A Theory of International Organization

A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume IV

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Introduction

How is governance organized among states? States remain by far the most powerful political actors on the planet, but only by cooperating can they handle the problems that arise when their populations interact. They do so chiefly by forming international organizations (IOs) with standing administrations that allow them to respond in real time to changing circumstances. This book seeks to explain the forms that institutionalized governance takes in the international domain.

The possibilities are diverse. Some international organizations have just a few member states, while others span the globe. Some are targeted at a specific problem, while others have policy portfolios almost as broad as national states. Some are member-state driven, while others have independent courts, secretariats, and parliaments. Some curb national sovereignty by making binding decisions by majority, while others use unanimity or provide opt-outs. Variation among international organizations appears as wide as that among states. The purpose of this book is to explain this variation, both across international organizations and over time.

Postfunctionalist theory draws on two ways of thinking about governance. The first considers governance—collective decision making in the expectation of obedience—as a rational response to the human condition. Governance allows individuals to provide themselves with security, law, knowledge, and civilization itself, and thereby escape “the state of nature.” This functionalist approach to the provision of public goods transcends the ceiling of the state. It applies to the problems generated by human interaction, regardless of territorial scale. The level at which a public good should be provided depends on the costs and benefits of centralization, and these vary widely with the externalities and scale economies of the public good in question. Hence, from a functionalist perspective, governance should be multilevel. Where the externalities of human interaction extend beyond national borders, it is efficient to organize governance at the international level.
Functionalist theorizing about governance has been productive in both comparative politics and international relations. It has enriched our understanding of how the search for efficient solutions to the provision of public goods shapes governance in general and international organization in particular. In order to explain the conditions under which states empower IOs, we confirm and extend functionalist theory.

However, the premise of postfunctionalism is that this is not sufficient because it ignores the sociality of governance. Beyond its functionality, governance expresses the right of a people to determine its laws. Hence, to explain international governance one needs to engage a second way of thinking about governance that considers the Who Question—who claims a right to rule themselves? We need to consider how the participants feel about being bound together in collective rule.

This approach to governance draws attention to perceptions of community. Do the participants conceive themselves as a community with a shared history and norms, or as a group that has little in common beyond facing a collective problem? Do they perceive themselves as having some overarching identity, or do they conceive their national identities as exclusive and incompatible? Do they share religious, social, or political norms that can help them negotiate the ambiguities of cooperation and defection? Shared norms extend the possibilities of cooperation by assuaging fears of exploitation, by promoting diffuse rather than specific reciprocity, and by making it feasible for the participants to bind themselves in an incomplete contract for broad-ranging governance.

Community is double-edged. Communities can facilitate cooperation because they sustain diffuse reciprocity. However, communities are also settings for parochialism expressed in favoritism for one’s own group, a readiness to draw a sharp boundary between one’s in-group and out-groups, and a tendency to harbor grievances stemming from a Manichaean “us versus them” conception of the social world.¹ Those who understand their identity, and particularly their national identity, as exclusive are prone to regard international governance as foreign imposition. Shared rule, for all its functional benefits, limits the self-rule of those living in the participating states. We argue that the effect of this for international cooperation depends on the extent to which people(s) conceive themselves as members of a community.

Hence, the core claim of this book is that international governance is both functional and social. One must take up their interplay to explain the institutional set-up of an IO, its membership, contractual basis, policy portfolio, decision rules, and the extent to which an IO’s member states delegate authority to non-state actors and pool authority in binding collective decision making.

¹ The idea that community is double-edged is expressed in the concept of parochial altruism.
This study is the fourth in a series of books that seek to explain multilevel governance.² The theory that guides this project applies to governance both within and among states. The first two volumes are concerned with subnational authority. The third volume conceptualizes and measures the authority of IOs with standing from 1950 to 2010. This book uses that information to evaluate postfunctionalist conjectures about the structure, competences, and authority of IOs. Doing so moves the analysis beyond the demarcation criterion, which posits that international and domestic governance are causally distinct spheres characterized by anarchy on the one side and hierarchy on the other. We conceive domestic and international politics as different contexts for a coherent set of generalizations rather than as two causally unique worlds.

Our focus is on institutionalized governance, i.e. governance in organizations having an ongoing capacity for problem solving. The diversity of such organizations on just about every dimension of interest is very wide, and to explain this it makes sense to frame this study broadly. This means that we include regional IOs, global IOs, and IOs that do not fall neatly into either category. Rather than having distinct theories for different subsets of IOs, we seek to generalize about the population of IOs as a whole.

Situating Postfunctionalism

Three streams of thought have been especially influential in the study of international governance, and this book relates to each.

Realism explains international governance as the result of strategic choices made by independent states which exist in the absence of overarching authority. We concur that states are the most powerful actors in international politics and they vary widely in their power capabilities. There is, indeed, no coercive authority above states capable of sustaining international organization. States exist in potential competition and conflict with each other. Hence, international governance must be self-sustaining for there is no external actor that can impose rules on states. However, conflict is just one possible outcome. If one assumes that states are (differentially) powerful, independent, and competitive, it would be perfectly rational for them to contract governance among themselves.

This is the point of departure for social contract theory. Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, and Rawls conceive governance as contracted to avoid anarchy. This has profound implications for international governance. Whereas anarchy is a

² Measuring Regional Authority (Hooghe, Marks, Schakel, Niedzwiecki, Chapman Osterkatz, and Shair-Rosenfield 2016); Community, Scale, and Regional Governance (Hooghe and Marks 2016); Measuring International Authority (Hooghe, Marks, Lenz, Bezuijen, Ceka, and Derderyan 2017).
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Theoretical possibility among persons, it is an actual possibility among states. The contracts among individuals that produce states are imaginary, whereas the contracts among states that produce international organizations are real documents negotiated by real actors in real time.

This book is concerned with the character of these contracts and their effect on cooperation over time. Under what circumstances will states enter into an incomplete contract for general purpose government? Under what conditions will they conclude a relatively complete contract that specifies exactly what the IO can and cannot do? And what are the consequences of this for the institutional set-up of an IO and for its authority?

