Territorial Identities in the European Union

Gary Marks

“We are uniting people, not forming coalitions of states.”
—Jean Monnet

Whereas the process of European integration over the past two decades has been driven mainly by economic goals, the founders of the European Union were driven by larger ambitions. Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Henri Spaak, and Alcide de Gasperi conceived the European Union (EU) as a response to the horrors of war in Europe, as a means to tame or at least moderate destructive nationalism. The founders hoped to weaken national animosities by establishing an international legal order that would constrain realist anarchy. They wanted to domesticate international tensions within stable supranational institutions. Their long-term goal was to foster a European identity that would overarch and thereby temper contending nationalisms. Although the founders did not believe nationalism would be replaced by Europeanism, they were convinced that patriotism and attachment to Europe could coexist.

The founders of the EU conceived of European identity as an outcome of European integration. They were prepared to build European institutions in the absence of “Europeans.” The idea was to appeal to elites who would see the virtue of collective decision making in specific policy areas at the European level. Institution builders today do not have that luxury. European integration has become politicized. It limits the sovereignty of national states in obvious ways, and unless citizens feel some genuine attachment to the territorial community of Europe, the possibilities for further European integration will be constrained. Identity has shifted to the
left side of the equation; it is no longer a passive outcome of integration but now shapes the possibility of further integration.

How, it is asked, can one legitimately allocate values if the losers do not feel they belong to the same territorial community as the winners? Decisions about who gets what often involve redistribution among groups, and those who lose will find such outcomes illegitimate if they do not identify with the larger society. Fritz Scharpf has made the point that representation and majority rule are legitimate only in the context of preexisting collective identity: "As long as the democratic legitimacy of European governance must rest primarily on the agreement of democratically accountable national governments, the citizens of countries whose governments are outvoted have no reason to consider such decisions as having democratic legitimation."2

One possible implication of this argument is that it is not worthwhile to deepen democratic institutions to counter the democratic deficit if a European-wide collective identity does not exist.3 This position is taken by Anthony Smith in his recent book, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era:*

Nations and nationalisms remain political necessities because (and for so long as) they alone can ground the interstate order in the principles of popular sovereignty and the will of the people, however defined. Only nationalism can secure the assent of the governed to the territorial unity to which they have been assigned, through a sense of collective identification with historic culture-communities in their "homelands." . . . Since there is little sign that the competition of states, even in Europe, is being superseded by some completely new political order, the likelihood of the nation which forms the *raison d'être* of the state and its community of will being transcended remains remote. Even if a number of states were to pool their sovereignties and even if their national communities were to agree to federate within a single political framework, the national and its nationalism would long remain the only valid focus and constituency for ascertaining the popular will.4

The collective identity that is so crucial to democratic legitimacy in Eu- rope, however, was rarely intended to eclipse national identity. Monnet was well aware that national identities were so deep-seated among most Europeans that any attempt to overwhelm them was bound to fail. His goal, like most of those who came after him, was to gradually erode the vindictive elements of nationalism by planting overarching institutions that would nurture common interests.

This pragmatic conception of identity building in Europe was shared by Karl Deutsch. Integration for Deutsch meant piecemeal transfers of specific competencies to an overarching polity alongside the gradual evolution of a "sense of community." Deutsch argued that this was more feasible than "amalgamation," which involves a central government with exclusive authoritative control over individuals in a given territory. Although Deutsch did not rule out the possibility that amalgamation might be the ultimate destination, he argued that it would be self-defeating to make it the explicit goal. Ambiguity served a useful function. In a remarkably farsighted passage, Deutsch explained that "to encourage this profitable ambiguity, leaders of such movements have often used broader symbols such as 'union,' which would cover both possibilities and could be made to mean different things to different men."5

Ernst Haas came to a similar conclusion about coexistence of multiple European and national identities. He rejected the possibility that European identity would replace national identities. Haas coined the term *asymmetrical overlapping* to describe the nonstate form of governance he saw developing in Western Europe. In a passage that presages the concept of multilevel governance, Haas identified the possibility of multiple overlapping sources of governance at different territorial levels and corresponding "tiered multiple loyalties."6

