How is contestation on European integration structured among national political parties? Are issues arising from European integration assimilated into existing dimensions of domestic contestation? We show that there is a strong relationship between the conventional left/right dimension and party positioning on European integration. However, the most powerful source of variation in party support is the new politics dimension, ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian to Traditional/authoritarian/nationalist.

DOES LEFT/RIGHT STRUCTURE PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?

LIESBET HOOGHE
GARY MARKS
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

CAROLE J. WILSON
University of Texas at Dallas

How is contestation on European integration structured among political parties competing in the member states? How is it related, if at all, to the political conflicts that have shaped political life in Western Europe?

The framework within which we pose these questions is the standard model of European party system dynamics consisting of the following elements:

- Contestation among political parties is limited to one or two dimensions. This renders competition among parties institutionally and intellectually tractable.
- These dimensions are, first, a Left/Right dimension tapping greater versus lesser government regulation of market outcomes and, in many party systems, a related new politics dimension tapping communal, environmental, and cultural issues.

The general question we ask in this article is whether issues arising from European integration are assimilated into these existing dimensions of domestic contestation. Can the positions that political parties take on European issues be read from their positions on the Left/Right and new politics dimensions? Or are these European issues unrelated—orthogonal—to these dimensions? Does European integration put a new and potentially disruptive set of issues on the agenda that cannot be swallowed within existing patterns of political contestation? If these issues are assimilated, how are they assimilated? What, in other words, are the substantive connections between party positioning on European integration and party positioning on the dimensions that structure domestic politics?

One must, we believe, disaggregate European integration into its particular policies (e.g., environmental, cohesion, and fiscal policy) to answer these questions accurately. Using expert data on 125 parties in 14 countries for a range of policy areas, we are able to do this.

We show that there is a strong relationship between the Left/Right dimension that chiefly structures party competition in European societies and European integration. We do this by taking a fresh look at the inverted U curve describing pro-integration centrist parties and anti-integration peripheral parties and by specifying the residual linear association between Left/Right position and position on European integration issues.

Second, we investigate the influence of a second dimension, a new politics dimension that we conceive as ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN). We find that this dimension is the most general and powerful predictor of party positioning on the issues that arise from European integration.

DATA

The analysis undertaken in this article is based on a new data set gathered under the auspices of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for European Studies. An expert survey conducted in 1999 by Gary Marks, Marco Steenbergen, David Scott, and Carole Wilson asks country experts to

evaluate the positions of national political parties on European integration on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 to 7), with the lowest score representing strong opposition to European integration and the highest score indicating strong support for European integration. One hundred twenty-three country experts reporting on their country of expertise evaluated the positions of a total of 125 political parties in all EU member states except Luxembourg.

The survey replicates Leonard Ray's 1997 expert survey of party positioning on European integration at four different time points: 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 (Ray, 1999).

The 1999 survey offers two additional kinds of data that allow us to simultaneously widen and sharpen our view of party positioning. First is a set of questions that tap the degree of support across parties for European integration in seven policy areas: EU environmental policy, EU cohesion policy, EU asylum policy, EU employment policy, EU fiscal policy, EU foreign policy, and expanding the European Parliament's power.[1] Second are items that tap party positions on basic dimensions of political contestation, including an economic Left/Right scale and a new politics scale.[2]

---

1. For example, the item for cohesion policy is as follows:

Now consider the issue of structural or cohesion policy. This policy transfers resources to the poorest regions of the EU and is the second largest item in the EU's budget. Some political parties wish to rein in or eliminate the EU's cohesion policy, whereas others wish to sustain or expand it. What about the leadership of the parties listed below?

2. Both scales range from 0 = *extreme Left* to 10 = *extreme Right*. The wording of the questions for the economic Left/Right and new politics dimensions is as follows:

Political scientists often classify parties in terms of the ideological stance they take on economic issues. Parties to the right on economic issues tend to emphasize a reduction of the economic role of the government; they want lower taxes, less regulation, privatization, reduced government spending, and a leaner welfare state that poses fewer burdens on employers. Parties to the left on economic issues want the government to retain an active role in the economy. Using these criteria, please indicate where the parties are located in terms of their economic ideology.

Another way parties are sometimes classified is in terms of their views of democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "post-materialist" parties tend to favor expanded personal freedoms and rights. Such parties, for example, support abortion, doctor-assisted suicide, same-sex marriages. They favor increased democratic participation and freedom of speech. At the same time, they oppose discrimination on ethnic, religious, political or sexual grounds. In sum, these parties want government to stay out of the life choices that people make and they promote widespread democracy. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas. These parties believe that the government should be a firm authority that expresses moral voice. To these parties, order is preferable to unbridled participation and freedom. On the scale below, please indicate where parties are located in terms of their ideological views of freedoms and rights.

Our estimate of each party's position on each of these questions is the mean of the country experts' evaluations. On average, there are nine experts for each country. Statistical tests indicate that these data are reliable within conventional limits and are consistent with alternative sources of available data (Marks & Steenbergen, 2002a).

THE LEFT/RIGHT DIMENSION

Whether and how the basic Left/Right dimension of contestation structures party positioning on European integration is the central topic of this special issue. What is the relationship between a party's Left/Right placement and its position on issues arising from European integration?

THE INVERTED U CURVE

Let us begin with some uncontested facts. Extreme Left parties and extreme Right parties share Euro-skepticism; parties in the middle, including most Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, Liberal, and Conservative parties, are generally much more supportive of European integration (see Figure 1). When one charts the positions of party families combining a Left/Right dimension with an orthogonal dimension indicating level of support for European integration, the result is an inverted U. Figure 2 displays just such a curve describing Left/Right placement and support for European integration and three selected policies for all political parties in the EU-14 in 1999.

How can one explain the U curve?

One explanation engages the strategic responses of parties and draws its inspiration from William Riker's (1982, 1986) work. "Within the constraints imposed upon them . . . each party attempts to strategically manipulate the European integration issue . . . to meet its goals" (Scott, 2001, p. 6). Parties that are successful in the existing structure of contestation have little incentive to rock the boat, while unsuccessful parties, that is, parties with weak electoral support or those that are locked out of government, have an interest in restructuring contestation.[3] The same strategic logic that leads mainstream parties to assimilate the issues raised by European integration into the Left/Right dimension of party competition leads peripheral parties to exploit

3. Geoffrey Evans (1999) raises an interesting counterexample, the decision on the part of the British Conservative Party to campaign against further European integration despite the fact that this issue was clearly orthogonal to the main Left/Right dimension. To date, the Conservative Party has failed to exploit this electorally.

