

---

# Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West

Comparative Political Studies

Volume 39 Number 2

March 2006 155-175

© 2006 Sage Publications

10.1177/0010414005281932

<http://cps.sagepub.com>

hosted at

<http://online.sagepub.com>

---

## Different Structure, Same Causality

Gary Marks

Liesbet Hooghe

*University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
and Free University Amsterdam*

Moira Nelson

Erica Edwards

*University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

How does the ideological profile of a political party affect its support or opposition to European integration? The authors investigate this question with a new expert data set on party positioning on European integration covering 171 political parties in 23 countries. The authors' findings are (a) that basic structures of party competition in the East and West are fundamentally and explicably different and (b) that although the positions that parties in the East and West take on European integration are substantively different, they share a single underlying causality.

**Keywords:** *European integration; political parties; ideological dimension; Eastern Europe; communism; Western Europe*

On May 1, 2004, eight former communist societies entered the European Union, with two more anticipating membership by 2007. These are decisive events in the stitching together of Europe after the demise of communism. The prospect or experience of membership in the European Union is the most effective means yet devised to disseminate and consolidate the defining ideals of Western civilization—civil rights, markets, and democracy. Enlargement is a geopolitical process extending Western norms, and hence peace and economic growth, to bordering countries. But what are the consequences of enlargement for the European polity? Do the East and the West view the issues arising from European integration through the same or different eyes?

We ask two questions in this article. First, how does party positioning on European issues connect to the basic conflicts that structure domestic politics? How does the ideological profile of a political party in national politics constrain its support for European integration? And, second, does European integration map onto domestic competition differently in the East and the West, and if so, how can we make sense of this?

Prior research has shown that in the West, the structure of domestic competition powerfully constrains attitudes on European integration (Aspinwall, 2002; Marks & Steenbergen, 2004; Pennings, 2002). The orientation of a party to European issues can be predicted fairly accurately if one knows how that party stands on the two dimensions that summarize domestic political competition—an economic, Left/Right dimension and a noneconomic, new-politics dimension.

Do these findings travel to Central and Eastern Europe? In recent years, several researchers have analyzed the structure of political competition in the accession states of Central and Eastern Europe. We draw on their research and bring to bear an expert data set covering the EU-15 (minus Luxembourg) and seven accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) plus Bulgaria and Romania.<sup>1</sup> This survey of 238 country experts was conducted in 2002 under the auspices of the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Center for European Studies and provides systematic data on party leadership positioning on European integration and on nine EU policies for 98 Western and 73 Eastern political parties (see Appendix A for details).

## Structure of Party Competition

Two dimensions structure competition among political parties in Europe. The first is an economic Left/Right dimension concerned with economic redistribution, welfare, and government regulation of the economy. The Left prioritizes economic equality; the Right prioritizes individual economic

1. To avoid repetition, we use the labels *Central and Eastern Europe*, *East*, and *accession countries* interchangeably, as we do *Western Europe*, *West*, and *EU-15*.

---

**Authors' Note:** For comments and advice, we are grateful to Geoffrey Evans, Evelyne Huber, Herbert Kitschelt, Kenneth Scheve, Robert Rohrschneider, Donald Searing, Aneta Spendzharova, Marco Steenbergen, John Stephens, Gabor Toka, Milada Vachudova, Stephen Whitefield, and participants in conferences at Duke University, Indiana-Bloomington, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Halki conference in Greece on “Redefining the European Project,” and the European Consortium for Political Research Summer School on “Political Parties and Multi-Level Governance” in Rijs, the Netherlands.

freedom. Contestation on this dimension, expressed in democratic class conflict, has predominated in most Western nations in the postwar period (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) and is diagnosed as the main dimension of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe (Evans & Whitefield, 1993; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Toka, 1999).<sup>2</sup>

A second, noneconomic or cultural, new-politics dimension has gained strength since the 1970s in Western Europe (Flanagan, 1987; Flanagan & Lee, 2003; Franklin, 1992; Inglehart, 1977; Kitschelt, 1988). In Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia, it is almost as powerful as the economic Left/Right, and in Hungary, it is stronger (Evans & Whitefield, 1993; Klingemann, 1994; Zielinski, 2002). This dimension summarizes several noneconomic issues—ecological, lifestyle, and communal—and is correspondingly more diverse than the Left/Right dimension. In some countries, it is oriented around environmental protection and sustainable growth; in others, it captures conflict about traditional values rooted in a secular-religious divide; and in yet others, it is pitched around immigration and defense of the national community. Therefore, we describe the poles of this dimension with composite terms: green/alternative/libertarian (Gal) and traditionalism/authority/nationalism (Tan).<sup>3</sup>

These dimensions are best regarded as ways to summarize how actors position themselves on major issues. The structure of political contestation varies in interesting ways across countries and across time. But one can discern a basic, generalizable pattern, and it is with this that we concern ourselves here.


In the West, there are strong affinities between Left and Gal and between Right and Tan. The simple correlation between party positioning on these dimensions is  $-0.64$ . Figure 1 splices political parties across four quadrants. Of 98 political parties, 81 across the 14 larger EU countries are located in the Left-Gal and Right-Tan quadrants. Eight of the remaining parties are liberal parties drawn to the Right-Gal quadrant.