We conceive governance within states and among states as having a logic that can travel across scale. This takes issue with the realist premise that the causal underpinnings of international politics are unique (Waltz 1979: 88; Mearsheimer 1995: note 183). The characteristics that realists perceive as distinctive of the international system appear to be present in degree rather than kind (Milner 1991). This includes the claim that the international domain is populated by units that have survival as their chief goal. State survival and national independence are often highly valued, but they are not the only goals that motivate states. States can decide to sacrifice considerable independence for the benefits of shared rule, as the history of federalism reveals (Riker 1964).

Federalism is an extreme example of a more general phenomenon in which a state gives up some freedom of action for the benefits of collective governance. States find many ways short of federalism to share rule, from general purpose governance to leaner organizational forms targeted at specific problems. Hence it makes sense to regard the existence of independent states in the absence of coercive hierarchy as a point of departure for a theory of international governance rather than its outcome. One can then consider the conditions that would lead states to contract certain forms of governance. What these forms are and how to explain them is the subject of this study.

From liberal institutionalism we take the idea that states act rationally in dealing with the collective action problems produced by interdependence. This approach conceives IOs as means to reduce the transaction costs of cooperation in areas where states have overlapping interests, thereby facilitating international governance under the structural constraints imposed by anarchy. Functionalist theory is indispensable if one wishes to explain two puzzling features of international governance: Why do states delegate authority to independent IO bodies and why do states collectivize decision making in binding majoritarianism? The answer, we believe, has to do with the functional pressures arising from the complexity of decision making and the risk of decisional blockage. International authority in our account is a functional adaptation to the benefits of finessing the national veto as the number
of member states increases and the benefits of empowering independent actors to set the agenda, provide information, and settle disputes as the policy portfolio of an IO expands.

However, a functionalist account can only take one so far. To explain how functionalist pressures play out in different contexts one must theorize the sociality of governance—how participants perceive themselves in relation to others. The extent to which the participants consider themselves to be a community conditions the contractual incompleteness of an IO, the course of its policy competences, and the size of its membership. Community comes into play in designing an IO, and so what appears to be a functionally determined process depends on the normative basis on which an organization is built.

This opens the door to a third stream of literature, constructivism, which explores how norms, identities, and discourse shape international cooperation. The character of international governance depends not only on its benefits, but on what the participants make of each other. Constructivism draws attention to the social fabric of international cooperation. To explain variation in international governance one needs to theorize the conditions under which the participants will be prepared to surrender some national self-rule for international shared rule.

We theorize the social character of international governance along two paths. The first concerns the extent to which the populations of the member states conceive themselves as having some overarching community. As Elinor Ostrom (1990) observes, community—expressed in overarching norms, a shared identity, and a common sense of fate—underpins diffuse reciprocity which can sustain incompletely contracted cooperation in a non-hierarchical setting. Community is generally weaker in the international domain than within states, but we find that the variation that exists in the international domain is decisive for explaining the diverse forms of governance that one can observe.

The second way in which the social nature of cooperation comes into play is through the politicization of international governance. The tension between shared rule and self-rule may intensify as an IO becomes more authoritative. This can play out in domestic political debate, which has seen growing opposition to international governance on the ground that it weakens national community and undermines national sovereignty. The mobilization of exclusive nationalism can constrain the willingness of a government to further empower an IO even in the face of functional pressures. We expect this to matter most for international organizations that are particularly salient and polarizing in domestic politics.

The objective of this study is to explain the institutionalization of IOs. How are they designed? What are their rules of decision making? How are they
empowered to exercise authority? This leaves important topics unconsidered. How effective are IOs in implementing decisions on the ground? How is the governance of an IO related to its performance? How do increasingly numerous IOs interact within regions and at a global scale? While these questions lie beyond the present study, a theory that explains how IOs are institutionally structured may contribute to each of them. The institutional character of a jurisdiction is a useful place to start in investigating how it implements policy, how it interacts with other units, and how well it performs. In general, it usually makes sense to analyze the characteristics of the units in a network, and how they came to be, if one intends to explain the relative strength of their ties with other nodes, why some units are more central than others, and how effective they are.

Distributional struggles over international governance—the subject of an extensive political economy literature—are beyond the scope of this study. The benefits of international cooperation may be distributed unequally both between member states and across social groups within them. Rational actors anticipate the distributional consequences of alternative institutional choices and seek to influence them in order to gain a disproportionate share of the cooperative surplus. In the analyses that follow, we control for distributional factors, such as hegemony and asymmetric trade interdependence, but our focus is on the interaction between efficiency-related and social factors.

From a long historical perspective this is a study of a single case, the liberal world order following World War II. This world order has been sustained by factors that lie outside our theory, including American material and ideational dominance and an extended period devoid of world war. It is possible that the functional and cultural variables in our theory are time-bound in ways that are not yet evident. As postfunctionalism argues, the chief constraint on international governance today is nationalism. Whether this will remain so, we cannot yet tell.

Plan of the Book

Chapter 2 lays out the hard core of a postfunctionalist theory of international organization. The point of departure is to conceive governance as a social contract among rational actors to escape anarchy. It refines social contract theory by assuming that a contract for governance can concentrate authority or disperse it across jurisdictions at diverse scale. Postfunctionalism proposes that the willingness to conclude a highly incomplete contract depends on whether participants think of themselves as a community. The remainder of the book specifies and tests the theory’s observational implications.
Chapter 3 explains why we conceptualize international authority as delegation and pooling and demonstrates how these abstract qualities can be measured. Our model of IO decision making disaggregates agenda setting, final decision making, bindingness of decisions, ratification, and dispute settlement across six decision areas: policy making, constitutional reform, the budget, financial compliance, membership accession, and the suspension of members. The chapter concludes by summarizing variation in pooling and delegation for seventy-six major IOs cross-sectionally and over time (1950–2010).