Figure 1. **Support for European integration, by party family, since 1984.**
Note: This excludes protestant, agrarian, regionalist, and nonaffiliated parties. Only parties in EU member states that obtained votes in the national elections prior to the time of evaluation are included. Parties numbered 57 in 1984, 74 in 1988, 70 in 1992, 91 in 1996, and 93 in 1999. Scores vary between 1 = *strongly opposed to European integration* and 7 = *strongly in favor of European integration*.

European integration in an effort to shake up the party system (Hix, 1999a, 1999b). In Paul Taggart's (1998) words, European integration is a "touch-stone of domestic dissent" for peripheral parties (p. 384).

A second explanation emphasizes ideology and the ways in which extremism on the Left/Right dimension leads to extremism on new issues arising on the agenda. As Ernst Haas (1958) made clear, the EU is the product of party-political actors on the Center-Right, Center, and to a lesser extent, the Center-Left who have dominated decision making in Europe during the past half century. European integration is primarily a market-liberal project mitigated by some measure of regulated capitalism. The Euro-skepticism of extreme parties arises, therefore, not only from their opposition to the EU's policies but also because they reject the ideology of the EU's construction. So we expect a party's support for European integration to decline with its distance from the center of the Left/Right dimension.

Figure 2.   **Positioning on selected EU policies, by Left/Right dimension, all parties in 1999 (*N* = 125).**

Both explanations find confirmation in our data. We measure the stake that political parties have in existing dimensions of contestation with the variables electoral vote, which is the proportion of the electoral vote captured by a party in 1999 or at the previous national election, and government participation, a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the party participated in government in the period from 1965 to 1995. We measure Left/Right extremism by squaring the distance between a party's Left/Right location and that of the median party. We control for Left/Right position and GAL/TAN position.

Table 1 reveals that government participation is a strong and highly significant influence on party positioning on European integration. Electoral vote is insignificant in the presence of government participation but becomes highly significant when government participation is dropped from the analysis. These two variables are quite highly correlated (.58). Exclusion from government leads to Euro-skepticism, and excluded parties tend to be those that are electorally weak. However, weak electoral performance and exclusion from government only partially explain why parties oppose European integration. The effect of Left/Right extremism survives the controls we

Table 1
Multiple Ordinary Least Squares Regression for Party Positioning on European Integration

Model	Standardized Coefficient (β)	*t*-value
Left/Right extremism	−.41	−5.73
Government participation	.25	3.08
Electoral vote	.10	1.32
Left/Right position	.23	2.58
GAL/TAN position	−.48	−5.74
R^2	.52	

Note: N = 125.

apply in the model represented in Table 1. The ideological positioning of parties toward the extremes of the Left/Right dimension exerts a powerful influence on EU positioning independent of electoral performance or government participation.

A LINEAR RELATIONSHIP?

Beyond the nonlinear relationship captured by Left/Right extremism, is there a linear association between a party's Left/Right location and its support for policies connected with European integration? There are three distinct lines of response (Gabel & Hix, 2002 [this issue]; Hix, 1999a, 1999b; Hooghe & Marks, 1999, p. 88; Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999; Marks & Steenbergen, 2002b [this issue]; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000):[4]

- *The regulation model:* European integration is subsumed into the Left/Right dimension. European politics is fused to the basic domestic competition between the Left, which pushes for common economic regulation across Europe, and the Right, which favors less regulation. Party positioning on Left/Right and European issues coincide.
- *The Hix-Lord model:* European integration and Left/Right contestation are independent of each other. European integration engages national sovereignty and mobilizes territorial groups, which compete on where authority should be located. Left/Right contestation involves the allocation of values among functional interests. Hence, party positioning on domestic issues and party positioning on European issues are orthogonal to each other.
- *The Hooghe-Marks model:* Left/Right contestation shapes positioning only on European policies that are concerned with redistribution and regulating capitalism. Hence, the Center-Left supports European integration in cohesion pol-

4. The international relations model, which posits no connection between European integration and the Left/Right dimension, is clearly invalid for our purposes.

icy, social policy, unemployment policy, environmental regulation, and upgrading the European Parliament, whereas the Right supports market integration but opposes European reregulation. Left/Right location is related to a subset of European issues.

By and large, our data confirm the third model. Table 2 presents results of multiple ordinary least squares regressions for positioning on general European integration and on six EU policies. On general European integration, the more right wing a party is, the more it favors European integration. The regulation model incorrectly predicts the sign of the coefficient for Left/Right position. When we control for GAL/TAN and Left/Right extremism, there is no consistent linear relationship between Left/Right and various components of European integration. This result is consistent with the Hix-Lord model and with the Hooghe-Marks model, which distinguishes among the kinds of policy positions that are constrained by Left/Right positioning. When one examines policies to achieve European regulated capitalism, including environmental policy, employment policy, and cohesion policy, the effect of Left/Right position is quite strong and highly significant. Consistent with this, the coefficient for Left/Right position is insignificant, and the sign unstable, for policies that are distant from egalitarian and regulatory concerns, such as EU asylum policy and the power of the European Parliament. There appears to be an explicable pattern of orthogonality and association between Left/Right position and positions on the various elements of European integration.[5]

The linear pull of Left/Right location on parties' positions concerning European regulated capitalism is sharper when we examine the subset of mainstream parties. Our initial attempt to formulate the third model focused

5. Fiscal policy is an exception ($R = -.13, p = .361$). Fiscal policy is at the core of the struggle between neoliberals and proponents of European regulated capitalism. Yet party positions on this policy are not significantly explained by Left/Right location. The reason for this is that economic Left and Right both want fiscal coordination—but for very different reasons. Proponents of regulated capitalism wish to shift authority to the EU to redress the current imbalance between fiscal and monetary policy under the Economic and Monetary Union. EU fiscal capacity should, they believe, be strengthened to cope with asymmetrical shocks. Neoliberals, on the other hand, wish to maintain the mismatch between fiscal policy capacity and monetary policy. With monetary policy securely hived off to an independent central bank, national governments are induced to compete for investment by reducing the overall tax burden and shifting its incidence from mobile capital to less mobile factors of production. Greater EU fiscal coordination could accelerate this market-driven process by subjecting tax incentives for investors to EU competition authorities and by imposing budget discipline, for example, through the Growth and Stability Pact. As Jan Beyers and Bart Kerremans (2001) summarize the position of Belgian liberal parties on EU fiscal policy,

the Francophone liberals expressed the hope that EMU would spill over into a European fiscal policy. But "fiscal" did not refer to a larger EU budget. It rather referred to the har-

