- A territory in which there is one dominant regime and a second, much weaker or partial, regime. Examples would be the co-existence of national states and the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community from the 1950s to 1986.
- A territory where two regimes have intersecting borders and share authority over a common territory, but where the territory at stake is relatively insignificant in relation to the territory monopolized by one or the other regime. Stateness here, as above, depends on the extent to which authoritative competencies overlap and the degree of contention in the relevant territory.
- A territory where two regimes are distinguishable, but have functionally distinct authoritative competencies and a measure of mutual integration. Stateness is the condition of regime monopoly of authority within a particular territory, but where there are multiple regimes, those regimes may have varying degrees of autonomy.

  Confederations are composed of multiple, non-intersecting, regimes nested within an overarching regime. A confederation may meld into a state if authoritative competencies exercised at different political levels become differentiated and regularized within a single (federal) regime.

  Federations are regimes in which authoritative competencies are nested among two or more layers of government. It is not necessary for the federal level to exercise a monopoly of legitimate coercion, so long as the constituent federal units exercise legitimate coercion in the context of an integrated regime. This is the case in Germany after 1949: policing is a competence exercised by individual Länder, but they do this in the context of a single federal regime.
- A territory in which two or more entrenched groups express mutually incompatible claims for control of an otherwise monopolistic regime. In this case, stateness is diminished to the extent to which the challenging group has generalized support and coercive or other resources to effectively press its claim against those in authority.

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[13] This approach allows one to relax the requirement that states are necessarily "territorially centralized," in the words of Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Volume I, 27. Critical for my conception is whether there are a plurality of *regimes*, irrespective of the territorial organization of competencies in a particular regime. From my standpoint (as distinct, I think, from Mann's) Switzerland is unambiguously a state.

[14] Many theorists over the past several decades have argued that legitimate coercion is only one aspect of a state, particularly in the western European polities that have developed over the past half-century. See Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, "European Integration Since the 1980s: State-Centric vs. Multi-level Governance."

These considerations suggest that the extent to which political authority within a particular territory is monopolized by a single regime or shared among a plurality of regimes can be conceptualized in terms of the following two dimensions:

First, there is the extent to which authority is *nested* among two or more layers of government. To evaluate the degree of stateness in such a territory, we need to inquire into relations among these governments. To what extent do they form a single integrated regime characterized by systemic and routinized (i.e. constitutionalized) allocation of legitimate coercion and other authoritative competencies? Conversely, to what extent do these governments form recognizably distinct regimes with no routinized allocation of authoritative competencies among them?

Second, there is the extent to which authoritative boundaries *intersect*. To what extent is regime monopoly in a given territory compromised by contention among regimes? Here we need to inquire into the scope of authoritative competencies that are at stake.

Figure 1 makes the point that these dimensions are independent of the *size* of the territory concerned. A territory the size of Luxembourg or Malta may exhibit as much, or more, stateness as one the size of Canada or the Soviet Union depending on the extent to which the territory in question is monopolized by a single regime.

--Figures 1 and 2 about here--

The two dimensions are represented in Figure 2. The circles in the figures represent the territorial exercise of authoritative competencies. At the bottom left, unitary states monopolize the exercise of all authoritative competencies in exclusive territories. These states exert centralized control over legitimate coercion, law making, implementation and adjudication.

To the right of these unitary states are slightly more complex polities characterized by the nesting of authoritative competencies among territorially exclusive (i.e. non-intersecting) units at two levels. To the extent that these units are separate regimes with overlapping territorial control, then we cannot speak of them as states. To the extent that the smaller territorial units are integrated into inclusive regimes (i.e. the larger circles), so it makes sense to consider them as levels of territorial government within states.

Authority is nested at three levels in the diagram on the extreme right of Figure 2. I.e. this is a multi-level polity. As before, if the levels are closely integrated within a single regime, as Länder and Bezirke are in Germany, or states and counties in the United States, then this diagram represents a state. But the largest circle might also represent the authority wielded by the European Union in relation to constituent federal (and non-federal) member polities.

At this point we come face to face with the grand issue of European integration. Is the European Union a state, and if not, do its constituent polities still qualify as states? My answer to the first question is no and my answer to the second is a qualified no, based on the criteria set out above. In the years since the Single European Act (1986) the European Union has come to exercise significant authority over the lives of citizens in its member polities in the areas of law making and adjudication. About half of all new laws in its territory are determined at the European-wide level. The European Court of Justice is accepted by national courts as a superior court with the powers of supremacy and direct effect. In addition, member polities have become so deeply enmeshed in the EU that they are no longer able to monopolize their external relations. Directly elected representatives who are totally independent of the constituent regimes make important authoritative decisions in the European Parliament and subnational actors of every kind mobilize outside their regime directly at the European level. These seriously dilute the

authoritative control of the member polities within their own territories and go a considerable distance in undermining their stateness either by comparison with states existing today or with states in earlier periods.

Yet the EU is hardly a state. Not only does it lack a monopoly of legitimate coercion within its territory, but it provides no avenue for integrating coercion in its constituent units. Those units have wide scope in law making, and they virtually monopolize policy implementation. Foreign relations are conducted both by the EU and by national polities. While there can be little doubt that European integration has compromised the stateness of its constituent national polities, there is no doubt at all that those polities are separate regimes.

At the top left of Figure 2 is a diagram representing a set of intersecting (and some nested) authoritative competencies. If these competencies are broad and overlapping, then the result is a set of non-state polities sharing authority. Feudalism is an example of such an arrangement for it is characterized by dispersion of authority among contending units exercising all four aspects of authority listed above, including legitimate coercion. If, on the other hand, the allocation of competencies across territorial units is functionally specific, then the contemporary term "variable geometry" might apply. Variable geometry refers to the sharing of authority among multiple regimes determining particular policies for diverse territories. European integration over the past decade provides some examples of this. The Schengen agreement eliminating internal border controls and harmonizing external border controls encompasses only a subset of the EU15; from 1993 to 1996 there was a special social policy regime which excluded the UK; European monetary union, if it comes to pass, will doubtlessly include some, not all, EU countries.

