

# **A Theory of International Organization**

A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance,  
Volume IV

Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks

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# Contents

<i>Detailed Contents</i>	xi
<i>List of Figures</i>	xv
<i>List of Tables</i>	xvii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xix
1. Introduction	1
2. Philosophical Foundations of a Postfunctionalist Theory of International Organization	9
3. Measuring International Authority	26
4. The Basic Set-Up: How International Organizations Vary	44
5. Why Do Some IOs Expand their Policy Portfolio?	60
6. The Resistible Rise of International Authority	84
7. Why States Pool Authority	104
8. Five Theses on International Governance	121
<i>Appendix</i>	135
<i>References</i>	159
<i>Index</i>	187

## Appendix

The Appendix describes the dependent and independent variables. Part I summarizes operationalization, shows descriptives, and contains a list of IOs in the MIA dataset. Part II provides detail on the conceptualization and operationalization of key variables of interest. The online Appendix has model specifications and robustness checks for Chapters 5, 6, and 7.<sup>1</sup>

### Part I: Operationalization

This section provides a short description of how we define and operationalize delegation, pooling, policy scope, community, contract, politicization, and trade interdependence (Table A.1). This is followed by descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables (Table A.2). The section finishes with a list of the seventy-six IOs, arranged by geographical location, that make up the Measure of International Authority (MIA) (Table A.3).

**Table A.1.** Operationalization of variables

<b>Affluence</b>	Annual mean GDP per capita for the member states of an IO using Penn World Tables 7.3. Missing observations in early years are derived from Maddison's Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP. Missing observations for countries that ceased to exist after 2005 (and are not included in the 7.3 version of Penn World Tables) are derived from Penn World Tables 5.6. Values are divided by 1000 to facilitate interpretation. <i>Sources:</i> Penn World Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013); Maddison Historical Data 2013 (Bolt and van Zanden 2014).
<b>Community</b>	<p>This factor represents the cultural, geographical, political, and institutional commonality among the member states of an IO in a given year using five indicators of diversity, which are reversed to express community:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Diversity in geographical location</i> is Rae's index of fractionalization <math>1 - \sum_{i=1}^m s_i^2</math> where <math>s_i</math> is the share of a region in an IO's membership, and <math>m</math> refers to the number of regions (out of nine) represented in the IO (<i>Source:</i> Jacobson 1998: V2001 IN; Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996).</li> <li>• <i>Diversity in religion</i> is a Rae index, where <math>s_i</math> is the share of a religion among an IO's membership, and <math>m</math> is the number of religions represented in the IO. A state is assigned the religion that has the largest number of followers in the country (from a list of eleven religions). <i>Source:</i> CIA World Factbook (n.d).</li> <li>• <i>Diversity in civilization</i> is a Rae index, where <math>s_i</math> is the share of a civilization in an IO's membership, and <math>m</math> is the number of civilizations (out of nine) represented in this IO. <i>Sources:</i> Huntington (1996); Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000).</li> </ul>

(continued)

<sup>1</sup> Available at the authors' websites.

## Appendix

Table A.1. Continued

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Diversity in political regime</i> is the standard deviation of the Polity2 score (rescaled from 1 to 21) among the individual members of an IO. We use the POLITY IV dataset. <i>Source</i>: Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers (2017).</li> <li>• <i>Diversity in legal tradition</i> is the Rae index, where <math>s_j</math> is the share of a legal tradition in an IO's membership, and <math>m</math> is the number of legal traditions (Islamic law, civil law, common law, mixed law) represented in this IO. <i>Source</i>: Mitchell and Powell (2009, 2011).</li> </ul> <p>Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 reports a principal components factor analysis. Factor scores are normalized and reversed so that higher values indicate greater commonality. See the section on <i>Community</i> in this Appendix.</p>
<b>Contract</b>	<p>This dichotomous variable estimates the extent to which an IO contract is complete.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A contract is <i>complete</i> (value = 1) if its purpose is to achieve a fixed objective under clearly specified conditions. Relatively complete contracts identify the means to cooperate in given policy areas.</li> <li>• A contract is <i>incomplete</i> (value = 2) if its purpose is to attain broad-ranging cooperation among governments or peoples under weakly specified conditions. Incomplete contracts focus on the process rather than the outcome.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source</i>: own coding of foundational documents (with intercoder reliability tests); see the section on <i>IO Contract</i> in this Appendix.</p>
<b>Core policy</b>	<p>A core policy meets three or more of eight criteria that capture a tangible legal, financial, or organizational footprint. <i>Core policy</i> is a count of the number of core policies that an IO is estimated to have out of a list of twenty-five policies. Annual estimation. <i>Source</i>: own coding; see the section on <i>Policy scope</i> in this Appendix.</p>
<b>Core state powers</b>	<p>An IO scores 1 if, in a given year, the IO has one or several of the following core policies: foreign policy, diplomacy, political cooperation; military cooperation, defense, military security; justice, home affairs, interior security, police, anti-terrorism; migration, immigration, asylum, refugees; welfare state services, employment policy, social affairs, pension systems; financial regulation, banking regulation, monetary policy, currency; taxation, fiscal policy coordination, macro-economic policy coordination. <i>Source</i>: MIA data on core and flanking policies, to which we apply Genschel and Jachtenfuchs' (2016: 44) conceptualization of policies that are directly related to a state's monopoly of coercion ("core state powers"); see the section on <i>Core State Powers</i> in the online Appendix.</p>
<b>Delegation</b>	<p>Delegation is a 0–1 scale that estimates, on an annual basis, the allocation of authoritative competences by member states to non-state bodies in an IO's decision-making process. Delegation is assessed (a) within one or more IO bodies (assemblies, executives, consultative bodies, general secretariats, dispute settlement bodies), that are (b) partially or wholly composed of non-member state actors, and that (c) exercise or co-exercise authority over agenda setting or final decision making in (d) one or more of six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and up to five streams of policy making. <i>Source</i>: Hooghe et al. (2017: ch. 3); see the section on <i>Delegation</i> in this Appendix.</p>
<b>Democracy</b>	<p>Annual mean score for the member states of an IO using the Polity2 scale of the Polity IV dataset. Scores are transformed to a 1–21 scale. <i>Source</i>: Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers (2017).</p>
<b>Enlargement</b>	<p>Change in the number of IO member states from the first observation of the IO in the dataset to its final year divided by the number of observation years. <i>Source</i>: Correlates of War IGO v2.3 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004), complemented by own research for years after 2005 and for missing IOs.</p>
<b>Epistemic community</b>	<p>A dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the IO has a provision in its constitution, treaty, regulations, or bylaws that (a) requires states to select representatives with recognized professional expertise to represent them in the IO assembly or an IO executive, and (b) mandates that these representatives have some decisional autonomy. <i>Source</i>: own coding for 76 IOs over time; see the section on <i>Episteme</i> in the online Appendix.</p>