Chapter 4 explains the basic set-up of an IO—its membership, contract, and policy portfolio—as resulting from the tension between the functional logic of public goods provision and the preference of exclusive communities for self-rule. The theory expects international organization to be bimodal. General purpose governance builds on transnational community to contract cooperation as an open-ended venture among peoples. Task-specific governance is more targeted. It contracts cooperation narrowly so that states, no matter how diverse, can come together to problem-solve. General purpose and task-specific IOs relate to their constituencies differently, and this shapes the scale of their membership, their openness to membership growth, and the breadth and dynamism of their policy portfolios.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 test some observable implications of a postfunctionalist theory of international organization. Chapter 5 models an IO’s policy portfolio in two steps. The first explains change in an IO’s policy portfolio as a function of the incompleteness of its contract. The second explains the incompleteness of an IO’s contract as conditioned by shared norms that allay fears of exploitation. A model that specifies an IO’s contractual basis and its normative coherence accounts for more than half of the variance in the policy portfolio over time.

Chapter 6 examines how functional and non-functional pressures affect pooling and delegation in IOs. Functional pressures stem from the need to make decision making tractable under an expanding policy portfolio. This prompts an IO’s member states to pool authority in majoritarian decision making and to delegate agenda setting to independent agents who can frame the agenda and mediate disputes. However, the politicization of exclusive national identity can constrain IO authority even in the presence of intense functional pressure.

Chapter 7 explains variation in pooling as a response to the number of potential veto players in the IO. The incentive to suspend the national veto is a function of an IO’s decision costs, which depend on the number of member states an IO anticipates. This hypothesis is assessed in a cross-sectional analysis using a measure of pooling that distinguishes the mode, bindingness, and substantive area of decision making.
Chapter 8 summarizes the argument of the book in five theses. International governance has both a formal and an informal basis. Its foundation in IOs is explicitly contractual. To explain the basic set-up and authority of an IO one needs to theorize the functional pressures that arise in the provision of public goods, the social constraints in adapting to those pressures, and the consequent politicization of IO legitimacy.
Philosophical Foundations of a Postfunctionalist Theory of International Organization

“Are you prepared to part with any degree of national sovereignty in any circumstances for the sake of a larger synthesis?” The question was directed at Winston Churchill on the floor of the House of Commons in a debate about whether Britain should participate in negotiations to form a European Coal and Steel Community. Churchill’s answer was yes:

The whole movement of the world is towards an inter-dependence of nations. We feel all around us the belief that it is our best hope... We are prepared to consider and, if convinced, to accept the abrogation of national sovereignty, provided that we are satisfied with the conditions and the safeguards... national sovereignty is not inviolable, and it may be resolutely diminished for the sake of all men in all the lands finding their way home together.1

The prime minister, Clement Attlee, agreed in principle, though he believed that Britain’s time to join a European Union had not come:

There must be a common basis of moral values... I have often spoken against the continuance of some absolute idea of sovereignty... As a matter of fact, anyone entering into an alliance or a treaty does take away to an extent their absolute power to do as they will... In advocating Western Union, we are prepared with other Powers to pool some degree of authority. I am not prepared at the present to agree to all the propositions in the Motion as being immediately practicable, but as an ideal to work towards.2

“Men in all the lands finding their way home together,” “a common basis of moral values”—these are appeals not just to the functional benefits of

international governance but to its social requisites. Both Churchill and Attlee recognized that the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner of the European Union, would have profound consequences for national self-rule. The 1951 Treaty was highly incomplete in its purpose, calling for the peoples of Europe to “lay the basis of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common destiny.” Proponents stressed the benefits of cooperation with European countries that were finding their feet after the war. Opponents raised issues of sovereignty and community. They included the chair of the 22 Club of Conservative backbenchers, Harry Legge-Bourke, who “believe[d] that federation in Europe can never work because, although the geography is very often the same, there is not sufficient common ground in sympathy and characteristics to make it work.”

Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Labour government, explained his refusal to participate in negotiations for a European Coal and Steel Community as follows:

So far as the Schuman Plan is concerned, it seems to us that the French are looking at the proposals from a different angle from that which we adopt. The French Government . . . says this: ‘By pooling basic production and by instituting a new higher authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, these proposals will build the first concrete foundation of the European Federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace.’ . . . It does not, however, seem to us either necessary or appropriate, in order to achieve these purposes, to invest a supra-national authority of independent persons with powers for overriding Governmental and Parliamentary decisions in the participating countries. Indeed, it seems to us that, even if desirable, such a scheme could hardly prove to be workable in democratic communities, unless it were to be preceded by complete political federation.

Governance—collective decision making in the expectation of obedience—allows humans to exert joint control over problems that they cannot handle independently. However, the kind of governance that people will consent to depends on more than the need to solve problems. It depends also on how the participants perceive each other. We reject the notion that governance is contracted among thinly rational actors who exist prior to society. Our premise is that governance arises out of social relations, and that the willingness to contract governance depends not only on its functional benefits but also on the way in which actors conceive themselves in relation to others.

A contract for international governance is no different from a constitution in that there is no external power to enforce it. An international organization

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can survive only if the participants want it to survive. A decisive challenge for international governance is therefore to harness the willingness of the participants to constrain themselves in the knowledge that this must be self-enforcing. Those subject to the authority of an international organization must be willing subjects even when obliged to implement decisions they do not like. Obedience in the international realm requires legitimacy (Lenz and Viola 2017; Lenz, Burilkov, and Viola 2019).

This problem has preoccupied constitutionalists over the ages. How should one design a political constitution so that it endures in the absence of an external authority? How can one frame rules for political engagement that will serve a people under conditions that cannot be predicted by those who write the constitution?

This book draws on two lessons from the history of constitution making. The first is that formal rules can play a vital role in coordinating expectations in the absence of an external authority. Written rules provide a record which anchors subsequent debate about how to interpret the agreement as conditions change. This is why it is worth paying close attention to the rules negotiated by states when they create and reform an international organization.

Second, no contract for governance stands on its own feet. The effects of a constitution depend on its informal setting, and in particular on the sociality of the persons it governs. To what extent do the participants conceive themselves as part of an overarching community? Are they willing to bind themselves in collective rule even if this means limiting self-rule?