More recently, William Wallace has argued that "the emergence of a diffuse sense of European identity has not led to a transfer of loyalties from the national to the European level . . . What we have observed across Western Europe over the last two decades is a shift towards multiple loyalties with the single focus on the nation supplemented by European and regional affiliations above and below."7

In the remainder of this chapter, I frame some expectations about sources of identity in Europe. The questions I ask are straightforward: How have the creation and deepening of the European Union shaped Europeans' diverse territorial identities? How strong and how widespread is attachment to the European Union? How is European identity linked to national, regional, and local identities? How can one begin to explain the pattern of identities we see?

I believe these questions are worth asking, even though the data I bring to bear on them are sufficient only to suggest the causal factors that may be at play. Previous quantitative analysis has focused on various measures of support for European integration rather than on issues of identity, and little systematic attention has been given to questions of multiple identity.8

**TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

First, I present a conceptual frame for analyzing variations in territorial identity (see Figure 4.1). I conceive of three basic types, each of which can be regarded as varying in any combination with the other two to describe individual territorial identity. At A in Figure 4.1, an individual has multiple identities—more than two coexisting identities; at B, an individual has an
exclusive identity, a single identity that overwhelms all others; the third corner of the triangle—\(C\)—admits the possibility that an individual may be unattached—with little or no territorial identity whatsoever. These three possibilities cannot be ranged sensibly along a single continuum, for the strength of territorial identity (and therefore the proximity of an individual to point \(C\)) is independent of the character of an individual’s identity—that is, whether the individual has an exclusive identity or multiple identities. Given variations among these three mutually exclusive poles, one may describe an individual’s territorial identity as lying at some point in the triangle \(ABC\).

Table 4.1 provides an overview of attachment to different levels of territorial community for fourteen countries (the EU-15 minus Luxembourg). The table is based on Eurobarometer surveys conducted in November 1991 and May–June 1995. In both surveys, attachments at the local, regional, and national levels are comparably high, a noteworthy finding given the emphasis in the popular press and in much scholarly literature on national states as the prime focus of territorial identity. In five countries—Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—attachment to country is significantly greater than attachment at the regional or local level. These are the only countries in which national attachment exceeds subnational attachment by 0.1 or more over both surveys or by 0.2 or more in one of the surveys. In France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden, attachment to country is matched by a subnational attachment. In the federal or federalizing societies of Austria, Belgium, Spain, and (western) Germany, country attachment is exceeded significantly by regional attachment.

Attachment to the European Union is much weaker than attachment to smaller territorial units. The difference can be summarized succinctly. Nowhere is mean attachment to the EU greater than 3.0 ("fairly attached"); attachment to all other territorial levels is never less than 3.0. At the individual level, however, a slightly different picture comes into view: 30 percent of the total number of individuals in the national samples are as attached to the EU as they are to their country.
Table 4.2 provides a set of simple correlations for intensity of attachment for individuals across pairs of territorial levels. These data allow one to come to grips with an important issue in the study of territorial identity: To what extent are attachments mutually exclusive or mutually inclusive? Does attachment to the nation come at a cost to EU or regional attachment? The data in Table 4.2 are unambiguous on this score. Attachments are mutually inclusive—that is, attachment at one territorial level is associated with greater rather than less attachment at other levels. There is no fixed sum of attachment an individual allocates across territorial levels—that is, attachment to the European Union, one’s country, region, locality, or town is not a zero-sum competition in which an increase at one level is matched by a loss of attachment at other levels. On the contrary, an individual with a relatively high attachment to any one of these territorial levels is likely to have a relatively high attachment to other levels.

This finding is congruent with responses to questions asked in Eurobarometer 38 (Fall 1992) concerning the relationship of European to one’s national identity. Whereas 30 percent of respondents viewed a European Union as a threat to their national identity and culture, 16 percent saw it as a protection. Sixty-two percent saw “a sense of European identity as being compatible with a sense of national identity,” compared with 23 percent who envisaged their “country’s identity disappearing over time if a European Union came about.”