## Appendix

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<b>GDP dispersion</b>	Annual coefficient of variation of the GDP per capita for the member states of an IO using Penn World Tables 7.3. Missing observations are derived from Maddison's Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, and from Penn World Tables 5.6. The coefficient of variation shows the extent of variability in relation to the mean of the population. <i>Sources:</i> Penn World Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2013); Maddison Historical Data 2013 (Bolt and van Zanden 2014).
<b>Historical ties</b>	Dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if two-thirds of an IO's founding members (1) share a history of membership within a federation, or (2) share experience of membership within—and resistance to—a colonial empire. <i>Source:</i> own coding for 76 IOs; see the section on <i>Community</i> in this Appendix.
<b>Historical ties extended</b>	Dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if two-thirds of an IO's founding members (1) share a history of membership within a federation, or (2) share experience of membership within—and resistance to—a colonial empire, or (3) host a pan-national movement that champions transnational political union and has substantial elite support. <i>Source:</i> own coding for 76 IOs; see the section on <i>Community</i> in this Appendix.
<b>Ideal points</b>	Estimate of congruence among the members of an IO in voting in the UN General Assembly. Voting is arrayed on a single dimension that reflects state positions toward the US-led liberal order. Votes are aggregated by UN session. The unit is the absolute distance between country <i>A</i> and country <i>B</i> 's posterior mean ideal-point estimates. The measure <i>Ideal points</i> is an IO's annual average of the absolute distance between ideal points for all dyads of an IO's member states between 1950 and 2010. Annual measure. <i>Source:</i> the variable <i>absidealdiff</i> as calculated by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).
<b>Membership</b>	The number of states that are formal members of the IO. Unless otherwise stated, we use the logarithm (log10) in analyses. <i>Source:</i> Correlates of War IGO data, v. 2.3 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004), and own updates for years after 2005 and for missing IOs.
<b>Policy scope</b>	Policy scope is a discrete variable for the range of policies for which an IO is responsible from a list of twenty-five non-exclusive policies. The list was initially developed by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and adapted by Schmitter (1996) and Hooghe and Marks (2001). Policy scope is assessed at each reform moment of an IO, i.e. at the time of a treaty revision, a new protocol or convention, the passing of framework legislation, or the creation of a new IO body or instrument (e.g. a fund) by applying eight criteria that capture a tangible legal, financial, or organizational footprint. Policy scope is an annual measure. <i>Source:</i> own coding; see the section on <i>Policy scope</i> in this Appendix.
<b>Politicization</b>	Raw count of mentions that combine "PROTESTOR" or "DEMONSTRATOR" with the IO name or acronym in "Major World Publications" in LexisNexis. We use an equally weighted three-year moving average of year <i>t</i> , <i>t</i> <sub>-1</sub> , and <i>t</i> <sub>-2</sub> . Raw counts are divided by 100 to ease interpretation. <i>Source:</i> own calculations; see the section on <i>Politicization</i> in this Appendix.
<b>Portfolio change</b>	Average annual change in <i>Policy scope</i> from the first to the final year of observation of the IO in the dataset.
<b>Pooling</b>	Pooling is a 0–1 scale that estimates the extent to which member states share authority through non-unanimous voting in decision making. Pooling is assessed by (a) examining the voting rule in interstate IO bodies, (b) for agenda setting and for the final decision, (c) in six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and (up to five streams of) policy making, and then (d) assessing the extent to which a decision is binding on member states and/or requires domestic ratification. <i>Source:</i> Hooghe et al. (2017: ch. 3); see the section on <i>Pooling</i> in this Appendix.
<b>Power asymmetry</b>	The ratio in material capabilities of the largest member state to the sum of all member states of the IO. <i>Source:</i> Composite Index of National Material Capabilities

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(continued)

## Appendix

**Table A.1.** Continued

	(CINC) v.5.0 (Singer 1987; Singer et al. 1972), which summarizes military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population annually from 1950 to 2010.
<b>Security</b>	A dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if an IO's sole mandate is estimated to be collective (military) security. The IO must focus exclusively on security and may not be estimated to have concurrent mandates in economic, multi-issue, or "other" areas. Cross-sectional coding based on an estimation in the early 2000s. <i>Source:</i> Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004), complemented with own coding for IOs not included in the BGN dataset.
<b>Trade policy</b>	A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 from the first year in which trade becomes an IO competence (core or flanking), and 0 if trade is not an IO competence. <i>Source:</i> own coding; see section on <i>Policy scope</i> in this Appendix.
<b>Trade interdependence</b>	<p>Three variables that tap the relative importance of trade among IO members compared to trade with the world outside the IO. Three measures with increasing complexity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Intra-IO trade share</i>, which estimates an IO's intra-IO trade (i.e. trade interdependence among member states) as a percentage of the overall trade of an IO's members.</li> <li>• <i>Trade intensity</i>, which estimates the ratio of an IO's intra-IO trade share and its share of world trade.</li> <li>• <i>Trade introversion</i>, which estimates the relative size of an IO's internal trade to the relative size of an IO's external trade.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources:</i> measures adopted from Iapadre and Plummer (2011); algorithm provided by Philippe de Lombaerde, the Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies of the United Nations University in Bruges (UNU-CRIS). See the section on <i>Trade interdependence</i> in this Appendix.</p>

**Table A.2.** Descriptives

	Mean	Median	Min	Max	N
<i>Delegation</i>	0.183	0.175	0	0.652	3292
<i>Pooling</i>	0.291	0.285	0	0.728	3292
<i>Policy scope</i>	5.687	3	1	24	3292
<i>Affluence</i>	8.091	5.473	0.186	59.923	3290
<i>Community</i>	0.000	-0.280	-2.403	3.570	3279
<i>Contract</i>	1.3704	1	1	2	3292
<i>Core policy</i>	2.002	2	1	10	3292
<i>Core state powers</i>	0.420	0	0	1	3292
<i>Democracy</i>	13.615	13.773	1.333	21	3279
<i>Enlargement</i>	0.937	0	-3	72	3216
<i>Episteme</i>	0.243	0	0	1	3295
<i>GDP dispersion</i>	0.718	0.212	0.002	46.640	3290
<i>Historical ties</i>	0.173	0	0	1	3292
<i>Historical ties extended</i>	0.243	0	0	1	3292
<i>Ideal points</i>	0.711	0.670	0.003	2.347	3281
<i>Members</i>	54.789	24	3	192	3292
<i>Members log</i>	1.433	1.380	0.301	2.283	3292
<i>Politicization (moving)</i>	0.065	0	0	5.650	3288
<i>Portfolio change</i>	0.079	0	-7	14	3222
<i>Power asymmetry</i>	0.352	0.292	0.086	1	3286
<i>Security</i>	0.030	0	0	1	3292
<i>Trade policy</i>	0.492	0	0	1	3292
<i>Intra-IO trade share</i>	15.916	9.93	0.040	72.120	1013
<i>Trade intensity</i>	56.470	5.13	0.250	5228.300	1013
<i>Trade introversion</i>	0.680	0.76	-0.600	5.360	1013

**Table A.3.** IO population in MIA**Africa (10 IOs)**

African Union (AU) (1963–2010)  
 Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) (1966–2010)  
 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (1982–2010)  
 East African Community I (EAC 1) (1967–76)  
 East African Community II (EAC 2) (1993–2010)  
 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS–CEEC) (1985–2010)  
 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (1975–2010)  
 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (1986–2010)  
 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (1950–2010)  
 Southern African Development Community (SADC) (1981–2010)