Polities in western Europe

The following is a somewhat arbitrary periodization of polity creation in Western Europe since the disintegration of the Roman Empire. If the criterion for break points was the first derivative of polity change on the dimension of stateness (i.e. a **change** in the direction of the slope describing degree of stateness) there would be fewer periods: the decline of the Roman state; the rise of the dark age state; the development of feudalism; the rise of the modern state; multi-level governance.

1) Disintegration of the Western Roman Empire: 378-455[15]

As Rome declines, so authority in its northern borderlands and later in the western Empire shifts to Germanic and Slav invaders, pressed across the Danube and Rhine by hordes sweeping in from the Steppes. The collapse of the Roman state frees the Roman church from state domination.[16] There is a widespread process of clericalization as former Roman

[15] These dates are somewhat arbitrary and disputed by historians. 378 is the year in which the Roman army was routed by the Visigoths near Adrianople. Emperor Valens and two-thirds of his army were killed, losses that were never recovered. 455 is the date in which the Vandals sacked Rome. After that time Roman military influence within western Europe was limited to Italy. The Roman state up the 4th century generally exercised a monopoly of authority over those in its territory, subject to two significant exceptions: Roman control over Germanic tribes in the Rhine was weak and intermittent; the senatorial class exercised authoritative competencies, including legitimate coercion, on their estates. Joseph R. Strayer, *The Middle Ages 395-1500* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), 115.

[16] Strayer, *The Middle Ages*, 20.

dignitaries gain prominent positions in the church.[17] To the extent that Roman authority is sustained, it is through the church as a non-territorial regime.

2) *Successor states: 455-814*
Rome splits into multiple kingdoms—Ostrogoths in Italy, Visigoths in Spain, Burgundians and Franks in Gaul, Lombards in Spain—which consist of territorial cores in which there is a monopoly of authority and extensive contested borderlands.[18] These states are followed by the Merovingian kingdom and the Carolingian empire. England appears to have been organized along looser political lines. Apparently, the largest kingdom, the kingdom of Mercia, was a loose confederacy of different tribes that exercised domination and exacted tribute on tribes around them.[19]
3) *Consolidation of feudalism: 814-1000*
4) *Multiple nested and intersecting regimes alongside state formation: 1000-1250*
5) *Consolidation of states: 1250-1939*
6) *Interstate conflict, empire building and the reestablishment of states: 1939-1951*
7) *Emergence of multi-level governance: 1951-present*

EXPLAINING REALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY

How can one explain these developments? Obviously this question cannot possibly be answered satisfactorily in the scope of this paper. What I wish to do here is point the reader in a direction that I believe may yield a systematic theory of political authority.

My point of departure is the assumption that powerful political actors cause institutional change. Structural or environmental factors, such as changing military technology, changing production costs, functional "needs" of the economic system, changing transaction costs etc. make their presence felt by constraining or facilitating humans or groups of humans wielding political power.[20]

What motivates actors to change relations of authority? Here I depart from Douglas North's assumption that institutions are changed by organizations in order to maximize their wealth.[21] Rather, I suggest that political actors are motivated by diverse personal and policy goals and this induces them to try to increase their power resources in order to achieve those goals. Chief among these power resources is control of positions endowed with formal authority.

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[17] Thomas Brown, "The Transformation of the Roman Mediterranean," in George Holmes, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 5.

[18] I follow most scholars of this period in the anachronistic practice of referring to territories by more recent country names.

[19] See Simon Keynes, "England, 700-900," in Rosamond McKitterick, ed., *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). We know little about the internal political structure of Mercia or of the 34 tribal territories in and around Mercia listed in the Tribal Hidage, except that Mercian rulers were considered powerful overlords.

[20] Hendrik Spruyt argues along similar lines that "changes in political organization seem to be preceded by broad shifts in constraints and opportunities imposed on social actors by the external milieu. Punctuations such as defeat in war, revolution, or emergent capitalism lead to a flurry of institutional innovations." Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25. Spruyt develops a coalitional approach to institutional change based on the idea that institutions reflect a particular distribution of power: "Actors have particular interests and perspectives and corresponding preferred forms of organization. An external change, a change in the overall milieu in which that society is placed will lead to a shift in the relative power of social and political actors. Individuals will seek to capitalize on their improved relative position and change the existing political institutions" (26).

[21] Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), p. 79.

This introduces a vital source of tension in a polity. Positions of authority are filled by individuals who are normally more concerned to sustain their individual power and project it into the future than to defend particular institutional rules.

Multi-level governance in contemporary Europe

The post World War II era has seen a diffusion of political authority up the European Union and down to subnational governments that is as impressive as the diffusion of authority that took place in the Carolingian empire in the 9th century. Tables I and II survey the double shift. We have to go back at least one thousand years in European history to find a comparable reallocation of authority away from states. How can one understand this development?

--Tables I and II about here--

This question can be resolved into a more specific one. The changes that have taken place were not coerced upon authoritative leaders, but have taken place with their consent. Why have leaders in positions of authority agreed to shift authoritative competencies away from existing central states?