Table 4.2 reveals two additional, second-order features. The first is contiguity: Associations between attachments are highest among contiguous territorial units. The strongest associations for any territorial level are those with the next level up or down. The second feature can be termed parochialism: Associations across lower territorial levels are stronger than those across higher territorial levels. To take the extremes, the association between attachments at local and regional levels (0.61) is considerably stronger than that at the country and EU levels (0.24). In the aggregate sample, parochialism is stronger than contiguity. The association between

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Correlation Matrix</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC attachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National attachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional attachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Town/Village attachment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 36.0.
Notes: * Pearson correlation (P value)
My larger purpose is to ask the reader to engage identity from a multilevel standpoint. Just as national states in Western Europe form only one part of a multilevel polity that stretches beneath and above them, so national identities form one element in a more complex multilevel pattern encompassing local and regional as well as supranational identities. This much is evident from the data presented here. How identities interact, how they change over time, and how they influence political activity are questions that lead us beyond Eurobarometer data. To make progress with such questions one must dig deeper. In the next section I examine evidence concerning regional and national identities in Catalonia and the Basque Country, and in the final section I engage macrohistorical issues of identity formation.

A NOTE ON CHANGE

The data presented in Table 4.1 suggest that territorial attachment taps deep-seated and therefore relatively stable orientations. Aggregated to the country level, shifts of just 0.3 point on a 4-point scale are rare: There are only three shifts of this magnitude and two shifts of 0.2 point among the forty-eight pairs of data points in Table 4.1. In the remaining forty-three cases, the change, rounded to one decimal place, is 0.1 or less. Of course, the two time periods may straddle a valley or a peak, but the similarity across two time points separated by almost four years indicates that attachments to territorial communities tap diffuse loyalties that are more stable than attitudes concerning the benefits of membership in the European Union.

Given the restricted time period for which commensurate questions were asked in Eurobarometer surveys, we must turn to other sources to probe change in territorial attachments. Some regional surveys for individual countries include questions on regional and national identity that have been repeated over longer time periods, and whereas they cannot give a general picture, they provide one line of sight into the issue of temporal change.

A question analyzed by Juan Linz in his 1986 study of identities in the Basque Country and Catalonia was repeated in surveys carried out by the Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social from 1991 through 1994. The first survey was conducted in 1979, the year in which Catalonia and the Basque Country were granted special status in the Spanish constitution. The second set of surveys was conducted roughly a decade after the establishment of regional governments in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the overall frequencies of territorial identities in the Basque Country and Catalonia.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 reveal that the percentage of people who have balanced multiple identities—that is, who claim to be both Spanish and Basque or both Spanish and Catalan—increased slightly from 1979 to the early 1990s, by 5 percent in the Basque Country and 4 percent in Catalonia. Table 4.5, which combines responses of all those who have multiple identities, whether evenly balanced or lopsided, shows a sharper pattern of change. In the Basque Country multiple identities rose 12 percent from 1979 to the period 1991–1994. In the Catalan case such identities rose 17 percent in the same period.

In both Catalonia and the Basque Country, the proportion of the population that regarded themselves as exclusively Spanish was small, 10 percent in the Basque Country and 16 percent in Catalonia. There was an even larger shift away from exclusive regional identity in the Basque Country, from 38 percent in 1979 to 27 percent in the early 1990s. A significant proportion of Basque citizens no longer view Basque and Spanish identities as incompatible.

The Basque Country and Catalonia are unusual regions in that they have strongly rooted ethnic cultures and distinctive languages, strong regionalist political parties, and entrenched regional governments. But it is worth stressing that the data reveal a shift not toward exclusive regional identity but toward multiple identity. The responsibilities of regional governments in these regions increased considerably during the 1980s at a time of intensive regional mobilization, and the outcome, as these surveys reveal, was multiple rather than exclusive territorial attachment. Neither survey posed questions about European attachments, but they suggest that the creation of European-level institutions may have deepened multiple identities that include a European component.

