

6. The most intergovernmentalist individuals among former state officials are diplomats who were previously posted with the European institutions. At first sight, this appears to go against the "going native" argument, that people who work in and around EU institutions become more susceptible to EU values and norms (Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Christoph 1993; Cram 1997; Lewis 1998; Schneider 1997). The reason why these ex-diplomats are more intergovernmentalist is that they were in state service for fifteen years on average, against nine and one-half years for domestic civil servants.

Political Parties Take a Stand

European integration has emerged as a major issue for national political parties.¹ The reallocation of authority that has taken place from the mid-1980s amounts to a constitutional revolution unparalleled in twentieth-century Europe. National parties now exist in a multi-level polity in which decisions about further European integration affect virtually all of their established economic and political concerns.

This chapter provides an explanation of positions taken by national political parties on the issue of European integration over the period 1984–1996. Our point of departure is the theory of social cleavages set out by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967. To what extent is the response of political parties to European integration filtered by historical predispositions rooted in the basic cleavages that structure political competition in Western European party systems? Our conclusion is that the new issue of European integration is assimilated into preexisting ideologies of party leaders, activists, and constituencies that reflect long-standing commitments on fundamental domestic issues. We find that the cleavage approach to party politics provides us with a powerful set of conceptual and theoretical tools for understanding the positions of national political parties on European integration over the period 1984–1996.

We begin this chapter by outlining a theory of party position based on social cleavages. Next, we test this theory with data on party positions on European integration. Finally, we apply the theory to explain variations within the major party families.

A CLEAVAGE THEORY OF PARTY POSITION

In their seminal article "Cleavage Systems, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments," Lipset and Rokkan argue that modern European party systems are shaped by a series of historical conflicts about state building, religion, and class that took

place from the Protestant Reformation to the Industrial Revolution. According to Lipset and Rokkan, these conflicts created durable identities and social institutions that can explain both national variations in party systems and the "freezing" of such systems.

Although the influence of traditional social cleavages has diminished in shaping individual voting choice, we hypothesize that such cleavages may still be powerful in structuring the way political parties respond to new issues (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Crewe and Denver 1985; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992). Our point of departure is the institutionalist presumption that organizations assimilate and exploit new issues within existing schemas. Most political parties have established constituencies and long-standing agendas that mobilize intense commitments on the part of leaders and activists (Budge, Robinson, and Hearl 1987). Political parties are not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures; rather, they are organizations with historically rooted orientations that guide their response to new issues. The range of a political party's likely responses to a new issue is therefore a product of the ideologies of party leaders and the constraints of party organization, constituency ties, and reputation. In other words, a political party has its own "bounded rationality," which shapes the way it comes to terms with new challenges and uncertainties (KLMS 1999; North 1990; Hall and Taylor 1996; Kitschelt 1994).

While party competition is no longer "frozen" along the cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan, class, religious, and center-periphery cleavages represent sunk costs that influence how party leaders process incentives generated by democratic party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt 1994).² We hypothesize that these cleavages constitute institutional frameworks or "prisms" through which political parties respond to the issue of European integration.

An alternative hypothesis would conceive of party positions on European integration as an efficient response to electoral incentives, but this would presuppose that voters have a clear idea of whether they benefit or lose from European integration. Yet it is not obvious to most citizens where their economic interests lie on the issue of European integration. While it is clear that European integration has a profound effect on national economies, politics, and societies, the extent and even the direction of economic consequences for individuals are contested.³ In time, European integration may spawn clearly demarcated sets of winners and losers, but for the present, attitudes toward the EU are weakly structured. It is unrealistic to believe that they may serve as powerful inducements for parties in determining their positions on the issue (Gabel 1998; Wessels 1995; Steenbergen and Scott 1997).

The political parties that currently dominate Western European party systems try to blend the issue of European integration into existing patterns of party competition. This is not to say that established political parties are ideologically immutable or unable to raise new issues. But it is to say that one would expect es-

tablished political parties rooted in the basic cleavages that have historically structured Western European party systems to assimilate the issue of European integration into their existing ideologies.

The next step, then, is to frame expectations about how political parties will position themselves on European integration given their long-standing ideological commitments.

HYPOTHESIZING PARTY POSITIONS

To understand how political parties respond to European integration, we need to unpack the policy content of European integration into two components:

Economic integration, the removal of tariff and nontariff barriers to the movement of goods, capital, services, and labor, has dominated European integration from its inception in the early 1950s. The creation of a single market was an overarching goal of the Treaty of Rome (1957). The idea was pressed into some 282 specific measures mandated by the Single European Act (1986) that were designed to eliminate an array of nontariff barriers (Wallace and Young 1996). The Maastricht Treaty (1993) built on these reforms and took economic integration a big step forward by envisaging a Europe-wide monetary union, which came into being in 1999.