**Americas (9 IOs)**

Andean Community (Andean/CAN) (1969–2010)  
 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (1968–2010)  
 Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI) (1961–2010)  
 Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) (1991–2010)  
 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994–2010)  
 Organization of American States (OAS) (1951–2010)  
 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) (1968–2010)  
 Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA) (1976–2010)  
 Central American Integration System (SICA) (1952–2010)

**Asia-Pacific (5 IOs)**

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967–2010)  
 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (1973–2010)  
 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (1986–2010)  
 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (2002–2010)  
 Pacific Community (SPC) (1950–2010)

**Europe (12 IOs)**

Benelux Union (BENELUX) (1950–2010)  
 Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR) (1950–2010)  
 European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) (1954–2010)  
 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (1992–2010)  
 Council of Europe (CoE) (1950–2010)  
 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) (1959–1991)  
 European Economic Area (1994–2010)  
 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (1960–2010)  
 European Space Agency (ESA) (1980–2010)  
 European Union (EU) (1952–2010)  
 Nordic Council (NORDIC) (1952–2010)  
 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (1973–2010)

**Middle East (4 IOs)**

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (1989–2010)  
 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (1981–2010)  
 League of Arab States (LOAS) (1950–2010)  
 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) (1968–2010)

**Multi-regional (11 IOs)**

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (1991–2010)  
 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (1950–2010)  
 Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International (CABI) (1987–2010)  
 Commonwealth of Nations (COMSEC) (1965–2010)  
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1950–2010)  
 International Organization for la Francophonie (OIF/ACCT) (1970–2010)  
 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) (1979–2010)

*(continued)*



## Appendix

**Table A.3.** Continued

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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1950–2010)
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (1970–2010)
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (1960–2010)
Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF) (1950–2010)
<b>UN organizations (15 IOs)</b>
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (1950–2010)
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (1950–2010)
International Labour Organization (ILO) (1950–2010)
International Maritime Organization (IMO) (1960–2010)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1950–2010)
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (1950–2010)
United Nations (UN) (1950–2010)
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (1950–2010)
UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (1985–2010)
Universal Postal Union (UPU) (1950–2010)
World Bank (IBRD) (1950–2010)
World Health Organization (WHO) (1952–2010)
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (1970–2010)
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (1950–2010)
World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) (1975–2010)
<b>Global (10 IOs)</b>
Global Environmental Facility/Fund (GEF) (1994–2010)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1957–2010)
International Criminal Court (ICC) (2002–2010)
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (1950–2010)
International Organization for Migration (1955–2010)
International Seabed Authority (ISA/ISBA) (1994–2010)
International Whaling Commission (IWhale) (1950–2010)
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (1950–2010)
World Customs Organization (1950–2010)
World Trade Organization (WTO) (1995–2010)

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## Part II: Variables

### International Authority

We conceive IO authority as comprised of delegation and pooling. States may *delegate* authority to independent non-state bodies which set the agenda, oversee implementation, and monitor compliance. The extent of delegation depends on (a) the degree to which an IO body is independent of member states, (b) its role in the decision-making process, and (c) the range of decision areas in which there is delegation.

States may *pool* authority in a collective body that makes joint decisions on behalf of its members. The extent of pooling depends on (a) how majoritarian decision rules are in interstate bodies, (b) the bindingness of their decisions, (c) the conditions under which they come into effect, and (d) the range of decision areas that are pooled.

Delegation and pooling along with their components are explained in the Measure of International Authority (MIA) dataset (Hooghe et al. 2017: ch. 3). The time series ranges from 1950 (or the date of creation) to 2010 (or date of abolition).<sup>2</sup>

### *Measuring Delegation*

The variable *Delegation* is an annual measure of the allocation of authoritative competences to non-state bodies in an IO's decision-making process. We distinguish between political delegation in agenda setting and final decision making, and judicial delegation in dispute settlement.

Political delegation is assessed

- in one or more IO bodies (assemblies, executives, general secretariats, consultative bodies) that are
- partially or fully composed of non-member state actors, which
- exercise or co-exercise authority over agenda setting or final decision making
- in one or more of six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and up to five streams of policy making.

Judicial delegation is the conditional transfer of authority to courts, arbitrators, or tribunals. It is assessed with items that tap how obligatory and independent third-party dispute settlement is, how binding it is, whether there is a standing tribunal, who has access, whether there is a remedy for non-compliance, and whether the tribunal can make compulsory preliminary rulings.

Scoring an IO on Delegation is as follows:

1. Each IO body receives a composition score for the degree to which it is non-state (on a zero to 1 scale). This is assessed using explicit criteria for the extent to which the body is partially or wholly composed of representatives who are (a) not part of the national executive (e.g. national parliaments, trade unions, indigenous groups, courts), or (b) operate under an explicit norm of independence.
2. Agenda setting. Composition scores are averaged for all non-state bodies that participate in agenda setting in each decision area. This produces an *agenda-setting score* for each of six decision areas.
3. Final decision. Composition scores are calculated for all non-state bodies that participate in the final decision in each decision area. The *final decision score* for each decision area is the score of the body with the highest (i.e. most non-state) composition score.<sup>3</sup>
4. Dispute settlement. If an IO has more than one dispute settlement mechanism, we select the one with the highest composition score.

<sup>2</sup> An update with estimates through 2020 will be released in 2021.

<sup>3</sup> Whereas delegation in agenda setting is estimated as an average effect, scoring for final decision making is targeted at the most supranational body.

## Appendix

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5. We now have three scores for each decision area: an *agenda-setting score*, a *final decision score*, and a *dispute settlement score*. The average of these scores is the delegation score for a decision area.
6. The *delegation score* for an IO is the average of the delegation scores across the six decision areas.

### *Measuring Pooling*

Pooling estimates the extent to which member states share authority in collective decision making. We assess pooling

- in one or more IO assemblies and/or IO executives,
- in which member states collectively set the agenda and make final decisions
- by jointly deciding under some voting rule with some degree of bindingness and/or requiring some form of ratification
- in one or more of six decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial compliance, and up to five streams of policy making.

Scoring an IO on Pooling is as follows:

1. IO bodies whose membership is chiefly or fully selected by member states are identified as state-dominated bodies at the agenda-setting stage and the final decision-making stage for each decision area.
2. Each of these state-dominated bodies receives a voting score in agenda setting and in the final decision for each decision area. Scores range from 0 (national veto) to 1 (simple majority).
3. A weighting factor for bindingness and for ratification is calculated for each decision area and applied to the voting score.
4. Agenda setting. For each decision area weighted voting scores are averaged for all state-dominated bodies that participate in agenda setting. This produces an *agenda-setting score* for each decision area.
5. Final decision. In each decision area the body with the lowest (i.e. least majoritarian) weighted voting score is identified. This produces a *final decision score* for each decision area.<sup>4</sup>
6. We now have two scores for each decision area: an *agenda-setting score* and a *final decision score*. The average of these scores is the pooling score for each decision area.
7. The *pooling score* for an IO is the average of the pooling scores across the six decision areas.

<sup>4</sup> Whereas we identify all bodies that are involved in agenda setting, we identify the most intergovernmental body in the final decision as the barrier over which decision making must pass.