### Table 4.3 Distribution of Identities in the Basque Country, 1979, 1991–1994 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Only Basque</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. More Basque than Spanish</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Both Basque and Spanish</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. More Spanish than Basque</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Only Spanish</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/Didn’t answer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** The frequencies for 1979 have been excerpted from Juan J. Linz, *Conflicto en Euskadi* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986), 51.

**Notes:** The mean frequencies for the period 1991–1994 are derived from five surveys conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social (CIRES) in June 1991 (525 cases), June 1992 (67 cases), January 1993 (69 cases), January 1994 (69 cases), and June 1994 (190 cases). The question asked by CIRES was: “In general, would you say that you feel more Basque than Spanish, or more Spanish than Basque? 1. Only Basque. 2. More Basque than Spanish. 3. As Basque as Spanish. 4. More Spanish than Basque. 5. Only Spanish. 6. Do not know. 7. Do not answer.”

### Table 4.4 Distribution of Identities in Catalonia, 1979, 1991–1994 (in percentages)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Only Catalan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. More Catalan than Spanish</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Both Catalan and Spanish</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. More Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Only Spanish</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/Didn’t answer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** The frequencies for 179 have been excerpted from Linz, *Conflicto en Euskadi*, 43.

**Notes:** The frequencies take into consideration the 9 percent of people who did not answer this question or who gave other responses. Mean frequencies for the period 1991–1994 are from five surveys conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social (CIRES) in June 1991 (333 cases), June 1992 (191 cases), January 1993 (190 cases), January 1994 (193 cases), and June 1994 (192 cases). The question asked by CIRES was as follows: “In general, would you say that you feel more Catalan than Spanish, as Catalan as Spanish, or more Spanish than Catalan? 1. Only Catalan. 2. More Catalan than Spanish. 3. As Catalan as Spanish. 4. More Spanish than Catalan. 5. Only Spanish. 6. Do not know. 7. Do not answer.”

### Table 4.5 Percentages of Multiple Identities (Responses 2, 3 and 4), 1979, 1991–1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(from table 4.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(from table 4.4)</td>
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### EXPLAINING TERRITORIAL IDENTITY

How and why do identities change over time? To make sense of this question one must engage macrosocietal factors including, above all, coercive conflict, culture, socioeconomic interaction, and political institutions. The causal processes linking variations of the initial conditions described by these factors with patterns of identity are undoubtedly complex and condi-
of multiple identity. The deepening of subnational and supranational identities has proceeded without the check of war and the hardening of exclusive national state identities. The past half century has been one of diffusion—diffusion of authoritative competencies among multiple levels of government, diffusion of individual identities among multiple territorial communities.

War

Territorial attachments have arguably been shaped more by coercive relations—above all, war and colonial domination—than by any other factors. The solidarity produced within a territorial group engaged in coercive conflict with another group is perhaps the strongest social glue there is. Almost every account of the rise of nationalism and national states in Western Europe, and, more broadly, of ethnic consciousness in a variety of industrial and preindustrial settings, emphasizes the causal role of coercive conflict as a source of identity. As Anthony Smith summarizes his wide-ranging survey of the sources of nationalism and ethnicity, “protracted wars have been the crucible in which ethnic consciousness has been crystallized.”

Coercive conflict not only deepens ethnic or national identity but usually makes those identities more exclusive. First, war eliminates attachments that overarch the contending communities.5 War creates an extreme “us versus them” mentality in which those who have an overarching identity with both communities are forced to make a choice.6 Second, a war among states weakens substate attachments as it strengthens attachment to the warring community as a whole. Historically, national war has helped to integrate diverse groups into multiethnic societies such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly, war has had the effect of nationalizing territorially diverse societies such as the United Kingdom, France, and Spain. International war not only ratchets up the state’s capacity to extract and mobilize resources in a society, but it deepens commitment to the national community in a way that squeezes out other identities. In other words, war strengthens exclusive identity; it presses individuals toward the A corner of Figure 4.1.