These effects underpin variation. Contracts for international governance vary in how they specify the purpose of cooperation. Some seek to radically restrict the scope for subsequent interpretation by precisely specifying what the organization can and cannot do, while others seek flexibility by framing the IO’s purpose in open-ended terms. General purpose governance—governance on a wide range of incompletely contracted policies—is akin to marriage, except that it is intended to outlast the lives of its founders. Like a marriage, this requires an informal basis of shared norms. Those who contract general purpose governance must expect that they can cooperate in the absence of immediate payoff and in circumstances they cannot predict. The alternative is to specify the purpose of cooperation as completely as possible around a particular problem so that diverse populations might cooperate while minimizing the costs of uncertainty.

The remainder of this chapter sets out a postfunctionalist theory of international governance in which sociality decisively conditions the effects of functionality. The foundations of the theory lie in classical social contract theory and contemporary contract theory as we now explain.
Scale and Community in the Provision of Governance

Governance is an exercise in human ingenuity under incentives and constraints. Our theory rests on the contention that the benefits of scale are a strong incentive for governance at diverse scale, while community, or its relative absence, explains the form that governance takes.

Why would rational individuals subject themselves to governance constraining their freedom of action? The classical approach to governance is to regard it as a solution to the dilemma of collective action. The discovery of this dilemma in the seventeenth century was the point of departure for modern political science, and it remains the core of political science to this day. The social contract in the philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls is the form in which individuals escape anarchy by consenting to bind themselves in collective governance. Only by doing so can they provide themselves with public goods including economic exchange, security, and law.

Such goods are no less desirable among states than within them. By encompassing a greater number of people, larger jurisdictions—whether states, empires, or international organizations—expand trade, extend the division of labor, and facilitate economies of scale in production and distribution (Marks 2012). The larger the jurisdiction, the greater the benefit of standardization of weights and measures, of a single system of law regarding contracts, and of other jurisdiction-wide laws that reduce the transaction costs of exchange. An enormous range of public goods call for international cooperation, including climate change, migration, biodiversity management, nuclear proliferation, scientific research, disease control, communication, human rights, and environmental protection. Scale enhances efficiency in each of these endeavors because it makes sense to determine the policy for all those affected and because the cost of providing a public policy is lower if it is shared across a very large number of people.

Yet, the provision of governance does not just depend on its functional benefits. It hinges also on a willingness to be collectively governed. A major shortcoming of a functionalist theory of governance is that it takes for granted one of the most problematic features of governance—the Who Question: Who contracts governance? Hobbes and Locke assume that it does not really matter who agrees to the contract; what matters is the logic of the state of nature that impels rational persons to contract a state or “Commonwealth.” Hobbes (2001 [1651]: ch. XXIX) goes further to conceive society not as the starting point for the social contract, but as its product: “For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the Commonwealth.”

Rawls (1971: 4) is concerned with how individuals in a given society, “a more or less self-sufficient association of persons,” should choose to govern themselves. Rawls’ normative commitment to liberal individualism allows
him to sidestep the *Who Question* by assuming that states are societies, and societies are states. In his treatise on international justice, Rawls (1999: 24) takes as his unit the “people” within a state-society “united by common sympathies.” The identification of peoples with states is a simplification that allows Rawls to set out an elegant and humane vision of liberal international governance. However, the notion that a state has a people and a people has a state compresses the possibilities of governance both within and among states. What are the consequences for governance within a state when common sympathies divide as well as unite the groups within? And what might one conclude about governance among states if common sympathies spilled beyond national borders to neighboring countries? The world has never been compartmentalized into national peoples. In order to understand governance among, as within, states, it is vital to relax the assumption that structures of authority fix patterns of sociality.

Sociality is generally weaker among states than within them, but where it exists it opens up opportunities for governance that go beyond the liberal reciprocity that Rawls envisages in the “Law of Peoples.” The principles that Rawls prescribes for relations among peoples—freedom, independence, equality, non-intervention, self-defense, human rights, restriction on the conduct of war, assistance to those living in unjust regimes—assume weak bonds among peoples and strong bonds within them. Each person in this schema is a clearly demarcated entity with corresponding limits on its toleration of overarching governance.

Because governance is fundamentally interpersonal, one must come to grips with the sociality of the participants as well as their functional needs. The *Who Question* is theoretically and empirically prior to the *How Question*, how governance should operate. A theory that tells us how authority should be contracted does not tell us for whom authority should be contracted. A veil of ignorance can usefully ask us to detach preferences over rules from our personal status, income, and capabilities. But can it strip away a person’s conception of who she is and with whom she identifies? Who, then are the persons that contract governance? How do they form a community? Which sets of individuals are willing to commit themselves to the ultimate political act of sharing rule? Will they consider collective governance as legitimate rule or as an illegitimate imposition? These questions require that one probe beyond the

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5 Rawls (1999: 112) maintains that mutual assistance presupposes “a degree of affinity among peoples, that is, a sense of social cohesion and closeness that cannot be expected even in a society of liberal peoples...with their separate languages, religions, and culture. The members of a single domestic society share a common central government and political culture, and the moral learning of political concepts and principles works most effectively in the context of society-wide political and social institutions that are part of their shared daily life.” At the same time, Rawls (1999: 113) recognizes that “as cooperation among peoples proceeds apace they may come to care about each other and affinity between them becomes stronger” (see this volume, Chapter 6).
functional benefits of governance to how individuals perceive themselves in relation to others.

This is where community comes in. *Sharing in common* is a literal translation of Aristotle’s *koinōnia*, the root of the modern concept of community (Liddell and Scott 1940). According to Sandel (1998: 172), “What marks community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain ‘shared final ends’ alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings within which the opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved.” These characteristics of community facilitate general purpose governance because they nurture *diffuse reciprocity*—atemporal exchange over incommensurate values. Exchange that takes place over an unspecified time period—atemporal—escapes the constraint of sequentiality in which a person concedes something only on condition of payback at a later time. Incommensurate values refer to goods that cannot be priced and cannot be exchanged by calculating matching values. So diffuse reciprocity has the virtue of making cooperation possible in situations where the participants are unsure about the timeliness or the equivalence of their exchange. The participants may cooperate even if they receive no compensation for doing someone else a favor or for retaliating against an antisocial act (Brazys et al. 2017; Keohane 1986; Knack 2001; Ostrom 1998).