## Appendix

*Discussion*

Delegation and pooling can be estimated as summated rating scales or as latent factors. Summated rating scales have the virtue of being unaffected by the composition of the sample. Factor analysis uses the available information more efficiently by weighting each indicator according to its contribution to the score for a given IO.

Table A.4 reports a principal components analysis (PCA) yielding two latent variables with eigenvalues greater than unity corresponding to delegation and pooling. These latent variables capture the bulk of the variance, 61 percent, in twelve indicators. There is no meaningful statistical difference between using factors or additive scales. The additive index is very highly correlated with the comparable predicted components from the PCA analysis. Table A.5 reports the correlation matrix for these factors and additive scales for delegation and pooling across the six decision areas. The Cronbach's alpha for the additive scale for pooling is 0.80 and for delegation it is 0.92, indicating high internal consistency. Tables A.6 and A.7 provide summary statistics for the components of delegation and pooling for the seventy-six IOs in the dataset from 1950 to 2010.

**Table A.4.** Principal components factor analysis of delegation and pooling

Components	Two-factor solution	
	Delegation	Pooling
Delegation in accession	<b>0.421</b>	-0.035
Delegation in suspension	<b>0.380</b>	0.043
Delegation in constitutional reform	<b>0.440</b>	-0.031
Delegation in budgetary allocation	<b>0.413</b>	-0.026
Delegation in financial compliance	<b>0.343</b>	0.063
Delegation in policy making	<b>0.421</b>	-0.022
Pooling in accession	0.003	<b>0.421</b>
Pooling in suspension	0.061	<b>0.376</b>
Pooling in constitutional reform	-0.007	<b>0.405</b>
Pooling in budgetary allocation	-0.127	<b>0.443</b>
Pooling in financial compliance	-0.021	<b>0.471</b>
Pooling in policy making	0.027	<b>0.301</b>
Eigenvalue	4.31	3.04
Explained variance (%)	0.36	0.25

Note: Principal components factor analysis, promax rotation, listwise deletion. N = 3,292 IO-years (all 76 IOs between 1950 or establishment to 2010). The highest score for each dimension is in bold.

**Table A.5.** Correlation matrix of delegation and pooling

	Delegation (additive)	Delegation (PCA)	Pooling (additive)	Pooling (PCA)
<b>Delegation (additive scale)</b>	1			
<b>Delegation (PCA)</b>	0.999	1		
<b>Pooling (additive scale)</b>	0.243	0.253	1	
<b>Pooling (PCA)</b>	0.235	0.275	0.997	1

Note: N = 3,292 IO-years.

## Appendix

**Table A.6.** Descriptives for delegation

Indicator	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75
<b>Delegation by decision area</b>							
Delegation on accession	0.140	0.143	1.147	0	0.778	0	0.191
Delegation on suspension	0.108	0.119	1.133	0	0.643	0	0.167
Delegation on constitutional reform	0.128	0.119	1.131	0	0.644	0	0.167
Delegation on budgetary allocation	0.318	0.333	0.626	0	1	0.167	0.443
Delegation on financial compliance	0.132	0.143	1.138	0	0.667	0	0.179
Delegation on policy making	0.270	0.254	0.641	0	0.933	0.167	0.364
<b>Delegation by decision stage</b>							
Agenda setting	0.231	0.208	0.642	0	0.708	0.139	0.333
Final decision	0.047	0	2.301	0	0.550	0	0
Dispute settlement	0.270	0.286	1.085	0	1	0	0.500
<b>DELEGATION</b>	<b>0.183</b>	<b>0.175</b>	<b>0.731</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.652</b>	<b>0.061</b>	<b>0.260</b>

Note: N = 3,292 IO-years.

**Table A.7.** Descriptives for pooling

Indicator	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75
<b>Pooling by decision area</b>							
Pooling on accession	0.351	0.330	0.697	0	1	0.125	0.500
Pooling on suspension	0.169	0	1.513	0	1	0	0.330
Pooling on constitutional reform	0.200	0.165	0.985	0	0.750	0.041	0.330
Pooling on budgetary allocation	0.442	0.330	0.715	0	1	0.165	0.660
Pooling on financial compliance	0.299	0.165	1.099	0	1	0	0.580
Pooling on policy making	0.312	0.250	0.691	0	1	0.165	0.375
<b>Pooling by decision stage</b>							
Agenda setting	0.253	0.221	0.749	0	0.749	0.083	0.375
Final decision	0.338	0.304	0.617	0	0.790	0.179	0.540
<b>POOLING</b>	<b>0.295</b>	<b>0.292</b>	<b>0.631</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.728</b>	<b>0.138</b>	<b>0.447</b>

Note: N = 3,292 IO-years.

Both delegation and pooling are lowest in membership suspension, constitutional reform, and financial compliance—three decision areas in which national sovereignty is deeply implicated. Conversely, delegation and pooling are strongest in budgetary allocation and relatively strong in policy making, the two decision areas most closely related to day-to-day operations. The sole marked difference concerns membership accession, where pooling among member states is relatively high but delegation to non-state bodies is relatively low.

Overall, there is slightly more variation in delegation than in pooling, as the coefficient of variation in the third column reveals. The coefficient of variation is a more useful measure of spread because it summarizes variability relative to the mean of the

distribution. Interestingly, decision areas and decision stages with the lowest mean tend to have the largest coefficients of variation. Variation among IOs is relatively large for those components of authority which affect national sovereignty most severely.

## Policy Scope

The policy scope of an IO—its policy portfolio—is a key element of an IO’s basic set-up (see Chapter 4). We seek to understand what drives change in the policy portfolio over time in Chapter 5. This, in turn, affects an IO’s international authority, as explained in Chapter 6.

Our measure of an IO’s policy scope is annual, and distinguishes between core and flanking policies. The data are available in the MIA dataset.

The scope of an IO’s portfolio is assessed across a list of twenty-five policies (Table A.8). This is more fine-grained than classifications of an IO’s mandate, such as the three-way distinction between economic, security, and multi-issue IOs in the Correlates of War dataset (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004). It covers more IOs, and includes more policies than measures developed for regional organizations (see e.g. Balassa 1961; Haftel 2013), security IOs (Haftel and Hofmann 2017), or IO legislative output (Lundgren, Squatrito, and Tallberg 2018).

In constructing a dictionary for policy categories, we draw from extant policy dictionaries (such as the Comparative Agenda project), case studies of international organizations and agreements, and IO documentation.