A distinctive feature of Western Europe over the past half century is that it has not been the site of a major international war. The study of identity in Western Europe is therefore the study of identity in the absence of its most powerful source. This historically anomalous situation provides, I believe, a key to understanding the developments of the past half century. The absence of war has meant the absence of an immensely powerful influence toward exclusive identity, leaving causal space for a variety of other influences that have had the net effect of sustaining significant levels

Culture

Important streams of theorizing about identity emphasize culture—including particularly language, ethnicity, religion, and social transactions—as key to territorial attachment.19 With respect to language and ethnicity the European Union is extraordinarily diverse and is likely to remain so. To the extent that ethnic and linguistic commonalities are requisites for shared territorial identity, one would not expect to see multiple identities that encompass Europe as a whole.

The most influential line of theorizing, associated with Karl Deutsch, hypothesizes that territorial identities are created as populations integrate socially and economically.20 This premise rests on the supposition that common identities result from shared experiences and culture that, in turn, are related to the intensity of social and economic interaction among individuals. From a Deutschian standpoint, then, there are grounds for expecting a shift in the direction of a European identity with the increase in intra-European trade and commerce, the decline of border controls, the vast in-
increase in travel within Europe, the creation of Europeanwide political institutions, educational exchanges, and so forth. All of these factors, according to a Deutschian model, contribute to gradual cultural homogenization and increased personal trust among Europeans, thereby leading to shared identity.\(^{21}\)

One must pay detailed attention to intervening factors, however, to evaluate whether an increase in the density of individual interactions will deepen shared identity. Examples of increasing interaction leading to hostility rather than integration (e.g., in Europe during the first two decades of the twentieth century) suggest that no objective function links social/economic/political transactions to identity. It seems sensible to argue not that the effect of a given level of transaction on individual identity is an objective datum but that it is instead interpreted—and contested—in a political setting.\(^{22}\)

The process leading from transaction to culture to territorial identity is neither simple nor reflexive. First, the process is shaped by institutions (i.e., socially accepted formal and informal rules) that (1) constrain interactions within preestablished networks so that the type and incidence of interaction vary systematically across groups and (2) shape the way a given transaction affects participants—for example, through a setting of schools, labor unions, and firms that can vary across the relevant territory. Second, the process depends on actors (i.e., individuals and groups of individuals operating within a given field of institutions) who (1) have prior territorial identities that shape their interpretation of ongoing experience and (2) are influenced by political discourse in their local and national settings.

To evaluate the effects of institutions and actors on the link between transactions and identity demands a disaggregated research agenda. To what extent have student exchanges within the EU had a measurable effect on the patterns of identity of participants? How have orientations (and identities) of particular sets of individuals been influenced by European cable television, structural funding in the poorer regions of the EU, travel abroad, or living in a border region? These are just a few of the basic questions that are essential building blocks for a theory linking cultural convergence to multiple identity, yet we have little systematic information that bears on them.

Transactions across national borders may exacerbate exclusive identities. As Suzanne Berger has observed, “The conjunction of rising global flows of capital with new immigrant flows across borders once politically closed has heightened sensitivities everywhere to territorial facts, the control of frontiers, and national sovereignty.”\(^{23}\) Globalization may lead to irredentist reaction rather than liberal internationalism. Such reaction has been intensified by the efforts of radical right politicians to link economic disaffection to European integration and the decline of national sovereignty.

Clearly, one cannot argue straight from the density of transactions to the creation of identity; too much intervenes. It may be, however, that cultural convergence resulting from increased transactions serves as a necessary but not sufficient condition of multiple identity creation. This would be a weak and perhaps more plausible form of Deutschian theory.

The European Union cannot draw either on solidarity resulting from coercive conflict, or on ethnic or linguistic commonalities, and these are by far the most powerful bases of territorial identity. This alone may explain the relative weakness of European identity compared with identity at the national or subnational level. But it would be premature to stop here, for we still need to explain the positive level of attachment to the EU among significant minorities in the 1990s and the increase in multiple identity that has occurred in particular regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country.