I noted above that there are good reasons to think that government leaders may not place a priority on defending the state as an institution. The logic is particularly powerful in a liberal democracy. If political leaders wish to remain in office they need to be responsive to constituencies which have no intrinsic stake in the institutional allocation of authority across levels of government beyond a) normative preferences concerning alternative political architectures and b) their perception of the substantive policy consequences of alternative political architectures. Those who hold, or wish to hold, positions of formal authority compete to gain support from the larger public or subsets of it. Hence liberal democracy confronts political leaders with a basic paradox: sustaining their personal exercise of political authority is divorced from the fate of those rules. If they wish to increase the likelihood of their personal or collective tenure in authority, they need to succeed in competitive elections rather than try to centralize power in their own hands.

Hence, political authority is diffused away from states because rulers wish to reshape authoritative institutions to assure themselves of continued political success. Why was centralized state monopoly of authority an inadequate institutional basis for competitive party appeals in western Europe in the post war era? Below I deal with two general sources: the inability of the state to guarantee external security; and the inefficiency of the state in providing certain collective goods.

The state as guarantor of external security.

The role of western European states as guarantors of the security of their populations from external threats was severely diminished in the years following World War II.

Many political leaders, particularly in the smaller states, campaigned to embed their states in supranational regimes on grounds of security and the lessons of the previous World Wars. More Europeans died in World War I and World War II than in all previous wars fought in Europe. The result was not only a shift of alliances in response to the rise of great powers outside western Europe and the decline of those within. The war experience led to fundamental rethinking of the foundations of European security and a widespread, if inchoate, demand for an overarching system of authority (i.e. a regime) which could encompass, and thereby tame, existing states. Underlying the efforts of several leaders, including Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Jean Monnet, who took the initiative in the creation of the European Coal and

Steel Community (1951), the European Atomic Agency (1957) and the European Economic Community (1957) was a determination to prevent nationalism "which is the curse of the modern world."[22]

The delegitimation of the central state and its association with war making had domestic as well as international repercussions. Such concerns were decisive in the reconstruction of the West German state by the allies. On the one hand there was the effort to bind Germany supranationally, on the other was the allied policy to divide the country internally. This was achieved on a grand scale by dividing the country into mutually exclusive regimes as a result of the Cold War and, more subtly, by creating a federal regime devolving policing, communications, education, and cultural policy to the Länder.

Technological change transformed military competition and denied all but two western European countries, France and the UK, the possibility of sustaining a credible coercive threat in interstate rivalry. In one important respect, nuclear weapons were not an extrapolation of the increasing scale of military conflict that had been taking place more or less continuously for a millenium. The need for armies that are beyond the resources of an individual country presses its leaders to enter in mutual alliance with other countries, so that the force each can summon is amplified by the capability of its allies. However, a nuclear threat, unlike conventional force, is not necessarily additive within an alliance. Either a country possesses nuclear weapons or it does not. Because nuclear weapons were the currency of coercive threat in post-war Europe vis à vis the Warsaw Pact, all but the UK and France were playing a game in which their own military efforts were essentially irrelevant to the outcome of war.

The effect of this was that decisions about allocation of authority were taken in the absence of the constraint that has decisively shaped it in the past: the need to assure military security through extensive, coordinated extraction of resources. The novelty of nuclear weaponry was reinforced by the widespread belief that nuclear weapons undermined the potential benefits of war, even for the victorious, and as a result reduced the likelihood that it would take place in Europe. In no other era (with the possible exception of middle Roman times) has so small a proportion of the social product been extracted to provide external security. This has had profound political as well as economic consequences. Post-World War II western Europe is distinctive in that it was not shaped by war making and war preparation.

Charles Tilly has argued that war and extracting resources for war created the central organizational structure of states. In terms of the theoretical framework developed here, increasing returns to scale in the conduct of war from the 11th to the mid 20th century created incentives for political leaders to devise regimes that monopolized authority in particular territories. If we extend Tilly's hypothesis into the second half of the 20th century, we may say that the changing technology of war contributed to the diffusion of political authority away from central states.

The state and provision of collective goods

A compelling reason for the concentration of authority in modern states is that they have reduced transaction costs in providing collective goods, above all, external security (discussed

[22] Jean Monnet quoted in François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York: Norton, 1994), 183. The force of this concern has waned as memories of the World Wars have faded and as peace in western Europe has become a fact of life rather than a goal to be struggled for. See Joseph Weiler... However, it is far from dead. Helmut Kohl has raised the specter of potential European war in defending European Monetary Union, and anti-nationalism still has political appeal among some constituencies.

above), domestic order, education, economic growth, and welfare to powerful constituencies. Ernest Gellner has argued that national states expanded because economic growth demands ease mobility and communication within a sufficient territory and as a result "an overwhelming part of political authority has been concentrated in the hands of one kind of institution, a reasonably large and well-centralized state".[23] My own view is less functionalist. The growth in the capacity of central states emerged in response to intensified competition among rulers and potential rulers to appeal to strategic constituencies. New functions were added to central states and alternative regimes were disempowered, particularly among distinct regions and localities, as office holders competed to reward powerful organizations and social movements or to preempt their opposition.

This is a model of progressive centralization of authoritative competencies within a monopolistic regime.[24] What changed? Why have politicians been led to disempower central state institutions in the context of liberal democratic competition for authoritative positions? Why have wielders of authority in western European societies been induced to shift authoritative competencies out of their own hands in competition for office?

Three processes appear to have been at work. First, office holders have been induced to shift authoritative competencies out of the central state for *functional reasons*. From the standpoint of efficient production of public goods, there is no good reason for the concentration of authoritative competencies in central states. The force of this has been most clearly felt in rule making and adjudication concerning market activity. Political leaders have had to respond to the widespread belief, backed up by intense business pressure, that existing west European states are too small to provide markets for efficient economic activity in a variety of sectors. This belief was quite common in the 1950s and gained new force in despair over European economic performance relative to North America and East Asia during the 1970s and 1980s. A driving force behind the institutionalization of the European Union has been an effort to reduce transaction costs for transnational exchange across Europe, i.e. the creation of supranational rule making and rule adjudicating capacity facilitating a European-wide market.