Political integration involves the creation of a capacity for authoritative decision making in the EU. Over the past fifteen years, the EU has become part of a multi-level polity in which European institutions share authoritative competencies with national and subnational governments in a variety of policy areas, including environmental policy, competition, social policy, regional policy, and communications policy. The EU has a Court of Justice, which is in some important respects the highest court in its territory, and a directly elected parliament that plays a vital role in many areas of authoritative decision making. The creation of broad authoritative decision-making powers in the EU has deepened political contention at the European level. Interest groups, social movements, and political parties have been drawn there to gain information and influence. From the mid-1980s, European integration has involved the creation of authoritative supranational institutions as well as the deepening of international market activity (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Marks and McAdam 1996; Schmitter 1996a, 1996b; Caporaso 1996a; Hooghe 1996b; Leibfried and Pierson 1996; see also chapter 8).

We hypothesize that the social cleavages that have historically shaped political parties and competition among them influence the policy positions of parties on each of these dimensions of European integration. To use Rokkan's phrase, political cleavages and their interaction create a "structure of political alternatives" that constrain the orientations of political parties on newly arising issues (quoted in Lipset 1983; see also Zuckerman 1982; Kriesi 1998; Gaffney 1996).⁴

The dual character of European integration creates tension for parties that compete on the class cleavage (Hix 1995a, 1995b; Hooghe and Marks 1996a; Hix and Lord 1997; Ladrech 1997a; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Social democratic parties are pulled in two directions. On the one hand, economic integration threatens social democratic achievements at the national level by intensifying international economic competition and undermining Keynesian responses to it. By making it easier for international capital to locate in the country that provides the most favorable conditions and rules, economic integration increases the substitutability of labor across countries, fosters economic inequality, and pressures employers to demand labor flexibility. On the other hand, political integration promises a partial solution to this bleak prospect by recreating a capacity for authoritative regulation—at the European level. If the capacity of national states to regulate markets is effectively declining, then it may make sense to enhance that capacity in the EU.

Parties on the right face the same logic in reverse. For such parties, economic integration is beneficial because it constrains the economic intervention of national governments. International economic integration lowers the costs of shifting investments between various countries and impels national governments to compete in attracting capital to their country. The implications of this for market regulation, social policy, and taxation are strongly favorable for parties of the right. Conversely, political integration threatens to create a supranational government for the EU as a whole that can regulate markets while negating regime competition among individual states in the integrated European economy.

The class cleavage continues to dominate European party systems, but many parties compete along other cleavages, and this has implications for their positions on European integration. The Catholic side of the *religious cleavage*, most strongly represented in countries where there was deep conflict about the role of the Catholic Church, is decidedly pro-European integration. European integration, both economic and political, is consistent with the supranational aspirations of the Catholic Church and the anti-national bias of Catholic parties that arose from their historic battles with national state builders. Religious practice is generally a much weaker source of political competition in Protestant countries, but where parties do identify themselves as Protestant, the national character of Protestant churches should lead them to be decidedly more skeptical of European supranationalism.

Peripheral minorities in party systems characterized by a *center-periphery cleavage* oppose centralization of authority in the central state and favor various forms of decentralization and cultural defense. While Lipset and Rokkan do not make much of the distinction between peripheral minorities that are territorially concentrated in particular regions (such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland, or Wales) and those that are territorially dispersed (such as Scandinavian farmers or Lutheran fundamentalists), this is important for orientations toward European integration. Political parties representing territorially dispersed peripheral minorities are likely to oppose all efforts to centralize authority, whether it is

in the central state or at the European level. From their standpoint, European integration is, if anything, more threatening because it shifts decision making even further away from their control and is yet more alien to their cultural milieu. Territorially concentrated peripheral minorities take a different view because European integration can facilitate decentralization of authority from the central state to their region or ethno-territorial nation (Marks 1993; Hooghe 1996c). The single European market reduces the economic penalty imposed by regional political autonomy because regional firms continue to have access to the European market. European market integration provides an overarching framework that allows regionalists to demand political autonomy without incurring market exclusion. Moreover, the EU is likely to be more a congenial setting for ethno-territorial minorities than their customary national setting because in the EU they become merely one minority among many, instead of a permanent minority facing a national majority. Conversely, political parties that define themselves as nationalist on the center-periphery cleavage will be opposed to European integration because it diffuses state authority and undermines state sovereignty.

A theory linking cleavages to European integration has testable implications for individual political parties. It suggests that party families—summarizing the accumulated historical experience of these cleavages—should predict the position of individual parties on European integration. We test this claim in the next section of this chapter.

ORIENTATIONS OF PARTY FAMILIES

Given the connections we hypothesize between party positions on these cleavages and orientations toward European integration, we expect to find that party families cohere on European integration and, further, that membership in a party family is significantly associated with position on European integration.

The data that we use for positions of political parties on European integration are based on an expert survey conducted by Leonard Ray (1997, 1999). Ray used evaluations from country experts to place political parties on a seven-point scale with the lowest score (1) representing strong opposition to European integration and the highest score (7) representing strong support for European integration for each of four time periods: 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996. Our estimate of each party's position at each time point is the mean of these evaluations. Statistical tests indicate that these data are reliable within conventional limits. There are few comparable sources of data, but where systematically collected manifesto data overlap with the Ray data, they tend to be mutually consistent. The resulting database allows us to view party positions on European integration for individual parties in EU member states over time.