**Economic Interest**

Instead of arguing that the sheer density of transnational transactions shapes identities, a number of writers have linked individual economic prospects under international market integration to support for the European Union. More generally, we can hypothesize that attachment to territorial communities is influenced by individuals’ perceptions of their economic fortunes under alternative scenarios. This would apply to national as well as international economic integration. The building of national states went along with the creation of national markets and the demolition of numerous local barriers to trade. In the process, village craftsmen and artisans employed in city guilds sought refuge behind traditional local and city privileges against rule making from the center. Conflicts between traditional guilds, based on monopoly rule setting in particular towns and cities, and new entrepreneurs seeking to escape those rules were an endemic feature of early capitalism across Western Europe.

In recent years, the link between economic life chances and the territorial organization of markets has again become transparent. Individual opinions concerning the personal economic implications of European market integration vary widely, from strongly positive to strongly negative, and we might expect that such impressions influence the level of individual attachment to the European Union. Their effect is magnified because the European Union is a relatively recent institutional innovation. In Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s terms, individual evaluations of EU policy output are likely to be particularly important because the polity cannot fall on reserves of diffuse loyalty.\(^{24}\)
Literature on the political economy of market integration allows us to relate individual location in the economy to EU attachment. A basic conclusion of this literature is that less skilled workers in protected sectors of domestically oriented industry stand to lose the most under market integration and that owners of export-oriented capital stand to gain the most.

The primary reason is that labor is far less mobile than internationally oriented capital, both across economic sectors and geographically. Owners of capital are able to shift the use of their productive resource in response to market pressures far more effectively than can workers. Although, in principle, freedom of movement exists for labor across national borders, it is limited by cultural and linguistic barriers. The effects of contrasting mobility are amplified by national economic regulation. National governments have a strong inducement to give special consideration to the political demands of international capital because it is so mobile. In seeking to retain existing capital and attract new capital, governments compete to provide a favorable regime for owners of capital, presumably at the expense of other factors of production. Finally, market integration has consequences for the relative organizational power of workers vis-à-vis employers. Employers, particularly those in export-oriented industries, can counter the demands of organized labor by moving—or threatening to move—investment to more accommodating labor markets elsewhere. Workers have been unable to redress their relative immobility by establishing transnational union organizations that encompass workers in relevant product markets.

These expectations are supported by Gary Marks and Richard Haesly in a multivariate logistic analysis of 1991 Eurobarometer data. The authors find that individual attachment to the EU is significantly associated with class position, sense of economic well-being, and respondents’ orientation toward the single market. Such relationships hold when controlled for education, political knowledge, and a variety of other individual background variables. This finding is consistent with the work of Agustí Bosch and Kenneth Newton and others cited in this chapter, although in none of these studies are the relationships particularly strong. Marks and Haesly find that on the basis of class, sense of economic well-being, and orientation toward the single market, individual attachment to the EU (on a four-point scale) can be “predicted” with a probability of slightly less than 60 percent.

A substantial body of research suggests a link between economic evaluations and support for European integration. One way to interpret the evidence is to say that specific support for economic integration spills over into generalized support for European political institutions. This has a precedent: Pride in German economic performance after World War II fed into diffuse loyalty toward the democratic institutions of the Federal Re-

public. If this process took hold in the European Union, it would be possible to speak of an economic route to European political attachment.

Political Institutions

A tradition in political philosophy has argued that identity may arise not only from the ingroup reinforcement of war or cultural commonality but also from a shared experience of political citizenship. Formal political institutions—in particular, parliaments, executives, courts, and civil services—may provide a locus for identity as symbols of a particular territorial community, by providing channels for meaningful political participation, and by making common policy for individuals in a given territory.