This aspect of European integration is a striking example of a more general process. If one assumes a) that authoritative institutions are completely flexible (i.e. there are no sunk costs or increasing economies of scale) and b) that the criterion for the existence of such institutions is the efficient provision of collective goods, then there would be no reason for the concentration of authority in regimes monopolizing particular territories. Instead authority would be divided among numerous regimes with nested and intersecting territorial compasses reflecting the relative costs of information gathering and enforcement at alternative levels of government for particular policies and constituencies. The reason we do not find such complexity is that there are increasing returns to scale in the allocation of authoritative competencies at particular levels of government. Once key competencies, above all the exercise of legitimate coercion and taxation, are institutionalized at the national level, there are powerful incentives to locate additional authoritative competencies at the same level. Such a path dependence model of authoritative allocation cannot explain the origins of states or alternative modes of authority; rather it suggests that once authoritative institutions are in place, they are extremely difficult to change.

Path dependence arguments have been applied most intensively to economic institutions, but there are strong grounds for believing that they are particularly appropriate to the analysis of

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[23] Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 140.

[24] The logic of this competition is expressed clearly in Beer ...

authoritative institutions.[25] Authoritative institutions profoundly shape the activities of organizations which try to influence decision or which adapt their behavior to particular legislation.

Given the dysfunctionality of central state control in a range of policy areas and the existence of powerful forces that inhibit change, the question becomes: Under what conditions will central state dysfunctionality lead to political pressures on rulers sufficient to induce them to reallocate authoritative competencies? No general answer to this question appears possible if our criterion is point prediction. Indeed there are strong grounds for believing that the precise outcome of such institutional struggle may depend on very small—essentially unmeasurable--variations in initial conditions. But from an Olsonian perspective one may specify which factors are likely to be important in the process: the political salience of the issue in electoral competition; the relative political influence of groups that suffer the effects of institutional dysfunctionality; and the preferences and strategies of party/government leaders.[26]

Second, change in the allocation of authority may be undertaken to *redistribute goods* to those in authority or their supporters. The allocation of authoritative competencies across different levels of government shapes the capacity of groups to exert political influence on decision makers and, as a result, the content of legislation. The shift of authoritative competencies concerning the market European level empowered certain groups, above all business groups, that could easily organize transnationally and disempowered other groups, including trade unions that were rooted in their respective national polities.[27] From the mid-1980s neoliberals, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and influenced by Mancur Olson's nostrums concerning the ill effects of "distributional coalitions", intentionally shifted decision making to the European level to outflank groups entrenched at the domestic level, above all those associated with labor.[28] Given the powerful role of national governments within the Council of Ministers, the most important decision making body at the European level, neoliberals believed that decision making would be relatively insulated from pressure for market regulation. This was part of an ambitious plan to institutionalize regime competition among individual European governments within an overarching market in which governments would be induced compete to attract the most mobile factor of production, namely capital.[29] Neoliberals have been opposed by those who wish to create a capacity for authoritative regulation at the European level that could provide a partial substitute for the loss of economic control at the national level.

Finally, institutional change is *recursive*. That is to say that institutional change at time t_0 shapes the possibilities for institutional change at time t_1 and the same applies across t_1 and t_2. There are two main ways in which this happens, and these provide the backbone for a stream of neofunctionalist literature on European integration.[30]

A) Reallocating authoritative competencies may actually affect the functionality of remaining competencies, a process that neofunctionalists describe as policy spillover. The underlying idea here is that the efficiency of the exercise of a particular authoritative competence

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[25] Krasner 1988; Pierson 1997.

[26] Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale, 1982); Gary Marks, forthcoming.

[27] Gary Marks and Doug McAdam, 1996.

[28] Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations*.

[29] Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "The Making of a Polity: Struggle Over European Integration," in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John Stephens, eds., *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[30] This literature was developed to explain transnational integration though I believe its insights apply equally to regional empowerment. See Ernest Haas . . . and Philippe Schmitter . . .

depends on the pattern of authoritative allocation as a whole. For example, national control of monetary policy may become dysfunctional once rules concerning market access and competition are shifted to the supranational level.

B) Learning may take place as actors sink resources into the new authoritative order. Authoritative decision makers may have invested resources into making the case for institutional change which they can extend to additional reforms; interest groups and social movements may have created durable new coalitions or explored new repertoires for pressuring leaders. In short, and more generally, new path dependencies may have been created.

The disintegration of the Carolingian empire and the emergence of feudalism

The Carolingian empire originated in the middle of the 7th century out of that region of the Merovingian empire, Austrasia, west of the Rhine, which was ruled by Pippin the Elder. In a series of successful military campaigns from 687 to 804, the Carolingians extended the empire, until by the end of Charles the Great's reign in 814, it encompassed Europe from the northern tip of Spain and the northern half of Italy to the Elbe and the Donau to the north. Feudalism developed during the 9th century as the empire was split among Charlemagne's heirs. There is some uncertainty about the degree of continuous authority that Charlemagne was able to exert over his vast kingdom, but I think specialists would agree with the statement that the territory of the Holy Roman Empire was dominated by a single regime.

The society that emerged in the break-up of the Carolingian empire is described as feudal, though this applicability of this 16th century term to the diverse polities and social relations that emerged in Western Europe from the 9th century is contested among scholars. Territorial variations in political authority cannot be ignored, for the test of a theory of authority is how well it fares in explaining variations across space as through time. For the present, however, I eschew this task in any systematic fashion. Given the space limitations of this paper I am content to generalize about some basic features of authority that were more or less common throughout the western Europe and raise regional variations where they illustrate some basic explanatory point.