Table 2
Multiple Ordinary Least Squares Regressions for Party Positioning on European Integration and EU Policies

Policy	Left/Right Extremism		Left/Right Position		GAL/TAN Position		R^2
	β	t	β	t	β	t	
General EU integration	−.50	−6.74	.28	3.02	−.53	−6.00	.43*
European Parliament powers	−.38	−4.86	.15	1.47	−.61	−6.55	.37*
EU asylum policy	−.37	−4.95	−.15	−1.56	−.54	−6.08	.43*
EU environment policy	−.42	−6.49	−.24	−2.98	−.58	−7.47	.57*
EU employment policy	−.48	−6.37	−.29	−3.01	−.38	−4.21	.41*
EU cohesion policy	−.47	−6.56	−.35	−3.88	−.40	−4.63	.47*
EU fiscal policy	−.31	−3.57	.12	1.08	−.43	−4.13	.21*

Note: $N = 125$.
*$p < .01$.

exclusively on the moderate Left, the Center, and the moderate Right, that is, the Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Conservative Party families, which dominate national governments and represent 80% of the electoral vote across the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 1999). There is no inverted U curve here but a strong and highly significant downward sloping line from a pro-integrationist Left to a less integrationist Right for cohesion, employment, and environment policy. This finding is robust across controls for the variables listed in Table 2.

DISCUSSION

The Euro-skepticism of the extreme Left is decisive in creating the inverted U curve, whereas mainstream parties underpin the linear association between Left/Right position and support for European integration issues. We discuss these in turn.

1. Radical Left parties are highly Euro-skeptical, and this accounts for the inverted U shape describing all parties on the Left/Right dimension.

monization of national fiscal policies so as to avoid fiscal competition. The [harmonized] level, however, would have to be lower than the current level of taxation in Belgium. So liberals would like to reconcile two objectives: 1) avoiding that competition would erode the budgetary basis of the Belgian social security system, and 2) avoiding that a European fiscal policy would open the door for a European Keynesian state or for ever higher taxes. (p. 144)

Opposition to European integration is deeply entrenched among the radical Left. This opposition is not merely antisystem. It is rooted in the perception that European integration fundamentally threatens cherished radical Left goals and that the EU has been co-opted by mobile capital. For example, when the Swedish Social Democratic government applied for EU membership, its competitor to the Left—Venstre—responded that "the message in the Maastricht Treaty was the construction of a capitalist block" (Christensen, 1996, p. 534). In the same vein, the Greek Communist Party, KKE, has virulently opposed membership in a EU of "monopolists" (Hermet, Hottinger, & Seiler, 1998, p. 245).

Underlying this reaction is the hard fact that the EU is fundamentally inhospitable to radical Left policy goals. Fritz Scharpf (1996, 1999) has made the point that there is an in-built institutional asymmetry in the European Treaties favoring market-deepening to market-correcting policies. Social Democrats expect that this asymmetry can be countered to achieve moderate reform. For the radical Left, the EU is biased beyond repair. Even EU institutions that facilitate regulated capitalism will not provide the kind of policies radical Leftists deem essential to curb market forces: public control over capital flows, extensive public investment in industrial policy, a statutory right to work, and a statutory reduction of the working week. And so the radical Left comes to the same conclusion as the radical Right, but for very different reasons.

Figure 1 illustrates that, in contrast to the Social Democrats, the radical Left has persisted in its opposition to European integration. This opposition is primarily motivated by ideological differences in economic Left/Right placement. Among the subset of radical Left parties in 1999, the association between Left/Right position and position on European integration is powerful and highly significant ($R = .74$). The association remains strong when we expand the subset to include all parties on the economic Left, that is, Green Parties and Social Democrats ($R = .68$). The more left wing, the more Euroskeptical.

2. Social Democratic parties have become distinctly more pro-integration as regulated capitalism has come on the European agenda. Parties on the Right oppose regulating capitalism at the national and European levels, and this leads them to selectively oppose European integration.

European integration is double edged for Center-Left parties (Hix, 1995a, 1995b, 1999a; Hix & Lord, 1997; Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Ladrech, 1997; Ladrech & Marlière, 1999; Marks & Wilson, 2000; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999). On one hand, it threatens Left achievements at the national level

because it intensifies international economic competition while undermining Keynesian responses to it. On the other hand, deeper integration may enhance the possibilities for social democracy by creating democratic, authoritative institutions capable of pursuing employment, environmental, or cohesion policy at the European level. As a Flemish Socialist (cited in Beyers & Kerremans, 2001) exclaimed during a parliamentary debate on Belgian participation in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1996,

> Why do you think that the German labor unions hope that the third stage of EMU will succeed? . . . They know that EMU will create the foundations for a Rhineland model on a European scale, for a project that will meet the needs of all Belgians and Europeans. That will be a model that will preserve our social welfare in a globalizing economy. (p. 144)

Social Democratic Parties are not monolithically in favor of deeper integration. Factions in some parties, particularly in Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, remain doubtful about the potential for European regulated capitalism and argue that although European legislation may ratchet up social democracy in poorer countries, it stands in the way of higher standards in the social democratic heartland of Europe. But this is a minority view. Majorities in one party after another have come to perceive European integration as a means for projecting social democratic goals in a liberalizing world economy (Hooghe & Marks, 1999; Katz & Wessels, 1999; Ladrech, 1997).

Figure 1 shows that Social Democratic Parties have shifted in favor of European integration during the past 15 years. In 1984, the largest pool of Euro-skepticism—measured according to electoral strength—was social democratic. Four Social Democratic Parties were rated less than 5 on our scale of general support for European integration—the Greek Socialist Party, PASOK (4.0), the Irish Labour Party (4.0), the British Labour Party (4.5), and Danish Social Democrats (4.7). In 1999, no Social Democratic Party had a score less than 5, and the average position of all Social Democratic Parties increased to 6.3, from 5.5 in 1984.