**Table A.8.** Policy categories

- 
1. Agriculture
  2. Competition policy, mergers, state aid, antitrust
  3. Culture and media
  4. Education (primary, secondary, tertiary), vocational training, youth
  5. Development, aid to poor countries
  6. Financial regulation, banking regulation, monetary policy, currency
  7. Welfare state services, employment policy, social affairs, pension systems
  8. Energy (coal, oil, nuclear, wind, water, solar)
  9. Environment: pollution, natural habitat, endangered species
  10. Financial stabilization, lending to countries in difficulty
  11. Foreign policy, diplomacy, political cooperation
  12. Fisheries and maritime affairs
  13. Health: public health, food safety, nutrition
  14. Humanitarian aid (natural or man-made disasters)
  15. Human rights: social & labor rights, democracy, rule of law, non-discrimination, election monitoring
  16. Industrial policy (including manufacturing, SMEs, tourism)
  17. Justice, home affairs, interior security, police, anti-terrorism
  18. Migration, immigration, asylum, refugees
  19. Military cooperation, defense, military security
  20. Regional policy, regional development, poverty reduction
  21. Research policy, research programming, science
  22. Taxation, fiscal policy coordination, macro-economic policy coordination
  23. Telecommunications, internet, postal services
  24. Trade, customs, tariffs, intellectual property rights/patents
  25. Transport: railways, air traffic, shipping, roads
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## Appendix

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An IO policy meets two general criteria. First, it is a multilateral policy administered by the IO rather than an aggregation of bilateral policies among the member states. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides an example. From 2000, ASEAN countries began to coordinate their management of regional short-term liquidity problems by setting up bilateral swap arrangements—the so-called Chian Mai Initiative. We consider “financial stabilization and lending to countries in difficulty” as part of the policy portfolio of ASEAN only from March 2010, when the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) Agreement became a multilateral policy administered by ASEAN.

The second criterion is that the policy is institutionalized. This requires a tangible legal, financial, or organizational footprint—not merely declarations of intent—evidenced in documentation, e.g. treaties, protocols, declarations, constitutions, framework legislation, budgetary documents, or white papers.

Policy scope is assessed at each reform moment of an IO, i.e. at the time of a treaty revision, new protocol or convention, the passing of framework legislation, or the creation of a new IO body or instrument.

The following eight indicators are designed to tap whether there is tangible evidence that an IO’s portfolio encompasses a particular policy:

- The policy features in the name of the organization;
- The policy is highlighted as a central purpose of the IO in the opening paragraphs of its foundational contract;
- The policy is the primary subject of a separate treaty section;
- The policy is the primary subject of an annex, a protocol, a convention, or an agreement;
- The policy is explicitly tied to budgetary resources in a convention, constitution, protocol, annexes, or ancillary document;
- The policy is the primary subject of an (actually existing) IO instrument: agency, fund, directorate, or tribunal;
- The policy is the primary subject of an (actually existing) IO intergovernmental committee, council, working group or equivalent;
- The policy features as the functional specialization of the national representatives who sign the IO’s foundational document.

These indicators assess policy scope at foundation and following institutional reform. For recent decades, in particular, one can often find valuable information on the IO’s website, from NGOs, and from academics monitoring the IO.

In estimating the portfolio, we distinguish between core policies and flanking policies. Table A.9 provides descriptives.


- A policy is conceived as *core* when it meets three or more of the above criteria. A core policy is very often prominent in the name of the organization or in the opening paragraphs of the foundational contract.
- A policy is considered *flanking* when it meets two criteria. *Policy scope* is the unweighted sum of core and flanking policies.

## Appendix

**Table A.9.** Descriptives for policy scope, core, flanking policies

Indicator	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75
Policy scope (core + flanking)	5.689	3	0.875	1	24	2	9
Core policies	2.002	2	0.642	1	10	1	3
Flanking policies	3.685	2	1.072	0	16	1	6

Note: N = 3,292 IO-years.

**Figure A.1** Policy scope over time

Note: Thin lines trace the development of the average IO in the dataset since 1975 (N = 51); thick lines trace the development of the average IO in a given year (with a varying number of IOs from an overall sample of 76 IOs).

The coding was a joint exercise by the three authors of this book. We began by coding a subset of IOs for the year 2010 before revising the coding scheme for all seventy-six IOs at the time of an IO's establishment or 1950 (if later) and 2010 (or the final year the IO appears in the dataset). We then identified intervening reform moments (treaty revisions, framework legislation, creation of new organizations such as a fund, court, or major council or committee). The coding procedure can be described as "interpretation through dialogue" (Hooghe et al. 2016: 27–30 and Hooghe et al. 2017: 31–2).

Figure A.1 displays policy scope over time. The thin lines plot average policy scope, average core policies, and average flanking policies for the fifty-one IOs for which we have continuous data since 1975. The thick lines track average scope, core, and flanking policies for all IOs in the dataset in a given year. The number of IOs varies from twenty-three in 1950 to fifty-three in 1975 and seventy-four in 2010. The shaded bars track the growth in the number of IOs over time.



## Appendix

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Three patterns can be discerned. First, IOs have seen a secular expansion of their policy portfolios, from an average of 2.9 policies in 1950 to eight policies in 2010 (light-gray solid line). Second, there is less movement in IOs' core policies over time, from an average of 1.4 core policies in 1950 to 2.5 in 2010. Third, and by implication, the dynamism in an IO's policy portfolio derives mostly from adding flanking policies, as revealed by the broken line in the figure. Interestingly, these trends are relatively similar for both the overall sample of seventy-six IOs and for the consistent sample of fifty-one IOs since 1975.

## Community

Community is operationalized as the extent to which the member states of an IO have similar or dissimilar cultural, political, and legal institutions.<sup>5</sup> This follows Deutsch's (1966 [1953]) pluralistic understanding of community as expressed across diverse social, cultural, and political fields. Hence it would make sense to tap community with a range of factors, including individual and elite perceptions; the extent of networking within a group; its boundedness; territorial cohesion; the ways of life of group members; their cultural, religious, and linguistic homogeneity; and the history of conflict between the group and others.

Data limitations are severe. Public opinion surveys have partial coverage and are not available over the entire period of this study. Surveys of elite norms are yet more limited. However, we can draw on institutional, cultural, and geographical indicators to estimate overarching norms across IO member states.

### *Indicators for Community*

*Community* is composed as follows:

- *Culture*: To what extent do the IO's member states belong to the same civilization? A state is categorized in one of nine civilizations according to the largest share of its population: Western, Latin American, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Islamic, African, Sinic, Buddhist, or lone culture (Huntington 1996, applied by Russett, Oneil, and Cox 2000).
- *Religion*: To what extent do the populations of an IO's member states share a religious affiliation? A state is categorized in one of eleven categories following the religious affiliation of the largest share of its population as atheist, Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, indigenous/animist, Jewish, Orthodox, Protestant, Shia, Sunni, or Taoist (CIA World Factbook).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> We treat indicators of economic interest and foreign policy position separately as alternative explanations. These include *GDP dispersion*, measured as the coefficient of variation in GDP among an IO's members in a given year; three measures of trade interdependence (discussed below), and *Ideal points*, measured as the average absolute distance between dyads of IO members in how they vote in the UN assembly in a given year. The correlation of *Community* with *GDP dispersion* is 0.15; with *Ideal points* it is  $-0.72$ ; and with measures of trade interdependence it ranges between  $-0.18$  and  $-0.01$  for the relevant subset of IOs. *Community* is robustly significant in models that control for these variables.

<sup>6</sup> Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

## Appendix

- *Political regime*: How similar are the political regimes of an IO's member states? The *Polity2* measure scores the democratic and authoritarian character of a regime by assessing the competitiveness and regulation of political participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2017). Scores are annual.
- *Legal tradition*: To what extent do an IO's member states have a common legal tradition? A state's domestic legal system is categorized as civil, common law, Islamic, or mixed (two or more systems coexist) (Mitchell and Powell 2009, 2011).
- *Geography*: To what extent are an IO's member states located in the same world region? A state is located in one of nine regions: Africa, Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, Oceania, Europe, North America, Central America, or South America (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996).