Conceived in ideal-typical terms as a mode of authority, feudalism has the following characteristics:

- *Intransitive nesting of authority*. Feudalism, at its core, refers to the reciprocity between the obligations a vassal owed to his lord—rendering military service, attending their courts, paying them dues, accepting their judgement over succession to their lands—and the lord's grant of a fief.[31] There is much evidence of complicated, compound, relations among lords and vassals. Virtually every lord was a vassal to some other lord, and vassalage was intransitive, i.e. it was possible that the lord of one's lord might be one's vassal. Many vassals owed allegiance to multiple lords for different lands, and conflict among lords (who themselves owed allegiance to multiple lords) could pose exquisite ambiguities that would have challenged Escher's powers of representation.[32]
- *Overlapping spheres of territorial and functional control.* There was little functional differentiation in the exercise of authority among multiple regimes in the same territory. Given the intense localism of coercive mobilization and economic activity, vassals entrenched in a castle keep were often well placed to exert elements of rulership in their

[31] This description follows David Whitton, "The Society of Northern Europe in the High Middle Ages," in Holmes, *The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe*, 121-2.
[32] Liesbet Hooghe suggested this connection.

territory: they exercised legitimate coercion, imposed taxes and dues, and were an immediate authority for settling grievances among their subjects. Their lords also exerted authority in these same territories: they also exercised legitimate coercion and were responsible for the rule of law in their lands. Territorial boundaries among neighboring spheres of control were indistinct and subject both to coercive enforcement and to elaborate processes of adjudication at a higher level (e.g. the monarch or regional magnate).

These characteristics are ideal typical features of feudalism. The practical realities of lordship and vassalage varied greatly from place to place and from situation to situation depending on the relative coercive and normative resources that lords could bring to bear.[33] The feudum was merely one of a variety of types of land tenureship and the meaning of feudal ties appears to have varied across Europe; multiple lords provided vassals with multiple possibilities of escaping their duties; and, most importantly, the norms embodied in fiefdom and vassalage could only be enforced coercively. According to Strayer:

> "The basic unit of feudal government was the county, since the counts had been the most important local officials and were in the best position to seize governmental power as the Carolingian Empire disintegrated. But the early feudal age saw a wild scramble for power, in which many counts lost their lands whether to greedy neighbors or to their own vassals. Some men, such as the counts of Flanders and Anjou, gained control over many counties and dominated many lesser lords. These vassals of the great counts might have soldiers, castles, and courts of their own, but they were forced to obey their powerful superiors. At the other extreme were districts in central France in which the authority of the count almost disappeared and every petty castle-holder was practically independent. There was no plan or system in early feudalism; every lord seized as much land and governmental authority as he could and was as independent of his nominal superiors as he dared be. For this reason it is a mistake to think of early feudalism as a pyramid, with every lord owing allegiance and service to a man just above him. Rather, it was an endless series of overlapping circles of influence. Some were large, some small, but no one included all the others. Each lord was well obeyed in his own immediate neighborhood; his power dwindled in more distant regions, until finally a zone was reached in which some other lord's influence began to be felt."[34]

Strayer's commonsensical observations concerning the role of power in feudal relations are consistent with Susan Reynold's radical reinterpretation of vassalage. Reynolds contends that "nobles and free men did not generally owe military service before the twelfth century because of the grant of anything like fiefs to them to their ancestors. They normally held their land with as full, permanent, and independent rights as their society knew, and they owed whatever service they owed, not because they were vassals of a lord, but because they were subject of a ruler."[35] Raw coercive power was the currency that mattered most. In Southern's memorable phrase: "The position of the count was based on violence, with the covering of such respectability as it could gather around it in the course of time."[36]

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[33] See, for example, Paolo Delogu, "Lombard and Carolingian Italy," in McKitterick, ed., *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. II, 292.

[34] Strayer, *The Middle Ages*, 120.

[35] Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 477.

[36] R.W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 92.

At any time from the disintegration of the Carolinian empire in the 9th century to the rise of Church authority in the mid 11th century one can find a variety of forms of political authority varying from multiple nested and intersecting regimes within a given territory to territories dominated by single regimes that monopolized the exercise of virtually all aspects of political authority (i.e. states). By the last quarter of the 9th century multiple, nested, and intersecting regimes were typical in much of the western empire. But there were marked regional variations here. Royal authority was far weaker in the royal demesnes of Francia and Burgundy than in Gothia or Aquitaine.[37] Under King Alfred's successors, England, by contrast, appears to have been dominated by a single system of government, at least up to the beginning of renewed Viking invasions from 980.[38]

Explaining feudalism

How can one explain this diffusion of authority? Why did Charlemagne's heirs allow the fragmentation of authority in their respective territories? The civil wars of succession which erupted in 817, from the late 820s until the end of Louis the Pious' reign in 840, and among the three kingdoms that Louis created for his three heirs fragmented the empire and undermined the prestige of the crown. The combination of personalism, the norm of dividing inheritance among one's sons, and the happenstance that Charlemagne's only surviving legitimate heir, Louis the Pious, bore four surviving sons, the oldest of whom was survived by three sons, is perhaps sufficient to explain the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire into smaller contending units. But this does not explain the origins of feudalism in Charlemagne's rein, nor even the fragmentation of authority in the 9th century, for many states have split in civil wars, only to be reorganized among exclusive territorial regimes at some later point.