Community in the Aristotelian sense is generally thinner among than within countries. But it is far from absent among countries, and it can underpin thick international governance. The populations of some regions have overarching norms that may provide a foundation for general purpose governance based on highly incomplete contracting—as we now discuss.

### The Sociality of Incomplete Contracting

An incomplete contract that commits states to general purpose governance can be far more flexible in responding to unforeseen events than a contract specifying exactly what should be done under all circumstances. However, incompleteness comes at the cost of ambiguity, and ambiguity can subvert cooperation unless the participants find common ground in their perceptions of what the contract implies for their behavior. Whether other participants are really cooperating, or just pretending to, involves judgment. No matter how extensive and effective the court system, the participants cannot rely on formal procedures to punish shading (Hart and Moore 2008). Incompleteness

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6 Liddell and Scott’s (1940) dictionary, accessed online: http://perseus.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.40:3:19.LSJ.
enlarges the scope for perceptual ambiguity by increasing the importance of performance in the *spirit* of the contract in relation to performance in the *letter* of the contract (Hart and Moore 2008: 3; Williamson 1975: 69). Performance in the spirit, unlike performance in the letter, cannot be judicially enforced. In order for states to make a highly incomplete contract for broad, open-ended governance they must expect not merely to be able to enforce the letter of the contract, but to share priors about its interpretation. And they must be willing to make a commitment not only to the current contract, but to their ability to collectively execute and adapt it. The participants are not merely making a bargain. They are also consenting to an iterated process of negotiation as circumstances change.

This, as Risse (2000) suggests, depends on the capacity of actors to transcend a logic of consequentiality and engage in argumentative discourse. Arguing implies that actors “are open to being persuaded by the better argument… Actors’ interests, preferences, and the perceptions of the situation are no longer fixed, but subject to discursive challenges… [Actors] are prepared to change their views of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument.” “Argumentative and deliberative behavior is as goal oriented as strategic interaction, but the goal is not to attain one’s fixed preferences, but to seek a reasoned consensus” (7). Drawing on Habermas (1981), Risse emphasizes that argumentative rationality requires *eine gemeinsame Lebenswelt*—a common life world, “a supply of collective interpretations of the world and of themselves, as provided by language, a common history, or culture… [For] it provides arguing actors with a repertoire of collective understandings to which they can refer when making truth claims” (10–11).

Cooperation requires community when governance extends beyond the classic two-person prisoners’ dilemma because uncertainty and ambiguity enter the picture (Ostrom 2005). Two players can spontaneously provide themselves with a public good by acting independently in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod 1984; Snidal 1985; Zürn 1992). Mutual perceptions are irrelevant in this scenario. If both players adopt a tit-for-tat strategy they can cooperate without having any regard at all for the other player. This is an elegant and surprising finding, and it tells us that institutions are unnecessary for cooperation if the contract between the parties is complete. In this scenario, each participant has full knowledge of the rules of the game in the present and future, the past behavior of the other participant, the past and present distribution of gains, and knows that everyone has the same complete

7 The distinction is made by Hume (1896 [1739]: 413): “[W]hen we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind or temper… We must look within to find the moral quality… If we find, upon enquiry, that the virtuous motive was still powerful… tho’ checked in its operation by some circumstances unknown to us, we retract our blame…”
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information. Cooperation and defection are transparent as are the payoffs. The only thing that participants cannot predict is the future behavior of the other player.8

Sociality enters the picture as soon as one begins to relax these assumptions. Imagine that cooperation is broad in scope, flexible in content, incompletely contracted, and offers benefits that are difficult or impossible to quantify. Under these circumstances, whether a player cooperates or defects becomes a matter of judgment.9 Cooperation and defection do not come clearly packaged, and judging whether a participant is really cooperating or really defecting requires that one interpret rules in relation to events and behavior. Is a specific behavior compatible with this rule or does it violate the rule? Consequently, the participants are continuously trying to figure out what motivates their partners (Chayes and Chayes 1993; McCabe et al. 2001; Smith 2010).10 This suggests that mutual perceptions are vital for cooperation under real-world uncertainty.

Dense interaction in a bounded group with shared understandings—community, in short—facilitates the provision of public goods in the face of uncertainty. The greater the scope for contending perceptions of the same behavior, the greater the importance of shared mental models for interpreting contractually agreed rules (Ostrom 2005: 26–7).11 “Interpretive communities set the parameters within the institution—the terms in which positions are explained, defended, and justified to others in what is fundamentally an intersubjective enterprise” (Johnstone 2005: 186). Ostrom (1990: 88–9) summarizes the lessons of dozens of case studies of effective management of common pool resource problems as follows:

[These populations] have remained stable over long periods of time. Individuals have shared a past and expect to share a future. It is important for individuals to maintain their reputations as reliable members of the community. These individuals live side by side and farm the same plots year after year. They expect their children and their grandchildren to inherit their land.... Extensive norms have evolved in all of these settings that narrowly define 'proper' behavior. Many of these norms make it feasible for individuals to live in close interdependence

8 Based on known probability distributions of future payoffs, they can make only educated guesses (Koremenos 2005: 550; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Rathbun 2007).
9 Here one enters the realm of uncertainty in which it is not possible to calculate optimal strategies (on possible short-cuts) (Beckert 1996: 827–9; Beckert 2003; Nelson and Katzenstein 2014).
10 Information about the preferences of others is incomplete, and, in mixed motives situations, information is a private good that can influence distributional outcomes (Laffont and Martimort 2002).
11 Morrow (2014: 6) adopts the term “common conjecture” to describe how legal obligations can restrain the use of violence by states in war. Our argument is complementary in emphasizing the causal role of shared understandings and the norms that underpin them. Whereas Morrow estimates shared understandings by examining the ratification of international laws, we conceive shared understandings as embedded in norms of sociality that exist prior to agreements among states, but which shape the governance of an IO in the course of its existence.
on many fronts without excessive conflict. Further, a reputation for keeping promises, honest dealings, and reliability in one arena is a valuable asset. Prudent, long-term self-interest reinforces the acceptance of the norms of proper behavior.