Similarly, the Left/Right dimension structures the positions of Right of Center parties to European integration. They support market integration—which means that they support European integration in general terms—but they oppose policies, particularly concerning the environment, cohesion, or employment, that regulate capitalism. When one restricts the analysis to political parties in the four mainstream party families, Left/Right position is far more powerful than Left/Right extremism and GAL/TAN position in explaining party support for EU cohesion policy (β for Left/Right position = $-.30$, $p = .075$) and EU employment policy ($\beta = -.72$, $p < .000$). On employ-

ment policy, Left/Right position alone explains 55% of the variance.[6] Social Democratic parties form the bedrock of the coalition in favor of EU employment policy. Support tapers off sharply as one moves to the Right. The strongest opponents tend to be parties toward the Right on the Left/Right scale, that is, neoliberal parties.

THE NEW POLITICS DIMENSION

The past two decades have seen the rise of issues concerned with lifestyle, ecology, cultural diversity, nationalism, and immigration. This dimension of contestation has been labeled postmaterialist/materialist (Inglehart, 1990), new politics/old politics (Franklin, 1992; Müller-Rommel, 1989), Green/traditionalist, and Left-libertarian/authoritarian (Kitschelt, 1994, 1995). One pole combines ecology (or Greenness), alternative politics (including participatory democracy), and libertarianism. We summarize this as the Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) pole. The opposite pole combines support for traditional values, opposition to immigration, and defense of the national community. We summarize this as the traditional/authoritarian/nationalism (TAN) pole.

THE ARGUMENT

Does a party's location on this dimension tell us where the party stands on European integration? Our expectation, as before, is that the greater the proximity of a new issue to a political party's established programmatic concerns, the more that issue will be assimilated into the party's ideology (Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, & Stephens, 1999; Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson, & Ray, 2001). To what extent, then, is the new politics dimension relevant for interpreting European issues? It takes little imagination to see that certain substantive issues, including EU asylum policy and environmental policy, are closely tied to existing new politics concerns. But the connection is deeper and more general. At its core is national sovereignty.

New Right parties react against a series of perceived threats to the national community. The threats are many: immigrants, foreign cultural influences, cosmopolitan elites, and international agencies. European integration combines several of these threats and poses one more: It undermines national sov-

---

6. When Left/Right extremism and GAL/TAN position are introduced into the equation, the variance explained is 57%. But neither of these variables is significant in explaining mainstream party positions on EU employment policy or cohesion policy.

ereignty. As scholars of European integration have long argued, one of the chief consequences of European integration is weakening the authority of national states (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Caporaso, 1996, 2000; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 1995; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Schmitter, 1996; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997). This is a core idea of multi-level governance, and it is anathema to those on the radical Right, which is why parties toward the TAN pole strenuously oppose European integration.

Parties toward the GAL pole are not so deeply motivated. They are driven by specific policy goals rather than profound antipathies. On one hand, European integration offers a prospect of more encompassing environmental regulation and enhanced locational choice for individuals. On the other hand, it threatens to intensify regulatory competition, weaken democracy, and disempower public interest groups.

The new data we have at our disposal reveal how powerful the connection between new politics and European integration is. The standardized coefficients for the GAL/TAN dimension in Table 2 are uniformly large and highly significant. GAL/TAN exerts a strong, consistent, and, it must be said, largely overlooked effect on party positioning on European issues.

Figures 1 and 3 begin to tell the story underlying these associations. Parties on the radical Right have become by far the most Euro-skeptic of any party family. In 1988, their average level of support fell below that of the radical Left, and the gap widened in the late 1990s. Support for European integration falls off a cliff at the right-hand side of Figure 3 for parties that are positioned at 7 or more on our new politics scale. If one isolates the right-hand side of Figure 3 (i.e., taking parties that score 5 or more on the new politics scale), the association between support for European integration and new politics is –.63. With the exception of environmental policy ($R = -.34$), the association between new politics and European integration is weak on the left side of Figure 3. Clearly, the TAN side of the new politics dimension drives the overall relationship.

DISCUSSION

The relationship between the new politics dimension and support for European integration combines the following three subplots:

1. Parties near the TAN pole, that is, radical Right and Right-populist parties, are without exception highly Euro-skeptical, and their relative electoral weight within their national party systems has grown considerably during the past two decades.

Figure 3   **Positioning on selected EU policies, by new politics dimension, all parties in 1999 (*N = 125*).**

The radical Right and populist-Right is the most Euro-skeptical party family. Their average score in 1999 on our 7-point scale is 1.92, with 4.0 being neutral. Common to all is a rejection of further political integration. They champion national sovereignty, and this leads them to favor at most an intergovernmental EU with retention of the national veto. The Flemish Bloc wants the EU to be "a confederate body for cooperation in economic matters, the fight against crime, defence, foreign policy, and other matters of common interest," and it "rejects a European superstate that is too centralist and too bureaucratic" (http://www.vlaams-blok.be, accessed on August 8, 2001). In the slogan of the French National Front, the radical Right supports a "Europe des patries." Most radical Right parties reject supremacy of EU law over national law, and they oppose EU parliamentary powers. The National Front wants to "restore the supremacy of French law over European law so that no European text can be imposed on the French without previously voted as a national law" (http://www.front-national.com/programme, accessed on August 8, 2001). The Danish People's Party "would like decisions in the EU to be made by the Council of Ministers in order that the European Parliament's own powers are reduced. The Danish People's Party would preferably

like to see the European Parliament closed down" (program of the Danish People's Party, cited in Benedetto, 2001).

Euro-skepticism sometimes encompasses economic integration as well. While the Danish People's Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, and the Flemish Bloc support free trade and the single market in Europe, others such as the French National Front and the Italian National Alliance have reservations. In the language of the National Front,

> the Europe of Brussels and Maastricht is a machine that crushes nations and people; it generates unemployment, a fixation with fiscal discipline, bureaucracy, and recession. Power is in the clutches of a handful of anonymous and irresponsible senior officials, who impose the homogenization of our legislation, put downwards pressure on our social systems, open borders to low-price imports and world-wide immigration, and force our integration in a new economic and political world order wholly dominated by the United States. (http://www.front-national.com/programme, accessed on August 8, 2001)

During the 2002 French presidential elections, Jean-Marie Le Pen announced that if he were elected, France would negotiate withdrawal from the EU (program of the French National Front, http://195.246.155.17/, accessed on May 15, 2002).