*Political regime* is estimated as the standard deviation among member states of an IO in a given year. All other indicators apply Rae's index of fractionalization, which was developed to estimate the extent to which a parliament is fragmented into political parties (Rae 1967).

$$1 - \sum_{i=1}^m s_i^2$$

where  $S_i$  is the share of a group in a population, and  $m$  refers to the number of groups represented in the population. The measure takes into account the relative size as well as the number of parties. Hence a parliament divided into nine groups with one group holding 50 percent of the seats has a smaller fractionalization index (0.72) than one with nine equally sized groups (0.89).

We use principal components analysis to estimate the common component, *Community*, and multiply by  $-1$  to achieve commonality. Table A.10 shows that these indicators are highly correlated. The standardized alpha is 0.943, and the common factor accounts for 79 percent of the variance of the indicators (see Table 5.2). Dropping one or several criteria does not meaningfully weaken the alpha or the index.<sup>7</sup>

**Table A.10.** Correlation matrix of indicators of community

	Community	Culture	Religion	Political regime	Legal tradition
<b>Community (factor)</b>	1.000				
<b>Culture</b>	0.953	1.000			
<b>Religion</b>	0.890	0.859	1.000		
<b>Political regime</b>	0.795	0.709	0.576	1.000	
<b>Legal tradition</b>	0.920	0.836	0.842	0.642	1.000
<b>Geography</b>	0.885	0.817	0.678	0.678	0.766

Note: N = 3,279 IO-years.

<sup>7</sup> Our results are robust across alternative operationalizations that (a) merge Catholic and Protestant in the *Religion* variable; (b) allocate mixed systems of *Legal tradition* to its nearest substantive equivalent (civil, common law, or Islamic); or (c) combine the three American regions (North, Central, South) into a single region and the two Asian regions (East and South) into a single region.

## Appendix

### *Historical Ties*

We operationalize community along a second track using indicators of a common political history. A common political history can leave a residue of shared norms that survive the break-up of the polity even if divorce comes through war.

*Historical ties* is a dichotomous variable where an IO has a value of 1 if at least two-thirds of its founding member states share a history of membership within a federation or within a colonial empire that meets the following criteria: the political (con)federation or colonial empire endured for at least twenty years, and it was in existence no more than fifty years prior to the creation of the IO. Table A.11 lists the fifteen IOs that meet one of these criteria.

**Table A.11.** Historical ties among IO founding members

IO name	End of ties	IO creation	Description of historical ties
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)	±1960	1989	4 of 5 founding members are former French colonies
Benelux	1839 ongoing	1944	federation between 1815 and 1839; BLEU: Belgium-Lux economic & monetary union (from 1922)
CABI international	±1960	1987	former British colonies
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)	1962	1968	former British colonies; former West Indies Federation (1958–62)
Central American Integration System (SICA)	1922	1952	Federal republic of Central America (1823–41); five short-lived attempts, most recently the Federation of Central America (1921–2)
Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS)	1991	1992	former members of the Soviet Union federation
Commonwealth of Nations	±1960	1965	former subjects of the British colonial empire
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	±1960	1982	8 of 12 founding members are former British colonies
East African Community I (EAC1)	1961–7	1967, 1993	former British colonies (until 1961); East African High Commission (EAHC) (1948–61); East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) (1961–67)
East African Community II (EAC2)	1961–7	1993	see EAC1
Economic and Monetary Union of Central African States (CEMAC)	1958	1966	former French colonies; Federation of Equatorial French Africa (AEF) (1910–58)
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)	1971	1981	4 of 6 founding members are former British colonies
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	±1960	1986	4 of 6 founding members are former British colonies
Nordic Council	1905	1952	colonial/confederal ties: Sweden–Finland (1150–1809); Norway–Denmark (1524–1814); Norway–Sweden (1814–1905); Denmark–Iceland (1524–1944)
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)	1962	1968	former British colonies; former West Indies Federation (1958–62)
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	±1965	1973	5 of 7 founding members are former British colonies (2 other founding members are former colonies of New Zealand, itself founding member)

## Appendix

A more inclusive operationalization of historical ties, *Historical ties extended*, adds a third criterion inspired by idealist theories of international cooperation: the presence of a pan-national movement that champions transnational political union and which has substantial support in at least two-thirds of the founding members of an IO. This applies to four additional IOs: the European Union (pan-Europeanism), the Organization of American States (pan-Americanism), the African Union (pan-Africanism), and the League of Arab States (pan-Arabism).<sup>8</sup>

*Community* and *Historical ties* are alternative measures of the institutional fabric of a community and produce similar results (see online Appendix).

### IO Contract

An IO's contract is a key element in its basic set-up (see Chapter 4) and affects the development of the IO's policy portfolio (see Chapter 5) and, indirectly, the IO's authority (see Chapter 6).

All international organizations are incomplete contracts, but their degree of incompleteness varies. Whereas some IOs, such as NAFTA, spell out a narrow range of commitments in considerable detail, others, such as the European Union or the Economic Community of West African States, entail diffuse commitments for general purpose governance. An IO with a highly incomplete contract can more easily adjust to the uncertainties of the world, but incomplete contracting also increases the scope for contending interpretation and this can fester into non-compliance (Ostrom 1990: 88). A relatively complete contract impedes an IO's capacity to adapt to changing circumstance, but it also draws explicit boundaries around its member states' commitments. Hence, an IO's contract tells one something important about how an IO may develop over time, which we test in Chapters 5 and 6.

Contract is a dichotomous variable where a *complete* contract for a fixed purpose for inter-state cooperation under clearly specified conditions takes the value of 1, and an *incomplete* contract expressing an open-ended purpose among governments and peoples takes a value of 2. Some examples clarify the coding.

A contract that specifies a free trade agreement normally falls into the first category. For example, the Dickinson Bay agreement establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Organization (CARIFTA) specifically limits cooperation to free trade: "AWARE that the broadening of domestic markets through the elimination of barriers to trade between the territories is a prerequisite to [full employment and improved living standards]; CONVINCED that such elimination of barriers to trade can best be achieved by the immediate establishment of a Free Trade Economic Community for all the countries who so desire" (Preamble). The Latin American Free Trade Association also articulates a specific goal: "By the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties establish a free-trade-zone" (Art. 1, 1960 Montevideo Treaty). It delineates a program of trade

<sup>8</sup> Whereas the coding for *Community* and *Historical ties* relies on well-established facts, that for *Historical ties extended* is contestable. Perhaps the most contestable decision is the exclusion of the Council of Europe (CoE). Pan-Europeanism was present in the immediate postwar period in several CoE countries, though only among influential minorities.

## Appendix

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liberalization requiring periodic negotiations between member states, the removal of tariffs based on national and common lists, and detailed flanking measures in industry, tax policy, and agriculture.