Variation in party position on European integration within party families tends to be much lower than variation within individual countries. The simplest way to

summarize this is to compare standard deviations for party families with standard deviations for individual countries. On our seven-point scale, the average standard deviation for party families that represent traditional social cleavages—the conservative, liberal, Christian democratic, social democratic, extreme left, and regionalist families—is 0.83.⁵ The average standard deviation for parties grouped by country is 1.20. Hence, party family tells us considerably more about the position of a party on European integration than national location does.

To test the hypothesis that party family explains a significant amount of variation in party position, we use the ANOVA (analysis of variance) procedure, which allows us to explore the amount of variation on a continuous dependent variable that is explained by a set of categorical variables. The results of this analysis are presented in table 10.1. Model 1 reveals that party family explains 63 percent of the variance in individual party positions on European integration ($p < 0.001$). Model 2 shows that the influence of country is far weaker. When combined in model 3, these two sets of independent variables explain 68 percent of variance in party position. In this equation, the ω^2 statistic, which standardizes the relative influence exerted by multiple independent variables in an ANOVA procedure, is 0.05 for country and 0.55 for party family.

Table 10.1 Party Position on European Integration (ANOVA—analysis of variance)

14 EU Member States							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Family	0.63**		0.55**				
Country		0.08*	0.05**				
Family 1984				0.73**			
Family 1988					0.72**		
Family 1992						0.72**	
Family 1996							0.47**
Adj R-squared	0.63	0.08	0.68	0.73	0.73	0.71	0.47
N	209	209	209	40	53	52	64

** $p < .001$ * $p < .01$. Cell entries are the omega-squared statistic for the variables.

9 EU Member States				
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Family 1984	0.73**			
Family 1988		0.79**		
Family 1992			0.72**	
Family 1996				0.71**
Adj R-squared	0.73	0.79	0.73	0.70
N	40	44	43	43

** $p < .001$ * $p < .01$. Cell entries are the omega-squared statistic for the variables.

Models 4 through 7 examine the influence of party family on party position for each of our four time periods. These models show that the influence of party family, while high across all four years for which we have data, is highest in 1984 and 1988 and lowest in 1996. During the 1980s, as we explain below, social democratic parties became more homogeneous in their orientations toward European integration, while the coherence of other party families declined slightly. In the mid-1990s, however, because of the enlargement of the EU to include northern Scandinavia, the liberals and Christian democrats became significantly more heterogeneous. As a result, the explanatory punch of party family declined markedly from 1992 to 1996.

Models 8 through 11 confirm this by excluding parties in countries that joined the European Union after 1984 (Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden). When we examine positions of political parties on European integration in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, the causal power of party family does not diminish appreciably over the period 1984 to 1996.

Party family captures a substantial amount of variance among individual political parties, but categorizing parties in this way does not exhaust the causal power of political cleavages in explaining party position on European integration. Lipset and Rokkan stress that the effect of a particular cleavage is mediated by how it interacts with prior cleavages. The interplay between cleavages varies from country to country, and this leads to intelligible variations *within* party families. In the remainder of this chapter, we focus our analytical lens more precisely to explain such territorial variations within the four major party families—the social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative families.

Social Democratic Parties

Social democratic parties are rooted on the left of the class cleavage, supporting greater equality, social welfare spending, and political control of markets. As Lipset and Rokkan noted, this party family is exceptionally homogeneous because it arose in response to a deep and relatively uniform cleavage across advanced capitalist societies: the class struggle between employees and owners of capital. Not surprisingly, then, social democratic parties in EU member states are also the most homogeneous on the issue of European integration.

However, the social democratic party family is by no means uniform. For example, the Scandinavian and British parties were relatively Euro-skeptic in the 1980s, while southern European social democrats (with the exception of the Greek PASOK in the early 1980s) have generally been pro-European (Featherstone 1988; Ladrech 1997b; Geyer and Swank 1997; Geyer 1997; Christensen 1996; Aylott 1997; Haahr 1993).

How can one explain such variations? The model we set out below constrains social democratic strategy along a possibility curve that is a function of the

achievements of social democracy at the national level, the costs imposed by European economic integration, and the prospects of Euro-Keynesianism.

To the extent that social democratic parties have been able to achieve their goals at the national level (for example, by creating national Keynesianism, strong welfare states, and a highly institutionalized industrial relations system), we hypothesize that they will regard the deepening of market integration in Europe as a threat. This seems plausible on several grounds (Streeck 1996, 1998; KLMS 1999). Market integration in Europe gives employers immense advantages in bargaining with unions because capital is far more able than labor to take advantage of opportunities for transnational mobility. Competition among national governments to lure the most mobile factors of production (i.e., capital) to their countries constrains government spending, provides incentives for governments to shift the burden of taxation from capital to labor, and leads governments and employers to press for labor "flexibility." Each of these undermines institutional settlements defended by social democrats that express neocorporatist class compromise.

But European integration is double-edged for social democratic parties. If social democracy at the national level is weak or difficult to sustain, then European integration is likely to be viewed positively as a means to establish social democratic regulations within the EU as a whole. The logical implication is a tipping point along the possibility curve describing social democratic strategy in figure 10.1. Suppose that national social democracy is being undermined by European integration as one moves from A to B in figure 10.1. Assume further that it is politically infeasible for social democrats to turn the clock back and return to A. How do social democrats respond? As a country moves toward B, we hypothesize that social democrats will demand more integration, not less. As the prospect of returning to A fades, so the appeal of C, European regulated capitalism, grows.