Carolingian rulers, including Charlemagne and his forbears, were pressed between two basic goals that they had to meet in order to survive politically. The first was to maximize the resources they exercised in their personal capacity as landholders. This meant extending the lands they owned, the royal fisc, and extending their authority over those lands. This was the core of a ruler's power: the royal fisc provided funds; it provided knights; and in the Carolingian period it provided administrators, the *vassi dominici.* The story of feudal state building, which begins in France in the 11th century—beyond the reach of this paper--is the story of fisc building.

But rulers faced another demand that was no less crucial for their political survival: the need to make and sustain alliances with actors who wielded substantial coercive power. Alliance building, as I detail below, threatened the royal fisc. It meant providing fisc lands to supporters and providing supporters a free hand in their lands, even if they were located in the fisc. The reasons for this go to the heart of the creation of feudalism.

Just as the sources of authority diffusion in European integration are rooted in the tension between liberal democracy and state centralism, so the sources of authority diffusion in the breakup of the Carolingian empire are rooted in the tension between alliance building and institutionalized royal authority. In both cases, individuals in positions of authority were induced to shed authoritative competencies to ensure their personal political survival. It is true that the stakes for Carolingians were higher: political failure meant coercive deposition or death.

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[37] Janet L. Nelson, "The Frankish kingdoms, 814-898: The West," in McKitterick, ed., *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. II, 130ff.

[38] Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Crucible of Europe: The ninth and tenth centuries in European history* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 141f.

Political failure today provides politicians with an opportunity to write their memoirs. But the underlying logic of institutional change appears similar.

External threats

Rulers who have trouble uniting their subjects behind them usually face incentives to flame hostility against some external enemy. For the past millennium external threats have been associated with state building, the creation of ever-larger scale military machines and the extractive and administrative capacity necessary to support them. But the effect of warfare on the allocation of authority depends vitally on the kind of threat in question. In the 9th century the chief external threat came from the Vikings, bloodthirsty marauders who struck with alarming unpredictability at any likely target that bordered the sea or river. Vikings struck deep into the empire, hauling vessels on land around rapids or shallow water. From the 10th century Vikings settled in Scotland, Ireland, Iceland and North America, Normandy, and Sicily, and engaged in extensive trade and colonization, but in the 9th century they specialized in short term visits to plunder and destroy.

The Viking threat could not be met with concentrated force. This it shares with contemporary terrorism, which is similarly small scale in its concentration of coercion and unpredictable in its choice of targets. To deal effectively with the Vikings, the Carolingians mobilized resistance that was as dispersed as the threat itself. Fortifications had to be built in vulnerable locations, which included the heartland of the empire. This was not a conflict across identifiable borderlands. The forces that had to be mobilized were, of necessity, local forces that could be mobilized quickly and brought to bear on the enemy directly. The inability of successive kings to deal with the threat delegitimized their authority, and impelled local populations to turn to their local lord for protection.

Finally, the Viking threat depleted the royal treasury as rulers were induced to pay Danegelt to the invaders.[39] The amounts involved were large and contributed to the difficulty, discussed below, that kings faced in rewarding their allies in anything other than control over territory and the persons who lived there.

The transparent logic of threat and response and the temporal correspondence of the Viking threat with disintegration of the Carolingian empire and the rise of feudalism suggest that this factor may have played an important precipitating role in diffusing authority. Regional variations in Viking threat and patterns of authority appear to bear this out.

In England, the Viking threat was very different from that in the western Carolingian empire and the result was different also. For whatever reason, Vikings settled early in England. Perhaps the weak defenses of the country induced the Vikings to attempt to conquer the country rather than plunder it in hit and run fashion. By 876 the kingdoms of Mercia, East Anglia, and Northumbria were occupied or dismembered. Only Wessex, under King Alfred, hung on. The gradual extension of Wessex rule over the next 60 years created an England-wide state with a coherent central administration and a territorially uniform legal system. Counties were established throughout the country, but these were part of, not separate from, the Wessex regime.

[39] See, for example, Nelson, "The Frankish kingdoms," 129. Nelson notes that Viking attacks enabled Charles the Bald to impose a general tax, and Viking demand for Frankish food, horses, and weapons increased trade. However, the dominant view in the literature is that Viking attacks in the western empire—as contrasted to the settlement of Vikings in later times or in other parts of Europe in the 9th century—diminished trade and increased localism.

"The contrast with the continent, where royal initiative was at a low ebb and law-making non-existent, could scarcely be more pronounced."[40]

The reasons for this are twofold. First, the Viking threat was a fixed one attached to possession of particular territory, the Danelaw. Despite his precarious position (in 877 Alfred had to flee to an inaccessible fortress surrounded by marsh and swamp in Somerset), Alfred had one advantage denied to the Carolingians: he was engaged in conventional war of territorial conquest. The Anglo-Saxon state that emerged from this war was built in sustained effort to mobilize resources for a network of fortresses (burhs), a mobile standing army, and a fleet. Second, the Danes eliminated centers of local power in the territories they conquered and their defeat created a political vacuum that the Anglo-Saxons filled.

The threat posed by marauding Vikings precipitated fragmentation of authority because underlying conditions were propitious. If one looks to the time beyond the Viking raids, to the late 10th and 11th century, one sees the emergence of multiple regimes in regions where the Vikings (or Magyar) were non-existent.

Constraints on Carolingian strategy

I have no systematic evidence for the claim, but I think it is the case that by far the most frequent, determined, and deadly threats to rulers in European societies have come from within rather than outside their countries. Charles Tilly's survey of European revolutions from the late 15th century onwards certainly reinforces such a claim. Tilly lists 35 revolutionary situations in the British Isles between 1492 and 1803 and 82 in France for the same period.[41] The frequency of domestic coercive contestation involving kings was, if anything, greater for the post 9th century period.