The same dimensions have been diagnosed in Central and Eastern Europe, but the location of parties in this two-dimensional space could

2. We use the concept “dimension” rather than “cleavage” because we are concerned with the positioning of political actors rather than the extent to which their interests are socially rooted or organizationally expressed (Bartolini, 2004, p. 3).

3. Gender and color connotations intended. The question with which we measure this, listed in Appendix B, is biased toward the libertarian element in green/alternative/libertarian (Gal) and the authoritarian element in traditionalism/authority/nationalism (Tan). This imposes a useful conservatism in our analysis because these elements are the most distant from the sovereignty aspects of European integration that, we argue, mobilize Gal/Tan concerns. Hence, the association we find between support for European integration and Gal/Tan is *not* an artifact of our inclusion of nationalism as an element in Tan.

**Figure 1**  
**Dimensions of Party Competition in Western Europe**




Note:  $n = 98$  parties. Weighted by vote.

hardly be more different. The Left-Gal quadrant encompasses just five political parties, and these are located around its southern and eastern edges (see Figure 2). Of the 73 parties in the nine countries for which we have data, 50 are either Left-Tan or Right-Gal. The association between the two dimensions is 0.45. As one would expect, given the relative newness of democratic competition in the East, party competition is less structured there. But the structure we do find yields an axis of party competition at a 90 degree angle to that in the West (Evans & Whitefield, 1993; Kitschelt, 1992; Sitter, 2002).<sup>4</sup>

Why is this so? The answer lies in the contrasting ways communism and liberal capitalism combine Left/Right and Gal/Tan (Kostecky, 2002; Lane,

4. The party scene in the aftermath of communism was chaotic. There were no firm links between the ideological positions of voters or political parties, on one hand, and social structures or basic values, on the other. Bernhard Wessels and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1994) use the term *flattened societies* to describe the social flux that made it difficult for citizens to define their political interests (Kostecky, 2002, pp. 168-171). This led some to argue that the dimensionality of the party system started from a tabula rasa and that first moves of party entrepreneurs might decisively shape the structure of party competition (Zielinski, 2002). Most observers now agree that

**Figure 2**  
**Dimensions of Party Competition in Central and Eastern Europe**




Note:  $n = 73$  parties. Weighted by vote.

2002; Lawson, Roemmele, & Karasimeonov, 1999; Meyer, 2003). Communism, as it existed in Eastern Europe, was a Left-Tan phenomenon. Communist regimes delivered more economic equality than market economies and suppressed public dissent and alternative lifestyles. Reform in these societies has combined the demand for free markets and democratic opening of the political process. Political parties that cater to transition losers try to blunt reform by emphasizing its polar opposite—economic equality and traditional authority—and are, therefore, located in the lower-left quadrant of Figure 3. Political parties that represent transition winners repudiate authoritarianism and state control over the economy precisely because they seek a clean break with the past and gravitate to the upper-right quadrant.

This account is consistent with Herbert Kitschelt's argument that the axis of party competition reflects conflict between defenders and opponents of

the structure of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe has become more stable and predictable.

**Figure 3**  
**Party Families and**  
**Dimensions of Party Competition in East and West**



existing property rights and modes of distribution (Kitschelt, 1992). Defenders are reluctant to jeopardize the status quo by opening the political process to new groups, and this leads them to limit political participation by stressing traditional values and exclusionary notions of political community. Hence, in the West, where the status quo is capitalism, there is an affinity between the promarket Right and authoritarian or (in our words) Tan values and between the Left, which favors political regulation, and libertarian or Gal values. In Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, defenders of nonmarket distribution are Tan and those anticipating benefits from marketization are Gal.

We gain an interesting line of sight into the East-West contrast when we compare the positions of party families.<sup>5</sup> Social democrats, Christian democrats, conservatives, liberals, and regionalist or ethnic parties have similar positions in the East and the West. These party families are located within the small ovals in Figure 3. Three party families—the radical Left, the agrarians,

5. Our categorization of Western parties follows the conventional classification we use in previous analyses (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Marks & Wilson, 2000). For Eastern parties, we follow (a) Derksen's categorization of party families (<http://www.electionworld.org>)

and the radical Tan—have contrasting locations in our two-dimensional schema. Their divergent positions are indicated by arrows. These families are mainly responsible for the sharp, indeed 90 degree, difference in the axes of party competition.


All three party families are drawn toward the bottom-left corner of Figure 3 in the East. Why? Not because they are attracted to communism. These party families include nationalist and religious parties that have little sympathy for communism. The Left-Tan quadrant attracts these parties because it is most removed from liberal-democratic capitalism. The Left-Tan quadrant is the quadrant of transition losers—the rural, the elderly, non-English speakers, the poorly educated, the unemployed, and the manual workers (Chicowski, 2000; Grzymala-Busse & Innes, 2003; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Tucker, Pacek, & Berinsky, 2002). Aside from their shared rejection of the brave new world of liberal-democratic capitalism, such people are diverse. Some are motivated primarily to defend traditional or religious values against secular cosmopolitanism, some wish to defend their nation against intrusive internationalization, and some are desperate to find political protection from impersonal market forces. But all are deeply suspicious of change to their communal status quo.