In this model, social democratic positions on European integration depend less on ideological variation than on evolving institutional constraints. Depending on the achievements of national social democracy (i.e., the vertical height of A), social democrats stand to suffer by falling into the valley of single market regime competition at B. The slope of the curve from A to B—the cost of European integration for social democrats—depends on the extent to which social democracy is institutionalized at the national level. What social democrats do at B cannot be inferred from their absolute preference for national social democracy versus European regulated capitalism, but from their evaluation of the relative merits of further integration versus the status quo.

We now have a logical set of expectations about the orientations of social democratic parties that depends on the slope of the possibility curve in figure 10.1 and the position of parties along it. How consistent is this with the evidence?

Figure 10.2 bifurcates social democratic parties successively along three variables. The first is the strength of national social democracy, which we measure by





Figure 10.1 The Social Democratic Possibility Curve

combining scores for the extent of social democratic participation in government, the organizational strength of labor, and the extent to which resources in a society are allocated authoritatively.⁶ Social democratic parties that do not defend entrenched national social democracy are, as we expect, inclined to support European integration. On our seven-point scale, the mean level of support among these parties is 6.06.

The orientations of the remaining parties depend on whether they are strategizing at point A or point B in figure 10.1. The second bifurcation of social democratic parties in figure 10.2 is between social democratic parties in the founding member states and in subsequent member states. By the beginning of the 1980s, social democratic parties in the founding member states were nearer to B than to A. They had experienced more than two decades of economic integration. The European Union was so deeply institutionalized that it was unrealistic to propose exiting the regime.⁷ National social democracy pursued outside the EU appeared a chimera, particularly after the debacle of "socialism in one country" in France



¹See note 6 for an explanation of this

Figure 10.2 Social Democratic Parties

in 1982-1983. In his electoral program for the 1981 presidential election, François Mitterrand proposed to increase France's room for maneuver in the EU by reducing trade to 20 percent of French GDP by 1990. The policy was unsustainable under the pressures of international currency and capital markets, and after 1983 Mitterrand and the majority of socialists came to believe that the only realistic alternative was to deepen, rather than marginalize, the European Union (Cole 1996). The debate between national social democrats and supporters of European regulated capitalism turned decisively in favor of the latter, and, under Jacques Delors's leadership in the European Commission, social democratic parties in these countries sought to deepen and extend the single market program. By the mid- to late 1980s most social democrats in established EU member states came to the conclusion that the European Union was the "only game in town" and adjusted their policies accordingly.

This conviction was not shared by social democrats in countries that were recent members of the EU or were outside the EU. To forge a policy in the valley of single market regime competition is one thing; to face the prospect of descending there is another. Without exception, as figure 10.2 reveals, social democratic parties in these countries in 1984 and 1988 took a skeptical position on European integration. The British Labour party is an interesting example (George and Haythorne 1996; Daniels 1998). In the early 1980s, the Labour party actually resolved to pull the United Kingdom out of the European Union because membership was deemed to be incompatible with its radical Alternative Economic Strategy. But by the 1990s, as the third bifurcation in figure 10.2 makes clear, every single social democratic party in this group had become favorably oriented to European integration, and all were above the social democratic mean of support for European integration for the 1984-1996 period as a whole.

This is consistent with our model. On the one hand, these social democratic parties have become less sanguine about social democracy at the national level. The bases of national social democracy have been weakened *economically* by the internationalization of capital and goods markets and by the decline of traditional manufacturing and resource extraction, *politically* by intensified employer demands for labor market flexibility and by the renewed influence of neoliberal ideology, and *socially* by the growing heterogeneity of the workforce and of labor unions and by the declining salience of social class.⁸

On the other hand, the European Union has become a more propitious arena for social democrats to achieve their goals. The EU has come to wield authoritative powers in a range of policy areas relevant to social democrats, including social policy, cohesion policy, environmental policy, and communications. There is the expectation that monetary integration will give rise to serious pressures for the creation of a fiscal policy to counter asymmetries of response to exogenous economic shocks within the Union. Decision making in the European Union has become more open to democratic (and, therefore, social democratic) pressures. The European Parliament has come to play a decisively larger role in decision making

since the introduction of the cooperation (1986) and codecision (1993) procedures (Tsebelis and Garrett 1996, 2000; see also chapter 1). Interest groups, including trade unions and a range of social and public interest groups, have mobilized at the European level (Imig and Tarrow 1997, forthcoming). The European Union is no longer the preserve of national governments operating in a business-dominated climate. As we argue in chapter 8, it has become a contested polity in which the social democratic project for regulated capitalism competes with neo-liberal and nationalist projects.