If this hypothesis is valid, one would expect to find that patterns of attachment reflect the distribution of political competencies across supra-territorial, national, and supranational political institutions—that is, that there are relatively high levels of regional attachment in federal polities and relatively high levels of national attachment in unitary polities. Table 4.1 confirms this hypothesis. The only countries for which regional attachment is higher than national attachment are Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Spain—federal or federalizing countries. From this standpoint, relatively low levels of attachment to the EU reflect lack of opportunities for participation at that level or a lag between the shift of competencies to the EU and changes in individual attachments.

Individual-level data are broadly consistent with this hypothesis. An extension of the citizenship hypothesis holds that individuals who participate more, have greater political knowledge of the EU, and have high levels of subjective political competence should be more attached to the EU. This is what we find, although the relationships are not very strong.

By the same logic, we would expect to see an increase in European identities as the scope of competencies in the EU has increased. An assortment of data presented in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott, supports this notion for the period up to the early 1990s. Bosch and Newton write that “one variable, however, stands out as important—the passage of time. Support for EC membership and for European unification simply grows slowly in the long term. Each year seems to add, on average, about a fifth to a quarter of 1 per cent for approval of European unification and EC membership.”

Recent surveys reveal that we cannot extrapolate this finding into the post-Maastricht era. EU support follows a jagged path through time. The overall level of EU attachment fell slightly between 1991 and 1995, whereas levels of specific support for European integration declined more sharply.
tion theory—it connects two factors that are mediated by actors and institutions. In the post-Maastricht era, European citizenship and identity have become salient issues in party-political competition in several member states. These issues spring from parties to electorates and back again; they are manipulated to gain votes or support for factions within parties, and they are interpreted and reinterpreted in partisan terms by the press. Consequently, it is problematic to model identity as if it resulted from an objective process of increasing transactions or opportunities for political participation.

**CONCLUSION**

The analysis of territorial identity is in its infancy. We know little about the pattern of individual territorial identities and even less about how and why those identities change over time. Instead of drowning in a sea of data, researchers strive to gain whatever tidbits of systematic information are available. The thrust of this chapter has been to set out a conceptual framework to map individual identity and discuss some factors that may explain what is found in Eurobarometer surveys.

In terms of identity creation, European integration over the past half century has been very different from state building during the previous two centuries. It is not simply that the degree of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity in the European Union is far greater than that in any member state but also that the forces of identity creation in European integration appear to be far weaker than those in the process of state building. European integration has been driven by an economic rather than a war-making logic; as a result, its capacity to transform individuals appears to be weaker.

But I do not draw the implication that common territorial identity is a chimera in the EU. This chapter argues that identity should not be conceived in all-or-nothing terms or as the result of a tradeoff among loyalties at different territorial levels. I have mapped territorial identity along two dimensions: intensity of attachment to a particular territorial community and exclusive versus multiple attachment across one or more territorial levels. It is not unusual to find individuals in the European Union who have relatively intense multiple identities. But the big questions remain unanswered: How can one explain variation among individual identities across time and place? How are different territorial identities mobilized in different contexts? How do individuals act on the basis of different patterns of territorial identity?

The offshoot of this inquiry is that we should regard with skepticism claims that democratic institutions cannot be deepened in the EU because there is too little European identity. Even if we accept the view that identity must precede democratic institutionalization, it is not self-evident that EU identity is lacking. This chapter has explored patterns of territorial identity based on the presumption that individuals may have mutually inclusive territorial identities. We might frame similar questions in studying liberal democracy, for it is not self-evident that by democratizing the European Union one is undermining democracy in national states. If Europe is a multilevel polity in which citizens may have multiple identities, we can envision democratic channels at a multiplicity of levels. As states and nations lose their grip on authority and identity in the process of multilevel governance, we might expect received wisdom about the virtues of the national state to be questioned.

Historically, the national state was the crucible for liberal democracy, but is the national state the only context in which liberal democracy might flourish?

**NOTES**

I am indebted to Richard Haesly for ideas and Eurobarometer data. I also wish to thank Liesbet Hooghe, Leonard Ray, Jeffrey Anderson, Paul Pierson, Mark Pollack, and João Espada for comments and Tim Burch for editorial assistance.