IOs that organize collaboration in a sector or for a policy problem tend also to have a relatively complete contract. The objective of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Export Countries (OAPEC) is clearly specified: “The principal aim of the Organization shall be the co-ordination and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries” (1968 OAPEC Agreement), and its rules and regulations are designed to cover all exigencies. Similarly, the World Customs Organization characterizes its mission as one to “improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of its Member Customs administrations across the globe, and to help them fulfill their dual role of facilitating trade whilst ensuring its security” (WCO 2009/10: 1).<sup>9</sup> The 1950 Convention—never amended—uses a few more words in its preamble to express the same goal, and it goes on in Article III to detail the eight tasks delegated to the Council.

Incomplete contracts commit states to broad-ranging cooperation that is only weakly specified. Economic unions would typically fall into this category. An economic union is less specific with regard to its objectives and means than an IO limited to customs cooperation or free trade. The central goal of Benelux was to establish an economic union (1958 Treaty establishing the Benelux Economic Union). Its preamble translates this into three broadly worded purposes: “to strengthen the economic ties between their countries by means of free movement of persons, goods, capital and services”; “to co-ordinate their policies in the economic, financial and social fields in order to attain the most satisfactory level of employment and the highest standard of living”; “to pursue a joint trade policy . . . by means of the freest possible trade.”

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has broad-ranging goals that range from the purpose to “facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint action on the basis of equal partnership” to “consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region” (SCO Charter, Art. 1).

Incomplete contracts usually engage people as well as governments. They commit states to a vague purpose—e.g. a “community of peoples” or “ever closer union”—though the means are left open. Cooperation is framed as an evolutionary process that is revealed only over time. The idiomatic case is the European Union along with its predecessors. Successive treaties state the EU’s purpose as open-ended. The preamble to the ECSC Treaty reads as follows: “RESOLVED to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their essential interests; to establish, by creating an economic community, the foundation of a broad and independent community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the bases of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common destiny.” The latter phrase was refined as “an ever closer union” with the 1957 Rome Treaty. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reads as follows: “RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in

<sup>9</sup> WCO (2009/10). “World Customs Organization: Mission, Objectives, Activities.” Brussels: WCO. Available at <http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/what-is-the-wco.aspx> (accessed February 20, 2019).

## Appendix

which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.”

A lexicon of key terms is applied to categorize the contract of an IO. These are normally found in the preamble and in the first sections of the IO contract.

We applied the coding schema initially to the foundational treaties of thirty-five regional organizations (Marks et al. 2014) and then compared these scores with those of two independent researchers familiar with the study's concepts who each coded thirteen randomly chosen IOs. They agreed on all but one score, producing a Krippendorff's alpha of 0.78.<sup>10</sup> We then implemented the coding, using the same lexicon, to all seventy-six IOs. An online Appendix contains text supporting our estimates.

IOs tend to have stable contracts, but it is not impossible for an IO to redraw its contract. Three IOs moved from a relatively complete to an incomplete contract. The Benelux's original contract, the Customs Convention of 1944 was short, concise in language, and focused on a single goal: a customs union. Its successor, the Benelux Economic Union of 1958, opened the door for broader interstate collaboration by linking economic and social goals: “believing economic progress, forming the principal aim of their union, must lead to the advancement of the individual and social welfare of their peoples” (1958 Treaty Establishing the Benelux Economic Union, preamble). CARICOM began in 1965 as a free trade association (CARIFTA) with a relatively complete contract, but in 1973 the member states upgraded the purpose to a common market, broadened collaboration to social, cultural, educational, and technological fields, and tellingly, renamed the IO into the Caribbean Community. And finally, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) began life as an IO for combating drought and desertification in the Sahel. In 1996, it became the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with an incomplete contract that sets out diffuse goals for economic, social, and political cooperation (Art. 7).

### Politicization

Politicization is a function of the salience and divisiveness of debate concerning an IO. We adapt Tallberg et al. (2014) who tap media coverage in the LexisNexis database for protests and demonstrations directed at an IO. The estimate is the annual raw count of mentions that combine “PROTESTOR” or “DEMONSTRATOR” with the IO name. We use a three-year equally weighted moving average for the raw count at  $t$ ,  $t_{-1}$ , and  $t_{-2}$  to smooth the series.<sup>11</sup>

The base line search segment in the “Build Your Own Segment Search” in LexisNexis, reads

*“organization name” OR “organization acronym” w/p demonstrator OR protestor OR protester*

<sup>10</sup> Krippendorff's alpha measures agreement among coders and ranges from 0, which indicates no agreement beyond chance, to 1, which indicates agreement without exceptions.

<sup>11</sup> We use LexisNexis' default “Major World Publications” going back to 1948. The moving average is divided by 100 for ease of interpretation.

## Appendix

There are several possible sources of measurement error. One is when a valid reference may refer only to a protest involving a constituent body of an IO. Here we descend a level of analysis to the component bodies and modify the baseline search segment to include an IO's component bodies. An additional issue is that some IOs have acronyms that can also refer to something other than the organization. There are also more general concerns related to the fact that the newspapers covered in LexisNexis vary over time and appear biased to those in the West, particularly in the early years.

This measure is correlated at 0.75 with an estimate of the salience of an IO, which was derived from a count of references to the IO in Google scholar. To minimize error, the search was set to cover publications dated between 2000 and 2014, and to search the organization's official name and acronyms with the "exact phrase" algorithm. Miscategorized references were removed after a manual check of each reference.<sup>12</sup>

### Discussion

*Politicization* is highly skewed towards a small number of IOs as Tables A.12 and A.13 reveal. For the 3,292 IO-years in our sample, the median observation is zero. While all but twenty-three IOs have been subject to protests or demonstrations that are picked up in the data, 96.6 percent of all references are skewed to twenty-four IOs. Figure A.2 plots politicization for fifty-three IOs that have a positive score on a log10 scale. It shows that politicization exceeds five references annually for ten IOs, in descending order: WTO, UN, APEC, EU, NATO, IMF, World Bank, International Criminal Court, ASEAN, and NAFTA.

Figure A.3 shows that politicization picks up from the early 1990s, peaks around 2000, then declines to a level that is still three times higher than in the 1990s. The data series underestimates politicization prior to 1980 when LexisNexis newspaper coverage was spottier. Even granting this, it is clear that there has been a sharp upward shift in recent decades. It is interesting to note that the age of an IO is a weak predictor of its politicization ( $r = 0.11$ ). The average age of IOs without politicization is not much lower than that for IOs with very frequent politicization.

**Table A.12.** Descriptives for politicization

Indicator	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75	N
<b>Politicization (annual)</b>	6.83	0	6.56	0	746	0	0	3292
<b>Politicization (moving average)</b>	6.47	0	5.91	0	565	0	0	3288

*Note:* annual observations or three-year moving averages for 76 IOs from 1950 to 2010. Raw counts of mentions in LexisNexis.


<sup>12</sup> For IOs with a large number of references, the first hundred and last hundred cites were manually examined to calculate the proportion of valid references. The total number of references for this IO was weighted with this proportion to estimate the total number of valid references for this IO.

Appendix

**Table A.13.** Incidence of politicization

Incidence of politicization	# IOs	Average age of IO (years)	Average politicization (moving average)	Median politicization (moving average)
<b>No politicization</b>	23	43.7	0	0
<b>Infrequent</b> (1 to 4 years in an IO's existence)	13	39.8	0.04	0.03
<b>Relatively frequent</b> (5 to 14 years in an IO's existence)	16	35.9	1.13	0.23
<b>Very frequent</b> (15 years or more in an IO's existence)	24	50.8	22.57	2.24
<b>Total</b>	76	43.6	7.37	0.08

Note: three-year moving averages for 76 IOs from 1950 to 2010. Raw counts on politicization.