It is worth noting that the mix of Left opposition to international capitalism and Tan opposition to secular cosmopolitanism varies, as do the kinds of political parties that draw support from the disaffected. In Hungary, for example, national issues are salient. The main axis of competition is tilted vertically on the Gal/Tan dimension, and the Left-Tan quadrant is contested by a small virulently nationalist Hungarian Justice and Life Party and Fidesz, which has veered in a Tan direction in the past few years. In the Czech Republic, by contrast, the axis of party competition has a Left/Right slant. The Left-Tan quadrant is dominated by an unreformed communist party, the KSCM, which demands protection for those threatened by economic liberalization. Hungary and the Czech Republic are extreme cases in which one or the other dimension of competition predominates. In most Central and Eastern European countries, some mix of radical Tan parties, agrarian parties, confessional parties, and former communist parties vies for the support of the disaffected.

---

and (b) the affiliations of Central and Eastern European countries' parties to European or international party families and to party groups in the European Parliament. Six political parties are uncoded. Party families in the East are not as coherent on the Left/Right and Gal/Tan dimensions as those in the West, but the difference is not large. The average standard deviation across Eastern party families on the two dimensions is 1.21 on an 11-point scale; for Western party families, it is 1.15.

**Figure 4**  
**Dimensions of Party Competition and Position on**  
**European Integration in Western Europe**



Note:  $n = 98$  parties. On a scale from 1 (*strongly opposed to European integration*) to 7 (*strongly in favor*), supportive parties have a score between 4.5 and 7; neutral parties have a score between 3.51 and 4.49; opposing parties score between 1 and 3.5.

### **Party Positioning on** **European Integration in Western Europe**

The general structuring of party competition allows one to explain party positioning on European integration with some precision. But the predictive power of Left/Right and Gal/Tan varies across the East and West. We begin with the West, where European integration has been on the political agenda for decades and where we have a decade-long research program on which to draw.

#### **Bipolar Euro-Skepticism**

The relationship between a party's position along the axis of party competition and its level of support for European integration is nonlinear in the



**Table 1**  
**West Versus East: Left/Right, Gal/Tan, Extremism,**  
**and Party Position on European Integration**

	West		East	
	Linear Model	Nonlinear Model	Linear Model	Nonlinear Model
Constant	6.06 (.112)	6.95 (.103)	6.70 (.165)	7.30 (.152)
Left/Right	0.29 (.024)	0.35 (.020)	0.19 (.019)	0.17 (.016)
Gal/Tan	-0.38 (.023)	-0.44 (.019)	-0.34 (.018)	-0.34 (.016)
Left/Right extremism		-0.16 (.008)		-0.07 (.007)
Gal/Tan extremism		-0.08 (.007)		-0.06 (.006)
$R^2$	.18	.45	.48	.59
$n$	98	98	73	73

Note: Ordinary least square regressions. Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Weighted by vote. Gal = green/alternative/libertarian; Tan = traditionalism/authority/nationalism.

West. Figure 4 provides a bird's eye view of support, neutrality, and opposition to European integration among parties placed in the two-dimensional space represented in earlier figures. The pattern revealed here is stark. Opposition to European integration is bipolar; it is located at both Left and Tan extremes. When we tap extremism, measured by squaring the distance from the median party on Left/Right and Gal/Tan, this boosts the fit of a model explaining party positioning on European integration from 18% to 45% (see Table 1).

The reason for this is that the European Union is a centrist project (Aspinwall, 2002; Hix & Lord, 1997; Marks, Wilson, & Ray, 2002; Taggart, 1998). The European Union has been created by mainstream parties—Christian democrats, liberals, social democrats, and conservatives—which have dominated national governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Many noncentrist parties attack European integration as an extension of their domestic opposition. The radical Left views European integration as an elitist capitalist project that isolates decision making from citizens in the interests of powerful corporations. Radical Tan parties view European integration as an elitist supranational project that weakens national autonomy and traditional values.

### Left/Right

The connections between domestic and European contestation come into sharp focus when one disaggregates European integration into its component

policies. The Left/Right dimension constrains party positioning on policies having to do with the political regulation of the market, including social policy, employment policy, and cohesion policy (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997). These policies—summarized by the term *regulated capitalism*—were promoted by Jacques Delors during his decade-long presidency of the European Commission (1985-1994) and became the project of the Center Left in its attempt to create a “citizens’ Europe” to counterbalance liberal market reforms (Ross, 1995). Regulated capitalism is opposed by the economic Right for whom market integration is a final destination rather than a point of departure. The Left/Right divide in domestic politics constrains the positions that political parties take on competing versions of capitalism in Europe (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 1999; Pollack, 1999; Rhodes & van Apeldoorn, 1997).