In short, as regulated capitalism at the European level became a feasible goal and as social democratic parties came to realize that they could not exit the single market, they sought to deepen the European Union. The shift in support for European integration is, as we predict, sharpest in countries where, at the beginning of this period, national social democracy was strong and where social democratic parties could realistically call for nonmembership of the European Union. In these countries, the steep decline from national Keynesianism to regime competition (i.e., from A to B in figure 10.1) was strongly felt. Mean support for European integration among this group was just 4.00 in 1984–1988, but rose to 6.14 in 1992–1996. The sharpest discontinuities are in countries that joined the EU during this period. In the 1980s, from their standpoint outside the EU, Austrian, Finnish, and Swedish social democrats were deeply opposed to membership. Once social democrats accepted that membership could not be averted, they became strong supporters of deeper integration. In 1984–1988 the mean orientation of social democratic parties in these three countries was 3.12; in 1992–1996 it rose to 6.34.

Liberal Parties

Liberal parties form the most ideologically diverse of the major party families. They arose out of the urban–rural cleavage (particularly influential for liberal parties in England and Germany in the nineteenth century), the cleavage between state and church (dominant for liberal parties in the Low Countries, France, Italy, and Spain), and the center–periphery cleavage (dominant for liberal parties in the Nordic countries, but present also in Wales and Scotland). Across these diverse cleavages, liberal parties share some diffuse common values based on opposition to ascription, clericalism, and aristocracy, and support for economic and political freedoms, though the substantive content of their programs varies considerably (Kirchner 1988; Smith 1972; von Beyme 1985).

Three variants can be distinguished in the liberal party family. The first—*liberal-radicalism*—describes liberal parties that are left-of-center on economic issues and support a broad interpretation of democratic rights. Liberal-radical parties, such as the Danish Radical Left and the Dutch D66, favor substantial state intervention in the economy on the grounds that this is necessary to achieve social justice and protect individuals from the vagaries of the market. The second




Figure 10.3 Liberal Parties

variant of liberalism, *liberal-conservatism*, emphasizes economic freedom and tends to be right-of-center. Liberal-conservative parties, such as the Dutch People's party (VVD) and the Belgian liberal parties, adopt an economically conservative agenda, advocating a minimal role for the state in the economy.

While they differ in left-right terms, there is good reason to expect that liberal-radical and liberal-conservative parties will support European integration. Liberal-radicals oppose aggressive nationalism and seek to minimize the constraints that national borders exert over the lives of individuals (Clarke and Curtice 1997). However, liberal-radicals also value decentralized decision making, and this leads them to criticize bureaucratization and the democratic deficit in the EU. On balance, though, liberal-radicalism is strongly pro-European integration.

Liberal-conservatives advocate European integration as a means to lower trade barriers and institutionalize free markets. But liberal-conservatives are also wary of the potential for a Fortress Europe to develop behind regional tariff barriers and they oppose the social democratic project for regulated capitalism at the European level. Hence liberal-conservatives favor economic integration but oppose political integration.

The third variant—agrarian or center parties—is the odd one out in the liberal family.⁹ These parties are distinguished by their agrarian roots and their defense of the periphery in opposition to the national establishment. They reflect the particular interaction of social cleavages characteristic of Scandinavia: the dominance of the Protestant Reformation and consequent absence of a Catholic Church, the relative weakness of feudalism and consequent scarcity of large landholdings, and the relative weakness of the urban side of the urban-rural cleavage at the time of the extension of mass suffrage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Stephens 1979).¹⁰

Figure 10.3 reveals that both the liberal-radical and the liberal-conservative parties have been strongly supportive of European integration.¹¹ The difference between these groups is slight. In contrast, agrarian-liberal parties are distinctly Euro-skeptical. Their location on the peripheral side of the center-periphery cleavage, and their corresponding opposition to central authority, appears to carry over to their position on European integration (Lindstöm and Wörlund 1996).¹² Hence, as the European Union has come to encompass northern Scandinavia, the liberal party family has become more diverse. This weakens party family as an explanatory variable in accounting for party positions from 1992 to 1996 (see table 10.1).

Figure 10.3 places Scandinavian agrarian parties in the liberal family, but were one to take a more refined approach and consider agrarian parties as a separate category, this would slightly increase the overall association between party family and position on European integration.

Christian Democratic Parties

Most Christian democratic parties represent the Catholic side of the church-state cleavage rooted in the Protestant Reformation. As the church-state cleavage has

lost prominence, many of these parties have toned down their Catholic ideology or become interdenominational. Such parties identify themselves at right-of-center along the left-right dimension of party competition and occupy much the same position as conservative parties in non-Catholic countries.

Christian democratic support for European integration expresses affinity with a supranational church and the long-standing rejection of nationalism that emerged in historic battles with state-builders. In contrast to Protestant churches, which are distinctly national in origin, Catholicism is explicitly supranational. The first program of the transnational organization of Christian democratic parties in Europe, the European Peoples' party, established in 1977, based its pro-European policy on the principle that "human rights and fundamental liberties have priority everywhere in the world over national sovereignty" (quoted in Papini 1997, 110).

Christian democratic parties also support European integration on pragmatic grounds, as a means to economic prosperity. While their support for welfare and social programs to moderate the unwanted effects of capitalism distinguishes Christian democratic parties from market liberal parties, Christian democrats do not question the benefits of international economic integration.