The views of the radical Right on Europe are an extension of their basic orientations. In the words of Le Pen (cited in Shields, 1995), "my European program is an exact extrapolation of the national program of the Front National" (p. 27). Since the 1980s, the Austrian Freedom Party's electoral campaigns have consistently forged connections between the threat to national identity, overforeignization (*Überfremdung*) and immigrant criminality, political and social corruption in Austria, and the arrogance of the EU (Luther, 2001). Nationalism, anti-immigration, and traditionalism go hand in hand.

European integration has mobilized the nationalist proclivities of the Austrian Freedom Party, the National Front, and new Right parties generally. These parties claim to speak for national pride and the silent majority of the nation—the electorally successful claim of the Austrian Freedom party is, "Wir Sagen Was Ihr Denkt" (we say what you think). The commitment of these parties to nationalism is prior to their commitment to authoritarianism. Radical Right and Right-populist parties are proud to call themselves national parties, whereas they reject the epithet *authoritarian*.

The Euro-skepticism of these parties is strongly linked to their opposition to immigration. They see themselves as defending national community and culture against foreigners (Betz, 1994; Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Hainsworth, 1992; Karapin, 1998; Kitschelt, 1995). In the June 1999 parliamentary elec-

tions, the Flemish Bloc's campaign theme was "Baas in eigen land" (in charge of our own country)—an update of their earlier slogan "Eigen Volk Eerst" (own people first). In the Netherlands, the radical-Right List Pim Fortuyn charged that "Nederland is vol" (the Netherlands is full). Anti-immigrant sentiment leads these parties to oppose free movement of persons in the single market, a concern that has intensified with prospective enlargement to the East. Jörg Haider, leader of the Austrian Freedom party, has opposed enlargement to the countries on Austria's eastern border: "From the moment we open our borders, 200,000 people will come here, settle, and look for jobs" (*Economist*, 1998, p. 55). Others, such as the National Front, tie cooperation with former communist countries to a strict immigration policy. The National Front rejects the Schengen rules and wants to reestablish full French control over its borders to keep out international crime, immigration, and terrorism. This is also the line of the two Right-populist breakaway Gaullist parties—former French Gaullists heavyweight Charles Pasqua's Rassemblement pour la France[7] and Philippe de Villiers's Mouvement pour la France, a breakaway from the French Gaullists and the liberal Union Démocratique Française (Flood, 1997; Hermet et al., 1998; Messina, 2001). The Mouvement pour la France (cited in Benedetto, 2001) proposes to abolish Schengen, reestablish French border controls, and repatriate non-European immigrants because a "multicultural society gravely menaces national identity. . . . Non-European foreigners in France should choose between assimilation or gradual repatriation." The Flemish Bloc, too, demands stricter European border controls to prevent immigration from outside Europe (especially North Africa and Turkey), and it wants to send back non-European immigrants (http://www.vlaams-blok.be; Messina, 2001).

Their suspicion of European integration is also rooted in traditional values. The National Alliance, for example, criticized the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights approved at the Nice intergovernmental conference in December 2000 for emphasizing rights rather than duties and for implicitly supporting "alternative family patterns" that "threaten the natural family, composed of man and woman, and this should be safeguarded in its integrity."[8]

Radical Right and Right-populist parties make up the largest reservoir of opposition to European integration. They anchor the association between GAL/TAN position and European integration. But GAL/TAN location does

7. Not coincidentally, Rassemblement pour la France is the name of the party created around Charles de Gaulle in the first days of the Fourth Republic.

8. "Documento della Delegazione di Alleanza Nazionale al Parlamento Europeo relativo alla Carta dei diritti fondamentali, alla riforma istituzionale ed all'allargamento dell'Unione Europea" (cited in Benedetto, 2001).

more than predict the position of parties on the extreme Right. It also predicts the positioning of conservative parties on European issues, as we describe next.

2. Conservative parties with a TAN inclination tend to be Euro-skeptical. The new politics dimension efficiently distinguishes among anti-integration and pro-integration mainstream party families.

Unlike radical Right parties, which are defined by their extreme location on the new politics dimension, conservative parties are distinguished mainly by their stance on the Left/Right dimension. However, several conservative parties, including the British Conservative Party, the Portuguese Popular Party, the Irish Fianna Fail, the French Gaullists, and more recently, Forza Italia, have a TAN orientation. The French Gaullists and Forza Italia have, from their founding, been expressly national parties. The Conservative Party, building on its Tory heritage, has always emphasized the unity of the British nation against peripheral nationalism, disestablished churches, and, during the 20th century, class conflict analyses (Baker, Gamble, Ludlam, & Seawright, 1997; Flood, 1997; Sowemimo, 1996).

While they are not so extreme as radical Right and Right-populist parties, these conservative parties defend national culture, the national community, and national sovereignty against the influx of immigrants, against competing sources of identity within the state, and against external pressures from other countries and international organizations. The French conservative Right has consistently condemned EU immigration and asylum policy as being too lax (Flood, 1997). Forza Italia explicitly rejects "a universal, multi-racial society that is rooted in the markets" in favor of a "Christian" model of society based on the "primacy of the nation understood in the romantic sense, as a nucleus and base of values, religion, culture, language, dress and tradition" (cited in the *Financial Times*, 2000, p. 2). Philippe Séguin, a leading voice of the French Gaullists, put it this way:

> A European consciousness does exist, and it can serve as a basis for a broad community of peoples. What does not exist is a single, homogeneous European people with some collective will to found a vast multinational state. We do have a European consciousness, but we do not have a European national feeling. So much the better. (Séguin, 1993, cited in Flood, 1997, p. 16)

The national orientation of these parties has an unambiguous bottom line for their position on European integration: The national state should defend its legitimate sovereign right to govern persons living in its territory. Euro-

skeptical voices in conservative parties rarely seek withdrawal from the EU, but they argue for a looser confederation that includes as much of Europe as possible, "from the Atlantic to the Urals," in Charles de Gaulle's words.