The data presented in Table 2 are consistent with this. Support for European employment policy tends to increase among parties on the Left ( $R = -0.53$ ), whereas support for the internal market tends to increase among parties on the Right ( $R = 0.34$ ).<sup>6</sup> If a party is one unit to the right on our 11-point scale, it will be an estimated 0.20 more favorably oriented to the internal market on our 7-point scale.<sup>7</sup>

### New Politics

EU issues that engage lifestyle, gender, environment, participatory decision making, and national culture are most closely related to the new-politics dimension. The location of a party on the Gal/Tan dimension is strongly associated with its support for an EU environmental policy ( $R = -0.62$ ), for an EU asylum policy ( $R = -0.46$ ), and for strengthening the powers of the European Parliament ( $R = -0.50$ ). As Table 2 reveals, the Gal/Tan divide is considerably more powerful than Left/Right in predicting party positioning across most policy areas.

Those committed to Tan values oppose European integration for the same reasons that they oppose immigration: Both infuse foreigners into the society, and both threaten the national community. The *Vlaams Blok*’s campaign slogan in the 2004 regional and European elections was “less taxes, more Flanders; less crime, more Flanders; less immigration, more Flanders”—an update of its “Safe Flanders” in the 2003 Belgian elections. The central plank of the party platform in the regional elections was opposition to immigrant

6. We assume that larger parties have a larger impact on the structure of competition. So, in this and following analyses, we weigh party positions by the percentage of votes a party receives in the national election in the survey year or the nearest prior year. Our results are robust across weighted and nonweighted analyses.

7. The unstandardized coefficient of the regression is 0.196, and its standard error is 0.015.

**Table 2**  
**West Versus East: Left/Right, Gal/Tan, and Party Position**  
**on European Policies**

	West		East	
	Left/Right	Gal/Tan	Left/Right	Gal/Tan
European integration	0.04	-0.30	0.52	-0.65
European Parliament powers	-0.17	-0.50	0.32	-0.57
Internal market policy	0.34	-0.18	0.64	-0.68
Employment policy	-0.53	-0.55	0.12	-0.53
Agricultural policy	0.11	0.29	-0.48	0.30
Cohesion policy	-0.25	-0.18	0.18	-0.30
Environmental policy	-0.59	-0.62	0.11	-0.27
Asylum policy	-0.23	-0.46	0.24	-0.56
Foreign and security policy	0.04	-0.33	0.38	-0.57
Enlargement	-0.11	-0.38	0.59	-0.71

Note: Bivariate correlations for 98 Western and 73 Central and Eastern European parties. Weighted by vote. Gal = green/alternative/libertarian; Tan = traditionalism/authority/nationalism.


voting rights. In its 2004 European election program, the Vlaams Blok supported “an intergovernmental EU” and was opposed to “European citizenship and a European Constitution as proposed by the European Convention. Only states can decide who their subjects are. The EU is no state and should never become one.”<sup>8</sup>

Defense of national sovereignty lies close to the hearts of those on the Tan side. In this, they are different from market liberals. Market liberals view national sovereignty in terms of its implications for economic exchange. Radical Tan parties defend national sovereignty as an intrinsic value.

Radical Tan parties are the most Euro-skeptical party family in the West. Their average position on European integration is 2.5 on a 7-point scale, compared with 3.3 for radical Left parties and 5.6 for all Western European parties. Conservative parties that lean to the Tan side of the new-politics dimension tend to be considerably more Euro-skeptical than those that do not. Conversely, Gal values are consistent with support for European integration. Green parties are the most Euro-enthusiastic party family in the West on EU environmental policy and for more powers to the European Parliament.

8. See <http://www.vlaamsblok2004.be/pdf/europa.pdf> Vlaamsblok.be (accessed July 18, 2004).

**Figure 5**  
**Dimensions of Party Competition and Position on European Integration in Central and Eastern Europe**



Note:  $n = 73$  parties. On a scale from 1 (*strongly opposed to European integration*) to 7 (*strongly in favor*), supporting parties have a score between 4.5 and 7; neutral parties have a score between 3.51 and 4.49; opposing parties have a score between 1 and 3.5.

### Party Positioning on European Integration in Central and Eastern Europe

#### Unipolar Euro-Skepticism

As in the West, Euro-skepticism in Central and Eastern Europe is prevalent among radical Left parties and among radical Tan parties. But, in contrast to the West, radical Left and radical Tan values tend to combine in the same parties. So, as Figure 5 illustrates, Euro-skepticism in the East is unipolar. A simple model with two linear variables tapping Left/Right and Gal/Tan captures 48% of the variance in party positioning on European integration (Table 1).<sup>9</sup> Variables tapping extremism increase the proportion of variation

9. These two dimensions are far more powerful than national location. ANOVA analysis of general support for European integration using national dummy variables explains 8.6% of vari-

explained, but the effect is smaller than in the West. When we add variables to capture the nonlinear effect of extremism, the coefficient of determination increases to 59%.

### Left/Right and Gal/Tan

Party positioning on European integration reflects—and reinforces—the axis of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe. Right-Gal parties tend to support European integration; Left-Tan parties tend to be skeptical.