Christian democratic parties have been more closely associated with the founding of the European Union than any other party family. Each of the countries that joined the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) and the European Economic Community (1958) had influential or governing Christian democratic parties, and all but one (Austria) of the countries where such parties were strong were part of the integration process. While communist, socialist, and conservative parties were opposed or divided, Christian democratic members of legislatures across the member states were strongly in favor. Not a single Christian democratic deputy abstained or voted against either treaty (Irving 1979; Papini 1997).

To what extent does cleavage theory explain variation *within* the Christian democratic party family? Alongside mainstream "social" Christian democratic parties are two variants. The first is composed of the Protestant parties of Scandinavia. These parties originated in fundamentalist Lutheran opposition to the dominance of central government elites and the mainstream Lutheran church. As a result, Christian democratic parties in Scandinavia share none of the supranational affinities of parties rooted in Catholicism. These parties are typically categorized within the Christian democratic family, but they are shaped by the distinctive pattern of cleavages in Scandinavia noted above and, in particular, by the interaction of the center-periphery cleavage with the urban-rural cleavage and religion. Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian Christian democratic parties have long exhibited fundamentalist Lutheran opposition to liberalism, permissiveness, and (with the exception of the Finnish Christian league [SKL]) defense of rural values (Karvonen 1994; Madelay 1994). Their religious fundamentalism, cultural reaction, and resistance to central authority generates a distinctly anti-EU orientation, as is evident in figure 10.4, and this is explicable in terms of their cleavage location.




Figure 10.4 Christian Democratic Parties

A second variant is distinguished not by its cleavage location but by its nationalism and defense of traditionalist values. Euro-skepticism can arise within a Christian democratic party because the party is responsive to reactionary traditionalism, as is the case with the German Christian Social Union (CSU), or because Christian democratic traditions are a superficial element in defining a party's program, as is the case with the Portuguese People's party (CDS/PP). These two parties stand far to the political right, and as figure 10.4 indicates, are distinctly less favorable to European integration than more-moderate Christian democratic parties. These cases may be covered by a general hypothesis: to the extent that the religious cleavage diminishes in salience relative to other sources of right-wing politics rooted in authoritarianism or nationalism, support for European integration will decline.

In 1984, the Christian democratic party family was more favorably oriented than any other to European integration, with a mean score above 6.5, and this positive orientation persisted through 1992. By 1996, however, the mean position of Christian democratic parties had fallen to what was almost certainly a historic low, 5.08, less than either the liberal or social democratic party families. The enlargement of the EU to southern and northern Europe—away from the traditional heartland of Christian democracy—has increased the heterogeneity of this party family. As a result, the explanatory power of this party family category has eroded over time. But, as in the case of the liberal party family, an examination of variation within this party family sustains a cleavage approach. The most distinctive subgroup within the Christian democratic party family when viewed from cleavage perspective—the Protestant parties of Scandinavia—are outlying cases in terms of their position on European integration.

Conservative Parties

Conservative parties stand on the class cleavage appealing to middle- and upper-class voters in support of economic liberalism and in opposition to social democracy. These parties combine two distinct strands: neoliberalism (i.e., support for free markets and minimal state intervention), and a national appeal that denies the relevance of class to the major political issues facing the nation. Variation among conservative parties on European integration reflects the relative strength of these ideological strands.

The European project of neoliberals, including those in the British Conservative party, the Swedish Moderate party, and the French Gaullist party (RPR), is an extension of the basic political-economic ideas that guide their domestic policies. Neoliberals support European integration insofar as this leads to regime competition within an integrated market. For neoliberals, European integration should focus on market integration, though it is recognized that some minimal political superstructure is necessary to induce compliance to market-making agreements, constrain monopolies, and adjudicate conflicts arising from

incomplete contracting. But neoliberals stress that such supranational institutions should not diminish regime competition, that is, competition among national governments to attract mobile capital.

Figure 10.5 summarizes these ideas by plotting a possibility curve relating neoliberalism to European integration. This curve is essentially the converse of that for social democracy (figure 10.1). At point A, neoliberals will be in favor of European integration as part of their effort to weaken national market regulation. The creation of a single European market undermines national regulation in two ways. First, it creates supranational rules that eliminate or reduce nontariff barriers, including national subsidies, national industrial policies, and regional policies carried out by national governments. Second, economic integration creates incentives for national governments to compete with each other in establishing capital-friendly environments where companies pay little tax and face minimal regulation.

Single market regime competition is the preferred outcome for neoliberals. Most support economic and monetary union (EMU) as the final step in this process. Neoliberals are opposed to further integration, whether it is to democratize the Euro-polity or to shift competencies to the European level. Their fear is the social democrats' hope: that political integration will create authoritative capacity for market regulation at the European level.

Neoliberalism is influential in most conservative parties, but it exists alongside a national orientation. Many conservatives defend national culture, language, community, and national sovereignty against the influx of immigrants, against competing sources of identity within the state, and against external pressures from other countries and international organizations. Nationalism has an unambiguous bottom line for European integration: the national state should not share with European institutions its legitimate sovereign right to govern persons living in its territory.