Conservative parties in Britain and France are riven by a struggle between nationalists and neoliberals about the future of the EU.[9] Nationalists oppose any dilution of national sovereignty, but neoliberals are prepared to limit national control if necessary for economic integration. This clash has dominated the internal politics of the British Conservative Party since the Maastricht Treaty (Baker et al., 1997; Baker, Gamble, & Seawright, 1999; George, 1998; Whiteley, 1998; Whiteley, Seyd, Richardson, & Bissell, 1994). After the 1997 national election, anti-Europeans gained the initiative, but pro-Europeans nipped at their heels. One result was to alienate the party from its traditional constituency—affluent, educated, middle-class voters— whose pragmatic pro-European attitudes fit uncomfortably with the party's principled Euro-skepticism (Evans, 1998, 1999). Yet in the wake of the Conservatives' decisive defeat in the June 2001 national election, a pro-European neoliberal candidate lost to a Euro-skeptic, nationalist candidate in the party's leadership contest. Similar disagreements in the French Gaullists propelled two staunchly anti-Europeanist factions to break away in the early 1990s (Flood, 1997). According to Peter Mair (2000), these cases "typif[y] a more general phenomenon, whereby Europe forces fissures inside parties which may then eventually be released in further fractionalization within national parliaments and national electoral arenas" (p. 36). Given the endemic conflict between neoliberalism, oriented on the Left/Right dimension, and nationalism, oriented on GAL/TAN dimension, we hypothesize that conservative parties are particularly prone to such fissures.[10]

One must refer to the GAL/TAN dimension to explain how conservative parties position themselves on issues arising from European integration. Our data reveal that the EU positioning of mainstream parties generally is strongly associated with the location of these parties on the GAL/TAN dimension. For 1999, the correlation between mainstream parties' positions on the GAL/TAN dimension and European integration is –.45. As one would expect, the relationship is yet stronger when one examines policy areas where

9. Other conservative parties have been less nationalist. Scandinavian conservative parties have defined themselves mainly in Left/Right terms, in opposition to Social Democracy, rather than as national parties (Ljunggren, 1988). These parties were unable to develop a strong national base in the countryside, with the result that the Left, not the Right, has been most successful in appropriating national symbols. Conservatism in Spain and Greece has striven to distance itself from its pre-democratic tradition, which combined reaction and nationalism.

10. Conflict within political parties is a vital element of party response to European integration, which we cannot pursue in the scope of this article.

integration involves loss of national authority, such as strengthening the European Parliament and developing a European asylum policy. The associations remain very strong and significant when one controls for the Left/Right dimension of contestation. Hence, the new politics dimension not only structures orientations to European integration among parties on the TAN side; it also structures party positioning in the major party families.

3. Green parties, located toward the GAL pole, have become more integrationist. This strengthens the association between the new politics dimension and support for European integration.

Opposition to European integration among TAN-leaning parties is not reciprocated by enthusiastic support among GAL parties. The mainstay of the GAL side, Green Parties, are equivocal about European integration. Green wariness about the lack of democratic transparency in the EU impedes general support (4.6 on a 7-point scale). As Elizabeth Bomberg (1998) observes, "Greens in Europe . . . face a strategic paradox: the incentives to work through the EU are great, yet how can they work through institutions that inherently violate green principles?" (p. 4; Rüdig 1996, p. 268). However, it is the Green Parties that have become the strongest supporters of European environmental policy (6.6 on a 7-point scale). Green parties also generally support strengthening the European Parliament (5.6 on a 7-point scale, second only to the Liberals).

A major determinant of Green Party positioning on European integration is the relative weight of pragmatic ("realo") versus principled ("fundi") tendencies. A second, related, influence is whether the party is purely environmentalist or combines Green and radical-Left views (Bomberg, 1998; Christensen, 1996). The more reformist and environmentalist a Green Party is, the more likely it is to support European integration.

In recent years, reformism has been ascendant in the larger Green Parties, including the influential German Greens. Back in 1984, the German Greens condemned European integration in sweeping terms as an attempt to create a European superpower. By the early 1990s, their position was more complex. Four Green Members of the European Parliament challenged the Maastricht Treaty in the German Constitutional Court on the grounds that it violated "eternal" German constitutional principles of "federalism" and "democracy" (Rüdig, 1996, p. 264).[11] But the party also made clear that it supported European integration in principle: "Especially in view of increasing nationalistic

11. The court rejected their claim but stated that further development of the EU had to be in step with the strengthening of democratic institutions.

and racist opinions and attacks in Germany and elsewhere, the Greens emphasize the importance and necessity of European integration" (policy statement of the Land Council, October 1992, cited in Rüdig, 1996, p. 263).

The French Greens have moved in the same direction. The Maastricht referendum of September 1992 precipitated an intense debate in Les Verts and Génération Ecologiste—the former straddling the issue and the latter recommending a yes vote (Rüdig, 1996). Poor results in subsequent national and European elections strengthened the pragmatic, pro-European wings of both parties (Bomberg, 1998; Hermet et al., 1998). Daniel Cohn-Bendit led Les Verts in the 1999 European Parliamentary elections on a manifesto that was expressly pro-integration.

All Green Parties, except the Irish and Swedish parties, have moderated their Euro-skepticism. It is no coincidence that these two small parties have a strong new Left current. Increasing support for European integration has been most pronounced in the larger Green Parties, particularly the Austrian, Dutch, Finnish, French, and German Greens.

Green parties are most favorably disposed to European integration where it touches their substantive commitment to protect the environment, strengthen democracy, and liberalize immigration law. These parties take pro-integration positions on the environment, strengthening the European Parliament, and asylum, and it is on precisely these issues that GAL/TAN location exerts the strongest influence relative to variables reflecting a party's Left/Right location (see Table 2).

The new politics dimension of contestation structures party positions on European integration because TAN parties are so deeply opposed. On the GAL side, Green Parties have become more favorably disposed to European integration in the 1990s, and we hypothesize that they have done so to the extent they are pragmatic rather than fundamentalist and Green rather than Red-Green.

CONCLUSION

We began by asking whether support for European integration is structured by two dimensions of contestation that predominate within EU member countries, and we can now answer that indeed it is. By disaggregating European integration into component policies, a detailed, explicable pattern of support and opposition comes into view. The programmatic convictions that constrain party positioning in domestic political arenas also constrain party positioning on European integration.

We find that the conventional Left/Right dimension—summarizing contestation about political control of the economy—structures European integration. Political parties located toward the Left extreme and the Right extreme—peripheral parties—are significantly more Euro-skeptical than parties toward the Center. The influence of Left/Right extremism is demonstrably not a facet of either weak electoral performance or exclusion from government.