1. I use the term European Union to encompass its earlier incarnations, the European Economic Community and the European Community.

2. Fritz W. Scharpf, “Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States,” in Governance in the European Union, Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds. (London: Sage, 1996), 26. My point of departure in this chapter is to explore the extent and sources of multiple identities, which include identity at the European level. A second response is the one taken by Philippe Schmitter who explores the scope for democracy in the absence of an overarching shared identity: “Why should individuals (and, for that matter, organizations) in the Euro-Polity have to be ‘nationals’ in some sense in order to act like citizens? Why could they not be loyal to a common set of institutions and political/legal principles rather than to some mystical charismatic founder or set of mythologized ancestors? . . . That, it seems to me, is the major issue. Not whether the eventual Euro-Polity will be able to reproduce on an enlarged scale the same intensity of collective sentiment that was once characteristic of its member nation-states, but whether it can produce an encompassing system of stable and peaceful political relations without such a passionately shared identity or community of fate.” Philippe C. Schmitter, “How to Democratize the Emerging Euro-Polity: Citizenship, Representation, Decision-Making,” unpublished ms.


Multiple identities in a system of multilevel governance bear some resemblance to Ernest Gellner’s description of prenational identity: “A great diversity and plurality and complexity characterizes all distinct parts of the whole: the minute social groups, which are the atoms of which the picture is composed, have complex and ambiguous and multiple relations to many cultures: some through speech, others through their dominant faith, another still through a variant faith or set of practices, a fourth through administrative loyalty, and so forth. When it comes to painting the political system, the complexity is not less great than in the sphere of culture. Obedience for one purpose and in one context is not necessarily the same as obedience for some other end or in some other season.” Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 139.

8. Several of the best quantitative analyses of European identity are contained in a single recent volume: Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott, eds., Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), which was published following an earlier draft of this chapter. See particularly the chapters by Oskar Niedermayer, Richard Sinnott, Bernhard Wessels


9. This table and the data for Figure 4.2 were prepared by Richard Haesly. Table 4.2 is based on data from Eurobarometer 36.0. At the time of writing, data from Eurobarometer 43.1 were not yet released for scholars. The duration of average level of attachment at the country level from 1991 to 1995 suggests that the patterns I derive from the earlier year are reasonably robust.


11. Because the data for 1995 are rounded to a single decimal place in the source currently available, I have done the same to data for 1991. This section is drawn from Gary Marks and Iván Llamazares, “La Transformación de la Movilización Regional en la Unión Europea,” Revista de Estudios Políticos 22, no. 1 (1995): 149–170.

12. I thank Iván Llamazares for these data. The ideas in this section are explored in the next.

13. Some surveys also indicate that the proportion of the Basque population that considers itself exclusively Basque has decreased since the late 1970s. According
to such surveys, from 1979 to 1989 the percentage of those who considered themselves "only Basque" decreased from 39.7 to 35.9, whereas the percentage who considered themselves "more Basque than Spanish" increased from 12.6 to 17.8. See F. J. Ilera, "Conflict in Euskadi Revisited," in Politics, Society, and Democracy: The Case of Spain, Richard Gunther, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 183.


15. By the same logic, cross-national alliances may deepen an overarching alliance identity as individuals develop attachments both to their respective nations and to the alliance in general. Arguably, this happened among the Allies during World War II. The strongest assertion of such transnational attachment was the sentiment that Britain and France and later Britain and the United States should merge into transnational states.


17. This hypothesis is plausible but, to my knowledge, untested.


19. For example, the writings of Anthony Smith, Hans-Jürgen Puhle notes that "to have a regional language and culture of one's own seems to be a minimum requirement for the formation of cultural and hence political nationalism." Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "Nation States, Nations, and Nationalisms in Western and Southern Europe," in Nationalism in Europe Past and Present, vol. 2, Beramendi, Máriz, and Núñez, eds., 13–38.


22. This is the approach taken by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).