Socioeconomic interests underpin this. European integration gains the support of economic winners, the very people who support Right-Gal parties. Those who voted “yes” in accession referenda tend to be more affluent, educated, and professional than those who voted against (Pienkos, 2004, p. 469; Tverdova & Anderson, 2004). Those who feel that they are economic losers, or who lack the skills to take advantage of new market opportunities, are more likely to oppose European integration and to support parties in the Left-Tan quadrant (Chicowski, 2000; Tucker, Pacek, & Berinsky, 2002).

In Poland, opponents of European integration support the Peasants Self-Defense Party headed by Andrej Lepper, or the Catholic, nationalistic, League of Polish Families, with its close association to the Catholic fundamentalist radio station *Marya* (Szczurbiak, 2001; see also Batory & Sitter, 2004). In Hungary, Euro-skepticism has established roots in the radical Tan and the former communist Left: The Far Right Justice and Life Party and the Far Left Hungarian Workers Party are hard-core Euro-skeptic parties (Batory, 2001; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Taggart & Szczurbiak, 2004). Similarly, in Slovakia, opposition against European integration is pronounced among the radical Tan (Slovak National Party and the Right Slovak National Party) and the radical Left (Slovak Communist Party). All but 1 of 16 Euro-skeptic or neutral parties (i.e., those scoring below 4.5 on our 7-point scale for general support of European integration) are located in the Left-Tan quadrant. The sole exception is the Czech ODS (*Obcanska Demokraticka Strana*), the Civic Democratic Party of former prime minister and current president Vaclav Klaus, which is located in the Right-Gal quadrant and is depicted as neutral by our experts.<sup>10</sup>

---

ance among parties in the East and 10.4% in the West. With respect to European integration, one can say that political parties are much more diverse *within* than *among* countries. Similarly, party family is a much better discriminator for party position on European integration than is country. The standard deviation of party positions on European integration tends to be considerably larger within individual countries than within individual party families.

10. Klaus's Euro-skepticism appears rooted in his neoliberal opposition to particular policies, such as agricultural and cohesion policy, rather than in generalized disapproval of the pro-

All of this suggests that contention on European integration in Central and Eastern Europe is aligned with the major dimension of political conflict. Opponents and proponents agree that EU membership is a step toward a democratic capitalist society. The formal conditions imposed by the European Union on candidate countries, the so-called Copenhagen criteria, require both a market economy and institutional guarantees for transparent democracy and minority protection (Vachudova, 2005)—in short, policies associated with the Right-Gal quadrant of Figure 5. As Karen Henderson observes, “The EU makes demands of candidate states which coincide with the aims of parties at the pro-market libertarian end of the axis” (Henderson, 2001, p. 10). From the early 1990s, this has included the successors of several reformist communist parties, such as the Polish SLD (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*), which supports European integration “to demonstrate its repudiation of the past” (Pienkos, 2004, p. 464), the Hungarian MSZP (*Magyar Szocialista Part*), the Slovenian ZLSD (*Zdrucena Lista Socialnih Demokratov*), and several parties in the Baltic republics.

In Western Europe, European integration highlights tensions in the dominant Left-Gal/Right-Tan axis of party competition, and this limits the extent to which political parties can absorb European integration. By contrast, European integration fits hand in glove with the Left-Tan/Right-Gal axis in Central and Eastern Europe, and this explains why positioning on European integration is more structured in the East than in the West.

### Issue Bundling

It is one thing for a party to take a position on European integration from the outside, as political parties in the East have done. It is another thing for a party to take a position from the inside, confronted with decisions on whether and how to pursue integration on several fronts, as has been the situation for political parties in the West.

From the outside, European integration is perceived as a bundle, a take-it-or-leave-it proposition on membership. This is what we find in Central and Eastern Europe prior to enlargement. Here, contestation reflects different world views—“cosmopolitan opening” versus “national closure” (Batory, 2001, p. 6).

The SDKU (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union), Slovakia’s main rightist party and government party since 2002, is staunchly pro-market, pro-civil liberties, and pro-European. It “considers membership in the Euro-

---

cess itself. This is to say that the ODS unbundles European integration, as do conservative parties in the West.

pean Union and NATO as a possibility to speed up the modernisation of the country” (see <http://www.sdkuonline.sk/english/policy.php3>, accessed on August 24, 2005). The orthodox communist KSS (*Komunistická Strana Slovenska*) defends a diametrically opposite view not because it protests against particular policies but on the basis of its claim that capitalism has been worse than socialism for Slovakia (Dauderstädt & Joerissen, 2004, p. 13). The same tension characterizes the EU debate in Hungary. “Asked what kind of European Union Hungary hopes for, the EU integration website (of the Hungarian Socialist party, the MSZP) answers that Hungary wants an efficient, transparent, and open EU” (Dauderstädt & Joerissen, 2004, p. 18). The party explains that “in the view of the Socialists, there is no other way of modernization for Hungary and more broadly Central Europe than joining the process of European integration as soon as possible, voluntarily giving up part of sovereignty and transferring that to the institutions of European integration” (quoted in Batory, 2001, p. 19).