National opposition to European integration both complements and conflicts with the neoliberal view. Nationalists share neoliberal opposition to political integration at the European level, but they disagree with neoliberals in that they oppose any weakening of national sovereignty, even if it is in the cause of economic integration. Neoliberals, including Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, agreed to weaken national sovereignty by instituting qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers to stop recalcitrant national governments from holding the single market program hostage to national vetoes.¹³ When it comes to hard choices between national sovereignty and market integration, the national and neoliberal strands of conservatism part company. In recent years the flashpoint of dispute has been European monetary union. Neoliberals are inclined to support EMU because it will put the finishing touches on the single market and because they believe it will put intense pressure on remaining national regulations, particularly those that impede flexible labor markets. National conservatives reject EMU because it undermines a vital element of national sovereignty, the authority to determine monetary policy.




Figure 10.5 The Neoliberal Possibility Curve

Nationalism is strongest on the extreme right, in parties like the French National Front and Austrian Freedom party (FPÖ), which are distinguished by their intense Euro-phobia, but it is also present to varying degrees in conservative parties. Accounts of conservative parties in Western Europe describe three parties in particular as being strongly national in orientation—the Irish Fianna Fáil, the French Gaullists, and the British Conservative party. Fianna Fáil and the RPR have, from their founding, been expressly national parties in which neoliberalism has been relatively weak. The Conservative party, building on its Tory heritage, has always emphasized the unity of the British nation against peripheral nationalism, disestablished churches, and, during the twentieth century, class conflict analyses. Classical liberalism, based on a competing Whig tradition, has also been an important stream within the party, but it has rarely eclipsed the national proclivities of Toryism, even during the heyday of Thatcherite neoliberalism.

It is no surprise then that Fianna Fáil, the RPR, and the British Conservative party are relatively skeptical of European integration, as depicted in figure 10.6.




Figure 10.6 Conservative Parties

In each of these parties there is an ongoing struggle between nationalists and neo-liberals about the future of the European Union, the outcome of which is an unstable balance of forces and rhetorical equivocation designed to avoid internal discord and costly political splits. Surveys indicate just how deeply nationalism has become ingrained within the British Conservative party. In 1994, around 50 percent of Conservative MPs believed that the creation of a single EU currency would signal the end of the United Kingdom as a sovereign nation (Baker et al. 1997). Concern with national sovereignty is by far the strongest factor associated with variation in orientations on European integration among Conservative MPs.

Other conservative parties have been far less nationalist. Scandinavian conservative parties have defined themselves mainly in left-right terms, in opposition to social democracy rather than as national parties (Ljunggren 1988). In these countries, conservatives were deprived of a strong national base in the countryside, with the result that the left, not the right, has been most successful in appropriating national symbols to its socioeconomic program.

Conservatism in Spain and Greece has traditionally combined reaction and nationalism, but contemporary conservative parties in these countries have striven to distance themselves from this tradition. Reactionary nationalism is indelibly associated with Francisco Franco and the colonels, authoritarian regimes that are an electoral albatross for modern-day democratic conservatives. The story of conservatism in these countries from the 1980s is essentially an attempt to redefine conservatism in ways that can appeal to moderate voters. In Spain, the Popular Alliance (AP) under Manuel Fraga struggled to escape the heritage of its leaders as ex-Franco ministers (Montero 1988). After Fraga resigned in 1986 and the party was relaunched as the People's party (PP) in 1989, the party succeeded in establishing itself as a moderate right party.

The Greek New Democracy party (ND) has been closer to the Gaullist model of a party of the nation. It has been centrist or even statist on economic issues, including nationalization, and has drawn on a rhetoric of national independence, emphasizing the "true" interests of the nation (Clogg 1987). But there are two important differences. First, successive leaders of the ND have made a sharp distinction between Greek national interests and defense of national sovereignty. Greece's vulnerable geopolitical position vis-à-vis Turkey has led ND leaders to support strongly the integration of Greece into NATO and the European Union (Verney 1987). Second, as in Spain, the ND has consistently had to disassociate itself from the nationalist-authoritarian right to sustain its democratic credentials.

Variations among conservative parties arise mainly from the tension between neoliberal and national conservatism. This makes the point that cleavage positions are sometimes fraught with ambiguity in the face of new issues. When this is the case, there is plenty of scope for acute tensions within parties as contending factions battle over policy. To probe the orientations of conservative parties

one must therefore go beyond comparisons of individual parties and pay serious attention to the divisions within them. There is a cleavage dimension to such conflicts. Once again the Scandinavian parties are distinctive.

CONCLUSION

Cleavage theory sheds considerable light on the positioning of national political parties on European integration. We have shown that party families summarize a sizeable portion of variation among individual parties on the issue of European integration. Political parties have significantly more in common with parties in the same party family than they do with other parties in the same country. The reason for this is that parties are shaped by their distinctive historical experiences, the most influential elements of which are the ideological propensities and constituency links that arise out of the basic cleavages that structure contention in a society. The thesis of this chapter is that if one wishes to know how a political party will respond to a new issue like European integration, one must pay close attention to these historical predispositions. The characteristics summarized by party family groupings—ideological schemas rooted in political cleavages—are a “prism” through which political parties come to terms with new issues.

We further believe that the explanatory power of cleavage theory is not exhausted by grouping parties in families. Much variation among individual political parties on European integration can be explained by territorial differences in the historical interaction of cleavages across particular countries and regions. In short, a cleavage theory of party positioning allows one to make sense of variations within party families as well as variations among them.