Ostrom is describing cooperation in local communities, but it is worth entertaining the idea that the principles underlying cooperation are robust across scale (Keohane and Ostrom 1995). Bounded groups of individuals who share common understandings are settings for thick international governance because they lengthen time horizons and make it easier for people to identify mutual gains, negotiate rules for reaping them, and sanction freeriding. Sustained cooperation in large groups requires “strong reciprocity, which is a predisposition to cooperate with others, and to punish (at personal cost, if necessary) those who violate the norms of cooperation” (Tuomela 2007: 150).

Cooperation in the provision of public goods can be considered a group characteristic. Aristotle begins his Politics by saying that “every state is a community (κοινωνία) of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good.” The greater the capacity of a group to provide itself with public goods, the more that group can be conceived as a κοινωνία. In this conception, the property of being a community is intended “to characterize all social groups rather than to characterize one especially close and highly integrated form of social life” (Yack 1993: 26).

We wish to investigate the effect of community on the provision of international governance, so we conceive a community more narrowly as a bounded group of individuals who perceive that they share common understandings.

We take an Aristotelian approach to community which breaks with the notion that a community is an intergenerational phenomenon that moves through social space. Communities do not travel as objects through time but are sustained or dissolved as patterns of human interaction change (Deutsch 1966 [1953]). In the short term, the possibilities for governance are constrained by common understandings; in the long term, shared governance can feed back to shape identities (Marks 2012: 5). The world has never been divided into mutually exclusive communities. Territorial communities exist at different scales, and often their edges are blurred (Mann 1986: ch. 1). Patterns of social, economic, and political interaction almost never coincide even in autarkic states, and most persons consider themselves members of more than one territorial community. Hence, communities have nested and overlapping memberships. A community, in the Aristotelian sense, is a generic concept applied to a group by virtue of its capacity to produce public goods. Our notion of community is similarly non-categorical. Instead of classifying some groups as communities and others as non-communities, every social group can be considered a community to some degree.
Community is double-edged. The social solidarity that facilitates governance within a group can constrain governance among groups. Communities may exhibit intense parochial altruism, a combination of unselfish concern for the welfare of others within the group combined with resistance to the rule of those from outside. Communities are parochial when they divide the social world into us and them, into insiders and outsiders. Distinctive norms and perceptions may lead a group to demand self-rule as a matter of principle. Jurisdictional reform is potentially a conflictual process that can foment nationalism. As international governance reaches into society, one can expect to see politicized debate about the relative virtues of shared rule and self-rule.

David Mitrany, a leading functionalist in the decades around World War II, was acutely aware of the constraining force of national identity (1966: 151): “We are favored by the need and the habit of material cooperation; we are hampered by the general clinging to political segregation. How to reconcile these two trends, both of them natural and both of them active, is the main problem for political invention.” The weakness of community in the international domain led Mitrany (1948: 353) to advocate cooperation in task-specific functional arrangements because “under present conditions of political nationalism an international federation is difficult to achieve, under present conditions … it would be difficult to maintain.”

National sovereignty and self-rule have an emotional resonance rooted in the principle that “Every man, and every body of men on earth, possesses the right of self-government” (Jefferson 1790: 60). The demand for self-rule on behalf of minority groups within states comes from all parts of the political spectrum, but the politicization of national sovereignty in the face of international governance is strongest on the political right. Objecting to a UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Senator Orrin Hatch stated the nationalist position: “Sovereignty certainly includes the authority to elect representatives and the authority of those representatives to enact laws. But it is much more than that. The American people also have authority to define our culture, express our values, set our priorities, and balance the many competing interests that exist in a free society. To put it simply, the American people must have the last word.”

The politicization of international governance—rising awareness, mobilization, and contestation—can foster transnational community (de Wilde et al. 2019; Zürn 2012: 50; also Zürn 2018). On human rights, for example, transnational coalitions of rooted cosmopolitans have identified problems,

developed common understandings, and helped implement humanitarian norms in the international domain. However, up to this point in time, politicization has chiefly mobilized nationalism and the defense of national sovereignty against international governance (Hooghe, Lenz, Marks 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2006; Zürn 2012: 47).

International governance and self-rule are perfectly compatible for a country that can impose its policies on other countries. In the absence of hegemony, the trade-off between self-rule and international governance depends on the politicization of national identity. A person who has an exclusive national identity will resent the rule of those they regard as “foreign,” whereas a person who conceives their identity as multi-layered, as encompassing the overarching group as well as the nation, will be more willing to tolerate some loss of national self-rule in international governance (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010). Because feelings of community are much stronger within than among states, the dilemma for governance among states is to gain the benefits of scale while adjusting to the shallowness of transnational community. A majority of Europeans attest some European identity, yet a decisive constraint on European integration lies in the opposition of those with an exclusive national identity who reject rule by people they perceive as foreign (Hooghe and Marks 2009b).

This suggests that governance cannot be explained as an efficient response to collective problems. This line of argument is postfunctionalist in that it builds on the idea that governance is two-sided. It is the exercise of shared rule in the provision of public goods at diverse scale from the local to the global. But it is not only this. Governance is no less the exercise of self-rule, rule by and for a specific political collectivity. The first conception conceives governance as a functional response to the benefits of multilevel governance. The second conceives governance as an expression of human sociality. It stresses that humans are social beings who value self-rule for what it is as well as for what it does. The benefits of providing public goods at diverse scale can exert sustained functional pressure, but those who conceive their group identity in exclusive terms may exhibit intense parochial altruism leading to the rejection of international governance.

This is the hard core of the theory in this book. In the next section we explore some of its implications for international governance.