Does Left/Right location influence support for European integration in linear fashion? We find that it does, but the effect is strongest on issues that involve the basic choice between a neoliberal Europe and European regulated capitalism. Party positions on EU environmental policy, EU cohesion policy, and EU employment policy are constrained by location on the Left/Right dimension. Social Democratic Parties that were merely lukewarm on the market-making project of the 1980s provide strong support for European integration in these policy areas.

The most important finding of our research is that the new politics dimension of party competition, ranging from GAL to TAN, powerfully structures variation on issues arising from European integration. The association is strongest at the TAN pole, reflecting the strength of nationalism among radical Right parties. However, the new politics dimension also influences the positions of major parties. We find strong associations between party score on the GAL/TAN dimension, overall support for European integration, and support for particular aspects of European integration, including environmental policy, asylum policy, and strengthening the European Parliament.

Given the lack of attention to this factor in our own previously published work and in the work of others, the strength of the new politics dimension is unexpected. We included a question on the new politics dimension in our survey on the hunch that it might be related to EU party positioning, but we had no idea that it would overshadow the Left/Right dimension. Perhaps we were not listening clearly enough to the insight that first sparked our interest in the effect of the Left/Right dimension: European politics is domestic politics by other means.

Our analysis of this phenomenon is no more than a first cut. There is much more to find out, particularly about how European integration plays back on domestic contestation. Does European integration bring some aspects of the new politics dimension to the fore while de-emphasizing others? Will European integration inject the issue of national sovereignty into party competition? Will this strengthen political parties near the TAN pole? We can only speculate about these basic questions arising from our analysis. What we can predict, however, is that future research on support for European integration

will investigate the new politics dimension of contestation as intently as it has investigated the Left/Right dimension.

REFERENCES

Baker, David, Gamble, Andrew, Ludlam, Steve, & Seawright, David. (1997, August-September). *The 1994/96 Conservative and Labour Members of Parliament Surveys on Europe: The data compared*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Baker, David, Gamble, Andrew, & Seawright, David. (1999, August-September). *Open regionalism or national political economy? New Labour and a Conservative consensus on the EU?* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.

Benedetto, Giacomo. (2001, May-June). *Scepticism and its antithesis: The case of Eurosceptics in the European Parliament*. Paper presented at the meeting of the European Community Studies Association, Madison, WI.

Berlusconi's immigration policy rings alarm bells. (2000, April 1). *Financial Times*, p. 2.

Betz, Hans-Georg. (1994). *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's.

Betz, Hans-Georg, & Immerfall, Stefan. (Eds.). (1998). *The new politics of the Right: Neopopulist parties and movements in established democracies*. New York: St. Martin's.

Beyers, Jan, & Kerremans, Bart. (2001). Diverging images of consensus: Belgium and its view on European integration. In K. Goldmann & K. Gilland (Eds.), *Nationality versus Europeanisation: The national view of the nation in four EU countries* (pp. 126-165). Stockholm: Stockholm University.

Bomberg, Elizabeth. (1998). *Green Parties and politics in the European Union*. London: Routledge.

Börzel, Tanja, & Risse, Thomas. (2000). Who is afraid of a European federation? How to constitutionalize a multi-level governance system? In Christian Joerges, Yves Mény, & J. H. H. Weiler (Eds.), *What kind of constitution for what kind of polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer* (pp. 45-59). Florence, Italy: European University Institute.

Caporaso, James A. (1996). The European Union and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory or post-modern? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *34*, 29-52.

Caporaso, James A. (2000). Changes in the Westphalian order: Territory, public authority, and sovereignty. *International Studies Review*, *2*, 1-28.

Christensen, Dag Arne. (1996). The left-wing opposition in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden: Cases of Europhobia? *West European Politics*, *19*, 526-546.

Evans, Geoffrey. (1998). Euroscepticism and conservative electoral support: How an asset became a liability. *British Journal of Political Science*, *28*, 573-590.

Evans, Geoffrey. (1999). Europe: A new electoral cleavage? In Geoffrey Evans & Pippa Norris (Eds.), *Critical elections: British parties and voters in long-term perspective* (pp. 207-222). London: Sage.

Flood, Christopher G. (1997, August-September). *Euroscepticism in the politics of the British and the French Right: A comparison*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Franklin, Mark. (1992). The decline of cleavage politics. In Mark Franklin, T. Mackie, & Henry Valen (Eds.), *Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Gabel, Matthew, & Hix, Simon. (2002). Defining the EU political space: An empirical study of the European elections manifestos, 1979-1999. *Comparative Political Studies*, *35*, 934-964.

George, Stephen. (1998). *The intellectual debate in Britain on the European Union* (Research and Policy Paper No. 5). Paris: Notre Europe.

Haas, Ernst. (1958). *The uniting of Europe*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hainsworth, Paul. (Ed.). (1992). *The extreme Right in Europe and the United States*. New York: St. Martin's.

Hermet, Guy, Hottinger, Julian Thomas, & Seiler, Daniel-Louis. (Eds.). (1998). *Les partis politiques en Europe de l'ouest*. Paris: Economica.

Hix, Simon. (1995a). Parties at the European level and the legitimacy of EU socio-economic policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *33*, 527-553.

Hix, Simon. (1995b). *Political parties in the European Union system: A "comparative politics approach" to the development of party federations*. Unpublished doctoral thesis, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

Hix, Simon. (1999a). Dimensions and alignments in European Union politics: Cognitive constraints and partisan responses. *European Journal of Political Research*, *35*, 69-125.

Hix, Simon. (1999b). *The political system of the European Union*. London: Macmillan.

Hix, Simon, & Lord, Christopher. (1997). *Political parties in the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's.

Hooghe, Liesbet, & Marks, Gary. (1996, March). *Birth of a polity: The struggle over European integration*. Paper presented at the 10th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago.

Hooghe, Liesbet, & Marks, Gary. (1999). Making of a polity: The struggle over European integration. In Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, & John Stephens (Eds.), *Continuity and change in contemporary capitalism* (pp. 70-97). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet, & Marks, Gary. (2001). *Multi-level governance and European integration*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.