Carolingian rulers were engaged in continual struggle to sustain their hold on authority vis à vis domestic challengers and factions. Charlemagne pursued a combination of strategies to sustain his political control. He created new sources of land and booty to be distributed to nobles by engaging in a series of military campaigns. He sought to integrate the Church into his regime, both as a "shadow administration" to control aristocratic power and as a valuable additional source of land.[42] He tried to build up the class of freemen as a counterweight to the aristocracy. And he used personal bonds to tie nobles to him personally. Only the last of these proved a durable option for Charlemagne and his successors in the 9th century. The outline of the relevant constraints is as follows:

- The exhaustion of feasible targets for conquest and pillage after 806 and the ensuing unwillingness of nobles to engage in future campaigns.
- The inability of rulers to find alternative monetary sources for paying noble allies as trade declined.

  Long distance trade diminished severely in the 9th century as a result of the disruption caused by marauders, the Vikings chief among them, and because trade routes to Asia were cut off by the rise of Muslim empires. Viking raids, which gained intensity from the mid 9th century and which amazed those affected because even the heart of Carolingian empire--the Rhine and Seine regions--was not spared, diminished even short distance trade and economic

[40] Barraclough, *The Crucible of Europe*, 126.
[41] Charles Tilly, *European Revolutions, 1492-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 110-1 and 146-7.
[42] On this point and Carolingian political strategies generally see Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 39ff.

activity generally.[43] The treasure Charlemagne plundered in a series of campaigns was disbursed by the time he died and neither seigneurage (charges on coin-users) nor tolls (taxes on trade) could provide an adequate substitute.

- Depletion of Church lands available for redistribution to secular allies.
- The erosion of the class of common freemen, the free peasantry in response to the exacerbation of local military threats and the exorbitant expense of bearing arms. As heavily armed cavalry became generalized, so fighting became a "closed profession" and free peasants, along with unfree, were compelled to seek security under the protection of local strongmen. So began a development in which only those who could fight effectively were regarded as "free and noble."[44]

Under these constraints, Charlemagne's descendents had to resort to other alliance building strategies, chief among which was the provision of land from their own fiscs. When Charlemagne, Pippin and Charles Martel, rewarded distinguished soldiers with conquered territory or land confiscated from the Church, these lands were effectively rented and held at the ruler's behest.[45] From the 9th century this practice was extended to almost all vassals and the benefice of a feudum or fief remained in the family so long as there were heirs. This custom was not forced on rulers; rather it was a strategy actively pursued to solidify their power under specific constraints.[46] Janet Nelson observes that "patronage in the form of land-grants was a positive instrument of royal government: political crisis can be documented by a fall in numbers of grants, the defusing of crisis can be documented by a market rise as the ruler rewarded supporters."[47]

Conclusion to follow.

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[43] An additional causal logic may be operating here. The decline of trade meant that there was far less use of and need for translocal rules or enforcement of rules reducing transaction costs. By the same functional logic in which increased international transactions gave rise to pressures for transnational rule making capacity in the European Union, so the decline of trade made such institutions redundant as trade declined in the 9th century.

[44] Barraclough, *The Crucible of Europe*, 30ff.

[45] Strayer, *The Middle Ages*, 110; Janet Nelson, "Kingship and Royal Government," in McKitterick, ed., *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. II, 394f; Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals, 84ff*.

[46] Reynolds makes the point that the creation of hereditary benefices was a matter of politics not of property law. This is important, because it concerns an alternative explanation for the rise of feudalism that I do not discuss: the notion that feudalism was created by changing norms about property relations. In her book, Reynolds makes a strong case against this hypothesis: "It is impossible to attribute the dissolution of the Carolinian fisc or the disintegration of the Carolingian empire to new forms of lordship, new forms of property, or new ideas about property. It is certainly possible to connect the rise of the Carolingians with new bonds of loyalty in so far as Charles Martel and his successors clearly achieved unprecedented success in marshalling their subjects to fight for them and their government. But it is not clear that the relation between the kind and either his counts or those who were now called his *vassi*, was new in the sense that it drew on new ideas or values. What was new was the ambition and success that made it work. Once the Carolingian kingdom was established relations must have changed through the multiplication of *vassi* and their duties, but that was more the result of events than of new ideas" *Fiefs and Vassals*, 113.

[47] Nelson, "Kingship and Royal Government," 392. Barraclough traces these developments to Charlemagne's reign: "So far as Charles could use feudal bonds to build up his own power, by increasing the number of vassals, and using them both in his army and to administer his conquests for him, he showed no hesitation. Indeed, he could not do otherwise: it was the only way of getting the work done. The concentration of wealth in land, the sharp decline of fluid wealth with the collapse of commerce, the limited quantity of money in circulation, precluded—even if he had thought of it—the reconstruction of a non-feudal hierarchy of salaried officials. In this sense, and for this purely practical reason, feudalism was the very backbone of Carolingian government; there was nothing to take its place" *The Crucible of Europe*, 32.