As membership becomes a daily reality, we predict that issue bundling will decrease. Already, we see that despite their general support for European integration, Right-Gal parties tend not to favor an integrated agricultural policy—a policy designed for a constituency that provides them relatively few votes. The same logic suggests that despite their general Euro-skepticism, Left parties will tend to respond positively to European employment policy. However, we also predict that party positioning on European integration will continue to be structured by the Right-Gal versus Left-Tan divide so long as the European Union is perceived as a supranational polity that enhances market capitalism and cosmopolitan values.<sup>11</sup>

## Conclusion

The theory of party positioning developed for Western European political parties does, indeed, apply to Central and Eastern Europe. That is to say, the positions that parties take on European integration are coherently, and systematically, related to the positions they take on the Left/Right and Gal/Tan dimensions of contestation that structure domestic politics. But the outcome could hardly be more different.

In the West, there are two main sources of opposition to European integration: the hard Left and the hard Tan. These are located at opposite extremes of the axis of party competition. Left parties, such as the Swedish *Vänster-*

11. This is consistent with a recent study of Eastern European public opinion on foreign ownership and integration, where the authors find that support is best explained by ideological commitments to market ideals (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2004).

*partiet* or the Portuguese *Coligacao Democratica Unitaria*, oppose the market implications of European integration. They view integration as a Trojan horse for international capitalism. Tan parties, such as the *Danske Folkepartiet* or the French *Front National*, oppose European integration because they wish to defend national sovereignty. They believe that European integration undermines national communities.

The causal logic linking Left/Right and Gal/Tan to support or opposition to European integration gives rise to powerful tensions within Western parties. Parties that are Left tend to be Gal; parties that are Right tend to be Tan. So the underlying sources of opposition to European integration are spread across the map, as are the sources of support. The conflicts that arise from this are particularly acute for conservative parties, several of which are rifted between nationalism and market liberalism. The logic of party positioning on European integration is combustible when it is overlaid on the axis of party competition that distinguishes Western Europe.

The logic of support and opposition to European integration is the same in Central and Eastern Europe, but it interacts with an axis of party competition that is orthogonal to that in the West. The result is that opposition to European integration is concentrated among a single set of hard Left, hard Tan parties. Conflicts over European integration mimic the basic conflicts that structure these societies. The chief source of internal party conflict arises not from contending ideological pressures, as in the West, but from the new choices and constraints implied by membership.

European integration shakes and moves parties in a strikingly similar fashion across Europe. But because the domestic dimensions of competition—Left/Right and Gal/Tan—intersect so differently in the East and the West, a single causal logic of European integration produces distinctive patterns of party support and opposition.

## Appendix A

---

The analysis undertaken in this article is based on a data set gathered under the auspices of the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Center for European Studies. A survey conducted in 2002 by a team of faculty and graduate students (Liesbet Hooghe, Milada Vachudova, Erica Edwards, Moira Nelson, Gary Marks, Marco Steenbergen, and David Scott) tapped 238 country experts—scholarly specialists on political parties or European politics—to evaluate the ideological and policy locations of 171 political parties in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and all EU member states except Luxembourg.



The survey replicates and expands an expert survey of party positioning on European integration conducted in 1999 by the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill Center for European Studies and in 1996 by Leonard Ray at four different time points: 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 (<http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks>; Ray, 1999). Both of these surveys were limited to EU member states.

Three sets of questions in the 2002 survey attempt to illuminate policy positions, internal party dissent, and dimensions of contestation. First is a set of questions that tap the degree of support across parties for European integration in general and in the following policy areas: EU environmental policy, EU cohesion or regional policy, EU policy toward asylum seekers, EU employment policy, EU agricultural spending, internal market, EU foreign and security policy, expanding the European Parliament's power, and EU enlargement. Second are two questions that tap the extent of dissent within parties, as well as on type of issues. Third are questions that tap party positions on basic dimensions of political contestation, including an economic Left/Right scale and a new-politics scale.

Political parties are included in the survey if they fulfill one or more of the following criteria:

- The party received 3% or more of the vote in the general election for the lower chamber in 2002 or the most proximate prior year.
- The party was represented in the lower chamber of the legislature in 2002.
- The party was represented in the European Parliament in 2002.

The 238 carefully selected experts have recognized expertise on the political parties in a particular country—normally, but not always, their country of citizenship. They completed a detailed questionnaire, which can be consulted at <http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe> (three respondents submitted invalid responses). Our estimate of each party's position on each of these questions is the mean of the country experts' evaluations.

The extent to which expert evaluations are reliable can be gauged by examining the mean standard deviations. Table A1 presents standard deviations in responses to two key questions and suggests that the current survey is within range of the 1984 to 1996 Ray data. The Ray data are comparable to the Huber and Inglehart (1995) and the Laver and Hunt (1992) data. For a cross-validation of expert data with other data on party positioning, including manifesto data, European election survey data, and an elite survey, see Steenbergen and Marks (in press) and Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen, and Bakker (in press).