Inglehart, Ronald. (1990). *Cultural shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jachtenfuchs, Markus, & Kohler-Koch, Beate. (1995). Regieren im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem [Governing in a dynamic multilevel governance system]. In Markus Jachtenfuchs & Beate Kohler-Koch (Eds.), *Europäische Integration* (pp. 15-44). Opladen, Germany: Leske + Budrich.

Jörg Haider, Austria's (and Europe's) border guard. (1998, July 11). *Economist*, *358*, 55.

Karapin, Roger. (1998). Explaining far-Right electoral success in Germany. *German Politics and Society*, *16*, 24-61.

Katz, Richard S., & Wessels, Bernhard. (Eds.). (1999). *The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European integration*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. (1994). *The transformation of European Social Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert (with McGann, Anthony J.). (1995). *The radical Right in Western Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, Lange, Peter, Marks, Gary, & Stephens, John. (1999). Conclusion: Convergence and divergence in advanced capitalist democracies. In Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange,

Gary Marks, & John Stephens (Eds.), *Continuity and change in contemporary capitalism* (pp. 427-460). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kreppel, Amie, & Tsebelis, George. (1999). Coalition formation in the European Parliament. *Comparative Political Studies*, *32*, 933-966.

Ladrech, Robert. (1997). Social Democratic Parties and EC integration: Transnational party responses to Europe 1992. *European Journal of Political Research*, *24*, 195-210.

Ladrech, Robert, & Marlière, Philippe. (Eds.). (1999). *Social Democratic Parties in the European Union. History, organization, policies*. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan.

Ljunggren, S. B. (1988). Conservatism in Norway and Sweden. In Brian Girvin (Ed.), *The transformation of contemporary conservatism* (pp. 120-144). London: Sage.

Luther, Kurt Richard. (2001). *From populist protest to incumbency: The strategic challenges facing Jörg Haider's Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)* (Keele European Parties Research Unit Working Paper No. 5). Retrieved from http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/spire/Working%20Papers/KEPRU/KEPRU%20Paper5.pdf)

Mair, Peter. (2000). The limited impact of Europe on national party systems. *West European Politics*, *23*, 27-51.

Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet, & Blank, Kermit. (1996). European integration since the 1980s: State-centric versus multi-level governance. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *34*, 341-378.

Marks, Gary, & Steenbergen, Marco. (2002a) *Measuring party orientations towards European integration: A new expert survey*. Unpublished manuscript.

Marks, Gary, & Steenbergen, Marco. (2002b). Understanding political contestation in the European Union. *Comparative Political Studies*, *35*, 879-892.

Marks, Gary, & Wilson, Carole. (2000). The past in the present: A cleavage theory of party positions on European integration. *British Journal of Political Science*, *30*, 433-459.

Marks, Gary, Wilson, Carole, & Ray, Leonard. (2002). National political parties and European integration. *American Journal of Political Science*, *46*, 585-594.

Messina, Anthony M. (2001, May-June). *Globalization and the surge of anti-immigration groups in Western Europe*. Paper presented at the meeting of the European Community Studies Association, Madison, WI.

Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. (Ed.). (1989). *New politics in Western Europe: The rise and success of Green Parties and alternative lists*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Ray, Leonard. (1999). Measuring party orientations towards European integration: Results from an expert survey. *European Journal of Political Research*, *36*, 283-306.

Riker, William H. (1982). *Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Riker, William H. (1986). *The art of political manipulation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. (1996). Exploring the nature of the beast: International relations theory and comparative policy analysis meet the European Union. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *34*, 53-80.

Rüdig, Wolfgang. (1996). Green Parties and the European Union. In John Gaffney (Ed.), *Political parties and the European Union* (pp. 254-272). London: Routledge.

Scharpf, Fritz. (1996). Negative and positive integration in the political economy of European welfare states. In Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter, & Wolfgang Streeck (Eds.), *Governance in the European Union* (pp. 15-39). London: Sage.

Scharpf, Fritz. (1999). *Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic?* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Schmitt, Hermann, & Thomassen, Jacques. (1999). Distinctiveness and cohesion of political parties. In Hermann Schmitt & Jacques Thomassen (Eds.), *Political representation and legitimacy in the European Union* (pp. 111-130). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Schmitter, Philippe. (1996). Imagining the future of the Euro-polity with the help of new concepts. In Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter, & Wolfgang Streeck (Eds.), *Governance in the European Union* (pp. 1-14). London: Sage.

Scott, David J. (2001). *The salience of integration: The strategic behavior of national political parties in the European Union*. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Shields, James. (1995). Le Pen and the progression of the far-Right vote in France. *French Politics and Society*, *13*, 21-39.

Sowemimo, Matthew. (1996). The Conservative Party and European integration: 1988-95. *Party Politics*, *2*, 77-97.

Stone Sweet, Alec, & Sandholtz, Wayne. (1997). European integration and supranational governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *4*, 297-317.

Taggart, Paul. (1998). A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. *European Journal of Political Research*, *33*, 363-388.

Tsebelis, George, & Garrett, Geoffrey. (2000). Legislative politics in the European Union. *European Union Politics*, *1*, 9-35.

Whiteley, Paul. (1998). The Conservative campaign. *Parliamentary Affairs*, *50*, 542-554.

Whiteley, Paul, Seyd, Patrick, Richardson, Jeremy, & Bissell, Paul. (1994). Thatcherism and the Conservative Party. *Political Studies*, *42*, 185-202.

Liesbet Hooghe is an associate professor of political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her principal areas of interest are European integration, political elites, multi-level governance, ethnic conflict, nationalism, and federalism. Her most recent publications are The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images of Governance *(2002, CUP) and, coauthored with Gary Marks,* Multi-Level Governance and European Integration *(2001, Rowman & Littlefield).*

Gary Marks is a professor of political science and the director of the Center for European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His most recent publications include Multi-Level Governance and European Integration *(with Liesbet Hooghe) (2001, Rowman & Littlefield),* It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States *(with Seymour Martin Lipset) (2000, Norton), and* Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism *(coedited with Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, and John Stephens) (1999, CUP).*

Carole J. Wilson is an assistant professor of government, politics, and political economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. Her research interests include comparative political behavior and the comparative study of political parties. Her current projects focus on responses of political parties and electorates in Europe, Mexico, and the United States to the process of regional integration. Some of her recent publications on these topics have appeared in the British Journal of Political Science *and the* American Journal of Political Science.