The cleavage theory set out here feeds into a stream of theorizing about European integration that goes under the term “multi-level governance.” In contrast to those who treat European integration as an international phenomenon, scholars of multi-level governance argue that politics in the European Union can be explained using tools of comparative politics as they have been applied to domestic political systems. This chapter substantiates this claim for national political parties. Supranational institution building in Europe is interpreted by political parties through ideologies that reflect centuries of domestic conflict. As international relations (i.e., relations among national governments) have become domesticated in the process of European integration, so domestic political concerns have come to shape relations among countries. To rephrase the old adage about war and diplomacy: European integration is domestic politics by other means.

NOTES

1. We would like to thank the participants at a conference on “Citizens, Parties, and Elections” (UNC-Chapel Hill, October 1998), participants of the UNC Department of Po-

litical Science discussion group, and David Scott, Marco Steenbergen, Helen Wallace, J. Matthew Wilson, and, posthumously, Vincent Wright. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Sussex University and Nuffield College, Oxford.

2. Note that our argument, which assumes the persistence of historical lines of cleavage, does not assume either the persistence of individual parties or that cleavages are frozen once and for all. On these issues, see Sartori 1969; Mair 1997, 56–66; and Smith 1990, 157–168.

3. One might add here that this is not clear to political economists either. Stolper-Samuelson models and Hecksher-Ohlin models yield quite different accounts of individual economic interests under international trade (Gabel 1998).

4. We do not include the new politics cleavage in this article for two reasons: first, it is better described as an ideological cleavage rather than a social cleavage and, therefore, muddies an evaluation of the Lipset/Rokkan model; and second, we choose, in the confines of this book, to focus on the major party families—at the expense of the greens and extreme right.

5. The figure is 0.86 when we include party families of the extreme right and greens based on a new politics cleavage.

6. The extent of social democratic participation in government is measured as the number of years social democratic parties were part of national government coalitions between 1950 and 1980 (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993). Organizational strength of labor is indicated by union density in 1985 (International Labor Organization Task Force on Industrial Relations, *World Labor Report, 1997–1998: Industrial Relations, Democracy, and Social Stability*, table 1.2). The extent to which economic resources are allocated authoritatively rather than by the market is indicated by the share of taxation in gross domestic product in 1985; Statistics of Norway, “Tax Revenue of OECD Member Countries as Percentage of GDP,” <<http://www.ssb.no/www-open/english/yearbook/tab/T1512004.html>>, June 8, 1999. These variables are each standardized around a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one and then arithmetically summed to create an index of national social democracy.

7. Social democratic parties were generally more skeptical in the early years of European integration. Despite their internationalist origins, by the early post-World War II period, socialist parties were deeply embedded in national states and opposed to economic liberalization and supranational governance. As a result, they were divided in their response to plans to create the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community (Griffiths 1993).

8. These and other factors are evaluated in KLMS (1999). In the conclusion of that volume, the authors claim that the Scandinavian model has been hit harder than the Rhine model by these developments. This is confirmed in our data by the marked shift in social democratic party positions from Euro-skepticism to Euro-support in Scandinavia relative to Germany, Austria, and other Rhine-model countries.

9. Whether to place the agrarian parties in the liberal party family is debatable. However, most general studies of party families, including those of Wessels (1995), Hix and Lord (1997), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and Ray (1999), include them.

10. This pattern is also characteristic of the Protestant cantons in Switzerland.

11. Though most observers still place the Danish agrarian party (Venstre) in the group of agrarian parties, it has actually shifted away from its agrarian roots towards a liberal-conservative position, and in the period under review, it has pursued an explicitly neoliberal line. That explains why it has supported European integration more strongly than the other agrarian parties.

12. Clearly, other factors are at work also, including the realization on the part of northern Scandinavian farmers that the subsidies offered to them within the EU, while high by most standards, are significantly less than those they have been receiving from their national states.

13. However, once the single market was set in motion, Thatcher opposed further political integration on nationalist grounds.

Appendix 1

Table A1.1 National and Supranational Governance, 1950–2000

<i>Issue arena</i>	1950	1957	1968	1992	2000
ECONOMIC POLICY					
Goods/services	1	2	4(3) ¹	4	4
Agriculture	1	1	4	4	4
Capital flows ²	1	1	1	4	4
Persons/workers ³	1	1	2	3	4
Transportation	1	2	2	2	3(2)
Energy ⁴	1	2	1	2	2
Communications	1	1	1	2	3(2)
Environment ⁵	1	2	2	3	3
Regional development ⁶	1	1	1	3	3
Competition	1	2	3(2)	3	3
Industry ⁷	1	2	2	2	3(2)
Money/credit	1	1	2	2	4(5)
Foreign exchange/loans	1	1	3(2)	2	4
Revenue/taxes	1	1	3(2)	2	3(2)
Macroeconomic ⁸	1	1	2	2	4(3)
SOCIAL/INDUSTRIAL POLICY					
Work conditions	1	1	2	2	3
Health	1	1	1	2	2
Social welfare	1	2	2	2	2
Education and research	1	1	3(2)	2	3(2)
Labor-management relations	1	1	1	1	3(2)