**Table A1**  
**Mean Standard Deviations of Expert Evaluations**

	1984	1988	1992	1996	<b>2002</b>
Party position	0.97	0.90	0.82	0.82	<b>0.82</b>

## Appendix B

### Description of the Variables

---

*Position on European Integration:* Mean expert score along a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly opposed to European integration*) to 7 (*strongly in favor of European integration*). Question: "How would you describe the *general position on European integration* that the party's leadership has taken over the *course of 2002*?"

*Left/Right Position:* Mean expert score on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (*extreme Left*) to 10 (*extreme Right*). Question: "Political scientists often classify parties in terms of their ideological stance on *economic issues*. Parties to the *right* emphasize a reduced economic role for government. They want privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, reduced government spending, and a leaner welfare state. Parties to the *left* want government to play an active role in the economy. Using these criteria, indicate where parties are located in terms of their *economic ideology*."

*Gal/Tan Position:* Mean expert score on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (*libertarian/postmaterialist*) to 10 (*traditional/authoritarian*). This score is reversed in Figures 1-5. Question: "Parties may also be classified in terms of their views on *democratic freedoms and rights*. "*Libertarian*" or "*post-materialist*" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, doctor-assisted suicide, same-sex marriages, and greater democratic participation. "*Traditional*" or "*authoritarian*" parties often reject these ideas; they value order and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority. Where are parties located in terms of their *ideological views on freedoms and rights*?"

*Left/Right Extremism:* Square of the distance of a party from the median Left/Right position, calculated separately for Eastern and Western parties.

*Gal/Tan Extremism:* Square of the distance of a party from the median Left/Right position, calculated separately for Eastern and Western parties.

---

## References

- Aspinwall, Mark. (2002). Preferring Europe: Ideology and national preferences on European integration. *European Union Politics*, 3, 81-111.
- Bartolini, Stefano. (2004, April 2-3). *Cleavages*. Paper presented at a workshop on the analysis of political cleavages and party competition, Duke University, Durham, NC.
- Bartolini, Stefano, & Mair, Peter. (1990). *Identity, competition, and electoral availability: The stabilization of the European electorate, 1885-1985*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Batory, Agnes. (2001). *Hungarian party identities and the question of European integration*. Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 49.

- Batory, Agnes, & Sitter, Nick. (2004). Cleavages, competition, and coalition-building: Agrarian parties and the European question in Western and Eastern Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43, 523-546.
- Chicowski, Rachel A. (2000). Western dreams, Eastern realities: Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33, 1243-1278.
- Dauderstädt, Michael, & Joerissen, Britta. (2004). *The European politics of left-wing parties in post-communist accession countries*. Bonn, Germany: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Evans, Geoffrey, & Whitefield, Stephen. (1993). Identifying the bases of party competition in Eastern Europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, 23, 521-548.
- Flanagan, Scott C. (1987). Value change in industrial societies. *American Political Science Review*, 81, 1303-1318.
- Flanagan, Scott C., & Lee, Aie-Rie. (2003). The new politics, culture wars, and the authoritarian-libertarian value change in advanced industrial societies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36, 235-270.
- Franklin, Mark N. (1992). The decline of cleavage politics. In Mark Franklin, Thomas Mackie, & Henry Valen (Eds.), *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western Europe* (pp. 383-405). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna, & Innes, Abby. (2003). Great expectations: The EU and domestic political competition in East Central Europe. *East European Politics and Societies*, 17, 64-73.
- Hall, Peter A., & Soskice, David (Eds.). (2001). *Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Henderson, Karen. (2001). *Euro-scepticism or Europhobia: Opposition attitudes to the EU in the Slovak Republic*. Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 50.
- Hix, Simon, & Lord, Christopher. (1997). *Political parties in the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, & Marks, Gary. (1999). Making of a polity: The struggle over European integration. In Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, & John Stephens (Eds.), *Continuity and change in contemporary capitalism* (pp. 70-97). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Marks, Gary, & Wilson, Carole. (2002). Does Left/Right structure party positions on European integration? *Comparative Political Studies*, 35, 965-989.
- Huber, John, & Inglehart, Ronald. (1995). Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies. *Party Politics*, 1, 73-111.
- Inglehart, Ronald. (1977). *The silent revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. (1988). Left-libertarian parties. *World Politics*, 40, 194-234.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. (1992). The formation of party systems in East Central Europe. *Politics and Society*, 20, 7-50.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Mansfeldova, Zdenka, Markowski, Radoslaw, & Toka, Gabor. (1999). *Post Communist Party systems: Competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. (1994). Die entstehung wettbewerbsorientierter parteiensysteme in Osteuropa [The emergence of a competitive party system in Eastern Europe]. In Wolfgang Zapf & Meinolf Dierkes (Eds.), *Institutionenvergleich und institutionendynamik*. Berlin, Germany: WZB Jahrbuch.
- Kopecky, Petr, & Mudde, Cas. (2002). The two sides of Euroscepticism: Party positions on European integration in East Central Europe. *European Union Politics*, 3, 297-326.
- Kostecky, Tomas. (2002). *Political parties after communism: Developments in East-Central Europe*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