**Figure A.2** Average annual politicization by IO

Note: 53 IOs with non-zero politicization (1950–2010). Average annual politicization is estimated as politicization divided by the number of years in the dataset. The X-axis is a log-scale.



## Appendix



**Figure A.3** Trends in politicization

Note: annual observations or three-year moving averages for 76 IOs for 1950–2010. Raw counts of references in LexisNexis.

## Trade Interdependence

The literature on trade refers to several measures of trade interdependence. We use three commonly used measures which cover a reasonably long period for all IO member states: intra-IO trade share, trade intensity, and trade introversion. Intra-IO trade share is the simplest and serves as the building block for the remaining indices.

Bilateral trade data and data for some regional trade organizations are regularly published by international organizations. The most comprehensive data come from the UN COMTRADE Database. We begin the series from 1970, when trade data become reasonably complete. We use algorithms kindly made available by Philippe de Lombaerde at the Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies of the United Nations University in Bruges (UNU-CRIS).

*Intra-IO trade share* is calculated using the following formula:

$$ITS_{i,t} = \frac{IT_{i,t}}{T_{i,t}} \times 100$$

where:

$IT_{i,t}$  denotes an IO  $i$ 's intra-IO trade in year  $t$ ,

$T_{i,t}$  denotes an IO  $i$ 's total trade in year  $t$  ( $i$ 's total imports plus total exports).

The value ranges from 0 to 100. This indicator reflects the importance of intra-IO trade (i.e. trade interdependence among member states) of a particular international organization in its overall trade.

## Appendix

*Trade intensity* relates intra-IO trade share to the size of world trade. In its simplest form, it is equal to the ratio of an IO's intra-IO trade share and its share of world trade. It is calculated using the following formula:

$$ITII_{i,t} = \frac{\left(\frac{IT_{i,t}}{T_{i,t}}\right)}{\left(\frac{T_{i,t}}{T_{w,t}}\right)}$$

where:

$IT_{i,t}$  denotes IO  $i$ 's intra-IO trade in year  $t$ ,

$T_{i,t}$  denotes IO  $i$ 's total trade in year  $t$  ( $i$ 's total imports plus total exports),

$T_{w,t}$  denotes the world's total trade in year  $t$  (world's total imports plus total exports).

The value ranges from 0 to  $\frac{T_{w,t}}{T_{i,t}}$ .

This value is:

- equal to zero in the case of no intra-IO trade;
- equal to 1 if the organization's weight in its own trade is equal to its weight in world trade (geographic neutrality);
- higher than 1 if intra-IO trade is relatively more important than trade flows with the rest of the world;
- equal to the reciprocal of the organization's share in world trade when all trade is intra-IO (no extra-IO trade)—that is, the maximum value of the ITII index is the higher the smaller the organization's total trade.

*Trade intensity's* minimum value is zero, and there is no set maximum value.

*Trade introversion* compares the relative size an IO's internal trade and its external trade, and it rises (falls) only if the intensity of intra-IO trade grows more (less) rapidly than the intensity of extra-IO trade. It is defined as follows:

$$STJ_{i,t} = \frac{\frac{HITI_{i,t}}{HETI_{i,t}} - 1}{\frac{HITI_{i,t}}{HETI_{i,t}} + 1} = \frac{(HITI_{i,t} - HETI_{i,t})}{(HITI_{i,t} + HETI_{i,t})}$$

with  $HITI_{i,t}$  a homogeneous version of the intra-IO trade intensity index, the maximum value of which is independent from the IO  $i$ 's trade size. Its denominator is not the organization  $i$ 's share in world trade, but its share in the trade of the rest of the world:

$$HITI_{i,t} = \frac{\left(\frac{IT_{i,t}}{T_{i,t}}\right)}{\left(\frac{ET_{i,t}}{T_{w,t} - IT_{i,t}}\right)}$$

HETI (homogeneous extra-IO trade intensity index) is the complementary indicator of HITI. It is defined for IO  $i$  as:

$$HETI_{i,t} = \frac{1 - \left(\frac{IT_{i,t}}{T_{i,t}}\right)}{1 - \left(\frac{ET_{i,t}}{T_{w,t} - IT_{i,t}}\right)}$$

where:

$IT_{i,t}$  denotes organization  $i$ 's intra-IO trade in year  $t$ ,

$ET_{i,t}$  denotes organization  $i$ 's extra-IO trade in year  $t$ ,

## Appendix

**Table A.14.** Correlations among measures of trade interdependence

	Intra-IO trade share	Trade intensity
<b>Trade intensity</b>	–0.025 (p = 0.433)	
<b>Trade introversion</b>	0.136 (p = 0.000)	0.216 (p = 0.000)

Note: N = 34 IOs from 1970 to 2010 (1,013 IO-years).

**Table A.15.** Descriptives for trade interdependence

Indicator	Mean	Median	Coefficient of variation	Min	Max	Q25	Q75
<b>Intra-IO trade</b>	15.92	9.93	1.06	0.04	72.12	5.18	18.18
<b>Trade intensity</b>	56.47	5.13	4.73	0.25	5228.30	2.21	18.19
<b>Trade introversion</b>	0.68	0.76	0.52	–0.60	1.00	0.62	0.92

Note: N = 34 IOs from 1970 to 2010 (1,013 IO-years).

$T_{i,t}$  denotes organization  $i$ 's total trade in year  $t$  ( $i$ 's total imports plus total exports),  
 $T_{w,t}$  denotes the world's total trade in year  $t$  (the world's total imports plus total exports).

The index for *Trade introversion* is:

- equal to –1 in the case of no intra-IO trade;
- equal to zero if the organization's weight in its own trade is equal to its weight in the trade of the rest of the world (geographic neutrality);
- equal to 1 in the case of no extra-IO trade.

The value for *Trade introversion* ranges from –1 to +1.

In theory, it is possible to calculate these indices for each international organization, but it makes most sense to estimate them for organizations that have a mandate in trade. Furthermore, a comparison of indices across IOs is substantively meaningful only for IOs that have comparable membership sizes short of the globe as a whole.

Each index has strengths and weaknesses (Iapadre and Plummer 2011). The most commonly used index is intra-IO trade share, though it is sensitive to the economic cycle, which expands or contracts an IO's intra-trade value irrespective of whether there has been trade integration. The trade intensity index avoids this problem though it has limitations that complicate comparison across IOs. Its maximum value is a decreasing function of an IO's total trade, which implies that a given value stands for different things for different-sized IOs, and it is characterized by range asymmetry, in that the range below unity is much smaller than above, which can bias comparison of IOs with values on either side of unity. The trade introversion index is the most complex and least intuitive of the three, but avoids these problems (Iapadre and Plummer 2011: 108).

The three measures approach trade interdependence quite differently, as is apparent in Table A.14 which reveals weak associations among the three indices for the thirty-four IOs for which we have data. Table A.15 provides descriptives.