TABLE I *Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity*

Table 6.1 *Issue arenas and levels of authority in Europe, 1950–2001*

	1950	1957	1968	1970[1]	1992[2]	2001[3]
I Economic issue arenas						
1 Goods/services	1	2	4[4]	4	4	4
			(3)	(3)		
2 Agriculture	1	1	4	4	4	4
3 Capital flows[5]	1	1	1	1	4	4
4 Persons/workers[5]	1	1	2	2	3	4
5 Transportation	1	2	2	3	2	3
				(2)		
6 Energy[5]	1	2	1	1	2	2
7 Communications	1	1	1	1	2	3
8 Environment[6]	1	2	2	2	3	3
9 Regional development[5]	1	1	1	1	3	3
10 Competition	1	2	3	3	3	3
			(2)	(2)		
11 Industry[7]	1	2	2	2	2	3
12 Money/credit	1	1	2	2	2	4
13 Foreign exchange/loans	1	1	3	4	2	4
			(2)	(2)		
14 Revenue/taxes	1	1	3	3	2	3
			(2)	(2)		
15 Macro-economic[8]	1	1	2	3	2	4
II Socio-cultural issue arenas						
1 Work conditions	1	1	2	2	2	3
2 Health	1	1	1	1	2	2
3 Social welfare	1	2	2	3	2	2
				(2)		
4 Education and research	1	1	3	3	2	3
			(2)	(2)		
5 Labour-management relations	1	1	1	1	1	3
III Politico-constitutional issues						
1 Justice and property rights[5]	1	1	1	2	3	4
2 Citizenship[5]	1	1	1	1	2	3
3 Participation	1	1	2	2	2	2
			(1)	(1)		
4 Police and public order[9]	1	1	2	2	1	2
			(1)	(1)		
IV International relations/external security issues						
1 Commercial negotiations	1	1	3	4	5	5
2 Economic-military assistance	1	1	1	1	2	4
3 Diplomacy and IGO membership	1	1	2	2	2	4
			(1)	(1)		
4 Defence and war	1	1	1	1	2	3

Key: 1 = All policy decisions at national level
2 = Only some policy decisions at EC level
3 = Policy decisions at both national and EC level
4 = Mostly policy decisions at EC level
5 = All policy decisions at EC level

Table 6.1 (*Continued*)

[1] Source for the estimates, 1950–1970: Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 67–71). Their estimates for 1970 were 'projections based on existing treaty obligations and on obligations undertaken as a result of subsequent policy decisions' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 70).

[2] Estimated outcome of the Single European Act based on projections from existing Treaty obligations and obligations undertaken subsequently. Score indicated for this and successive column represents the mode of independently provided evaluations by members of the Consortium for 1992 present at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in March 1992: Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, Philippe C. Schmitter and David Soskice.

[3] Estimated outcome of the Maastricht Treaty based on assumed Treaty obligations and presumed ratification by member states.

[4] Scores in parentheses ( ) represent *ex post* revaluations in March 1992 of the original scores in Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) by members of the Consortium for 1992.

[5] Category not in Lindberg and Scheingold (1970). My estimates for 1950–1970.

[6] Defined as 'Exploitation and protection of natural resources' in Lindberg and Scheingold (1970).

[7] Called 'Economic development and planning' in Lindberg and Scheingold (1970).

[8] Called 'Counter-cyclical policy' in Lindberg and Scheingold (1970).

[9] Called 'Public health, safety and maintenance of public order' in Lindberg and Scheingold (1970).

From:
Ph. Schmitter. 1996. "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity." Governance in the European Union G. Marks, F. Scharpf, Ph. Schmitter, W. Streeck ed. (London: Sage), 125-6.

Table II : Diffusion of Authority in Western Europe 1950-1995

	Year	*Constitutional Federalism*[a] *(0-4)*	*Special Territorial Autonomy*[b] *(0-2)*	*Role of regions in central government*[c] *(0-2)*	**Summary Score (0-8)**
Belgium	1950	0	0	0	**0**
	1995	4	1	2	**7**
Denmark	1950	0	1	0	**0**
	1995	0	2	0	**2**
Germany	1950	4	0	2	6
	1995	4	0	2	6
Finland	1950	0	0	0	0
	1995	0	0	0	0
France	1950	0	0	0	**0**
	1995	1	0	0	**1**
Greece	1950	0	0	0	0
	1995	0	0	0	0
Ireland	1950	0	0	0	0
	1995	0	0	0	0
Italy	1950	0	0	0	**0**
	1995	1	1	0	**2**
Luxembourg	1950	0	0	0	0
	1995	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	1950	0	0	0	0
	1995	0	0	0	0
Portugal	1950	0	0	0	**0**
	1995	0	2	0	**2**
Spain	1950	0	0	0	**0**
	1995	3	2	0	**5**
Sweden	1950	0	0	0	0
	1995	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	1950	0	1	0	1
	1995	0	1	0	1

*Figures in bold indicate a **reallocation** of authority*

Note: This table is based on Gary Marks et al. (1996) and Liesbet Hooghe (1997).

[a] Federalism refers to the constitutional scope for regional governance in the state. 0 = unitary state with at most a weakly institutionalized regional level of governance. 1 = unitary state in which regions have restricted and specialized competencies. 2 = regionalist state in which regions have extensive and diversified competencies. 3 = semi-federal state in which regions significantly influence central government policies. 4 = federal state in which regions have constitutionally guaranteed high political, administrative and financial autonomy.
Belgium: consecutive reforms from 1970 onwards and full-fledged federalism in 1993.
France: regionalization in the 1980s.
Italy: regionalization in 1978.
Spain: regionalization in 1982 and progressive deepening since.

[b] Special Territorial Autonomy refers to the existence of special arrangements for home rule. Territories with narrowly defined special arrangements are scored 1, and those with wide-ranging special arrangements receive a score of 2.
Denmark: special home rule for Greenland and Faroer Islands from the 1940s and deepening from the 1970s.
Italy: special arrangements for Sicily, Sardinia, Valle d'Aosta, Trento-Alto Adige in the 1950s, and for Friuli-Venezia-Giulia in the 1960s.
Portugal: special provisions for Azores and Madeira.
UK: special home rule for Northern Ireland until 1960s; progressive deconcentration to Scotland and Wales from 1970s.

[c] Role of regions in central government: 2 = regions with a very strong role in central government decision making; 1 = regions with a strong role; 0 = others.

FIGURE 1: Exclusivity and Size as Independent Dimensions



FIGURE 2: Dimensions of Exclusivity