- Lane, David (Ed.). (2002). *The legacy of state socialism and the future of transformation*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Laver, Michael, & Hunt, W. Ben. (1992). *Policy and party competition*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
- Lawson, Kay, Roemmele, Andrea, & Karasimeonov, Georgi (Eds.). (1999). *Cleavages, parties, and voters: Studies from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, & Rokkan, Stein. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: An introduction. In Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan (Eds.), *Party systems and voter alignments: Crossnational perspectives* (pp. 1-64). New York: Free Press.
- Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet, Steenbergen, Marco, & Bakker, Ryan. (in press). Cross-validating data on party positioning on European integration. *Electoral Studies*.
- Marks, Gary, & Steenbergen, Marco (Eds.). (2004). *European integration and political conflict*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Marks, Gary, & Wilson, Carole. (2000). The past in the present: A theory of party response to European integration. *British Journal of Political Science*, 30, 433-459.
- Marks, Gary, Wilson, Carole, & Ray, Leonard. (2002). National political parties and European integration. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46, 585-594.
- Meyer, Gerd. (2003). Values, small life worlds and communitarian orientations: Ambivalent legacies and democratic potentials in post-communist political cultures. In Detlef Pollack, Jorg Jacobs, Olaf Müller, & Gert Pickel (Eds.), *Political culture in post communist Europe: Attitudes in new democracies* (pp. 169-205). Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Penning, Paul. (2002). The dimensionality of the EU policy space. *European Union Politics*, 3, 59-80.
- Pienkos, Donald E. (2004). Consensus and division over Poland's entry into the European Union. *East European Quarterly*, 37, 461-473.
- Pollack, Mark. (1999). A Blairite treaty: Neoliberalism and regulated capitalism in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In Karl-Heinz Neunreither & Antje Wiener (Eds.), *European integration after Amsterdam: Institutional dynamics and prospects for democracy* (pp. 266-289). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Ray, Leonard. (1999). Measuring party orientations towards European integration: Results from an expert survey. *European Journal of Political Research*, 36, 283-306.
- Rhodes, Martin, & van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. (1997). Capitalism versus capitalism in Western Europe. In Martin Rhodes, Paul Heywood, & Vincent Wright (Eds.), *Developments in West European politics* (pp. 171-189). New York: St. Martin's.
- Rohrschneider, Robert, & Whitefield, Stephen. (2004). Support for foreign ownership and integration in Eastern Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37, 313-339.
- Ross, George. (1995). *Jacques Delors and European integration*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sitter, Nick. (2002). Cleavages, party strategy and party system change in Europe, East and West. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 3, 425-451.
- Steenbergen, Marco, & Marks, Gary. (in press). Evaluating expert judgments. *European Journal of Political Research*.
- Szczerbiak, Aleks. (2001). Polish public opinion: Explaining declining support for EU membership. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39, 105-122.
- Taggart, Paul. (1998). A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. *European Journal of Political Research*, 33, 363-388.

- Taggart, Paul, & Szczerbiak, Aleks. (2004). Contemporary Euroscepticism in the systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe. *European Journal of Political Research, 43*, 1-27.
- Thomassen, Jacques, & Schmitt, Hermann. (1997). Policy representation. *European Journal of Political Research, 32*, 165-184.
- Tucker, Joshua A., Pacek, Alexander C., & Berinsky, Adam J. (2002). Transitional winners and losers: Attitudes toward EU membership in post-communist countries. *American Journal of Political Science, 46*, 557-571.
- Tverdova, Y. V., & Anderson, Chris. (2004). Choosing the West? Referendum choices on EU membership in East-Central Europe. *Electoral Studies, 23*, 185-208.
- Vachudova, Milada. (2005). *Europe undivided: Democracy, leverage and integration after communism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Wessels, Bernhard, & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. (1994). Democratic transformation and the prerequisites of democratic opposition in East and Central Europe. *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 3*, 94-201.
- Zielinski, Jakub. (2002). Translating social cleavages into party systems: The significance of new democracies. *World Politics, 54*, 184-211.

**Gary Marks** is Burton Craige Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and is Professor in the Chair in Multi-level Governance at Free University Amsterdam. His recent books include *European Integration and Political Conflict*, coedited with Marco Steenbergen (Cambridge University Press, 2004); *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*, with Liesbet Hooghe (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); and *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States*, with Seymour Martin Lipset (Norton, 2000).

**Liesbet Hooghe** is a professor of political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is Professor in the Chair in Multi-level Governance at Free University Amsterdam. Her recent books include *The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images of Governance* (Cambridge University Press, 2002); *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*, with Gary Marks (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); and *Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance* (Oxford University Press, 1996). Her interests are in theories of European integration, multi-level governance, political parties, political elites, and public opinion.

**Moira Nelson** is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her dissertation examines activation policies in continental European welfare states. Her interests are in theories of welfare state reform, varieties of capitalism, and political parties.

**Erica Edwards** is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her dissertation focuses on internal party dissent over issues of European integration. Her research interests include political parties, public opinion, European integration, and gender and the welfare state.