14 For a related argument about the relationship between state identities and international governance, see Hebel and Lenz 2016.
15 Volume II in this series applies this theory to multilevel governance within states (Hooghe and Marks 2016).
A Theory of International Organization

The Puzzle of International Governance

If rational individuals are impelled into collective governance, why not states? Why should states not heed the lesson of the social contract theorists that it is rational for individuals to exchange self-rule for the benefits of overarching governance? If governance is a contract among individuals who wish to provide themselves with goods that they cannot provide individually, it stands to reason that the contract should encompass all those who would benefit by provision of the good or who would suffer if they were excluded. If some who benefit are excluded, they will escape having to pay for it, and the cost will be higher for the remainder. If the provision of a good can be extended to additional persons at less than average cost, then it would be irrational to exclude them. In the language of contemporary public goods analysis, governance should be adapted to the externalities and economies of scale of the problems it confronts.

Hobbes (2001 [1651]: ch. XXI: 161) saw the problem clearly:

For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods or lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every particular man: so in states and Commonwealths not dependent on one another, every Commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that man or assembly that representeth it shall judge, most conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round about.16

The puzzle is not just hypothetical. The functional pressures that have led individuals to combine in states have also led states to merge into larger units. Many states have in fact done so voluntarily, most commonly in federal states.17 Federalism promises to provide the best of both worlds: increasing scale in the provision of public goods while retaining self-rule for the constituent units. The functional benefits are compelling. Federal states internalize the effects of authoritative decision making over a larger population and they can exploit economies of scale in security, taxation, and market making. However, the number of states that have merged into federal polities is small in relation to the number of states that would stand to benefit from scale in the provision of public goods.

Federal institutions are designed with great care to guarantee the rights of the constituent units while exploiting the benefits of scale, yet such rules are

16 Kant (2010 [1795]) grappled with the same puzzle for which he developed the “law of nations.”
17 On alternative forms of hierarchy in the international domain, see Lake 2009.
always open to interpretation, and interpretation opens the door to opportunism. When independent states contract a federal constitution, they are making an enduring commitment. They are making a commitment not merely to a set of rules, but to perpetual union. This requires that they expect to be able to agree on how to interpret the rules when those who have written them are no longer alive. On the occasions when they cannot agree, they must have the expectation that this will not outweigh their desire to live in the same political community. Hence, the decision to willingly sacrifice independence is made possible when the peoples in question have shared understandings, a “mutual compatibility of major values” (Deutsch 1957: 66).

Ostrom (1979: 77, 81) emphasizes that federalism can only be undertaken if the participants have

a common understanding and basic agreement upon the terms and conditions for making collective decisions. . . . Federal societies depend first upon a shared community of understanding and agreement about: (1) basic moral precepts and standards of value and; (2) the terms and conditions that apply to governance of a community . . . The level of common agreement and understanding must include reference to commonly shared standards of value that can serve as generally accepted criteria of choice, and to mutually agreeable terms and conditions for the governance of the shared community of interests.

This line of argument appears to travel—we will explore how far in the chapters ahead. But first, it can be illustrated by two examples of thick governance that are at the book-ends of Western civilization: ancient Greek city states and the contemporary European Union (EU).

The Greek state, or polis, was the epitome of a self-governing community. Its constitution was more than “an arrangement of offices”; it was “a manner of life” (Barker 2010 [1918]: 6). Outside of the polis, according to Aristotle, man was akin to a wild animal; within it he was “political man” (Lipset 1960; Rawls 1971: 500–1).18 The intense sociality of citizens in the polis, its moral imperative, and the fact that the population of each polis was rooted in common descent “fostered in each community an attitude of jealous exclusiveness towards its neighbors” (Boak 1921: 376). The history of conflict among Greek polei shows that self-rule (autonomia) was considered worth dying for.

Under what circumstances were city states willing to give up self-rule in overarching governance? Existential insecurity was a necessary condition, but this does not help us much because war, or the threat of war, was almost

18 “Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the Tribeless, lawless, heartless one, whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts” (Aristotle, Politics, bk 1, part 2; see also Hansen 2006: 115).
always present as a result of Persian expansion, internecine war among polei, and the rise of Macedon. The most common response was to form an alliance, which placed the militaries of the contracting states under unified command in time of war, but otherwise left their freedom of action intact. But several city states with overarching identities to a regional ethnos were willing to voluntarily sacrifice self-rule in permanent confederation. In her book on the subject, Morgan (2003: 4) asks “How, and under what circumstances did different kinds of community constitute and define themselves, and on what level were they salient to their members?” She finds that “tiered identities were more common than not” (6). “Far from being distinct and alternative forms of state, polei and ethne were thus tiers of identity with which communities could identify with varying enthusiasm and motivation at different times” (1).

The confederations reached deeply into the internal life of their members. The Boeotian and Achaean confederations set up a joint assembly, council, and magistrates that had complete control of military and foreign affairs with the right to legislate on federal issues, arbitrate disputes among its member states, impose taxes, issue coinage, and fine citizens (Beck and Funke 2015; Cary 1923). “In nearly every case the federal states arose on an ethnic basis, that is to say, they were associations of cities or rural states belonging to the same ethnos” (Boak 1921: 381–2).

The contemporary European Union illustrates both the potential and the obstacles for deep international governance. The European Union was established following two world wars in which the European states system and its vaunted balance of power had proved a disaster. Not one of the six founding states had avoided occupation by a foreign power in World War II. Ideas that were considered utopian before the war now seemed worth trying. The logic of integration was to gain the benefits of scale among densely interacting peoples who shared a long history of conflict and cooperation. The European Union, and its precursor, the European Coal and Steel Community, were highly incomplete contracts for an ever closer union based on an explicit recognition of common values.

The functional pressures for shared rule in Europe are powerful and sustained. The EU encompasses countries and their regions in a continental system of economic exchange, individual mobility, dispute resolution, fundamental research, and external representation. The economic size of the Union makes it one of the three largest domestic markets in the world, the world’s largest exporter, and a great power in global economic, financial, and 19 The Peloponnesian League and the Delian League were alliances that interfered heavily in the internal affairs of polei only after the Leagues came under the coercive hegemony of Sparta and Athens, respectively.
environmental governance with “equal bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States” (Drezner 2007: 121).

The assumption was that community would follow. Trust among Europeans has grown (Klingemann and Weldon 2013), and around 50 million Europeans have acquired a European identity that they attest is prior to their national identity (Kuhn 2015). However, powerful currents run in the opposite direction, framing national identity in opposition to European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009b; Kriesi et al. 2008). The hard edges of European states have been softened in a system of multilevel governance, but a series of crises reveals both the functional pressures and the constraints in bringing communities under a single jurisdictional roof (Hooghe and Marks 2019).

The severity of the Eurozone crisis was an unintended consequence of economic and monetary integration, formalized in the Maastricht Treaty, itself the outcome of the single market in the 1980s. Monetary union in Europe was half-baked because it eliminated monetary flexibility at the national level but made no provision for European-wide fiscal insurance. There was immense pressure on governments to coordinate a response to the crisis as early as October 2008 when the European economy was in freefall. However, nationalists stoked domestic resistance to pooling risk. Politicization in the shadow of exclusive national identity decisively narrowed options for reform.20 The predominant response was to shield decisions from democratic pressures by resorting to ad hoc constructs bypassing treaty reform and avoiding referendums. This brought the Eurozone close to collapse. The eventual cocktail of European Central Bank (ECB) measures, bailouts, heightened macro-economic surveillance, and banking supervision was partial, delayed, and Pareto-inefficient. Politicized procrastination carried a steep price for the North as for the South (Börzel 2016; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018; Grande and Kriesi 2016).

Whereas the Eurocrisis raised issues of identity indirectly by tapping unwillingness to redistribute across national borders, the migration surge touched the nerve of national identity directly by intermixing culturally dissimilar populations. In the fall of 2015, for the first time in Eurobarometer’s history, immigration became the number one concern across Europe. Following on the heels of the Eurozone crisis, the migration spike intensified a long-simmering

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20 In a study of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the EU, and regional integration in Latin America, Hurrelmann and Schneider (2015: 254) conclude that “The overall effect of politicization has been constraining, not in the sense of halting the integration process but rather in the sense of limiting the options available to political elites when considering the next integration steps” (see also Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015: 26).
divide that has strengthened radical nationalist political parties and polarized electorates into socially distinctive groups.\textsuperscript{21}

Nationalist challengers impelled governments to introduce restrictions. By early 2016, electoral pressure to shut the door appeared irresistible. The German government, which had initially welcomed more than one million refugees, adopted restrictions through an asylum law reform (Asylpaket II) and the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016. Austria and Sweden also changed course.

The Brexit referendum in June 2016 reveals how functional pressures for shared rule can be thwarted by nationalism. For Prime Minister Cameron the decision to call a referendum on UK membership of the EU was a Mephistophelean pact: the referendum would take place only if he won the election, and he was convinced that victory in the election would be followed by victory in the referendum. He was wrong. The two sides of Brexit never connected. Remainers predicted economic dislocation while avoiding mention of European identity. Leavers emphasized national self-rule and control over immigration while sidestepping economics (Dennison and Geddes 2018; Hobolt 2016). Since then, polarization on the Remain/Leave divide has hardened (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2018). Nationalism can, and sometimes does, subvert multilevel governance.

Conclusion

The fundamental problem of governance, and the focus of this book, is that the externalities of many public goods stretch beyond any community. Dahl (1967: 960) makes the telling point that there is an inescapable trade-off between self-rule and the capacity to influence events beyond one’s community. Small units sacrifice scale to achieve self-rule; large units sacrifice self-rule to achieve scale: “At the one extreme, then, people vote but they do not rule; at the other, they rule—but they have nothing to rule over.”

The existence of states is both a resource and a constraint for governance beyond the state. It is a resource because states can act authoritatively for vast numbers of people within their territories. How else could one fashion cooperation among large, diverse, and distant populations? It is a constraint in

\textsuperscript{21} We label this a transnational cleavage because it has as its focal point the defense of national political, social, and economic ways of life against external actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods, or exerting rule (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Marks et.al. 2018). The divide has spawned a multiplicity of terms, including cosmopolitanism vs. parochialism, multiculturalism vs. nationalism, universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian, integration vs. demarcation, fluid vs. fixed (De Vries 2018; de Wilde et al. 2019; Hetherington and Weiler 2018; Hutter and Kriesi 2018).
that states can be settings for exclusive nationalism and the conviction that international governance is the rule of foreigners. Because feelings of community are much stronger within than among states, the dilemma for governance among states is to gain the benefits of scale while adjusting to the shallowness of transnational community. To what extent are states willing to commit themselves to an incomplete contract for general purpose governance? How prepared are they to delegate authority to independent non-state actors? Under what circumstances will they be willing to bind themselves to majority rule?

Willingness to obey depends on more than its functional benefits. Governance is an expression of community and reflects the desire of those sharing a history, institutions, and norms to rule themselves. People care deeply about who they are expected to obey, and this exerts a powerful effect on the character of international governance.

We theorize that the differences among international organizations in their institutional architecture, their competences, and their decision making result from the contrasting ways in which human beings confront the dilemma of international governance. Overarching jurisdictions are uniquely able to manage problems that stem from the interaction of peoples. Yet the feeling of “we-ness” that underpins effective governance is at best weak. Still, even weak community among peoples makes possible general purpose international organization.

We now need to set out the implications of this theory and assess them against the evidence. How does the tension between scale and community produce distinctive forms of governance (Chapter 4)? Why do some IOs expand their policy portfolios while others are fixed (Chapter 5)? How can one explain the course of delegation and pooling over an international organization’s lifetime (Chapter 6)? And why do some states pool authority in a collective body that makes joint decisions on behalf of its members, while in others, states retain national sovereignty (Chapter 7)? However, before we can do any of this, we must generate information that allows us to compare the exercise of authority in international organizations. This is the topic of Chapter 3.